LIBYA. After Russia abstained on the UNSC resolution, allowing it to pass, the Foreign Ministry spokesman piously objected when the “no fly zone” enforcement began exactly as the US Defense Secretary had said it would two weeks before. Much as it may please some Russians to throw that fatuous word “disproportionate” back at the West, this is pretty hypocritical. Russia could have stopped it by veto. Meanwhile Medvedev has declared that Moscow is ready to mediate. That may happen yet: for all I know, NATO would still be fighting in Kosovo if Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari hadn’t stepped in.

SPLIT IN THE DUUMVIRATE? Is there a difference between Putin and Medvedev on Libya? Putin said that the resolution reminded him of “a medieval call to crusade”; shortly afterwards, Medvedev said that to talk of crusades was “unacceptable”. Certainly Medvedev seems more comfortable (or less uncomfortable) with the operation than Putin does (not surprisingly given the number of times Putin was burned by the West.). Although, when meeting with the US Defense Secretary, Medvedev used the words “indiscriminate use of air power”. Which it is not (but then, the Russians don’t have JDAMs. See below). When Medvedev (in Moscow) made his formal statement, was he aware that Putin (in the Udmurt Republic) had given his “personal opinion” about four hours earlier? On the other hand the word “Crusaders” is commonly used by jihadists to describe the West and Gaddafi is using it too. So, coincidence or direct rebuke? Putin (in Slovenia) has denied any split: “We have a president in Russia who directs foreign policy and there can not be a split”. Yesterday he (in Serbia) eased off a bit more. What this incident does show is that the assumption that Putin is the puppet master and Medvedev the puppet is naïve.

DEFENCE INDUSTRY. The battle continues. As Russia tries to catch up after a twenty-year pause in weapons design and production, the question arises as to whether what’s left of the old Soviet weapons industry is competitive. In a number of categories – UAVs, assault ships, light AFVs – the decision seems to be that it is not. But there are many more categories over which to argue. In a direct riposte to the Ground Forces Commander’s assertion that the T-90 MBT was inferior to, and more expensive than, the German Leopard, we have the counter: mathematical models that purport to show the reverse. (A personal aside: years ago I was in the combat simulation business and inputs and assumptions are pretty important in the models: one of the ones in this study apparently was to start the fight at 1500 metres. Which is a rather short range these days). Deputy PM Ivanov, however, has announced that Moscow will invest US$100 billion in the development of the defence industry in next decade. A lot of money and pride is at stake and the battle will intensify.

POLICE. Medvedev just dismissed another batch of high-ranking police officers; no reason was given. (Perhaps they failed their examination). As I suspected, the current situation is that all high officers have been formally suspended and are acting in their former ranks pending the performance review to be conducted by the Head of the Presidential Administration and approved by Medvedev.

CORRUPTION. Dmitriy Gayev, the former Moscow subway chief, has been charged with taking US$4 million of public funds: the story is that he illegally patented the electronic tickets that replaced the old tokens and peacefully trousered the patent payments.

ROADS. Last year a couple of guys drove from Moscow to Vladivostok recording all the way. Their films are worth a look: Russian roads are in much better shape than is commonly assumed: Russia has not been wasting its energy profits.

ARMENIA. On Thursday there was a substantial (10,000 people seems to be the consensus) anti-government protest in Yerevan. The former president, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, was one of the leaders. He has been protesting the results of the last election, claiming fraud, and claims that the present ruling group is corrupt and oppressive. Independent Armenia has not had a happy 20 years. Wars over Karabakh, the resulting blockade of the eastern rail route from the north (the western one is blocked by the Georgia-Abkhazia dispute); a small land link with Iran and a longer border with Turkey (and difficult relations there); the fear that Baku will use its oil revenues to attack. All these have made for a stagnant economy and rather hopeless forecasts. And high levels of emigration.

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)

ANNIVERSARY. Twenty years today the USSR held a referendum on whether to support the proposed New Union Treaty. The new setup would have given much more power to the republics; the word used to describe it then was “confederation”. I recall much brouhaha about how the referendum would be a bust and even some “experts” claiming that no one knew what they were voting on (despite the fact that all the iterations of the treaty – 3 as I remember – had been published in the Soviet press). In the event there was a decent turnout and a strong support for continuing in the new arrangement. This was the pre-Internet days and I have lost the detailed results but the overall results are here and more detailed here. (Both sources are disingenuous, taking their numbers not from the whole population of potential voters but from those who actually did vote; in several areas not voting was voting “no”). The three Baltic SSRs, the Moldavian, Georgian and Armenian SSRs did not hold votes, on the grounds that they had not legally been incorporated into the USSR in the first place. But the Abkhaz ASSR voted by a small margin to stay in. The Chechen-Ingush ASSR voted to get out as did the Nakhichevan ASSR (the last I suspect being part of Heydar Aliyev’s manoeuvring to get to Baku). So, some hints of the future were given. The proposed signing date was set for 20 August but the coup attempt on the 19th (not unconnected of course) intervened. In the event the leaders of the Ukrainian and Belarussian SSRs and the RSFSR (55.7% of whose registered voters had voted “yes”) simply declared the end of the USSR in December (the three Baltics had been let go in September in what turned out to be effectively the last official act of the USSR). And that was that. I still believe that the bulk of the USSR could have transformed into the New Union; if so, a lot of suffering would have been avoided. Three quotations are instructive: “The recent dramatic events [ie the coup attempt] showed that our republic is absolutely unprotected… ” (Kravchuk 1991); “if Ukraine really will not be in the Union, I cannot imagine such a Union” (Yeltsin 1991); “I believed that Ukraine is so rich that it provided for the entire [Soviet] Union” (Kuchma 1993). So Ukraine killed the New Union on the expectation that it would become immediately rich by stopping the imagined drain from the others on its “rich” economy. Ah well, divorce in haste, repent at leisure: a recent poll from Ukraine says half the population now regrets the breakup. I suspect that a lot of former Soviets do too. Indeed it would be very interesting to see polls from others of the fifteen; especially from those that were very glad to get out twenty years ago. But it’s too late, it’s gone.

EMERGENCIES MINISTRY. Speaking of 1991, that is the year that Sergey Shoygu was appointed head of the Ministry. And he still is. For twenty years he has consistently ranked very high in popularity and trust. And for good reason. I have noticed in many international disasters that the Ministry is quick to act and regularly one of the first responders. And so it has with the Japanese disaster: the first rescue teams started work in Sendai Tuesday and more are on the way together with the first load of emergency supplies. Moscow has also offered fire fighting expertise at the damaged reactors. A highly skilled and efficient organisation that does not receive the attention that it should, obsessed as the Kommentariat is with Russian failures, malfeasance and Kremlinology.

ELECTIONS. As usual United Russia dominated in Sunday’s local elections. Well, if you were a Russian, would you vote for Zhirinovskiy? the Communists? for any of the latest dozen quarrelling “liberal” parties? What do they have to offer?

WEAPONS PRODUCTION. The Russian Armed Forces are re-equipping themselves and the effort is revealing problems in what is left of the former Soviet weapons industry. I was interested to see that the Ground Forces head told the Federation Council that Russian ground weapons were below NATO and Chinese standards and over-priced as well. Here is a rather gloomy accounting of the latest armaments program about half way through its term. Not unconnected with this is the announcement that Moscow is in talks with France to buy light armoured vehicles for the border guards.

UMAROV. The UNSC has put Doku Umarov on its terrorist list. High time.

LIBYA. The Foreign Minister has just said that the Arab countries should take the lead in formulating the international response to the situation in Libya and that Moscow will base its policy on their views.

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)

US-RUSSIA. US Vice President Biden is in Moscow. He says that Russia’ accession to the WTO is a top priority, (although hinted that it depended on Russia’s human rights record) and may have made approving noises about ending the absurdly out-of-date Jackson Vanik Amendment. He reportedly told Putin that visa-free travel between Russia and the US was “a good idea”. Well, we’ll see. As to the WTO, it is quite absurd that Russia is not a member. During the time Russia has spent trying to get into it, Oman, Côte d’Ivoire, China, Cuba, Zimbabwe and others have entered. No problems with “human rights” there apparently. Russians could be forgiven for thinking that the WTO is not the economic organisation that it purports to be but really a political organisation. Members appear to have a quasi-veto and Tbilisi is quite happy to use its. A Russian official claims that Biden said that Washington had tried to talk Tbilisi out of opposing Russian membership. But I wonder how much influence Washington has on Tbilisi these days over what is the only pressure point on Moscow that Saakashvili has.

AFGHANISTAN SUPPLY. With good timing, Medvedev signed the law ratifying the agreement with Washington on military transit to Afghanistan via Russia. Another attack on a NATO fuel convoy in Pakistan a couple of weeks ago.

CORRUPTION. Two significant cases this week. Yesterday the Duma sanctioned the arrest of a Deputy from the LDPR. He is accused of significant fraud and embezzlement connected with construction in Moscow. The Duma stripped him of his immunity in November – the fourth Deputy to have lost it. Criminal proceedings were instituted in Primorskiy Kray in another embezzlement case. The suspect is the former director of a plant and the charge is that he expropriated money Japan had contributed three years ago to a program for the safe disposal of nuclear submarines.

THE THIRD TURN. Something that I’m sure would not have happened a couple of years ago is that a Russian company won the tender to operate the container terminal at the port of Tallinn Port beating out nine other bidders including an Estonian firm.

CHECHNYA. On Saturday, with Medvedev’s nomination, Ramzan Kadyrov was unanimously confirmed for another 5-year term as head of Chechnya by its parliament. Whether it likes it or not, Moscow is pretty well stuck with him. I have long been of the opinion that the people now running Chechnya, mostly people who fought Moscow in the first war, have learned that de jure independence is too costly in blood and risks the danger of a takeover of Chechnya by international jihadism. So they have decided to game Moscow with effusive protestations of loyalty and improbable voting results for the pedestal party while inching their way towards de facto independence. If this is true, there isn’t much Moscow can do about it.

LIBYA. Medvedev signed on to the UN sanctions package. It remains opposed to international intervention. There are, I believe two principal reasons for its opposition. Moscow questions the wisdom of intervention in something that grows messier by the day, especially when it is encouraged by hyperbolic reporting that may not prove correct in the end. A bit of intervention can easily become a lot of intervention. The other reason is that Moscow is highly suspicious of the “international community”, or some part of it, making decisions about what regime is acceptable and what is not. It remembers the Kosovo intervention (speaking of a “little” turning into a “lot” and hyperbolic reporting) and fears the same could be applied to it. The current Russian government prefers the international status quo.

© Patrick Armstrong, Ottawa, Canada

POLICE REFORM. The new law took effect on Tuesday (see here for a discussion of its provisions). As if in celebration, Medvedev dismissed seven high ranking police officers from around the country. And high-ranking they are indeed. No reasons were given. He had a meeting with Interior Minister Nurgaliyev and signed a number of decrees moving the effort forward. Something I have often wondered about is how one gets from here (an institution with a culture of corruption and incompetence) to there (something much better). It appears (but the wording of his instructions to Nurgaliyev is not clear and this is my best guess of what Medvedev told him) that all members of the present force (“militia”) will be, as it were, passed through a sieve and either dismissed or allowed to join the new force (“police”). Senior officers will be examined by the Head of the Presidential Administration, Sergey Naryshkin, and approved by Medvedev. So, it would appear that everyone’s job is at risk. The examinations are to be complete by 1 June which, only two months away, seems an unrealistically early date. Given the existing corruption as well as the powerful resistance all bureaucracies present to change that threatens their “corporate will”, this is a very tall order and certainly all the crooks and incompetents will not be weeded out by then. But one assumes that if someone slips through the sieve by bribing his superior or by lying and is caught, he will be subject to instant dismissal. Those who are interested in reforming intransigent and locked-in bureaucracies run mad, should watch this experiment carefully.

MISSILE DEFENCE. Foreign Minister Lavrov has called for a formal agreement that NATO and Russia will not target each other with their defence systems; he says Moscow is willing to sign. Such a formal declaration – which is supposed to be NATO’s official policy anyway – will go some of the distance to resolve differences between the two. I repeat that Moscow has no reason to trust any informal declaration from NATO.

GOVERNORS. In January Medvedev said that he had already replaced one third of the regional heads: “I think it is a normal, objective practice… And all governors should understand that they have two, three terms at the most to prove themselves… Secondly, people need to understand that they can’t be in office forever.” Two more have just gone – Kamchatka Oblast and the Karachay-Cherkess Republic. This too is part of “modernisation”.

“PUTIN’S PALACE”. So-called. A medium sized flap over this monster house (“a billion dollars”) allegedly being built for Putin. Turns out it’s a hotel and conference centre and it has just been bought by a Russian plutocrat. But, no doubt, the anti-Putinites will say this is just a cover story: for them everything visible in Russia is a manipulated illusion covering what’s really happening. Oddly enough, they alone have penetrated the deception and uncovered the Truth.

PEOPLE POWER. The Blue Buckets are back in their campaign against “blue lights”. Their latest stunt is handing out stickers for cars that read “I only give way to 01, 02, 03,” (the emergency numbers for police, fire and ambulance services). The Moscow police, as usual, don’t know how to react to these clever campaigns.

RETURN. Last week four families of Old Believers (23 people) returned to Russia from Bolivia. They are to be given land in Primorskiy Kray.

GORBACHEV. Was 80 yesterday and Medvedev awarded him the Order of St Andrew. I invite you all to consider what the world would look like today had Viktor Grishin been chose as GenSek in 1985, as he might have been. Grishin died in 1992. Incidentally, in contrast with the way Yeltsin treated Gorbachev, the Duumvirate is much more respectful.

BUSHEHR. On 26 February Iran announced that it was unloading the fuel from the reactor for “technical reasons”; on Tuesday another spokesman said fuel was not being unloaded. The same day RosAtom (which would be doing the work) said it was being unloaded because of the possibility that metal particles could get into the machinery. The Iranian nuclear program is not going well and common speculation centres on the Stuxnet virus. The story is very murky and it will likely be years – if ever – before we find out what happened but there are those who see a Russian connection.

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)