CORRUPTION. A poll this week suggests the size of the problem. About three-quarters of the respondents believe the corruption level in Russia to be “high” or “very high” and that there has been no improvement in the last year or only an insignificant amount. The only encouraging thing from Medvedev’s perspective is that 15% believe corruption in the federal government is high down from 20% in 2006. (The cynic would suggest that the decrease may be more a result of publicity than reality). The most corrupt elements were named by respondents as: traffic police (33%), local government (28%), police in general (26%), society on the whole (23%), medical sphere (16%), education sector (15%), federal government (15%) and judicial branch (15%), big business (13%), military commandant offices (8%), show business (6%), the armed forces (5%), the trade sector (4%), the media (3%), political parties (3%), and parliament (3%). A comprehensive list indeed.

WAR AFTERMATH. Sarkozy and Medvedev worked out a settlement. Sarkozy said he brought a letter “from President Saakashvili with [Georgia’s] commitment to not using force against Abkhazia and South Ossetia”. An EU observer force of at least 200 will patrol the “security zones” in Georgia proper and Russia will withdraw its forces from there (the pullout from western Georgia is already underway). The EU, Medvedev reported, has said that it will “assist in resolving the conflict, including by launching international mechanisms to maintain security around South Ossetia and Abkhazia”. Yesterday Medvedev signed treaties with South Ossetia and Abkhazia that will allow Russian troops to be based there: “We will not allow any new military adventure”, and there are plans to build a gas pipeline from Russia into South Ossetia. The peace settlements of the early 1990s are, of course, dead. Meanwhile Saakashvili continues to make ever wilder accusations: the most outrageous being that the Russians destroyed Tskhinvali. As to his current excuse that the Russians moved first, see JRL2008/170/21. Two accounts of the war: Georgian and Russian; they both provide indications, as I thought, that the Georgians were stopped by the Ossetians and, when the Russian got there, fled.

KHODORKOVSKIY. Lost in last month’s news was the fact that the local court rejected his request for parole.

ECONOMY ETC. Inflation seems to be coming down in the second half of the year as the government hoped: RosStat reports that the cost of the basic food basket declined 3.7% in Aug from Jul and, more recently, that inflation has been 10% since the beginning of the year. The Central Bank, however, expects the year-end rate to be 12%. But the financial crisis is hitting Russia hard with big losses on its stock exchanges; the government remains publicly confident and has just made large short-term loans to some banks. So, all bets are off.

ARCTIC. Turn up the hyperventilation index to eleven.

CARIBBEAN ADVENTURES. Russia will send some naval units, including the Petr Velikiy, to exercise with the Venezuelan Navy. A couple of long-range bombers visited recently. No doubt designed to irritate Washington. But all I can say is: does Moscow really think that Venezuela, Nicaragua and Belarus are very useful allies?

CAUCASIAN RUMOURS OF WARS. In the last two weeks, there have been several fights with “illegal armed groups”, as Moscow calls them, in Dagestan and Ingushetia. The situation is not getting quieter – especially in Ingushetia where the ill fruits of Putin’s decision to push Ruslan Aushev out of the presidency are being harvested.

OPPOSITION IN GEORGIA. Immediately upon the ending of martial law in Georgia on the 4th, the opposition began demanding Saakashvili’ departure. An open letter called for the launch of a public debate; Nino Burjanadze, and many in the opposition, refused to sign his “Charter of Georgian Politicians”; Kakha Kukava said the United Opposition will demand early elections: “We will not allow Saakashvili to continue living in a virtual world and people in a bitter reality”. Former Defence Minister Okruashvili, confirmed as a political refugee in France last week, confirmed there were long-standing invasion plans; said Saakashvili’s “days are numbered”; his party demanded Saakashvili’s immediate resignation as did several others. Even though the news media in Georgia is completely under the control of the government, this level of dissatisfaction cannot be hidden. (Something that got little coverage in the West was the shutdown of Georgia’s last independent TV station in November: last broadcast in Georgian, Russia Today coverage, interview with US manager). I do not see Saakashvili going willingly and the question will likely turn on whether his security apparatus will be as loyal to him as it was a year ago.

© Patrick Armstrong, Ottawa, Canada

GEORGIA. Moscow has announced that all troops introduced on and after the 8th are back in Russia. But the peacekeepers remain, at a strength it is said, of 500 in South Ossetia. They have set up checkpoints south of the South Ossetian border (as well as to the east of the Abkhazia border). Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, in a statement yesterday, insisted that the Medvedev-Sarkozy plan has in it “written in black and white that, before international mechanisms are created, Russian peacekeepers must carry out additional security measures”. Moscow is clearly taking this to mean that its forces can set up check points on the edges of the demilitarised zones (Map for Abkhazia showing restricted weapons zone; for South Ossetia reference (II.A.3)to 14-km band on either side of the border). Thus, pending the arrival of patrollers from elsewhere (Moscow has just said it would welcome an international police presence in the security zone), Moscow argues that it is abiding by the ceasefire agreements of the early 1990s. (Here is Shevardnadze discussing the South Ossetia agreement and its necessity: “Gamsakhurdia decided to invade the region… the Georgians were not ready for war and they were defeated”).

REINFORCING FAILURE. The US Vice President has just doubled Washington’s bet on Saakashvili. I particularly enjoyed his statement: “After your nation won its freedom in the Rose Revolution”. Freedom from what? Shevardnadze in his time was hailed as a brave democrat too, and not that long ago either.

AFTERMATH. The Organisation of Residents of South Ossetia Against Genocide has filed more than 300 lawsuits with the International Court. This website lists the names of 311 South Ossetian citizens killed who have been identified so far. Meanwhile there are credible reports of Georgians being driven out of South Ossetia. The Chairman of Georgia’s parliamentary defence and national security committee has slightly revised the figure he gave a couple of weeks ago to 156 soldiers, 13 police and 69 civilians killed.

AGITPROP. Two films. South Ossetian point of view (“The Wounds of Tskhinvali” – 30 min Russian, English subtitles). Georgian TV “Russian Marauding in Poti” – 4min, Georgian, no subtitles).

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY PRINCIPLES. On Sunday Medvedev outlined five points of Moscow’s foreign policy. Appeal to international law principles (ie the UN et al); opposition to unilateralism; no desire for isolation; protection of citizens and interests; there are parts of the world where Russian has special interests. All this should be familiar from years of repetition, but no one used to bother to listen. Now they do and, because it all seems new to them, they draw the wrong conclusions.

A REMINDER. On Thursday a Russian ICBM, said to have measures against ABM systems, was launched.

TNK-BP. The long struggle may be over – the principals signed an MOU today.

CHICKEN WARS. PM Putin has announced that 19 US firms will not be allowed to export to Russia; he claimed sanitary grounds saying that the 19 had ignored Russian remonstrations.

MAGOMED YEVLOYEV. Magomed Yevloyev, an opponent of President Zyazikov of Ingushetia. was killed while in police custody on Sunday. The police story is that he was accidentally shot while trying to seize a weapon. The federal Investigative Committee has opened an investigation into his death.

GAS WARS. The low price that Ukraine has been paying for gas since 2006 was the consequence of Turkmenistan’s willingness to sell cheap. But it, the source of about 60% of Ukraine’s gas, is no longer prepared to do so; this has been clear since at least October 2007 and the Achilles heel of the January 2006 deal was always the question of how long it was willing to subsidise Ukrainian customers. It all began to unravel when President Niyazov died about 18 months ago and Berdymukhammedov started slowly reversing his acts. This will, as usual, be painted as another piece of Russian imperialism.

UKRAINE. The two principals of the “Orange Revolution” are again at each other’s throats. Yesterday, saying that PM Tymoshenko was starting a “political and constitutional coup d’état”, President Yushchenko threatened to dissolve parliament and call new elections. Tymoshenko’s party scorned this as “adventuristic lies”. Meanwhile, Yanukovich, head of the largest single party in the parliament, must be smiling. A new poll shows 46% of Ukrainians expecting NATO accession to destabilise the country and only 30% disagreeing with that proposition. But what do Ukrainians know about their own interests?

© Patrick Armstrong, Ottawa, Canada

HYPOCRISY. There’s plenty of that to go around. NATO is taking its stance on the principle of territorial integrity – something that apparently didn’t apply in Kosovo – and Russia’s supposedly “disproportionate” response, despite NATO’s bombing of the Danube bridges in Novy Sad. For its part, Moscow is posing as a humanitarian hero – a quality in short supply in the Chechen wars, especially the first – and a defender of self-determination, ditto. So let us concentrate on the two salient facts, and ignore the posturing.

TWO FACTS. The first fact is that Ossetians do not want to be part of Georgia. And, apart from the Georgian Empire of the 1200s (and maybe not then either – note Alania on the map), Ossetia was only in the Georgian SSR because Stalin-Jughashvili, a Georgian, decided that it should be. There have been three wars since 1918 in which the Ossetians have made their feelings plain. The second fact is that South Ossetia trusts only Moscow, not NATO, the EU or the UN, for its protection. These are the central facts upon which any solution to this present mess must be based. The world made a mistake in recognising Georgia, and some other examples of Stalin’s cartographical jokes, without making the qualification that the secessionist problems had to be dealt with in a civilised fashion (as, for example, Kiev did with Crimea and Chisinau with the Gagauz; granting a sufficient degree of autonomy in each case).

RECOGNITION. After almost unanimous recommendations from the Federation Council and the Duma, Medvedev formally recognised the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia; here are the reasons he gave. Each is now pressing for Russian troops to be based in them. In my opinion, the recognition would have been better had it waited, but I don’t think Moscow cares any more: WTO membership is an ever-receding carrot; the Medvedev-Sarkozy agreement seems to have been changed somehow (discussion); relations with NATO have never amounted to anything real; and as far as much opinion in the West is concerned, Russia is at fault anyway.

CASUALTIES IN SOUTH OSSETIA. The South Ossetian Prosecutor General Teimuraz Khugayev is reported by Interfax to have stated: “As of August 28, 1,692 people were killed and 1,500 were wounded as a result of the Georgian aggression. An estimated 3,500 citizens have been recognized as victims: those are the people who have lost their relatives and homes”. Having watched a lot of film from Tskhinvali, I do not find the numbers unbelievable but there is a disparity between the killed and wounded (normally the latter figure is two to three times the first. But Tskhinvali’s hospital was badly damaged early on).

INTERNATIONAL MONITORS. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov has announced that Moscow would like to see international monitors replace Russian troops in the parts of Georgia adjacent to Abkhazia and South Ossetia (EU and OSCE were mentioned) and Medvedev confirmed this today. This is consistent with the 6th point of the Medvedev-Sarkozy plan (if that still exists).

GEORGIAN OPPOSITION. Generally speaking, the opposition has rallied around the flag. But I do not expect this to last. An opposition leader, Koba Davitashvili, has called for a government of national unity saying: “all decisions on the governing of the state should be taken not by one person, but collectively”. Saakashvili does not take kindly to collective decisions, as Davitashvili, a former close ally, knows. Nino Burjanadze, another former ally of Saakashvili, said recently: “I’m afraid it will not be very easy for the government to answer all the questions”. Other opposition members are beginning to point the finger at Saakashvili. Something to watch.

MORE FROZEN CONFLICTS. Another of Stalin’s cartographical legacies is the territory on the east bank of the Dnepr; it was used as the nucleus of the Moldavian SSR pending the acquisition of the necessary territory from Romania in 1940. During the breakup of the USSR, when many in Moldova could only think that they should join Romania, the inhabitants of Transdnestr balked and a war began. The situation has been “frozen” since then and a tripartite peacekeeping force keeps the temperature down. Another Stalin decision to put people where they do not want to be is Karabakh in Azerbaijan. Again fighting broke out in the late 1980s and early 1990s and again the secessionists won. There is a ceasefire agreement which has held reasonably well but very little political movement. I believe that the inhabitants of Transdnestr can stomach being in Moldova with a reasonable degree of autonomy, but the inhabitants of Karabakh will never accept rule from Baku.

© Patrick Armstrong, Ottawa, Canada

WHAT MOSCOW SAYS. Moscow says that the Georgian retreat from South Ossetia became precipitous; the civil authorities, police and armed forces abandoned Gori. Russian reconnaissance elements (and it should be understood that the Russian Army, like many others, practises heavy recce – ie with tanks) found a base with many tanks, APCs and ammunition quite abandoned. The Russian command elected to “secure” this dump lest it fall into irresponsible hands. Moscow say that it is maintaining order in the power vacuum and suppressing looters. It says that something similar happened in many areas of Western Georgia where Russian forces are “securing” another dump in Senaki. There is a good deal of evidence from Western news agencies to support this. Readers are invited to check these links: not everything gets the emphasis it should. Retreat, power vacuum and looting, Western Georgia (note that reporter does not entertain the possibility that these are abandoned Georgian vehicles the Russians are driving: a similar mistake was made by the BBC in Gori), at least one jailbreak in Georgia, looters, some of whom are Georgians (go to 48sec). Moscow claims there is still occasional firing.

BUT/BUT. Moscow keeps saying that it has, or will soon, withdraw, but that never quite seems to happen: it has just been announced that troops will be pulled back “to the area of responsibility of the peacekeeping contingent in South Ossetia” by the end of today; or will it be in ten days? Russian troops keep appearing in the port of Poti and elsewhere, something for which Moscow has given no reason, while Moscow announces there are no Russian troops outside of South Ossetia. There are reports of determined efforts to destroy Georgia military infrastructure. There are unmistakeable indications of triumphalism and hubris in Moscow; perhaps understandable but most unwise. Moscow is also playing a game in which the difference between “peacekeepers” and “servicemen” is blurred. Moscow also intends to increase the “security zone” around South Ossetia. As Shevardnadze said in an interview: the longer the Russians stay and the more they call for Saakashvili’s departure, the less likely it is that the Georgian population will turn on him.

CEASEFIRE. There have been innumerable reports of ceasefire violations which obscure the question of when exactly the agreement that Sarkozy and Medvedev negotiated on the 12th was signed in Tbilisi. I believed, from the reports I had seen, that Saakashvili signed it in Sarkozy’s presence that day but it now seems it was not signed by him until the 15th. So what happened here? And what precisely are the terms of the agreement?

LATEST ACCUSATION. Moscow today charges that the OSCE observers in South Ossetia knew about the Georgian attack but did not warn the Russian peacekeeper force. Moscow is already asserting that the Georgian peacekeepers opened fire on their Russian colleagues. When Ruslan Gelayev’s fighters were moved across Georgia with Tbilisi’s involvement to attack Abkhazia in October 2001, Moscow made similar charges that the OSCE observers had failed to report it.

REPORTING. Interfax claims to have been quoted more often than any other news source during the war. I followed its reporting and found it to be invariably first with the news and most accurate. (No passing off Tskhinvali as Gori, for example).

AFTERMATH. A Georgian parliamentarian has given the following casualty figures on the Georgian side: 133 soldiers and 69 civilians killed and nearly 1500 injured of whom 446 are in hospital. A Russian spokesman has announced army deaths of 64 and 323 wounded. Prisoner exchanges are now happening. Casualties in South Ossetia are still not known, but will likely prove to be significantly fewer than the thousands originally reported but many people are said to have been killed in collapsed buildings or quickly buried. (French report from Tskhinvali.) A rally in Tskhinvali has asked Moscow to recognise South Ossetia’s independence. Abkhazia has likewise asked for Moscow’s recognition.

RUSSIA INC. It is reported that capital flight out of Russia (said to have been $US7 billion) as a result of the war has stopped; that revenue from energy sales has probably peaked as of 2008; agricultural output is said to be up about 5% year-on-year. Putin says that the first half year’s economic numbers were “not bad” but affected by inflation. The question to be asked is: does Moscow care any more about the West’s opinion? It seems to be coming to believe that WTO membership is nothing but an ever-receding carrot.

BLOGS. I have terminated my association with russiablog.org and will now appear here.

© Patrick Armstrong, Ottawa, Canada

THE WAR. A few hours after President Saakashvili went on TV and promised autonomy to South Ossetia and that Russia could be its guarantor, Georgian MLRSs opened fire in Tskhinvali. Hundreds if not thousands of Ossetians were killed and wounded. Moscow came to their rescue. French President Sarkozy and Foreign Minister Kouchner (who actually went to talk to the refugees who had escaped into North Ossetia) swiftly negotiated a settlement with Medvedev and then induced (what is the mot just?) Saakashvili to sign it. The leaders of South Ossetia and Abkhazia have just signed as well. The settlement exactly corresponds to what Moscow has said was its intention from the beginning: cessation of fire; withdrawal of Georgian forces from South Ossetia (and Russian from South Ossetia); a declaration by Tbilisi that it will not use force in the future; opening access for aid and the beginning of a serious international discussion of Georgia’s secessionist problems. The Medvedev-Sarkozy settlement has two important points in it that Moscow has been calling for for years: Tbilisi is to make a formal promise not to use force (now perhaps one can understand why Moscow was always calling for such a promise) and the world should start taking a closer and more balanced look at Georgia’s secessionist problems. The EU is taking the lead: Sarkozy’s fast initiative has got us to where we are today. Besides, Washington is seen by Moscow (and the Ossetians) as too complicit.

SAAKASHVILI. Long time readers will know that I have been warning about Saakashvili and his bellicose desires for years. An attack on South Ossetia in 2006 failed in defeat and so, as I have long predicted, did this one. Complete defeat: thousands of refugees in Georgia, the apparent collapse and precipitate withdrawal of the Georgian army and the local administration from Gori, the abandonment of weapons and ammunition in Gori and Senaki (which, in the power vacuum, the Russians are securing), Georgia’s credit rating is dropping. And a legacy of destruction in Tskhinvali which the Western press is just now starting to discover. In November thousands of people on the streets of Tbilisi demanded his ouster – I would not be the least surprised to see bigger crowds in a few days when the extent of this folly becomes apparent. If I may give some advice to my readers regarding Georgian politicians: take the effort to find out what they say when they think you’re not listening: it’s often very different. See this, by a Georgian as it happens, summarising his recent statements. Will he be President of Georgia in a week? From his first domestic-audience statements, I expected Gamsakhurdia redivivus – someone else hailed as a “democrat” by naïve Westerners – and so he has proved to be.

MEDIA COVERAGE. The Western news media covered itself with shame, relaying every report from Tbilisi without hesitation. Some balance has been restored – the BBC in particular is starting to report what its people actually see in Tskhinvali and Gori rather than passing on Tbilisi’s press releases. But the degree of inaccuracy and bias have been made plain to any objective viewer.

LARGER ISSUES. It is too early to speculate on NATO-Russia, Moscow-Washington or anything like that. The West – especially Washington, whose reaction has been especially ill-informed – has a severe learning curve in front of it and Sarkozy (and Kouchner) have begun the process. For 15 years the West has believed the secessionists in Georgia were something created out of whole cloth by Russia; since the “Rose Revolution” Saakashvili has been a darling in the West; for years Moscow’s warnings have been contemptuously dismissed.

SOUTH OSSETIA FUTURE STATUS. No one in South Ossetia will ever believe a Georgian politician again unless there is a complete change and admission of what they have done since 1991. This is the third time since 1991 Tbilisi has attacked and they still speak of the “genocide” of 1920. Too much history, too much blood. This is simple reality. Stalin made these maps: they are not fixed by God.

ABKHAZIA. Expecting to be next on the list, the Abkhazians have driven Georgian forces out of Kodori.

OTHER POSSIBLE SECESSIONS. Tbilisi has not been able to locate Emzar Kvitsiani in Svanetia; the people in Javakhetia are potentially restive; Ajaria may take advantage.

FURTHER READING. By me on the sequence of events, “Now comes the hangover” and this on the terrible situation in Gori yesterday (the Georgian police have apparently come back). This essay on the cost of the West’s ignorance is very informed or this which is more breathless and not entirely to my taste but has lots of links. Russia Today has, until very recently, given the only coverage of Tskhinvali and the refugees in North Ossetia.

© Patrick Armstrong, Ottawa, Canada

SOLZHENITSYN. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, a man of unshakeable integrity and courage, who did more to kill communism than anyone else, died on Sunday. His body lay in state at the Academy of Sciences and Putin and Gorbachev paid their respects. He was buried yesterday at the Dmitriy Donskoy Monastery in Moscow and Medvedev attended. Lately he had begun to sound rather out-of-date but I suspect his influence will endure for many years.

CORRUPTION. Medvedev signed his national anti-corruption plan and the Russian text is up on his website. A number of laws and amendments are expected to go to the Duma next month. Some features are restrictions and regulations for disposal of state assets and a provision by which companies can be responsible for the corrupt actions of employees. Speaking of which, the labour in the Augean Stables continues: so far this year, the military prosecution office says that 5 generals have been found guilty on corruption charges and the Investigative Committee states that 757 criminal cases have been opened against legal officials.

THE CADRE PROBLEM. As Stalin once said, “cadres resolve everything”. Medvedev is starting to wrestle with the question of where Russia’s civil servants come from and how they get to where they are. He has recently been musing on the subject and has suggested that some sort of “reserve” be formed of likely people. That won’t do the trick either – it’s a perennial idea in Western bureaucracies and it all goes the usual way.

KHODORKOVSKIY. The Levada Centre released an interesting poll which indicated that 55% had little sympathy for him even though only 15% believed his conviction to be lawful (85% were either doubtful of the legality or gave no opinion); 35% thought he should be paroled – his hearing is set for 21 August – while 30% did not. Apart from anything else, it shows that Russians are more capable of making up their own minds than the conventional view, which assumes an imposed official opinion, has it. (JRL/2008/142/28).

XENOPHOBIA. In most Western press coverage, Russia is treated as a sort of freak show – an endless catalogue of disasters – but, typically, coverage is often short on the facts. One of the current memes is the epidemic of attacks on foreigners. Well, according to Aleksandr Brod, director of the Moscow Human Rights Bureau, who is not likely to understate the numbers, so far this year 73 have been killed and 200 injured. While this is much more than nothing, it is hardly an “epidemic” in a country of 150 million. Neither is it a uniquely Russian phenomenon.

USA-RUSSIA. The latest US National Defense Strategy takes some shots at Russia: “Russia’s retreat from openness and democracy… leveraged the revenue from, and access to, its energy sources; asserted claims in the Arctic; and has continued to bully its neighbors… more active military stance… threatened to target countries hosting potential U.S. anti-missile bases…. retreat from democracy… intimidation of its neighbors”. Too many unexamined clichés in that catalogue, I fear.

CHECHNYA. Sulim Yamadayev has been put on the federal wanted list on charges connected with kidnapping and murder. A real attempt at justice, or the removal of a potential opponent?

OSSETIA-GEORGIA. The small-scale war has intensified with reports of car bombs, artillery shelling and sniper fire. Each side blames the other. I have always maintained that Moscow’s principal motivation in the South Caucasus is that a war there could – as it did before – spread into the North Caucasus. And, rhetorically at least, it is spreading. Kokoity threatens to declare mobilisation and call on North Caucasians for help; Abkhazia has put its forces on alert; Tskhinvali claims volunteers from North Ossetia are arriving and a Cossack hetman says he’s ready to help. The Ossetians claim to have driven a Georgian force off a hill with some killed: Tbilisi first denied and later admitted losses. The correlation of forces may be changing: Saakashvili has just made a speech on TV: he ordered a ceasefire adding “And I am offering the Russian Federation to be a guarantor of the South Ossetian autonomy within Georgia… I offer a very important role to Russia in resolving this conflict… Georgia is a natural ally for Russia… We need a real mediator.” Words not before heard: he sounds quite nervous. As he should be: Tbilisi has been consistently defeated in its wars with South Ossetia and, if Abkhazia joins in, anything could happen in that rather fragile country. Illusion meets reality.

© Patrick Armstrong, Ottawa, Canada

THE DUUMVIRATE. I regard The Economist as a generally worthless commentator on Russia, useful only because it is a reliable guide to the “mean sea level” of conventional opinion. In its 6-12 October 2007 issue, it was confident “It has always been a question of how, not if, Vladimir Putin would retain power”. Now it’s not so sure: maybe Medvedev is in charge. Its latest piece (JRL/2008/130/6) finally understands that Putin could have amended the Constitution easily and run for a third term. The point is not that The Economist has become any more thoughtful but that its change of mind is an indication that conventional opinion is coming around to the idea that maybe the whole thing wasn’t, as the October 2007 headline read, “Vladimir Putin: The never-ending presidency”. Revisiting my five hypotheses, I am coming to think that the choice is now between Numbers 4 and 5: I never thought 1 and 2 very likely and 3 is certainly dead. For what it’s worth, but presumably signalling new tactics if not a new strategy, there has been criticism of some of Putin’s legacies appearing in the Russian press.

IN A NUTSHELL. Having been away for a while, I am catching up. What occurs to me is this simple summary. Putin saw his job as stopping the rot and can justifiably regard himself as having been reasonably successful at doing so. Medvedev sees his job as “modernising” Russia; or perhaps a better term is establishing “good governance”. These are two different but related missions. Each has the persona and skills for his task and neither would be very convincing at the other. But they are on the same team trying to get to the same place.

COLOUR REVOLUTIONS. Vladislav Surkov, widely regarded as the Kremlin’s chief political theorist, has just said that the threat of a “colour revolution” being introduced into Russia is now over. (By the way, I am now much more sceptical about the, shall we say, spontaneity of the “Orange” and “Rose” “revolutions” than I was at the time – and I was sceptical then). I never thought such a thing could happen in Russia but it is clear that some in the Presidential Administration did. Another fear that probably had a bearing on Putin’s decision to stay around.

USA-RUSSIA. A VTsIOM poll on how Russians view the USA shows that the generally positive impressions of five years ago are unchanged. About 50% had positive attitudes in both periods while the negatives have actually declined from 29% from 40%. Which certainly goes against a lot of conventional wisdom (Ref).

MECHEL. Thanks to some rather Stalinesque remarks by Putin, the company’s value has taken a hit and people are starting to worry about Russia as a reliable investment area again. His complaint seems to be that the company may (or may not) have been evading taxes but it seems a stunningly inept thing to say in public. Interestingly, today Medvedev said that officials “should stop causing nightmares for business”. Stay tuned.

KHODORKOVSKIY. Applied for parole on the 16th. As usual there are two opinions, each asserted with utter conviction: 1) the request will be rejected 2) the request will be approved. We’ll soon know.

ECONOMY. Still growing but slowing: GDP is up about 6% since last June, but June’s increase in industrial production (0.9%) was the lowest since November 2002. Inflation is now predicted to be about 11% for the year. But, thanks to energy prices, Russia has more than half a trillion dollars in reserves and US$44 billion in debts.

GAS PRICES. Will be rising. Gazprom’s CEO expects a European price of at least US$500 tcm by the end of the year and has cut a deal with Turkmenistan that will greatly raise the price. Ukraine’s arrival at “world prices” may be sooner than it hopes, given that much of its gas is from Uzbekistan. Get ready for more “Russia’s energy weapon” thinkpieces.

ESTONIA. 8.2% of Estonia’s residents are denied citizenship; mostly Russophones, they have taken Russian citizenship – what would you do if you couldn’t get it from the country where you live? The government has rejected an amendment to allow their Estonian-born children to become citizens automatically. This rather obvious violation of basic rights will, no doubt, prevent Estonia’s joining the EU or NATO. Or perhaps not.

CAUCASIAN RUMOURS OF WARS. Has a low grade shooting war begun in South Ossetia? Or is it another of the periodic flare-ups? The campaign season in mountainous areas is short and starting to end. Moscow sent some fighters over the territory in an admitted show of force it hoped “dampened the zeal of hotheads in Tbilisi”.

ABKHAZIA. The German Foreign Minister has been trying to sell a settlement plan. Three stages are reported: Tbilisi will promise not to use force and refugees will return, then some reconstruction and only then a resolution of Abkhazia’s status. Too little too late, I think, but it may prove to be the basis for something in the end.

© Patrick Armstrong, Ottawa, Canada

BALANCE. A Levada poll shows a probably important change in political reality. For years opinion polls have ranked the president distinctly higher than the PM or government. This was so even in the Yeltsin era (although all at very low levels in the latter years). What this poll shows is that Putin’s presence has pulled the government rating up: in the 40s through most of his presidency, it is now in the 60s. At the same time his rating remains in the 80s and Medvedev’s is in the 70s. If this trend holds – and why shouldn’t it? – Russia’s political structure will be much better balanced than it has been. Further evidence, to my mind, of my fifth hypothesis.

CORRUPTION ET AL. Medvedev mused that some provision should be made for transferring assets held by civil servants into trusts and said a first draft of a national plan for combating corruption has appeared. A presidential aide suggested that “independent directors” might replace state officials in some state-owned companies. Of course if that turns out to be a way of letting former members of Putin’s administration keep these lucrative positions… I can understand why you would want to place government officials in these important companies (remember Gazprom under Yeltsin?) but the problem then becomes: where do their interests now lie?

MILITARY. I have been hearing rumours of something happening in the defence apparatus. What has surfaced is that the Defence Minister said the Forces would be reduced to one million by 2013: The original target had been 2016 but “We suggested doing it faster…”. Then a 1st Deputy Defence Minister made the observation that training methods were still rooted in the 1960s and 1970s despite “the experience of the two anti-terrorist campaigns in the North Caucasus and the coalition forces in Afghanistan”. Yesterday the Public Chamber published a report about corruption in the Armed Forces: “Businessmen in epaulets” was a memorable expression. Maybe the rumours of disagreements current a couple of months ago have something to them.

TEMPS ET MOEURS. “2008 Nashi Summer Camp To Focus on Business Training Program” (JRL/2008/125/7).

TAXES AND FOREIGN NGOS. Putin has cut the number of international organisations that can avoid Russian taxes from 101 to 12. This will no doubt be played as another crackdown but a little time on Google suggests that at least one of the entities (IFAW) does not appear to have a Russian branch, although it has many other national branches. Maybe it should set up a proper local Russian branch. In short, this may have more to do with Russia treating such things as other countries do rather than allowing them to browse Russia for cash.

YAVLINSKIY. At the recent Yabloko conference, Grigoriy Yavlinskiy announced he was retiring as leader: his nominee, Sergey Mitrokhin was duly elected. I can’t help thinking that his adamant refusal to ally with anyone else has produced Yabloko’s decline and helped create the reality that today’s “liberal” “opposition” (how many sneer quotes can I get away with?) is little more than a stunt for foreign TV. The head of the St Petersburg branch, who has been critical of Yavlinskiy’s leadership, welcomed the change, saying he expected Mitrokhin to work towards a unification of this potential political grouping.

KHODORKOVSKIY. I have long wondered whether Medvedev might signal a new look by letting, one way or the other, Khodorkovskiy out of jail, given that the Yukos prosecution marked such a turn in Western conventional opinion about Russia. On the one hand, Khodorkovskiy’s lawyers have said they have advised him to apply for parole; on the other, new charges against him are been mentioned. We’ll see. It’s an issue receiving some debate.

IMPERIAL FAMILY. A spokesman for the Prosecutor General’s Office has confirmed that the bodies of Crown Prince Aleksey and Grand Princess Maria have been identified. So all the remains have now been found.

DEMOGRAPHICS. The latest statistics for January-April show continued improvement at each end, although the population is still shrinking: the decline was 96,000 this year compared with 148,100 for the same period last year. Births were said to be 547,100 (488,700 last year).

BELARUS. Medvedev and Lukashenka met; the communiqué spoke of cooperation “on the principles of a market economy”. So no cheap gas. On the other hand, Venezuela will lend Belarus US$500 million to help pay the bills.

CAUCASIAN RUMOURS OF WARS. Bombs in and around Abkhazia: Sukhumi blames Tbilisi, Tbilisi blames Abkhazian criminals. Sukhumi says Tbilisi has begun UAV flights again; Tbilisi denies it. On the 1st Sukhumi sealed the border with Georgia. Javier Solana recommended direct dialogue between the two.

© Patrick Armstrong, Ottawa, Canada