PUTIN’S VIEW. Occasionally we get a succinct indication of Putin’s thinking. Here’s one from a meeting with the State Council on Friday: “We must not allow our political culture to follow a Ukrainian scenario, and we must also prevent it from sliding into totalitarianism and despotism. Unfortunately, we know examples of this within the post-Soviet space”. A not unreasonable via media.

NATO. Relations proceed as NATO continues its self-educational process of realising Russia is more important than it used to think it was.

PREDICTION. A study by PricewaterhouseCoopers predicts that, by 2050, Russia’s economy will be the sixth-largest in the world and larger than any in Europe. There are too many future unknowns to put much stock in these kinds of predictions but it is interesting (amusing?) to juxtapose this with the commonplace predictions that Russia will collapse, sink into permanent poverty or that Russians will disappear from the earth.

VOTING. The Central Elections Committee has proposed the elimination of preliminary voting; it is widely regarded as the principal means of “improving” election results. (I refuse to say “fixing”: under no conceivable circumstances, with the government so supported and the opposition so irrelevant, would United Russia not dominate elections across the country).

SHAYMIYEV. I have long been intrigued by Mintimer Shaymiyev who has been more or less running Tatarstan since 1989 (and a major player there since 1983). I was impressed by the negotiation of the power-sharing treaty with Moscow in the 1990s (which still has legs: I love that “associated (объединенное) with the Russian Federation”) and the way in which Moscow was skilfully manipulated by Kazan. Indeed, at one point in the First Chechen War Shaymiyev’s website could not resist pointing out how much cleverer he had been than Dudayev had been in Chechnya. Dudayev threw away the power-sharing treaty that the Chechen parliament negotiated with Moscow in 1992: because freedom needed sacrifice. On the contrary, one of the Tatarstan negotiators told me, never did they make the mistake of breathing the word “independence”. On Friday he announced he would not seek another term as President and will retire in March. Age, presumably, he’s 73 (and maybe a gentle hint from Medvedev). Tatarstan seems to be one of the better-off and more peaceful parts of the Federation. Medvedev has nominated PM Rustam Minnikhanov. Who knows, maybe the Mayor of all the Moscows (who is 74) will hang up his hat next!

KARABAKH. On Monday the Presidents of Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan met in Sochi and agreed to a “preamble” to an agreement on Karabakh. For some years this issue seems to have been snatched back from solution at the last moment: often what happens is that the war veterans in all three participants (it’s important to remember there are three; it’s not just between Yerevan and Baku) protest any compromise.

IRAN. Foreign Minister Lavrov is quoted as saying that Moscow is disappointed with Tehran’s reaction to the proposal on nuclear fuels and added that “it is impossible to wait forever”. “Forever”, however, is a long time and doesn’t preclude more waiting.

GEORGIA. The Georgian government has issued a policy statement on South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It’s the usual stuff except for this: “Georgia seeks to achieve these objectives only through peaceful means and diplomatic efforts, and rejects the pursuit of a military solution”. For years Moscow tried to get Tbilisi to formally renounce force (and the ceasefire agreement does oblige it to do so) so this may mean something. But, on the other hand, there is no reason to believe anything that comes out of Saakashvili or his government. And, of course, the statement appears only now that the territories have been lost to Tbilisi for the foreseeable future and the Ukrainian election (in which Saakashvili seems to have tried to meddle) has removed one of Saakashvili’s most important friends (and weapons suppliers – will the new Ukrainian President will look into that murky story?). Finally, a strategy of “engagement through cooperation” might have been a winner in 1989, but it’s too late now: Tbilisi has attacked the two too many times.

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)

UKRAINE-RUSSIA RELATIONS. Will obviously be “better” as neither winner is running on an overtly anti-Russia platform. That having been said, a better word would be “rational relations”. The NATO obsession was a disaster for relations (and extremely divisive inside Ukraine, where an overwhelming majority want good relations with Russia) and that is now over. There will, however, still be disagreements but, with luck, they can be settled outside of an apocalyptic framework.

INTERNET. The latest numbers suggest about a fifth of Russian adults (24 million) use the Internet daily. This figure is said to be up about 20% since last year. (JRL/2010/11/5). As I have said many times before, the standard scare pieces about government control of Russian media omit to mention Internet access (probably because they are mostly written by Old Media types). The New Media is replacing the Old all over the world.

NORTH CAUCASUS. Medvedev’s latest idea is to create a new North Caucasus federal district, appointing Aleksandr Khloponin presidential envoy. What is interesting about the appointment is that he is not a security man but someone evidently intended to improve the desperate economic situation.

DWELLINGS. Many Russians privatised their dwellings for modest sums (about 80% in Moscow, for example), but many still have not. The Duma has extended the deadline for another 3 years.

CHICKEN WARS. In the 1990s chicken legs were an important US export to Russia – Americans apparently prefer white meat and Russians were then happy to eat any meat. But Russia has just, to quote Putin, adopted EU standards: “We simply took them for use in our own country”. This really has nothing to do with Russia: the Europeans also reject US imports for convincing reasons. Negotiations continue (and with Europe too).

Nukes. Medvedev has said that negotiations are progressing. The target seems to be 1500-1675 warheads and 500-1,000 delivery vehicles each. This would seem to leave each with an admirable sufficiency of destruction.

INTERIOR MINISTRY. The police force scores high in public perception of corruption and there is supposed to be a reform going on. Meanwhile, the policeman who blew the whistle about police corruption in Krasnodar has been charged by his former colleagues; make of that what you will. There’s supposed to be an investigation there too. Heads of Russia’s media outlets have sent a letter to the Minister requesting police protection for reporters; this after a reporter was arrested and fined for covering an unauthorised protest. The Public Chamber will take up the reporter’s case, so this may result in a precedent the police will be inclined to follow.

UKRAINE ELECTION. Two good things. Turnout was about two-thirds which shows that, however disgusted they may be with the “Orange stagnation”, Ukrainians have not lost faith in the process. And the election was reported by all foreign observers as being to an acceptable standard. The bad news is that the country’s division remains. Outsiders have – or should have – only one interest in the outcome of Ukrainian elections and that is security; the last being greatly affected by stability. Ukraine is much divided by its history and east and west have quite different interests on many subjects. The NATO membership question, injected by the “Orange Revolution”, is the single-most divisive issue that I can image: nothing could be better calculated to remind Ukrainians, every moment, of what divides them. The NATO obsession helped paralyse politics, turning every question into one between treason and patriotism. Ukraine’s genuine problems are the common post-communist ones greatly intensified by the financial crisis: for this Ukraine needs a government of national unity, or if that is not possible, a president who can claim to be president of all Ukraine and not just half of it. In this respect, a better result would have been to have had the winner of the first round score in the forties and cruise to a convincing victory in the sixties or seventies. Instead, the results follow what opinion polls have shown for years: Yanukovych’s support in the mid-thirties is based on the east and south; Tymoshenko, about ten points behind, has her support in the west and centre. Thus the expectation is that winner will only score in the low fifties and will, therefore, be president of half of Ukraine. Pundits are punditting away, but there are questions we simply do not know the answers to. Conventional wisdom seems to be developing that Yanukovych has never been able to score more than the low forties; this is true, but neither has Tymoshenko. Can losers move their votes to one or the other? (In any case, Tyhypko (13%) and Yaysenyuk (7%) are reported as saying they will support neither). Results here.

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)

TEN YEARS. Putin became acting President on the last day of 1999 and was elected in March. When he came to power, judging from the essay he wrote, he set himself four tasks: 1) to reverse the economic decline; 2) to reverse the disintegration of Russia; 3) to increase Russia’s influence in the world; and 4) to introduce a rule of law or, as I prefer to put it, a rule of rules. Then economic indicators were trending down; Russia seemed to be literally breaking up (this fear often featured in his early speeches); most world capitals slighted it as a negligible and declining power; and the “rule” in Russia was that of corruption and incompetence. No one can deny that he has made great progress in these aims. The economy has turned around: here he had luck with high energy prices, but his policy did not squander the money. He has certainly restored central control – too much in my opinion – but no one now talks about the coming disintegration of Russia. Russia is taken much more seriously today although here the result is mixed. To those who will ever regard a weak Russia as a danger and a strong Russia as a threat, Putin’s effects have been wholly negative; but these people will never be pleased. Russia must now be taken more seriously (even though I think that Putin and his team sometimes overestimate its power and influence). But there has been little progress on the fourth aim. Nevertheless, few have been as successful at accomplishing their purpose as Putin and his team have. The team is still in place and is moving on the second half of the program. Putin stopped the decline and it is Medvedev’s task, as he ceaselessly says, to “modernise” Russia. The economy may be improving but it needs a new “modern” basis; the over centralisation of the Putin period should be relaxed; Russia has to improve its standing in the world so as to be seen as more of a problem-solver and less as a problem-causer (which, of course, requires a certain change of attitude in the rest of the world as well as a change in Russia’s behaviour); and finally the “rule of law” must replace “legal nihilism”. Medvedev will not see the resolution of these problems, but he will move them along. I am reminded of a remark made by Dr Leonid Abalkin about 15 years ago: reform will be in three stages, the first stage will take one year, the second five years and the third thirty years. The Putin team is popular in Russia today for a very good reason: it has delivered what governments are hired to do. Altogether, it has been quite a turnaround in the last ten years: no one would write “Russia is Finished” today; now conventional wisdom has moved to the “Russia resurgent” meme (but, note, Russia remains a problem!). The plain fact is that Russia is doing better than any of the final 12 members of the USSR and the ruling team has broad, real and persistent support firmly based on things that Russians can see happening around them. This, incidentally, is the principal reason why Russian elections are so unsurprising: Russians vote for more of the same and that means voting for the team’s pedestal party. In Ukraine, for example, this broad support does not exist: support there for the government is “the lowest in the world”.

ANTI-ALCOHOL CAMPAIGN. PM Putin has approved an anti-alcohol campaign. Certainly a major problem in Russia (and for a long time – English sailors in Murmansk in the 1500s are reported to have been pretty stunned by what they saw) and a major contributor to the death rate. But, Gorbachev’s efforts only resulted in the destruction of ancient vineyards in Georgia and Moldova and a sugar shortage when samogon production took off. We’ll see whether this campaign is more successful. Distilled alcohol consumption is a problem in northern countries generally and it is moderated by high prices.

HAITI EARTHQUAKE. The ever-efficient Russian Emergency Ministry has got its rescue teams off to Haiti.

NORTH CAUCASUS. The authorities claim more successes this week: perhaps the jihadists were ill-advised to keep their attacks up in winter.

RUSSIA INC. FOREX and gold actually grew last year by US$13.52 billion to US$440.6 billion and have gone up a bit so far this year.

UKRAINIAN ELECTION. For what it’s worth, a VTsIOM poll suggests that Serhey Tyhypko is catching up to Tymoshenko. The consensus of other polls is that Yanukovych will lead on the first round and he and Tymoshenko will go into the final round. But, maybe not. A possible decision by voters sick of the post-“Orange” stalemate might be that Tymoshenko and Yanukovych were part of it because each served a term as PM under Yushchenko. There may, therefore, be a chance for someone not involved. We’ll find out next week.

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)

HAPPY NEW YEAR! С НОВЫМ ГОДОМ!

JIHADIST WAR IN RUSSIA. The jihadist war continues in the North Caucasus. After the deaths of Khattab in 2002 and Basayev in 2006, jihadist activity slowed greatly; but a new leader, who has re-animated the “Caucasus Emirate” has appeared, (Said Abu Saad Buryatskiy). His new tactics use suicide bombers to target the security forces and other opponents. Since the last Sitrep, there has been a murder attempt on an imam, car bombs in Nazran and elsewhere in Ingushetia, a police chief murdered in Dagestan, a bomb defused in Kabardino-Balkaria, a suicide car bomb in Makhachkala and today mines near a railway line in North Ossetia. However, in strong contrast with their ineffectiveness when the international jihadists arrived 15 years ago, the authorities also win some: a group, together with an important leader was killed in Chechnya; another group with its leader was killed in Dagestan. The last produced a document showing payments (reportedly local extortions as well as monies from UAE, Georgia, Turkey and Azerbaijan). Two more were killed today in Dagestan. This is, of course, the very same war, animated by the same ideology, using the same methods and fought for the same purpose, which we see in the USA, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia and around the world. It’s just being fought in a different place. But, because that place is Russia, many in the Kommentariat cannot make the connection. (And I’m not convinced that very many intelligence and security services truly understand it either).

POPULATION. The Health and Social Development Minister said that, as of 1 November, the population was 141.9 million and by 1 January it would be 15,000 to 25,000 larger than it had been the year before. The increase comes from immigration (about a third of a million) because the natural decline continues. Although at a slower rate: the birth rate is up about 3% and the death rate down about the same. The government program is having an effect at both ends of the demographic problem.

FINANCIAL CRISIS. Last week Medvedev said that Russia had passed through the worst of the global financial crisis and he anticipated modest growth in 2010. Indications suggest he is correct in thinking so.

INTERIOR MINISTRY. Medvedev has signed a decree ordering the Interior Ministry Staff to undertake reform because “there has been a recent increase in offences against law and disciplinary infractions committed by police officers”. It is reported that some of the aims are a 20% staff reduction and a review of selection procedures. Eradicating corruption – which is to say, getting it down to “normal G7” levels – will be a long, weary effort for Medvedev and his successors.

STREET THEATRE. Here we go again: “opposition” groups apply for a demonstration permit; the city refuses, claiming the location was already booked; they march there anyway; they are arrested and soon released; Western governments huff and puff. When they march where the city permits them (and what city allows anyone to demonstrate anywhere at any time?) nothing happens.

THINGS THAT AREN’T REPORTED. There are all kinds of projects in Russia that don’t get much mention. Two items caught my eye recently: an upgrade of the control system for Russia’s railways and the “modernity” of the ambulance in this photo. Not all of Russia’s new money is being spent on yachts and fast cars.

PEOPLE POWER. There was a blow to the opposition to Gazprom’s proposed high-rise in St Petersburg when the city council voted against holding a referendum on its construction.

GAS. Gazprom has announced that Belarus will be charged about $168 tcm in the first quarter of 2010 (up from 2009’s average price of US$150 tcm). Meanwhile Russia and Turkmenistan have agreed on gas supplies at the European price level (last year’s price was about US$300 tcm).

CUSTOMS UNION. As of Friday, Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus have begun using common customs tariffs. It is planned to introduce a common customs space in July and a single economic space in January 2012.

UKRAINIAN ELECTION. The last poll before the presidential election on the 17th shows Yanukovych leading comfortably (about 30%), Tymoshenko second (about 20%) and Yushchenko far behind. Therefore, Yanukovych will not likely win on the first round but will presumably on the second against Tymoshenko on 7 February. I would suggest that any other result would be prima facie evidence of severe cheating, given that these polling results have held for the past couple of years. I wonder who really won in 2004.

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)

REALITY BITES. NATO, having enjoyed a decade of expanding and ignoring Russia’s concerns, now finds itself, in the person of its Secretary-General, asking Moscow for help. Rasmussen was in Moscow looking for weapons and training to support NATO’s efforts in Afghanistan. Too bad the people in NATO didn’t listen harder in 2000 and early 2001, when Putin and Ivanov were warning about the common enemy. While Moscow certainly has no desire to see a jihadist-controlled Afghanistan, it has no reason to trust NATO which has failed to keep any of its promises to it. What can NATO offer Moscow in return? Will it make a binding declaration that there will be no more expansion? Can it, filled as it now is with new members who regard it as nothing but an anti-Russia organisation? It’s not surprising that Rasmussen left without any commitments. Just asking is not going to do the trick: NATO must acknowledge the mistrust it has built up.

NIGHTCLUB FIRE. Earlier in the month a fire in a nightclub in Perm killed about 150 people. The fire began when fireworks set off inside (!) ignited the place and the fire exits turned out to be locked. Sergey Shoygu, the long-time head of the Emergency Ministry, reported that inspectors “had turned a blind eye to the discrepancies for many years”. The disaster has sparked inspections throughout Russia and a list of 80 deficient Moscow clubs was published yesterday; 8 have been closed. No doubt more will follow.

YEVLOYEV DEATH. A court in the Ingush Republic sentenced Ibragim Yevloyev, the police officer who killed Magomed Yevloyev, to two years in prison upon conviction on accidental homicide charges.

GLONASS. Three more satellites were successfully launched on Monday. There are now 22 in orbit, enough to cover Russia and, with another two, to provide world-wide coverage. But the program is behind schedule and there are reported to be problems with the satellites.

GAYDAR. Yegor Gaydar died yesterday at the young age of 54. His role in the initial changes in the early 1990s will be hotly debated for years, particularly the removal of price controls. The empty stores that had characterised the later Gorbachev period filled up quickly but horrific inflation wiped out everyone’s savings. His actions remain unpopular today.

CAUCASIAN RUMOURS OF WARS. In the last few weeks the authorities have been having some successes but the jihadists struck back this week: two bombs in a gas pipeline in Ingushetia were defused; a Dagestan imam was wounded in a shooting, and in the Ingush Republic, a car bomb yesterday killed two in Nazran, and a suicide car bomb today wounded several. Something, come to think of it, NATO might pay more attention to.

IRAQ. A consortium of LUKoil (85%) and StatoilHydro (15%) has won an auction to develop the large (estimated at 12.88 billion barrels) West Qurna-2 oil field in Basra province, Iraq. The consortium expects to produce 1.8 million barrels per day.

PIPELINE. The Turkmenistan-Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan-China gas pipeline was officially opened on Monday. It is planned to pump 40 billion cubic meters annually in a couple of years of Turkmenistan gas to China.

STALIN. Evidently there is some sort of Stalinist revival in New York: a letter written by him sold for US$12,500 at Sotheby’s New York.

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)

PUTIN PHONE-IN. On Saturday, Putin gave another marathon phone-in session (Eng) (Russ). As befits the Prime Minister’s job, everything was domestic (except for a bit about the WTO and the Jackson-Vanik amendment). The discussion was very detailed and, as ever, many questions were of the nature “My roof leaks, can you fix it?” My favourite bit was the presenter’s observation: “We have a lot of messages which quote the local authorities as saying: ‘We hear that Putin has promised it to you, so go and ask Putin’”. To which Putin replied: “Well, if you have such facts, let me know while we are on the air and we will sort out [мы разберемся] the people who give such answers.” Still a long way to go. And, once again he refused to give any indication of future plans. Here is his reason: “The biggest mistake would be to adjust our current work based on the interests of future election campaigns… When you start thinking about your ratings or about what you should do in the interests of future election campaigns, you will immediately feel tied to that and unable to make decisions some of which may be unpleasant but important for the economy and ultimately for the people.” Neither he nor Medvedev (nor Mr X) will ever say anything different before the event.

RUSSIA AND CLIMATEGATE. A few days ago articles in the UK media appeared intimating that the “Climategate” documents had been hacked/forged/whatevered by the Russian security services. Others have picked it up. The gist of the argument seemed to be that they were placed by the leaker on a server in Russia, that Russia has a lot of oil and that Russia is generally a sinister place (see van Ypersele’s comment in particular). The story collapses quickly – if they were clever enough to do it, they wouldn’t have leaked it from a Russian server.

HUMAN RIGHTS. Medvedev met with the Human Rights Ombudsman Vladimir Lukin yesterday who informed him that “the number of complaints has increased by a little more than 10 percent” December to December. The biggest increase (47%) concerned children’s rights; housing rights was next with a 42% and third was employment rights, up 20%. Medvedev expressed concern. The point of these rather wooden public exchanges, of course, is so that the populace can see them and understand that the President is behind them. (But “so go and ask Medvedev… ).

BULAVA LAUNCH FAILURE. Yesterday saw the seventh failure of this SLBM out of 12 launches. See “Strange lights over Norway”.

START. The treaty expired on Saturday but Medvedev and Obama stated they are working towards a new treaty and will observe the old in the meantime. Agreement is reported to be very close.

CAUCASIAN RUMOURS OF WARS. The FSB claimed that, so far this year, security forces had prevented 81 terrorist attacks in the North Caucasus this year and arrested 782 “members of illegal armed groups”.

INDIAN REACTOR. The USSR signed an agreement to build an NPP in Kudankulam, India, in 1988 but little happened until 1998. The head of RosAtom head has just said that the first reactor should start up in 2010. A somewhat faster rate of work than at Bushehr, where the Russian contract to finish what the Germans had begun was signed four years earlier. (Although Moscow has just promised to finish Bushehr “on time” – but “on time” has proved to be a flexible measurement).

UKRAINE ELECTION. Polls agree (here’s another) that, with about five weeks to go, Yanukovych is well ahead of Tymoshenko and President Yushchenko is far at the back. Indications therefore are that Yanukovych will head the first vote and beat Tymoshenko in the run-off. Either way, it’s probable that the NATO obsession, which has contributed to Ukraine’s political paralysis since the “Orange revolution”, will now stop.

MOLDOVA. In Moldova, the parliament chooses the head of state with 61 of 101 votes. The current dominant coalition (Alliance for European Integration) has 53 seats. Parliament again failed to elect someone (the Alliance nominated the same candidate who had been rejected last month). Neither side seems to be much inclined to compromise. The danger here is that some of the members of the Alliance, in former times at least, were in favour of Moldova’s joining Romania. This was the spark that set off war in the largely Slavic territory of Transdnestr (which was not part of Romania in the first place, having been added to territory gained from Romania in 1940 when Stalin created the Moldavian SSR). An idea altogether better forgotten at present.

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)

RUSSIA AND EUROPE. Readers will know that since the Ossetia war I have been predicting a change in European attitudes towards Russia. My argument is that many there have realised what a bill of goods they were sold about Saakashvili, Georgia and Russia (to say nothing about the gas supply problem) and will therefore be re-considering their ideas about Russia’s alleged hostility. Some more indications: Medvedev seems to have had a fruitful visit to France and I would expect similar results when he visits Italy today. Furthermore, it appears that his ideas on a new security treaty (Russ, Eng) are at least being listened to rather than dismissed as they first were. And, interestingly enough, Berlusconi just visited Belarus signalling the end of the shunning of “Europe’s last dictator”.

NATO EXPANSION. Russians have been saying NATO promised not to expand. Are they right? Apparently.

IRAN. Russia’s representative on the IAEA voted with Western countries to criticise Tehran for its nuclear program. Ahmadinejad was not best pleased. So, Bushehr delayed, no SS-300s and now this.

DEMOGRAPHICS. More gradual improvements are reported as births continue to increase and deaths decrease. One analyst expects that, at present rates, the two rates will cross over in 18 months or so. A rather large drop (even suspiciously so – there is a mild anti-alcohol campaign on) in alcohol consumption is reported.

CW. The Foreign Ministry has announced that so far, Russia has destroyed 45% of its CW stocks in line with its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention. All are supposed to be gone by 2012.

GAS. At their meeting a couple of weeks ago, Tymoshenko promised Putin that Ukraine would fulfill all its commitments. Gazprom is estimating a price next year of US$280 tcm with a reduced supply – it and Naftohaz agreed to cut gas deliveries by 35% in 2010. Then Medvedev said that Belarus’s price would be 30-40% lower than for EU states in 2010. For comparison, Germany was paying about $230 tcm in October; but it pays a fluctuating price which, a year earlier was $576 tcm. Russia is still subsidising its neighbours. But to a lesser degree than before.

MAGNITSKIY. The lawyer for Hermitage Capital Management, Sergey Magnitskiy died in prison in Moscow where he had been held on a tax dispute for a year. Medvedev ordered an investigation on the 24th. A consequence it appears of Russia’s brutal pre-trial detention rules and the appalling condition of the ancient and overcrowded prison. For what it’s worth, the prosecutors say he was involved in a scheme to illegally buy and sell Gazprom stock.

ZAKONIKI. A year or so ago I joked that, given Medvedev’s utterances about “legal nihilism”, the Kommentariat would stop talking about the siloviki and start talking about the sinister zakoniki behind him. Well, it hasn’t happened, but Russia’s top courts and RIA-Novosti have announced a program to “provide prompt and objective coverage of the Russian judiciary and legal system”.

RUSSIA INC. As of 20 November, Russia’s international reserves were up again to US$443.8 billion. GDP fell 8% year-on-year in October but has been inching up over the last five months. Foreign investment is way down however; that decline is, of course, not just because of Russia’s actions and events.

HISTORY WARS. For those among you who read Russian, here is a site with a lot of Russian historical documents. Evidently part of Medvedev’s Get the History Right project.

TERRORISM. A bomb derailed the Nevskiy Express on the 27th, killing a number of people. The police are tending to suspect jihadists. On the 20th a priest was murdered in his church, there may be a similar connection. Another bomb on a railway line in Dagestan failed to do damage.

STATUES. The Lenin statue in Kiev that was vandalised in June has been restored and re-erected. Does that mean that Leninism has returned to Kiev? And Moscow’s Worker and Collective Farm Woman statue has been re-erected after a long renovation.

THINGS YOU WON’T HEAR. A poll in the Czech Republic poll shows 80% of the respondents happy with Obama’s decision to stop the missile deployment. A poll in Poland just after the decision also showed approval. Clearly a gap between certain politicians and the population here.

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)

MEDVEDEV SPEECH. Last week Medvedev gave the annual Presidential address to Parliament. (Russ) (Eng). The principle theme was “modernisation”: “Today we are talking about modernisation – this is the essential aspect of my Address today – about our desire to be modern.” His definition: “A truly modern society is the one that seeks constant renewal, continuous evolutionary transformation of social practices, democratic institutions, visions of the future, assessments of the present, the one engaged in gradual but irreversible changes in technological, economic and cultural spheres, the steady improvement of the quality of life.” He understands that this involves a major psychic change: “Instead of an archaic society in which the leaders think and decide for everyone we will become a society of clever, free and responsible people” and “we ourselves will change too”. These speeches are made annually (the Constitution requires them, Art 84.f) and I am interested that, for practically the first time, the Kommentariat appears to have actually read the speech rather than skimmed it looking for some phrase it can twist into a threat. But old blinders are still on as many commentators spun it as a criticism of Putin, because they never bothered to read Putin’s speeches. Here from Putin’s speech in 2004 (the first I looked at): “We want high living standards and a safe, free and comfortable life. We want a mature democracy and a developed civil society… We are interested in further integration of the Russian economy into the international economy.” What many people cannot imagine is that this is a long-term project carried out by a team. Putin stabilised things; Medvedev is to modernise things. But it’s the same project. The doing of it, is, of course, the problem. It will be neither easy nor short. Nor entirely successful.

IRAN. The Bushehr NPP will not start this year as planned and the Iranian Defence Minister complains that Moscow has not fulfilled its promise to supply S-300 SAMs. Medvedev stated that Moscow and Washington could use “other means” if the talks on Iran’s nuclear program yield no results. Clearly a developing story.

LITVINENKO DEATH. German prosecutors have dropped their investigation of Dmitriy Kovtun because of lack of evidence. Is this the beginning of the end of this flimsy case? Readers who think there is a case against Lugovoy are invited to read this piece by US reporter Edward Jay Epstein.

TIME ZONES. One of Medvedev’s suggestions was to “examine the possibility of reducing the number of time zones”. This struck me as strange until I looked at a map which shows some rather curious divisions: there appear to be two spots in Siberia where, by merely turning around, one can be in three time zones.

CORRUPTION. Medvedev said “We need to take some very strong measures to cleanse the ranks of police and special services and rid them of the unworthy.” A policemen in Novorossiysk made a YouTube recording on corruption in the police force. The Interior Ministry has promised an investigation. Here’s Medvedev’s chance.

GOVERNORS. Russia has fiddled around with the method of choosing regional governors and we have just had the newest idea carried out. The dominant party in each region nominates three candidates, the President picks one and the legislature approves (or not). Eduard Rossel has been Governor of Sverdlovsk Oblast since 1995. He was duly nominated but Medvedev picked Aleksandr Misharin, deputy transport minister. It is rather probable that Rossel, controlling the resources he does, would have been re-elected so this method at least allows for new blood occasionally.

BUS ACCIDENTS. The head of the traffic police says that more than 5000 people have been killed or injured in driver-caused bus accidents in the first 9 months of 2009. Here is a film of one man lucky enough not to be.

HAPPINESS. A VTsIOM poll shows that about 70% of Russians say they are more happy than not. Which is another reason why they vote – those who do – for the establishment.

GAS GAMES. On Monday Russia and the EU signed a memorandum designed to avert another supply crisis. Right on cue, Ukrainian President Yushchenko started complaining about the existing deal. Readers are reminded that there is an election in Ukraine in which the President and PM are pitted against each other and that it was PM Tymoshenko who negotiated the existing deal. Blaming Tymoshenko, Yushchenko says the IMF has declined the latest tranche of its loan to Ukraine. There may be gas interruptions this winter, but they won’t be Moscow’s doing.

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)

ELECTION FRAUD. Two opinion polls, both by Levada, give us data on how people say they voted in the elections last month. A poll of Muscovites (JRL/201/4) gives 46.1% for United Russia (official numbers 66.25%), 27.1% for the communists (13.3%), 11.8% for LDPR (6.13%), 7.9% for Just Russia (5.33%) and 3.7% for Yabloko (4.71%). A nation-wide poll asking the same question gives United Russia 47%, communists 13%, Just Russia 8%, LDPR 7% and Yabloko 2%. When the Yabloko leader said his vote hadn’t been counted at all, a recount was ordered and, lo! it was found that some Yabloko votes had “accidently” been miscounted. But these numbers do not give us a clear picture. Levada tells us that Muscovites voted communist at twice the rate of the nation; this seems improbable. Levada also tells us that fewer people voted for Yabloko than the official numbers give; this too seems improbable if the scenario were to inflate United Russia’s numbers and deflate the others. So, as always, an examination of the data we have deepens the mystery. The Yabloko leader has described what his people told him and it appears that fake voters was the preferred method. Medvedev met with the head of the CEC and said “All types of claims must be investigated thoroughly”. Well, we’ll see. These numbers make a prima facie cause for fraud favouring the pedestal party but leave us in the dark as to what degree of fraud there was.

STALINSHCHINA. Last Friday was the Remembrance Day of Victims of Political Repression and Medvedev made an address on his video blog. “It is impossible to imagine now the scale of terror which affected all the peoples of our country and peaked in the years 1937-1938… For twenty years before the World War II entire strata and classes of our society were eliminated… millions of people died as a result of terror and false accusations – millions… But even today you can still hear voices claiming that those innumerable victims were justified for some higher national purpose. I believe that no national progress, successes or ambitions can develop at the price of human misery and loss… But it is equally important not to sanction, under the guise of restoring historical justice, any justification of those who destroyed our people.” The Kommentariat will either ignore this or try and spin it into a difference between Medvedev and Putin (despite the latter’s similar remarks at the Butovo Memorial two years ago).

OPEL. The GM Board of Directors has voted to keep Opel, thereby blocking the Russian-Canadian offer to buy it; but workers in the Opal plants in Europe are not happy.

MARKELOV MURDER. It is reported that one of the suspects has confessed.

North Caucasus. More violence in the last two weeks but the authorities have done better: an assassination attempt on Kadyrov was said to have been prevented and the instigator killed, another senior “emir” was killed in Chechnya; “militants” were killed in Dagestan. Two suicide bombers were stopped in Groznyy. The Chechnya Interior Minister says that 144 “militants” have been killed since April, 118 of them in Chechnya. On the other hand, the imam of a village mosque in Dagestan was murdered (murder of Muslim clerics who oppose Wahhabism is an important jihadist tactic).

UKRAINE. Readers are reminded that there is a rather vicious election campaign in Ukraine in which President Yushchenko, whose ratings are very low, and PM Tymoshenko are rivals. It would be wise to regard all statements by either as part of that campaign. Yushchenko will be campaigning as the man who stands up to Russia and would like a crisis to prove it; Putin reports that Tymoshenko told him that he was blocking payments for Russian gas supplies. Tymoshenko will be campaigning as the person who can get things done and she has ordered a 3-week closure of schools and cinemas because of the H1N1 flu. Yushchenko then appealed for international help (including from NATO!). Yanukovych, the favourite, so far has been silent. He will no doubt be campaigning as the man Ukrainians should have picked in the first place.

GEORGIA. Two more reasons to be happy that Georgia is not in NATO. International PEN says that “mass media in Georgia is under strict censorship” and “government controlled broadcasting organisations are led by companies that are themselves part of the government administration”. The newly-appointed Public Defender (his predecessor has joined the opposition) reports that the human rights situation, especially in prisons, is “grave”. Meanwhile, we discover that the Foreign Minister of Georgia has Russian citizenship! He, after a Russian Duma member tried to get him stripped of it, has decided to renounce it.

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)