RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP 19 June 2008

On By Patrick ArmstrongIn RF SITREP

A NOTE ON FILLING THE PAGE. Today is the 490th Thursday that I have done a Sitrep. I have always been able to fill a page, some days more easily than others. This is the hardest I’ve worked to do so. For some years, we have been living with the “Russian Question”. One day, it, like the “Eastern Question” or the “German Question”, will pass and there won’t be enough happening to warrant weekly Sitreps. While that day is not here, we are, perhaps, closer to the desired end when Russia ceases to be a “Question” (with, FAR less bloodshed than the other two were settled, by the way, and far less than predicted by anyone). A “normal” Russia: one with which other countries may have trade disputes or strategic disagreements but will be confident that they can be settled “inside the box”. It’s a mixture of perception and reality: the latter changing much faster than the former.

TOURISM. A result of the growing prosperity of the Putin years has been a steady increase in tourism by Russians. 15 years ago the fear was millions of refugees; ten years ago thousands of criminals; the reality has become ordinary Russians on holiday. I have noticed this for some time but last year in the Mediterranean was interested to see that there are enough of them to justify guidebooks in Russian everywhere and we often had a Russian couple beside us in a cafe. This piece discusses the phenomenon. To my mind, the relative absence of such pieces in the MSM (although see JRL/2008/116/2) is a product of the meme that Russia is locked down by Putin and his Chekist minions. But, as Stalin understood, to really lock a country down, you can’t let people out and you can’t let people in. Perception and reality again.

POLITKOVSKAYA CASE. The Investigation Committee of the Prosecutor General’s Office has announced that it has “finalised” the investigation into her murder. Murder charges have been brought against three Chechens and the police officer, earlier rumoured to have been the “spotter” for the killers, has been charged with abuse of office and extortion. The editor of the paper for which she worked, which has been doing its own investigation, questioned how “finalised” the investigation was. While it was “on the right track”, he reiterated that there were more people involved than the three shooters. As was evident the moment the prosecution’s case was outlined, the murder was not something ordered by the Kremlin, as so many in Western media outlets rushed to assume. As I thought from the beginning, it appears that she ran across some piece of information a “biznesman” didn’t want known.

KLEBNIKOV CASE. This is also the likely explanation in the murder of Paul Klebnikov some years ago – certainly it is the heart of the prosecution case. The Presidium of the Supreme Court just ruled that the decision to return the case to the Prosecutor and suspend the trial was lawful. The Prosecutor General’s Office believes that he was murdered at the order of a Chechen “biznesman” (now apparently dead himself) who didn’t like what Klebnikov said about him in a book. But the prosecutors have been unable to produce either killers or witnesses as is not unusual in mob hits.

TNK-BP. I have no idea what is going on and it appears that there is no clear opinion elsewhere either. Some see it as another Kremlin-inspired takeover while others believe it is an internal dispute.

YOU JUST CAN’T KEEP UP ANYMORE! The newspaper that published the false report that Putin was going to divorce has announced that it will resume publication; on the other hand, the eXile is stopping. While the latter’s closing will be – is being – spun as pressure from the centre, so was the former’s. Apparently the eXile was no longer making money for its backers. Newspapers are dying all over the world.

NORTH CAUCASUS. Quite a number of evidently coordinated small scale attacks across the North Caucasus on and around Russia Day. In Dagestan, a bomb in Makhachkala killed one, the authorities were after a group near the Chechnya border, and a bomb was defused near Khasavyurt. In Chechnya there was an attack on a village in the mountains and a couple of attacks elsewhere and in the Ingush Republic an attack on a police post. Nothing like the scale of a few years ago but a reminder that the jihadists are still there, as they are elsewhere around the world.

CAUCASIAN RUMOURS OF WARS. There was an explosion yesterday on the railway line in Abkhazia on which the Russian railway troops are working. Tbilisi denies any involvement. There are, however, a number of Georgian militia groups in Western Georgia that are not necessarily under Tbilisi’s control. Meanwhile accusations and claims continue from all parties.

© Patrick Armstrong, Ottawa, Canada

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP 12 June 2008

On By Patrick ArmstrongIn RF SITREP

MEDVEDEV SPEECH. In his speech opening the St Petersburg International Economic Forum Medvedev said he wants to turn Moscow into a “powerful global financial centre”; well, to do so would require a substantial reduction of corruption, criminality and opacity. He spoke of liberalising the gas market and reducing taxes on the oil sector. He also spoke of helping to overcome the food crisis (but how? more wheat?). He took some shots at the USA’s financial policies and mused about how the UN or something could do it better. For the rest he tried to present a picture of a Russia, prosperous (1st DPM Igor Shuvalov next day said Russia would become the 6th largest economy by the end of the year) and an important and responsible participant in the world’s economy.

HUBRIS. That’s what it sounds like to me. Putin, yesterday: “Our country has asserted itself as a major economic player, it formulates principal items for global agendas. Russia is one of what one calls the chief newsmakers of the modern world.” My sarcastic response would be: only as an energy exporter; not very successfully; bad news. But seriously, while the contrast with ten years ago is striking and in Russia’s favour, it is not truly a big player, it has not had much luck with its interests (see NATO expansion, for example) and news coverage is all “energy weapon”, “journalist murders”, “aggression” and the like. I think the ruling class overestimates the strength of Russia’s position. That is a problem.

HUMAN RIGHTS. Some developments under the new regime. On the 10th Medvedev had a meeting with the Human Rights Commissioner Vladimir Lukin and that day signed two laws affecting the Commissioner’s position and the rights of prison inmates. In each case the theme seems to be to bring the Public Chamber and NGOs into the process. Lukin was quoted as cautiously approving the new laws. We shall see what difference they make. The Public Chamber is potentially an important force in Russia but it is still finding its feet.

AT LONG LAST. People who have suffered the Heisenbergian car trip to Sheremetyevo will be happy to know that a high speed rail link between the centre of town and the airport opened yesterday.

BUDGET SURPLUS. The federal budget surplus is reported to be about US$50 billion so far this year. What a change from the 1990s when enormous wage arrears were the main feature of federal finances. Now the problem is one of success: what to do with all the money without firing up inflation. Maybe it’s time to cut taxes: an increase in the threshold for the mineral extraction tax is in the works but individuals can usually spend their own money more wisely than governments can.

FRENCH CULTURE. There is an outbreak of cars being set on fire in Moscow: about 35 so far.

CHECHNYA. A Russian general has just stated that there are no plans to disband the East and West battalions in Chechnya. Which still leave a lot of questions unanswered. But, because Chechen conscripts are placed in these units Groznyy probably wants to keep them (and they are rather brutally effective).

SOCHI OLYMPICS. The decision to award the 2014 Winter Olympic Games to Sochi has repercussions. Quite apart from the (potentially eye-poppingly corrupt) process of building the millions and millions of dollars worth of facilities there, there are the Abkhazia implications. Sukhumi will want a piece of the action. The Russian companies involved will want to cut their costs by importing what they can from Abkhazia. This is likely the principal incentive to get the railway operating. An optimist would think that Tbilisi and Sukhumi will now have an opportunity to cooperate but I suspect that Sukhumi, remembering its sack in 1992 (quoting a Western scholar: “The campaign of looting, rape, torture and murder mounted by the Mkhedrioni in the region did much to poison relations between Mingrelia and the rest of Georgia… Georgian forces behaved similarly upon their entry into Abkhazia in the summer of 1992”). will not be interested. And Saakashvili’s record here and in South Ossetia does not inspire confidence. It’s probably too late. But the exigencies of the enormous construction effort in Sochi will likely make tensions worse. (Link to a rational and informed piece on Abkhazia: there’s a lot of baggage in this place and I can’t shake the fear that most Western officials haven’t a clue).

ABKHAZIA. Confirming my suspicion that Moscow’s principal motive in Abkhazia is fear of another war, Foreign Minister Lavrov said the other day that the Russian peacekeeping force had been increased not for “preparing any intervention” but “to prevent the possible use of force by our Georgian colleagues”. However, Medvedev and Saakashvili have had their first contact and maybe they can establish a better personal relationship.

 

© Patrick Armstrong, Ottawa, Canada

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP 5 Jun 2008

On By Patrick ArmstrongIn RF SITREP

MEDVEDEV IN GERMANY. The conversation appears to have been mostly about gas pipelines but Medvedev expressed concern about the “increasing gap between Russia and the West” on security issues and reiterated his intentions to effect a “qualitative transformation” of Russia.

PUTIN INTERVIEW. When he was in France, Putin gave an interview (English summary, Russian) to Le Monde. As usual, it’s a straightforward unemotional statement of his views on present and past. It’s a “one stop shopping” trip for Putin’s view of things. The English summary above leaves out his remarks on Abkhazia where he, once again, attempted to educate a Western audience that the problem has deep roots that cannot be wished away.

LITVINENKO. Those who still accept the standard explanation might find this interview with Edward Jay Epstein interesting. From the start I have thought that Litvinenko was engaged in nuclear smuggling for his friends in Ichkeria and poisoned himself.

MONEY. As of 1 June the Reserve Fund had $129.32 billion and the National Welfare Fund $32.60 billion. Much of the first is supposed to be invested abroad which is a compelling indicator that Russia wants a quiet world.

MILITARY CHANGES. Yuriy Baluevskiy has resigned as CGS and will become Deputy Secretary to the Security Council (is it still a parking lot for retirees?); Nikolay Makarov will succeed him. There have long been rumours that Baluevskiy and Defence Minister Serdyukov have been at odds and perhaps they are true. Or maybe, it’s Medvedev putting new makeup on the Russian face. Or maybe he’s had enough.

ENERGY. Medvedev has issued a decree setting targets for improving Russia’s efficiency in using energy. Just as well if we are indeed facing another Maunder Minimum.

POLITKOVSKAYA. The Prosecutor General’s Office has announced that the preliminary investigation into her murder should be complete by the 20th. Although, as the editor of her paper observed, the case can hardly be called finished when neither the killer, nor the man who ordered it, is in custody.

ALTERNATE FUTURE. On Tuesday Grigoriy Romanov died, aged 85. At one point, he was regarded as a strong contender for the post of GenSek. I think we’d be looking at a rather different, and much worse, situation today if he had been.

CHECHNYA. Groznyy continues its tiptoe towards as much independence as it can get: an official has announced that Chechen conscripts into the Russian army this year will not serve outside Chechnya.

CAUCASIAN RUMOURS OF WARS. The International Crisis Group has issued a report on Abkhazia. Unusually for Western discussions of the issue, it is both balanced and informed and doesn’t take the conventional route of blaming Moscow alone: “It [Tbilisi] has quietly been making military preparations, particularly in western Georgia and Upper Kodori. A number of powerful advisers and structures around President Mikheil Saakashvili appear increasingly convinced a military operation in Abkhazia is feasible and necessary.” I remain convinced that Tbilisi would lose such a war and that Moscow will do what ever it has to to prevent it. There is, as the report admits, a considerable danger of spillover, just there was the last time Tbilisi decided to solve the problem by war.

ABKHAZIA RAILWAY. The railway from Russia, via Abkhazia, to Tbilisi has been closed (and decaying) since the Abkhazia-Georgia wars of the early 1990s. In February 2006 an agreement was made between the parties to re-open it. Last week Russia put about 400 railway troops in to rebuild tunnels, bridges and power supplies. Tbilisi has complained, insisting that it never gave permission. The timing of the Russian move has probably some connection with the decision to award the 2014 Winter Olympic Games to Sochi. There will be more activities like this in preparing the area and Sukhumi is certainly hoping to make some money out of all the visitors to a city which is only about 30kms from its border.

PEACEKEEPERS IN ABKHAZIA. The end of the Abkhazia-Georgia wars established a Russian-Georgian-Abkhazian peacekeeping force which has been there ever since (and very likely prevented another war). Ukraine’s Defence Minister has said that Kiev will sent troops if Tbilisi wants it to. We will see what this amounts to: presumably Moscow and Sukhumi would have to agree as well if Ukrainian troops are to be added to the force, but it could be a productive step as Kiev has no axes to grind there.

 

© Patrick Armstrong, Ottawa, Canada

Five Hypotheses About the Future of Power in Russia

On By Patrick ArmstrongIn POLITICS AND POWER

Note: Originally in the now-defunct Russia Blog. Didn’t get this one right either because Putin did come back and, maybe, never really went away. I advance my explanation for why he came back here, in 2015. https://patrickarmstrong.ca/2015/10/05/i-wasnt-really-wrong-when-i-said-putin-would-retire-heres-my-rationalisation/

JRL/2008/ 53/ #15
March 10, 2008
Five Hypotheses About the Future of Power in Russia
By Patrick Armstrong

A consensus appears to be developing that Putin has contrived a means of staying in power indefinitely. The idea is that, one way or the other, Medvedev will be a dummy President and Putin, as Prime Minister will retain the real power. However, the accounts that argue this point – for example Christopher Walker at RFE – fail to consider one salient fact.

And that is that, had he wanted, Putin could easily have been elected President for a third term on Sunday. No one can doubt that one or two years ago Putin and his machine could have secured the necessary majorities to have removed Article 81. 3 of the Russian Constitution (“One and the same person cannot hold the office of President of the Russian Federation for more than two consecutive terms”). This is, after all, what the leaders Walker cites have done. It would have been by far the easiest way for Putin to stay in power: the Presidential machinery of power that Putin spent so much time building up would remain without change and with the same man in the chair.

But he didn’t. Therefore, any argument that Putin is staying in power has to explain why he didn’t take the easy route to that power.

Nonetheless, we did not know what will happen. I propose that there are five possible hypotheses for the future power structure of Russia.

We cannot yet rule out the possibility, despite the facts above, that Putin has contrived a means of keeping power. Two possible hypotheses flow from that:

1. Putin pretends to be Prime Minister and Medvedev pretends to be President, but Putin keeps the real power and makes the real decisions. This seems to be the consensus of commentator opinion.

2. Medvedev resigns after a suitable period and Putin becomes Acting President and is elected for a third, non consecutive, term.

The objections to either of these possibilities remain: if Putin had wanted to stay as the supreme power, amending the Constitution would have been much easier than this contrived and complicated process. Therefore these two hypotheses appear to be less likely than others.

Two more hypotheses are possible on the assumption that Putin’s concern was to ensure that the transition period be as smooth as possible. Indeed, his recent speeches, both in the Duma and Presidential elections, as well as Medvedev’s, have had one theme: “Do not fear, nothing will change, the same team and the same policy will continue”. Under this assumption, therefore, Putin’s saying that he will continue as Prime Minister, has the object of telling everyone, both inside and outside the Kremlin, that nothing will change. Supporting this possibility are all the rumours about power struggles inside Putin’s team over the past six months.

Two hypotheses come from this assumption:

3. He will not serve as Prime Minister.

4. He will serve as Prime Minister, but only for a few months in order to ensure that the transition has been completely uneventful.

A fifth hypothesis is that Putin wishes to break the one-man power system of Russia. Both he and Yeltsin were virtually the only actors and Russia has a long tradition of being a one-man system. One can see this phenomenon in Putin’s press conferences when Ivan Ivanovich from Bezbogorod phones to complain that his roof is leaking and that Father Putin should repair it. An exaggeration, to be sure, but many of the questions are appeals to the supreme power on details that, in a normal state, would be below his level of responsibility. Under this assumption, we have a fifth hypothesis.

5. Putin is attempting to break one man rule by establishing the Prime Minister as a powerful figure and creating a separation of powers between President and government and a certain creative tension.

In this connection, his and Medvedev’s speeches have concentrated lately on the next phase of the plan: what might be called intensive development. Under this hypothesis, Putin would be a powerful Prime Minister concentrating on the improvements that must be made in health, education, infrastructure, high technology and the other deficiencies if Russia is really to become a truly modern and prosperous country. As part of a team, of course – and this was the other great theme of recent speeches: there is a team running Russia, and that team will stay in place. This hypothesis, of course, has dangers in that Russia’s experience with dual power has not been a happy one and raises the possibility of real differences between the President and the Prime Minister or their apparatuses that could paralyse the country.

So, I can see five hypotheses in three groupings: that Putin is contriving a way to stay in power (but why then did he not do it the easy way?); that Putin is motivated by fears for the smoothness of the transition and finally that he is trying to use his prestige to establish the post of Prime Minister and government as real players in the Russian power system and not as mere puppets of the Presidential Administration.

At the moment there is insufficient data to decide for one of these and, as Sherlock Holmes remarked: “The temptation to form premature theories upon insufficient data is the bane of our profession”.

Early Thoughts on Litvinenko Case

On By Patrick ArmstrongIn ACCUSATIONS, PROPAGANDA, LIES AND NONSENSE, PUTIN DERANGEMENT SYNDROME

The initial story, which developed over a few weeks, was that Alexander Litvinenko, a former “spy” and opponent of Putin, met in a London sushi bar on 1 Nov 2006 with an Italian professor, Mario Scaramella, who had urgent information for him about the murder of the Russian reporter Anna Politkovskaya. Litvinenko returned home, became sick, was taken to hospital and died three weeks later from radiation poisoning. His last words were to accuse Putin of having had him killed. This story was widely disseminated in suspiciously similar wording. It, together with the murder of a Russian reporter Anna Politkovskaya in Moscow, has become woven into a story that Russian President Putin routinely has his opponents murdered. Some were more sceptical, but the January piece in the New Yorker magazine reiterates the thesis that Putin’s enemies tend to die suddenly. (Summaries of some of the UK and US reactions).

Russians are strongly irritated at the way the immediate consensus that Russia is run by a sort of Murder Inc has been accepted so uncritically. The more suspicious believe that the story is a consciously manufactured plot to defame Putin and Russia.

From the first reports, there were reasons to be sceptical of the initial story. 1) all the sources, Litvinenko himself, (and Tim Bell, a major British PR and advertising executive, who handled the publicity) were people who worked for Boris Berezovskiy (see below); 2) Litvinenko was known to be a very unreliable source; 3) Even if Putin were in the habit of murdering his opponents, there were many more profitable targets in London alone; 4) the death bed accusation appears to exist only in English, which Litvinenko’s widow said he “couldn’t really speak”, and was given out by Alexander Goldfarb, another Berezovskiy employee.

In 1997, while working in the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), in a section providing protection services, Litvinenko met Berezovskiy; shortly after, he was fired from the FSB (after dramatically stating that his superiors had ordered him to murder Berezovskiy) and began working for him openly. He moved to the UK and eventually became a British citizen. He had made a career of dramatic accusations – murder plots against Berezovskiy; Putin was responsible for the apartment building explosions in Russia in 1999; Italian politician Romano Prodi is a Soviet agent; al Qaeda is a KGB plot; Putin is a pedophile. He was never able to produce any convincing proof of these accusations and few paid much attention to him. There is also a claim that he was short of money and trying to blackmail people.

No single point of the original story has stood up in subsequent revelations

  • Improbability – If Putin were in the habit of murdering his opposition, in London alone, there are three people who would be much higher on his list. Oleg Gordievskiy (one of the highest-ranking KGB officers ever to defect), Berezovskiy himself and Akhmed Zakayev (an apologist for the jihadists in Chechnya). And would he choose such a complicated means and assign the job to people inept enough to poison themselves?
  • Mario Scaramella, the man with whom he met in the sushi bar in the original story. 1) denied his information was connected with Politkovskaya’s death); 2) none of the universities he claims to be associated with have heard of him; 3) is today under arrest in Italy accused of giving false evidence on a case involving arms smuggling.
  • Polonium-210. Traces of polonium-210 were found all over London: in numerous hotels and offices and in Litvinenko’s home. Further traces were found corresponding to the movements of Dmitriy Kovtun (see below). In this connection, Berezovskiy’s statement in 2005 that the jihadists in Chechnya were close to building a nuclear weapon may be relevant (polonium can be used as a trigger). There is some evidence that Litvinenko was exposed to polonium-210 more than once. The material is, in fact, not that hard to obtain.
  • Islamic Jihadist connections. Litvinenko 1) converted to Islam shortly before his death; 2) the rebel forces in Chechnya awarded him their “highest decoration” – what had he done for them and where were his loyalties?
  • Boris Berezovskiy. Berezovskiy made a great deal of money in the Yeltsin years (when he was known as the “godfather of the Kremlin”) and was driven out of Russia by Putin because he violated Putin’s declaration that the shady billionaires from the Yeltsin period could keep their money so long as they stayed out of politics. Berezovskiy was granted asylum in the UK and has said that he is trying to overthrow Putin. Litvinenko was employed by Berezovskiy when he left the FSB; it appears that Berezovskiy kept him on a retainer but had recently cut it leaving him eager for money. Alexander Goldfarb, the source for much of the original story, who has been naively described as Litvinenko’s friend, is Berezovskiy’s “right hand”.
  • Lugovoy and Kovtun. Andrey Lugovoy is another former FSB officer who quit to work for Berezovskiy; apparently he had known Litvinenko for some years. Dmitriy Kovtun is an associate of his. They were some of the people with whom Litvinenko met on the fatal day and traces of polonium-210 have been found on aircraft and in Germany associated with Kovtun’s movements. Both were reportedly made sick, but have recovered.
  • Coverage. The media likes simple stories and that is what it was given in the beginning: brave opponent of Putin’s dictatorship murdered. As the story grew, with new characters, multiple appearances of polonium-210, Chechen connections, Scaramella’s arrest, it has become so complicated that media attention has wandered. But the simple story has lingered, and many people are not aware of the details that cast doubt on it.
  • The three most significant new facts are: 1) the jihadist connection; 2) the widespread traces of radiation; 3) several cases of sickness of the principals (especially the case of Scaramella who met Litvinenko before Litvinenko met Lugovoy and Kovtun). What this evidence fits best is a story of nuclear smuggling in which the principals managed to contaminate themselves and spread radiation traces wherever they went. Clearly, the mystery remains, but all new evidence makes the simple original hypothesis that Putin murdered an enemy less probable.

Note: Feb 2016. In February 2009 I added this introduction

The death of Alexander Litvinenko, a former low-level KGB agent and employee of Boris Berezovsky, created scandalous world press. Western media were quick to intimate that President Putin had orchestrated the death, quoting, among other things, a deathbed letter written in English despite the fact that Litvinenko’s English was poor. More astute commentators observed Litivinenko’s connections with jihadists in Chechnya and the fact that Polonium, the radioactive material that killed him, can be used in making nuclear weapons; this theory is strengthened by Litvinenko’s deathbed conversion to Islam. Others concentrate on the fact that every story – and many appeared to be later discarded – came from one of Berezovsky’s employees: the original statement that he was sick with thallium poisoning, the Scaramella connection and the famous deathbed accusation. Berezovsky has publicly stated that he would do anything to bring down Putin; if Litvinenko was trying to smuggle the material to his friends in Chechnya, then Berezovskiy successfully spun the story so as to do great damage to Putin. The murder remains unsolved, but Russian state involvement seems the least likely explanation today.

And this final point:

  • Last year, an American reporter, Edward Jay Epstein, actually visited Moscow to look at the evidence the British police had given the Russians to support their accusation of Lugovoy and came away very unconvinced: “After considering all the evidence, my hypothesis is that Litvinenko came in contact with a Polonium-210 smuggling operation and was, either wittingly or unwittingly, exposed to it.” His account summarises the case very well.

Russia, The South Caucasus and the Caspian: A Handbook

On By Patrick ArmstrongIn HISTORY, SOUTH CAUCASUS

Russia, The South Caucasus and the Caspian: A Handbook

Patrick Armstrong Ph.D.

Ottawa, Canada, August 1998

Executive Summary

The Caspian Sea area is shaping up to be one of the biggest sources of oil and gas in the world. A conservative estimate gives about one-sixth the amount of oil as there is in the Gulf area. Every major oil-connected company (including many Canadian companies) is involved today in the oil business in and around the Caspian. Other interests will pull the West, into the area.

The Caspian area – particularly the Caucasus – is extraordinarily complicated: there is no other like it anywhere. Dozens of distinct peoples claim it as their home. Many more peoples have arrived “recently” (ie in the past millennium). Since 1991, six wars have been fought in the Caucasus and none of them has produced a final settlement. There are at least nine outstanding border disputes – ten if one counts the Caspian Sea itself. The area is so uniquely complicated, with such an entanglement of ethnic and historical concerns, that ignorance of its complexities can be fatal for wise policy.

This paper is intended to be a reference guide and not to be read straight through; continuous reading would, therefore, reveal a good deal of duplication. The Table of Contents has been arranged so that the reader can directly turn to the sections of concern.

The sections are summarized below.

  • “Oil and Gas” discusses current expectations of Caspian hydrocarbon reserves. It is thought that the Caspian area contains at least 100 billion barrels of oil and 500-600 trillion cubic feet of gas. But, as much is not yet explored, there may be more.
  • “The Land” gives an overview of the geography of the territory under discussion.
  • “The Peoples of the Caucasus” describes the extraordinary ethnography of the Caucasus in which are found, at least, twenty-six distinct peoples who call the area home. In addition to the “natives”, the years in the Russian and Soviet Empires means that many other peoples now make the area home.
  • “History” sketches the major events of the Caucasus from early times to the present. Generally speaking, the Mountaineers (the peoples of the North Caucasus) were independent until conquest, after a tremendous resistance, by Russia in the Nineteenth Century. The South Caucasus had lost its independence centuries before to Ottoman and Persian power. It was conquered (if Muslim) or “liberated” (if Christian) by Russia during the Nineteenth Century until, by 1900, for the first time in history, one power ruled the whole Caucasus. All peoples tried for independence after the collapse of the Tsarist Empire but were brought under communist power. Demands for independence re-appeared after the fall of the Soviet Empire.
  • Memories are long in the Caucasus and the section “National Dreams and Nightmares” recounts the national myths of the area. Georgians dream of the Greater Georgia of the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries. Armenians cannot forget the massacres of Armenians by Turkish power. Azerbaijanis seek to find their identity whether as Turks, as Caucasians or as Muslims. Mountaineers dream of a Mountain Republic, free from outside power. The collapse of Soviet power liberated all these dreams and nightmares.
  • “Diasporas” speaks of the large and influential populations of Armenians and Mountaineers who have transported their national myths to their new countries.
  • “Soviet legacies” briefly touches on the problems and – even – the benefits of seventy years of communist rule on the area.
  • “Sufism-Wahhabism – An Islamic Fissure” discusses a tension that has already caused strife in Chechnya and Dagestan and may cause much more. The traditional form of Islam in the east North Caucasus – Naqshbandi Sufism – appears to be under threat from a rigorously purist form of Islam from Arabia – Wahhabism.
  • “Post 1985 wars” gives a brief account of the wars fought in the area since the Gorbachev reforms began to release the pressures built up by the communist system – the Karabakh war between Armenians and Azerbaijanis; the Ingush-Ossetian troubles; the Russo-Chechen war; the Georgian civil war; the war between the Abkhazians and the Georgians and between the Ossetians and the Georgians. This section is the most argumentative portion because the fairly widely held belief that Moscow started and maintained these troubles must be combated. In most cases, these wars have their origins in Stalin’s border decisions, which the world recognized in 1991 and 1992.
  • “Potential Border Disputes” deals with some potential war-causing territorial and ethnic disputes. These have not so far caused any great amount of violence but could explode.
  • “Historical Hatreds” attempts to describe the attitudes that Armenians and Azerbaijanis; Georgians and Russians; Chechens and Russians have towards each other. These attitudes – hatred or contempt for the most part – greatly affect relations in this small area.
  • The sections “Kalmykia” and “Tengiz Oil and Gas Field” move the reader out of the Caucasus proper to the north end of the area. The Tengiz field is already producing and one of the possible pipeline routes from it passes through Kalmykia. Output may also be connected to the central Caspian fields and so this area may become connected to the Caucasus.
  • “Caspian Sea Borders” discusses one of the initial problems: the littoral states cannot agree on how to divide up the Sea. However, now that Moscow has virtually agreed to the position that Baku has held all along, this issue is close to settlement and the entire area will likely be exclusively divided among the littoral states.
  • “Pipeline Routes” briefly discusses the principal routes suggested for the exit of the oil and gas to their customers. A vexed question which has attracted some extreme statements, it seems that the Russian and Georgian routes will certainly be used while the others depend on the price of oil.
  • “National Interests” sets out what the players can expect to gain from the Caspian hydrocarbons. President Aliyev of Azerbaijan has very cleverly involved almost all players in almost all possibilities. This represents a force for stabilization as nearly all can become “winners” of something. But, three players – Armenia, Karabakh and Abkhazia (and the last two are the local military powers) – have been altogether left out. Russia’s involvement is also discussed and it is argued that Moscow’s involvement is no more or less malign than anyone else’s and that any attempt to cut Moscow out of the profits is, simply, impossible.
  • “Federalism” highlights what is probably the only stable long-term solution for the area in which a mono-ethnic “homeland” state can only be established by war.

A number of appendices complete the Handbook.

If there is as much oil and gas in the Caspian as there seems to be, the Caspian, and all the peculiar problems of the peoples who live nearby, will be the stuff of headlines, international meetings and briefings for years to come.

>>Download the full-text document in PDF format (1. 06 MB)