RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP 21 May 2009

DEMOGRAPHICS. Medvedev gave an interview the other day in which he spoke about what the government was doing about Russia’s demographic problems. The problem has two “ends”: too few births and too many early deaths and the government has put effort into both ends. A number of specialist cardiovascular centres (he visited one today) are being created around Russia “we know that cardiovascular disease is the biggest cause of death here” and the program to encourage births is having its effect as well: “The number of childbirths has increased by almost 7 percent over the last year… At the same time, there has been a decrease in infant mortality….” RosStat’s figures show that these programs are starting to bite. While Russia is still losing population, the net loss has been reduced by about 300,000 since 2006 (2006 – 637,200 net loss; 2007 – 442,700; 2008 – 337,300). 2009’s figures show continuing progress. 2006-2008 saw births up by about 200,000 and deaths down by about 90,000. In short, alarmist pieces about Russia’s demographic collapse are starting to look outdated. Added to which, Russia is not the only country with a shrinking population.

CONSTITUTIONAL COURT. Earlier this month Medvedev proposed a change to the way the Chair of the Court is appointed. Today the President nominates judges and the Federation Council approves them and they choose their own Chair. His proposal is that the President nominate the Chair and the Federation Council approve. In short, something similar to the way that US Supreme Court judges are chosen. The big difference however is that in Russia the President has a powerful influence on determining the membership of the Federation Council. So, under present circumstances this is an increase in Presidential power (although all members were nominated by the President before); if Russia ever has real political parties, it will be different. (Discussion).

CORRUPTION. Medvedev has signed an executive order creating a list of senior civil servants and managers of state owned corporations and funds who will be required to file public annual declarations of property and income (see his for the example). In principal, this could be an effective attack on corruption given that most corruption is about acquiring money. If enforced, that is. One of the major enforcers will be Sergey Stepashin, head of the State Audit Commission. In an interview (JRL/2009/93/12) he is talking tough: FSB involvement, undercover operations etc. We will see: an earlier attempt in the Yeltsin years fizzled out. I still say that we will know that Medvedev is really attacking the problem when someone in an office near his or Putin’s is arrested.

HISTORY. Medvedev has set up a commission to guard against “falsification of historical facts and events aimed at damaging Russia’s international prestige”. This will no doubt be excoriated as an attempt at thought control but, given Ukrainian attempts to paint the great famine as a Russian attack on Ukraine, or Latvian attempts to gain compensation from Russia for the cost of communism or the long-term refusal to regard Russia as a “captive nation”, there may be something to be said of reminding people of the Kuban famine, the Lettish Rifle Regiment and the cost of communism to Russia. But those who know these things know them, and those who want to airbrush them out of the historical picture will do so anyway.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS TALKS. Russians say they are “satisfied” so far. Related (maybe) to better Washington-Moscow relations is the report that Moscow has put a hold on a contract to supply fighter aircraft to Syria.

PIPELINES. Russia, Italy, Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece signed an agreement on South Stream gas pipeline (Russia-Black Sea-Bulgaria and north) on the 15th bringing it a step closer to construction.

CHECHNYA. For some years I have been arguing that the war in Chechnya is over: that is to say the jihadist attempt to create a secure base in Chechnya from which they could spread elsewhere has been defeated. But jihadists are still there (as elsewhere in the world). A bomb attack in Groznyy – said to be a suicide attack – has impelled Kadyrov to cancel the amnesty. The next day the police reported having killed 3 connected with the attack. This, if true, suggests informers led them to it.

GAS WARS. Today Gazprom announced it had pre-paid for this year’s gas transit, somewhat helping out Ukraine’s economy; meanwhile Yushchenko still wants to re-negotiate the deal.

GEORGIA. Government repression continues, quietly, with little coverage. Meanwhile the protests have spread to other towns in Georgia.

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP 14 May 2009

DECENTRALISING. In April 2001, when Putin had been President for about a year, a piece entitled “Russia is Finished” appeared; it read as one would expect from its title. This piece, which proved to be a poor predictor and was swiftly forgotten, is a reminder of the view of many in the West and not a few in Russia at the time. I saw in Putin’s early speeches a reflection of the fear that Russia was actually heading towards collapse or extinction. In my opinion, this fear plus the shortages of competent managers in Russia (something about which he periodically complained) led him to solve problems by centralising power and decision-making in his office. Then the “colour revolutions” in Ukraine and Georgia, seen by Moscow as outside manipulations (something their unhappy outcomes, which can be directly related to the NATO expansion obsession, make plausible) re-emphasised this tendency. Perhaps that was the right thing to do between 2000 and 2008 but I believe that this over control has become a brake on development and that a large part of Medvedev’s job is to reverse it. In this regard, Medvedev has made another couple of openings in the political system. He has signed a law which will give equal access to state TV to all parties in the Duma and another law that will allow representation to parties receiving between 5% and 7% of the vote. A re-drafting of the NGO law is in the works. Many will spin this as Medvedev vs Putin. But maybe there’s a plan.

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY. Yesterday Medvedev signed off on the latest version. A cursory read doesn’t show anything much different from other versions (Russian text). I have never understood why Russians feel the need to produce these long-winded cliché-ridden documents in which they toil though a laundry list of every thing that could conceivably affect security in its broadest possible definition (“46. Improvement in the quality of life for Russian citizens is guaranteed by ensuring personal safety and the availability of comfortable housing, high-quality and safe goods and services and appropriate payment for work”). They’re gifts to the Russophobes who skim through them to cherry-pick something alarmist.

US-RUSSIA. Nothing specific yet but an apparently good meeting between Obama and Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov the other day. Obama is scheduled to visit Russia 6-8 July. But for negotiations to be successful, both sides must gain something. And from Russia’s perspective, sooner or later, NATO expansion and missile defence locations will have to be discussed

THINGS YOU WON’T HEAR ABOUT. Last December the offices of St Petersburg Memorial were raided by police and data was confiscated. Several court rulings that the raid was unlawful followed and the organisation received its computer disks and other data back last week. They are being checked to see whether anything is missing. As always one wonders whether this is a result of Medvedev’s campaign against “legal nihilism” or merely “telephone justice” with a new phone.

UKRAINE. The war between President and Parliament continues: this time over timing of the Presidential election. At present ratings, Yanukovych is ahead. Far from being the stooge of Moscow, as we were told during the “Orange Revolution”, he remains the most popular politician in Ukraine.

GEORGIA. Saakashvili and members of the opposition met on Sunday although not much happened: they, according to Burjanadze, continue to insist that the only question is the timing and modality of his resignation; he insists he’s not going. In an interview which should be read by those who (still) think Saakashvili is a “democrat”, Salome Zurabishvili (his former Foreign Minister) says he’s “insane” and warns that Georgians “may turn away from Western style democracy out of disappointment. For too long, the Americans have confused support for Georgia with aid for Saakashvili”. Former President Shevardnadze said on Tuesday that the situation in the country was “catastrophic:” and that Saakashvili should resign. The protests continue as they have for a month now with more planned. Most interestingly however, two brigade commanders have been arrested and accused of involvement in the so-called mutiny of last week. Almost certainly this “mutiny” was a decision by the battalion commander that his troops would not become involved in putting down the protests. The new arrests suggest that this view is widespread in the army; thus Saakashvili has lost another prop of his rule. Not surprising, given the catastrophe he led them into last August.

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP 7 May 2009

DUUMVIRATE. A poll touches on Russians’ perceptions of the Medvedev-Putin relationship. Probably the most important finding was that 41% believed power to be shared equally between the two. This is the first time in history, as far as I know, that Russia has had two cooperating power centres (there was no cooperation in 1917 or 1993). I believe that the most accurate way to look at this unusual situation is through that perspective rather than barren speculation about who’s in charge and trying to find splits between the two.

ECONOMY NUMBERS. Last month unemployment was put at 2.26 million; GDP declined 9.5% in the first quarter but gold and foreign currency reserves increased slightly to US$384.8 billion. The Reserve Fund is down 13.7% to US$106.81 billion (it owned a lot of Fanny Mae and Freddy Mac at one time) and the National Prosperity Fund is down 1.6% to US$86.3 billion.

NATO. Foreign Minister Lavrov gave an interview explaining Russia’s position on NATO: “For us NATO is one of the objective key factors determining the state of security in the North-Atlantic region [but] obviously Russia cannot ignore NATO countries’ military infrastructure moving closer to its borders”. Worth reading for those who want to know what Moscow’s position really is rather than what interested parties tell you that it is.

EXPULSIONS. NATO expelled 2 Russians, perhaps in retaliation for an Estonian convicted of spying. As usual, Moscow has responded reciprocally with the expulsion of 2 Canadians from the NATO office in Moscow.

THINGS YOU WON’T HEAR ABOUT. Moscow has been quietly reducing its forces in Kaliningrad and Medvedev has said that he hopes for a response from NATO.

PIPELINES. On the 21st Moscow and Beijing agreed to build a branch of the East Siberia-Pacific Ocean pipeline toward China with an annual capacity of 15 million tonnes. Beijing is lending RosNeft and TransNeft US$25 billion to finance it. Interesting: China has a lot of assets worth less and less; here’s a use for them.

CHECHNYA. Long-time readers will recall that I have always believed that the former resistance fighters who now run Chechnya still want as much independence as they can get away with (short of actually using the word). Kadyrov has taken another step in that direction with the announcement that no Chechens will be conscripted this year into the Russian Armed Forces

GAS WARS. The international crisis, combined with political paralysis, is hitting Ukraine very hard and it cannot buy all the gas it contracted to. PM Tymoshenko is in Moscow trying to get the amount reduced, Putin’s response is open and some sort of arrangement may be possible – Gazprom may pay transit fees in advance.

MOLDOVA. The election results have been confirmed although with one important difference from the initial results: the dominant Communist Party is now one seat short of the power to name the next President. A Moldovan businessman has been arrested on suspicion of inciting mass riots and attempting a coup.

RE-WRITING HISTORY. Latvia has estimated the cost of the Soviet occupation: this sounds like an attempt to present a bill to Russia. But perhaps, given the role of the Lettish Rifle Regiment in Lenin’s coup in 1917, Latvia should charge itself. Or Georgia from whence Stalin, who ordered the 1940 occupation, came. These countries are airbrushing their home-grown Bolsheviks out of their history.

GEORGIA. The protests continue. The next tactic, to begin on the 8th, will be blocking highways. Which leads us to the “mutiny” story as reported here. One has to read all the way to the bottom of the account (all Georgian news media is controlled by the government), through Saakashvili’s accusations of Russian plots and the now-customary electronic “evidence” showing blurry people saying indistinct things to each other, to get to the real story. It appears that the battalion announced it would stay in its barracks and not get involved in the protests, perhaps after Saakashvili ordered it to prepare to stop the road blockages. In this connection see the report that the Patriarch’s appeal to troops to sit it out was censored from his address on 8 April. Opposition members are facing violence on the edge, out of sight of Western reporters – one example – and violence actually began last night. The Western MSM, still in thrall to the meme that Saakashvili “democratic”, is reporting little. The army unit’s refusal is indicative: people are switching sides and I continue to believe that the police will not turn out for Saakashvili as they did last time. Meanwhile more and more countries, perhaps sensing the trouble coming or re-assessing their views of Saakashvili’s regime, are dropping out of the NATO exercise.

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP 16 April 2009

MEDVEDEV. Has just granted an interview with Novaya Gazeta – the first to a Russian media outlet. Worth reading before the Western MSM tells you what it thinks you need to know. I cannot emphasise this enough – you must read the ipsissima verba and not rely on reports from sources with axes to grind.

LUCRE. Medvedev has published his income on his Website: appropriately modest.

RUSSIA INC. The Head of the Central Bank says inflation was 5.3% so far this year (4.8% the year before) and the Finance Minister says the budget deficit is 50 billion rubles (US$1.5 billion) in the first quarter.

LENIN. On 1 April (is the date significant?) the Lenin statue (could this be the original “Hey! Taxi! Statue”?) near the Finland Station in St Petersburg was damaged by an explosion. This has occasioned many protests pro and con and a Kremlin official reiterated that the time was not yet ready to move the body from Red Square.

US-RUSSIA. Tone continues good but no real actions yet.

MULTILATERALISM. Putin has several times pointed to North Korea as the example of how international cooperation is supposed to work. I wonder how he feels now that it has fired a missile in the general direction of Japan and announced that it is ordering IAEA inspectors out and resuming work on its nuclear facilities.

NATO. Albania and Croatia are now full members. The Danish PM has been chosen Secretary-General and NATO has agreed to resume the work of the Russia-NATO Council, which was suspended last August.

THE GREAT RUSSIAN MILITARY BUILDUP. It has been confirmed that the Armed Forces will buy UAVs from Israel. The Russians may have defeated the Georgians in August (though I maintain that the Ossetians actually stopped them and they ran away when the Russians got there) but many deficiencies were revealed.

PONAMARYOV. On 31 March, Lev Ponomaryov, a prominent Russian human rights activist, was mugged in Moscow. As this piece wonders, was it “hooligans” (as the police think – he was 67) or politically-inspired as he claims? Not everything that happens in Russia is orchestrated from the Kremlin.

CHECHNYA. Sulim Yamadayev was killed in Dubai on 28 March. The Dubai police have arrested two (one of whom worked for Kadyrov) and accused a Chechen politician of having been behind the death. Kadyrov, for his part, suspects Yamadayev of having been behind the murder of his father. I am inclined to suspect a “tidying up process” (today the “anti-terrorism” operation was formally ended, which further reduces the federal presence) but there are too many currents under the surface to be confident. Kadyrov’s interview (JRL/2009/69/21) is worth reading, however.

BELARUS. I have never taken the so-called Russia-Belarus “Union” seriously and more confirmation of my opinion comes from Lukashenka’s calling for more “transparency” in relations with Russia. Moscow only pays attention to Minsk around election time and takes it for granted the rest of the time.

GEORGIA. It’s begun. Starting on 9 April there have been very large, continuous, well-organised, gradually escalating anti-Saakashvili protests throughout Tbilisi (photos more Film Film). Saakashvili, typically is claiming that it’s orchestrated from Moscow but a listing of the opposition leaders, many of them former colleagues and none of them a Moscow stooge, shows he is, again, being “constructive” with the truth. Some polling suggests most want him gone but do not expect he will go voluntarily. At the end, I remain convinced he will be gone: I do not expect the police to turn out for him again.

MOLDOVA. The bare facts: on the 5th there were elections in Moldova and the ruling Communist Party won; on the 6th there were protests in Chisinau; they turned violent; by the 8th the police had regained control; on the 12th the Constitutional Court ordered a recount which began yesterday. Interpretations: a “colour revolution” gone wrong? Young people fired up by the economic/financial crisis? A lot of protesters carried Romanian flags (go to 1:09) and President Voronin has accused Bucharest of involvement (strongly denied). Moldova is another of the Great Cartographer’s jokes, having been severed from Romania in 1940. 10-15 years ago a live issue was whether Moldova ought to join Romania (the trigger for the fighting in Transdnestr). I had thought that the issue had been put to bed but apparently not entirely yet. A rational discussion of the issue here.

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)

Reply to Ronald Asmus’s Claim Russia Attacked First

Note Feb 2016: Can’t remember exactly what Asmus said but his general line was that Russia was the aggressor. Of course, as I show here and elsewhere, Saakashvili changed his story and the “Russians already in the Roki Tunnel” version only appeared when he had a defeat to explain away.

http://www.russialist.org/archives/2009-60-1.php

Response to Ronald Asmus JRL/2009/59/04

Will this canard never die?

Below is what Civil Georgia reported in 8 August in its entirety (my emphasis)

http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=18955&search=control%20ossetia

“President Saakashvili said he had announced a general mobilization of reserve troops amid “large-scale military aggression” by Russia.

In a live televised address on August 8, Saakashvili said Georgian government troops had gone “on the offensive” after South Ossetian militias responded to his peace initiative on August 7 by shelling Georgian villages.

As a result, he said, Georgian forces now controlled “most of South Ossetia.”

He said the breakaway region’s districts of Znauri, Tsinagari, as well as the villages of Dmenisi, Gromi, and Khetagurovo, were “already liberated” by Georgian forces.

“A large part of Tskhinvali is now liberated and fighting is ongoing in the center of Tskhinvali,” he added.

He also said that Georgia had come under aerial attack from Russian warplanes on August 8, which was an obvious sign of “large-scale military aggression” against Georgia.

The Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs said that three SU-24 Fencer attack aircraft had breeched Georgian airspace on August 8, and one of them had dropped two bombs close to a police station in Kareli, slightly injuring several people.

“Immediately stop the bombing of Georgian towns,” Saakashvili told Russia. “Georgia did not start this confrontation and Georgia will not give up its territories; Georgia will not say no to its freedom… We have already mobilized tens of thousands of reserve troops. Mobilization is ongoing.”

“Hundreds of thousands of Georgians should stand together and save Georgia,” he added.

Note there is no mention of Russian forces in the Roki Tunnel: he gives quite different excuses.

Saakashvili’s story has changed: see my piece (with Georgian sources) on JRL/2009/ (http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/2008-170-21.cfm) documenting the change. The “Russians are already in the Roki Tunnel” excuse – of which Saakashvili put forth two variations) only appeared after the operation went so badly wrong.

And BTW – here’s the Civil Georgia report of the Kurashvili statement from 8 Aug (http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=18941&search=)

A senior official from the Georgian Ministry of Defense said Georgia had “decided to restore constitutional order in the entire region” of South Ossetia. Mamuka Kurashvili, an MoD official in charge of overseeing peacekeeping operations, told journalists late on August 7 that the South Ossetian side had rejected Tbilisi’s earlier decision to unilaterally cease fire and had resumed shelling of Georgian villages in the conflict zone.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP 26 Mar 2009

USA-RUSSIA. The Kissinger-led group’s trip to Moscow and Gorbachev’s trip to Washington are visible signs of potential changes. More directly the Chair of the US Senate Armed Services Committee said Washington should seek cooperation with Moscow on missile defence. Of course, many attempt to head off any change by saying Obama is soft on Russia (an example which includes the current charge sheet). As Stalin said: “the struggle intensifies…”.

ANTI-CRISIS PLAN. The text of the government’s anti-crisis program has been published (Eng) (Rus). No sugar-coating here: “After ten years of continuous economic growth and improvement in living standards, Russia has faced a very serious economic challenge…The global economic downturn is affecting Russia in a special way because of its deformed economic structure, and a number of immature market institutions, including the financial system.” But maybe (maybe) Russia Inc has stopped dropping.

MILITARY REFORM. The Ground Forces commander has said that 20 motorised infantry brigades have been created. This is of course a re-organisation, not an addition. The current (and indeed long-announced) idea is to replace the old large-war structure of fronts/armies/divisions and move to smaller and more flexible brigade group structures. For years the General Staff fought for the large war concept and strove to preserve the structure, even though most of the divisions and armies were empty of troops. More than ten years ago, most of the “empty divisions” disappeared. The first Chechen war taught them the utility of special forces and the complete uselessness of their structure; after that war the first brigade groups were created in the North Caucasus at Buynaksk, Maykop and Budyonnovsk (ah! people must miss the CFE Treaty and all the information it produced!). There was talk then of completing the restructuring, but once again the process stalled and there were a number of under-strength “divisions” retained (troop sizes for motorised rifle divisions in 2002 ranged from 4700 in Kaliningrad to 15,000 in Groznyy). The Ossetia war seems to have taught them that the Russian Army is simply not as well-equipped or as flexible as it has to be. Last November, it was announced that the Kantemirovskaya tank division and the Taman motorised rifle division, as far as I know the most capable divisions Russia had, would be re-organised into four brigades. We’ll see if the plan is followed through this time. The reorganisation is, by the way, a convincing sign that Moscow does not seriously fear a big war with NATO; as is the location of its troops: the North Caucasus dominates.

PIPELINES. On Monday, Ukraine and EU signed a cooperation declaration to modernise Ukraine’s gas pipeline network. Putin is in a huff and called the agreement “unprofessional”. But why? Ukraine owns the pipelines; they are rather elderly and Tymoshenko has said Russia can invest. Gazprom’s official line is that this could uncoordinate what was designed in the first place as an integrated network.

FOR YOUR AMUSEMENT. Irreverent Russian art.

CAUCASIAN RUMOURS OF WARS. The Dagestan Interior Ministry has announced that a “special operation” has been concluded: 12 “militants” and 5 security servicemen were killed.

SOUTH OSSETIA WAR. The latest canard is that the assertion that BGen Mamuka Kurashvili said that there were orders to “restore constitutional order” in South Ossetia is “part of a series of lies and misinformation” by Russia. Well, here’s a Georgian report from 8 August quoting him as saying just that. Clearly Tbilisi is anticipating a bad report from the EU commission and is pre-muddying the waters.

GEORGIA. The dance continues and the government is making its moves. On the 17th the Georgian Times Media Holding announced it had shut down the Georgian edition of The Georgian Times, claiming “pressure” and “intimidation attempts.” The Interior Ministry has arrested a number of oppositionists, accusing them of illegally buying weapons; Burjanadze, from whose party they are said to have come, says it’s a plant and Alasania is sceptical.

AZERBAIJAN. In a referendum, limits on presidential terms were eliminated. Ilham Aliyev is 47 and he has a son. His father Haydar Aliyev brought a level of stability to Azerbaijan and, after the coups and other disorders of the 1990s, security was rather desirable to many of the citizens.

 

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)

Hyperlinks ought to work immediately but, if not, right-click, copy link location, put it in your browser.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP 19 March 2009

USA-RUSSIA. More indications that something is happening under the surface.

The mighty Russian arms build-up. Medvedev has (again) announced plans to re-equip the Armed Forces (Eng) (Rus). But before hyperventilating, consider that the Defence Minister then said the aim was to have 30% “modern” weaponry by 2015 and 70% by 2020. (REF) A very long way to go. And that I myself heard Russian generals outlining much the same intention a decade ago. Doing is harder than saying.

BRICKS WITHOUT STRAW. Reading JRLs after a week or so away from Russia, I am struck with all the pieces on 1) how Russia’s economy is collapsing (and with it Putin) and 2) how Medvedev and Putin are starting to split. I can’t find any real evidence of either and editorials from the usual sources or endless regurgitation of the “car riots” in Vladivostok only convince the already convinced.

FINANCIAL CRISIS. Putin stated government spending on anti-crisis measures will be 12% of GDP in 2009 and outlined a 2009 budget of US$198 billion revenues, $287 billion expenditures and a deficit of $88 billion 7.4% of GDP.

UNITED RUSSIA. There has been some coverage of Gorbachev’s criticism that it is “a party of bureaucrats” reminiscent of the CPSU. But here’s Putin himself in November 2007: the party lacks a set of serious principles, has attracted some criminals, but “we don’t have anything better”. Sounds much the same to me. (Can’t find the original but I mentioned it in Sitrep 20071115).

DÉJÀ VU ALL OVER AGAIN. Medvedev has declared that all state officials, including himself, must annually publish their incomes and property holdings. I seem to recall an earlier attempt at doing this that dissolved into risible declarations of parsimonious adherence to state salaries, broken-down dachas and a part share in a Zaporozhets. Despite a plethora of fancy watches and elaborate holidays.

NEWS YOU WON’T HEAR. A sanctioned protest – Day of People’s Wrath – on Sunday in Moscow was disrupted by Young Guard (usually termed “pro-Kremlin”) counter protesters: the police arrested them.

IRAN. A Russian source has admitted that there is a contract with Iran to deliver S-300 SAM systems but insists that no missiles have been delivered and that fulfilment would depend on the world situation. Sounds like a bargaining chip to me. According to this however, thanks to Belarus, Iran already has some of an earlier version (the earliest versions of the system were fielded 30 years ago).

FRANCE. Readers will recall that I believe Paris had a “reality check” last August about the actuality of the situation in Georgia and the consequences of NATO expansion. Some signs of this, I think. France will return to the NATO military structures – giving it more say – and its Defence Minister said Russia should be consulted before NATO expands further.

TRANSDNESTR. Yesterday Medvedev hosted talks between Moldova and Transdnestr; nothing much is reported other than a communiqué which doesn’t say anything new. Of the five unrecognised mini-states created after the USSR’s dissolution: Chechnya is “solved” (although I remain convinced that the leadership – all now Chechens, many of them veterans of the first war – still want eventual independence); Abkhazia and South Ossetia have a kind of solution. That leaves Karabakh, which seems as far from solution as ever, and Transdnestr. I believe Transdnestr is solvable and that the solution is more-or-less on the table already.

GAS WARS. Are now raging inside Ukraine itself. Too complicated, too many accusations and counter-accusations for me to summarise: see JRL/2009/54/40. Ukraine is taking less gas than it contracted to but Gazprom will not seek compensation; as Putin said: Ukraine is “on the verge of bankruptcy and as you well know you should not finish off your partners”.

GEORGIA. On the 10th 9 opposition parties began to collect signatures demanding Saakashvili’s resignation. There is a disagreement among the opposition whether to collect signatures, hold protest rallies or do both. It is intended, starting 9 April to begin continuous protests but they have already begun (Pictures). Will Saakashvili go quietly, or will he turn to the police again; and if so will they turn out for him? (It would be interesting to know who paid for all that expensive equipment the police have).

 

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)

Kitsmarishvili Testimony

JRL/2009/54/41

In response to David J. Smith’s piece “Russia Was First” (JRL/2009/53/34) allow me to just add a few things that may have escaped his attention.

This from the testimony of Erosi Kitsmarishvili, Georgia’s former ambassador to Russia and a one-time close ally of President Saakashvili. Reference at http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=20026. The whole thing, covering relations with Moscow related by someone who was intimately involved, is worth reading.

“But an incident took place between Okruashvili and Kokoity [Kitsmarishvili did not specify] and escalation started to raise in the region; a special operation was then carried out in South Ossetia, which was led by Okruashvili; on that day Okruashvili announced [on August 19, 2004] that [the Georgian troops] killed eight Cossacks fighting on the South Ossetian side. But eventually it turned out that only one person was killed.”

“During that meeting, President Saakashvili asked the question whether to launch a military assault on Tskhinvali or not? Vano Merabishvili, Irakli Chubinishvili and Zurab Adeishvili were against of launch of this operation; then we asked Gogi Tavtukhashvili whether there were enough capabilities to secure control over the region in a next few days in case of the military operation; Tavtukhashvili failed to give us a positive answer on that question; We were very close to taking a decision in favor of the operation, because Okruashvili, who was in favor of the military operation, was at that time very close associate to President Saakashvili;”

“In the second half of April, 2008, I have learnt from the President’s inner circle that they have received a green light from the western partner to carry out a military operation; When asked to specify “the western partner” Kitsmarishvili said: after a meeting with the U.S. President George W. Bush [the meeting between Bush and Saakashvili took place in Washington on March 19], our leadership was saying that they had the U.S. support to carry out the military operation; In order to double-check this information, I have met with John Tefft, the U.S. ambassador in Tbilisi and asked him whether it was true or not; he categorically denied that;”

The military operation should have been undertaken in direction of Abkhazia; military instructors from Israel were brought here in order to prepare that military operation; Kezerashvili also said at that meeting that the operation should have started in early May, or at least before the snow melted on the mountain passes; This decision was not materialized;”

In short, according to one of the insiders, an attack by Tbilisi was always in the cards. And, as Mr Smith appears to have forgotten, but Mr Kitsmarishvili has not, there actually was an attack in August 2004 (which resulted in another defeat for Tbilisi).

Moscow’s taking preparations is hardly proof of aggressive intent.

Russia Profile Weekly Experts Panel: Eastern Europe in Danger?

http://neftegaz.ru/en/press/view/5698

When NATO expansion was light-heartedly (George Kennan’s expression) begun by the Clinton administration its proponents sold the idea (I well remember earnest Americans patiently explaining this when I was a diplomat in Moscow) as a means of improving European security. And, had there been any serious intention to include Russia, perhaps it would have been. But wiser people, like Jack Matlock, foresaw that the exclusion of Russia would make things rather less stable.

And so it has proved to be. Even proponents of NATO expansion can see the connection with Tbilisi’s attack on South Ossetia last August and are fond of claiming that Russia puts up gas prices in order to weaken Ukraine (ignoring the fact that Russia has put up prices for everyone – even Armenia and Belarus which have no intention of joining NATO). NATO expansion has steadily crept east, from Poland to Latvia and now to Ukraine and Georgia (although their accession looks less likely today). Now the argument seems to be little more than because Moscow does not want these countries in NATO, they must be admitted (and, above all, we must not give Moscow a “veto”). A thin reason indeed.

NATO now has members that have re-painted their history under communist rule: gone are the home-grown communists like Wladyslaw Gomulka or Martin Latsis and in their place is a picture of Russian imperialism and native resistance. These countries are a lobby pushing NATO into a reflexive anti-Russian stance. They do not need actual evidence of Russian hostility: Russian imperialism is the very foundation stone of their new historical mythology. Perhaps the most preposterous example of this reconstruction of reality was the proposal that the still-existing museum in Gori Georgia to its favourite son, Iosef Bissarion-dze Jughashvili, be re-named the museum of the Russian occupation of Georgia. Perhaps Russia should create a museum of the Georgian occupation of Russia: given the importance to Russian history of Stalin, Beria, Orjonikidze, Golglidze and Gvishiani, this would have more historical credibility. “In 1939 the whole of the USSR could be said to be controlled by Georgians and Mingrelians” says Donald Rayfield in Stalin and his Hangmen. But these people have been painted out of the portraits – de-communisation was often more airbrushing than an honest recognition of the reality of enthusiastic native participants. And now they’re selling these paintings to NATO. As Matlock saw ten years ago: “it creates greater polarization of attitudes as the line moves east”. Kennan called it “a tragic mistake”.

The actual problems of the post-communist countries are all similar: corruption, out-dated industry, bad work habits, decaying infrastructure, crashing demographics and fragile economies. Countries that had the full 70-year dose of communism are worse off than those who received the 40-year dose to be sure, but the problems are shared. NATO is not the answer to any of them.

There is no better illustration of this truth than the parlous state of Ukraine today. The post “Orange Revolution” obsession with NATO has only exacerbated the political division in the country.

And finally, why would Russia, which is surviving the financial storm better than most – if not all – of its neighbours, want to acquire these countries anyway? Much more trouble (and expense) than they’re worth. After all, there wasn’t much stopping Russia from seizing most of Georgia last August if it had wanted to.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP 5 March 2009

US-RUSSIA. Something is happening under the surface with the two Presidents corresponding. Unfortunately someone leaked it, which is never good when delicate negotiations are beginning and each has been forced to insist there will be no tradeoffs or quid pro quo. The Russian Defence Minister reiterated that the stationing of Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad has always been conditional (something some don’t seem to understand). For what it’s worth, here’s Shevardnadze’s opinion of how we got here (JRL/2009/41/34): “So who is the initiator of this new tension between the US and Russia?” Shevardnadze: “America”.

CRIME. Medvedev addressed the Collegium of the Prosecutor General’s Office on the 25th: “The total number of crimes registered has decreased, this is indeed the case, but nonetheless, more than 2,000 murders were unsolved last year, tens of thousands of people are listed as missing, and crimes of an extremist nature rose by almost a third.” No sugar coating there.

CORRUPTION. The Prosecutor General says about 3700 corruption-related criminal cases were opened in 2008. Meanwhile charges have been laid against Navy officials suspected of attempting to smuggle weapons to China.

POLITKOVSKAYA TRIAL. The Prosecutor General’s Office, still reeling from the collapse of the case, insists that the Makhmudov brothers were involved and has appealed the acquittal. Meanwhile, Medvedev is reported to have told the prosecutors that they “should learn to work with the existence of the institution of the jury… It is time to learn to do this, and not discuss how good it was back when this institution did not exist”.

PROTEST. Kasparov & Co’s latest vehicle, Solidarity, held a rally in Moscow on the 21st. This time, rather than refusing the location offered by the city (a central one on the Boulevard Ring) and forcing a confrontation for the sake of Western media coverage, they accepted it; a few hundred turned out and there were no incidents.

DEMOGRAPHICS. Still declining, but not as badly: in 2008 the population declined 363,500, about 20% better than the year before. Putin claimed the highest birthrate since 1992 with 260,000 more than 3 years before and claimed life expectancy was up nearly 3 years.

RUSSIA INC. RosStat reported foreign direct investment had dropped by 14.2% to US$103.8 billion in 2008. (In a bright spot McDonald’s announced plans to invest US$120 million in opening more restaurants). The Finance Minister said capital flight between October and January had been about US$200 billion. Foreign debt totals about US$40 billion. The Reserve and National Wealth Funds total about US$220 billion. Putin told the United Russia party conference that the crisis had not ended but again expressed his confidence that Russia would get through.

COLOUR-FAST. His predecessor and his former ally think Mr Orange should quit; his former ally thinks Mr Rose should quit and, with the closing of Manas, Mr Tulip is being regarded as a Russian stooge. Stage managed quasi legal overthrows for the sake of the NATO expansion obsession were not, in fact, the answer to these countries’ problems.

GEORGIA. I’m sure many of my readers think I bang on too much about Georgia but I do so because of the absurd coverage that is prevalent in the West and the importance of Georgia to the anti-Russia mental construct (for 15 years now!). I highly recommend you read the interview with Nino Burjanadze in JRL/2009/45. She explains why it is necessary to get rid of Saakashvili; she is not Moscow’s apologist or stooge but understands that Georgia should have “stayed within the framework of civility”.

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)