My Presidential Election Bet

Note February 2016. Of course, I was wrong and Putin did run again. I believe, as I argue here, that NATO’s duplicity over Libya convinced him (correctly as it turned out) that bad times were coming and only he could helm the ship.

http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/2011/08/my-presidential-election-bet.html

Reprinted

http://vivreenrussie.1fr1.net/t4769-my-presidential-election-bet-by-patrick-armstrong

 

It sometimes seems that the only story in Russia today is who will run for President and the Kommentariat is parsing every word uttered by Putin or Medvedev in its search for clues. Neither has yet said anything definite (and no more would either: the fear is that the Russian bureaucracy – ever alert to power shifts – would stop working altogether). Readers are reminded that we heard similar speculation before: Gorbachev would not step down; Yeltsin would not (could not some said) step down; Putin would change the Constitution and stay on. In some cases, there are Russia watchers who have stoutly maintained all these positions.

I was amused by a recent – and rather lengthy – think piece which concluded that the possibilities were that Medvedev, Putin or someone else would be the next President. I believe that people who watch Russia should do better than that; and I am putting my bets down:

1. Medvedev will run for President and Putin will not.

2. There may be another candidate from the Team who runs.

Medvedev will run for President and Putin will not.

I believe that the decision was made some years ago that Putin would not serve more than two terms and that he would hand off to a trusted member of the Team which been running Russia since 2000. What Putin did, by stepping down as President and re-appearing as Prime Minister, was something not before seen: for probably the first time in Russian history there are two power centres which are cooperating. Many people simply cannot grasp the concept and insisted for some years that Medvedev was just a place-holder; now, curiously, the conventional view is becoming that Medvedev is somehow opposed to Putin and that Putin will take back the reins.

I maintain that there has been a Plan since 2000; that that Plan can be seen in the speeches of the two and especially in Putin’s Russia at the Turn of the Millennium. Or to take a more recent example, here is Putin reflecting on what has been accomplished and what remains to be done. I do not apologise for the length of the quotation; in my opinion too few actually read what the man says. He remembers what he faced in 2000:

The scale of the tasks was directly proportionate to the problems Russia was facing at the beginning of the 21st century. We entered the new century after a default that spurred inflation growth and led to bankruptcies and unemployment. At least one-third of [the] population fell below the poverty line. The system of state governance was experiencing serious problems. The authorities were ineffective, and the country looked like a group of principalities, each with its own laws and rules. At that time, a genuine civil war was under way in the North Caucasus, unleashed by terrorists who were supported by forces that sought to weaken Russia. The situation called for decisive action. I am referring above all to the restoration of constitutional order, social guarantees, and the strengthening of state institutions. We have done all of that. We have literally brought the country together, restored its legal space and created a balanced system of state governance… Most importantly, we have ensured stability.

In short, three problems: economic failure, an ineffective state and lawlessness. He did not mention the fourth: a Russia that was considered to be a declining power, on its way to negligibility. But, “Most importantly, we have ensured stability”. That sums up what Putin thinks he did as President.

The interviewer than asks him whether, “after solving high-priority problems in the past decade, we now need qualitative changes and some kind of a breakthrough in all spheres of the country’s life?” Putin answers:

I get asked this question a lot. And I’ll give the same answer by quoting Alexander Solzhenitsyn who once said that ‘preserving the people’ was Russia’s national idea. This phrase captures the main goal of modern Russia and all the ongoing transformation of its economy, social sphere, and its public and political life. At the same time, I consider consistent development to be the key to realising this national idea. We should take pride in Russia’s thousand-year history, natural resources and cultural heritage. But we must move forward, no matter what. We must maintain competitive positions in all spheres, including technology, human capital, industrial production and the arts. Society, the government and the business community must work as a team. This is the only way to attain the qualitative breakthrough you mentioned.

Qualitative change is, of course, one of Medvedev’s continually-repeated themes. I fail to see any serious disagreement between the two here. Putin “restored stability” during his two presidential terms and now is the time for a “qualitative breakthrough”. Phase I then Phase II of the long job of rebuilding Russia after what Putin once called the “blind alley” of communism.

Making the “qualitative breakthrough” will, of course be more difficult; although there were many who thought that stability could not be restored – a favourite example is a piece that appeared in 2001, the title says it all, “Russia is Finished”. It will also take much longer, and, in some respects, will never be completed because the target of “modernity” is continually moving.

Therefore, the Plan has moved into another phase and that is the job of Medvedev, whom Putin picked and nurtured (and they were both grown in Anatoliy Sobchak’s nursery). I see no serious evidence that Putin is dissatisfied with his choice. Compare and contrast lists like this do not convince me that there is a strategic difference between the two.

And there is a little clue: in another interview, Putin dropped a pretty significant hint when he said he was “fed up with foreign policy”. Foreign policy is a rather large part of the President’s job.

Therefore, I expect that The Plan will be adhered to and Medvedev will run for a second term and Putin will not.

There may be another candidate from the Team running

In 2006 the political party Just Russia (Справедливая Россия) was created. It was clear that there was a good deal of involvement by the Kremlin in its creation. This was puzzling because United Russia (Единная Россия) is the “Kremlin party”; why would the Kremlin want to create a second establishment party with a slightly different flavour?

The Russian political scene is rather barren. The only detectable raison d’être of the majority party is the division of the spoils of power. The Communists and Zhirinovskiy’s personality party have little to offer the majority. Russian liberals are quarrelsome and play more to outside opinion than to Russian interests. Perhaps the hope was that Just Russia would attract membership away from the Communist and liberal electorates but, if so, there is little evidence that it has. Although the party has secured seats in the Duma and in regional legislatures, it is very much a second fiddle to the all-dominating United Russia.

At the time – just before the 2008 presidential election – it seemed possible to me that the reason for Just Russia’s creation could be that two Team candidates would run, one for United Russia and one for Just Russia. In this event, the election would be more competitive than yet another run of the Team candidate against Zhirinovskiy and Zyuganov – a very tired contest indeed and one we have seen in almost every presidential election since 1991. Secondly, the contest would establish Just Russia as a viable party and Russia would have a species of political pluralism.

But, if this were the plan, it did not happen and Russia had another election in which the Team candidate, supported by the machinery of United Russia, faced off against Zhirinovskiy and Zyuganov. And, of course, Medvedev won as he would have, with or without the power of incumbency.

There are signs that the Team is not very enthusiastic about United Russia; as Putin said recently “Frankly speaking, United Russia, our leading political force, needs an influx of new ideas, proposals and people in these circumstances”. Medvedev has more than once called for more political competition. But, as long as United Russia is the dominant party for lack of competition, why would it ever want to be creative? All it has to do is agree and anticipate.

So, in a way, the Team is a victim of its success. In contrast to the Yeltsin period in which “pedestal parties” (eg Russia’s Choice, Our Home Russia) were cobbled together at the last moment and performed poorly, United Russia has been more carefully constructed. So the Team has a reliable base of support; but that base so dominates political discourse in Russia that the creativity necessary for Phase II (“qualitative change”) is stifled. Hectoring United Russia to be creative won’t change the reality that it is an association of apparatchiks and would-be apparatchiks.

Could my imagined 2008 scenario play out in next year’s presidential election? I believe that it is possible. I did not see much evidence of it – although the move of Sergey Mironov from the Federation Council to the Duma is interesting, as are his attempts to distinguish Just Russia from United Russia. If Just Russia were to run a credible Team candidate, it would offer a route out of the political stagnation that Medvedev and Putin complain about.

So I believe that the possibility of two Team candidates, one of them Medvedev and the other not Putin, each supported by one of these parties is something to watch for.

Other points

Putin’s future. I have no opinion on whether Putin will stay on as Prime Minister in the next presidential term. However, I believe that he has come to the end of his possibilities. He was the right man for Phase I (reversing the decline) but not so good for Phase II (qualitative change). And, as far as Russian’s image in other countries is concerned, as long as he stays in power, there will more years of speculation that “the ex-KGB officer” is really running the show. More of this would hinder the development of Phase II which requires a peaceful environment and outside investment.

When to make the declaration, I see a disagreement between Medvedev and Putin on the timing. Putin, ever cautious, has said he would prefer to get the Duma elections over with first; Medvedev keeps saying he will announce “soon”. What they both fear is the kratotropism of Russian officials. Should Medvedev declare, there will be a tendency to regard Putin as yesterday’s man and he will lose traction. Even more so, should Putin declare, then Medvedev would immediately become “nobody’s man”. On the other hand, it can be argued that the growing speculation frenzy can itself paralyze action. Thus the timing requires nice judgement and it is understandable that there could be different ideas about when to do it.

Election turnout. Russian electoral turnout, at least in presidential elections, is on the high side by world standards in the mid- to high-60s. US presidential turnouts have been gently drifting down to the low 50s; Canadian federal elections are also drifting down to the mid- to low-60s; British general election turnouts are similar and French presidential turnouts, while higher than the others, also show a downturn. Two common – and opposed – explanations are given for low turnouts: either disgust with what is on offer or acceptance of the probable outcome. Opinion polls, over many years and with many different polling organisations, suggest that Russians are generally content with their leaders. Thus it seems likely that the Russian turnout (somewhat inflated by improbable results, especially in Chechnya) will be at least in the 60s.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP 14 July 2011

MILITARY. There may be more to last week’s retirements of three generals. One reporter suggests that their retirement has a connection with what he says are several cases of convicted officers being promoted. He has learned that the Presidential Administration has “frozen” their resignations and will be interviewing them to ascertain why “young, promising leaders are retiring from the army”. Report in English here. On the procurement problem – and the growing conviction that a lot of Russian-made weaponry is more expensive than it should be – a Deputy Defence Minister reports that overpricing is caused by an excessive number of subcontractors which, he said, can lead to sudden and unexplained price drops when the initial bid is challenged. It rather sounds as if this is a polite way of saying that many people are “wetting their beaks”.

“AGAINST ALL”. Russian ballots used to have an entry “Against All” and “Against All” could win and occasionally did. In that case, new election with new candidates. The provision was abolished in 2006 but Sergey Mironov, the leader of Just Russia, has introduced a bill to the Duma to bring it back. An interesting provision that very few countries dare to have because it might lead to unflattering discoveries. I suspect that the real reason Mironov made the proposal was to distinguish his party from United Russia. Whether it passes or is voted down, he will achieve that aim.

STOLYPIN. I have always had the suspicion that it is Putin’s dream to be considered a second and successful Piotr Stolypin and I have noticed the occasional reference to him in his speeches over the years. He has “suggested” government officials might “like” to contribute to a statue of Stolypin to commemorate his 150th birthday. I’ll bet all the officials would “like to” and that the statue appears.

INFRASTRUCTURE. There have been a couple of plane crashes lately and the sinking of a cruise boat on the Volga. Russian infrastructure is rather old and there is some concern. But new things are appearing: roads, hospitals, trains, farm equipment and so on. While a lot of it is foreign-made, it is undeniably new. But it’s a race.

Space. With the launch of the Atlantis, the USA has finished the Space Shuttle program. This leaves the space launch field pretty much to Russia. And to make the point, a Soyuz just launched six US satellites. Not a state of affairs to have been expected in 1961.

QUADRIGA AWARD. Putin is one of the winners {“for his contribution to the stability and reliability of German-Russian relations” we are told). This has set off the usual huffing and puffing.

GEORGIA. Tbilisi has announced the arrest of three photographers on charges of spying for – of course – Russia. One of them is Saakashvili’s personal photographer. The case has been declared secret and no information is allowed out except what the regime chooses to say. Many Georgians have lost their confidence in what the government says and the Coalition for Media Advocacy has protested the secrecy of the case and the Public Defender also wants more evidence. It would appear that their “crime” was photographing the breakup of the protest on 26 May or perhaps selling photos to Russian news outlets. Anyone who believes anything official Tbilisi says is rather naïve. More scepticism about Saakashvili’s periodic discovery of plots from Dmitry Babich here. Meanwhile six opposition parties have united to form the Free Choice coalition. I find it instructive that two party leaders and the founders of one of the six held office under Saakashvili and two of the remaining three parties were former allies of his party. Saakashvili’s Western claque is oblivious to the fact that the people who know him best have, one by one, gone into opposition. (Why do I go on about Saakashvili? you may ask. It is because Georgia has been used for years as a stick with which to beat Russia. Western sources have displayed much credulity. Perhaps not so much any more though.).

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP 7 July 2011

GRAIN EXPORTS. When I was in Russia in the early 1990s I visited several farms. In my travels I don’t recall ever seeing a field that was being used for anything except grazing for a scrawny cow or two. I spoke to Russians and Westerners, more knowledgeable than I, who had seen farms; everyone agreed that the situation was, in a word, hopeless. At that time it was said that Russia imported half its food. Something has happened. Last year, with the bad summer, Russia halted grain exports and the world price went up. Exports have just been resumed (perhaps 15 million tonnes out of a total harvest expected to be about 85) and prices went down. Somehow the desperate situation of the 1990s has turned around and Russia is an important grain exporter for the first time since when? a century ago? In the 1990s, the idea of Russia becoming an major food exporter would have been utterly unimaginable. I am not aware of any coverage of this and I would love to see some. Private farming? A restructuring of the decayed remnants of state and collective farms? New land? What? Away from the everlasting barren speculation of neo-Kremlinology there are real stories to cover.

MILITARY. In addition to the problems of modernising equipment, improving its command and control and other matters requisite to becoming modern, the Russian Armed Forces are plagued with three endemic scandals. Military procurement, by many accounts, is a feeding frenzy for corruption. Yesterday, Medvedev gave Defence Minister Serdyukov three days to report on the state of the defence procurement order for this year. Serdyukov is a money man and was brought in to get a grip on where it goes. Second is the pain (and disagreements) of reform: it is reported that several influential members” of the high command have resigned over implementation of reforms (or maybe not). Added to this is confusion about the end point. For example, the aircraft carrier dream refuses to die: last week the head of the United Shipbuilding Corporation said Russia would get its first nuclear powered carrier by 2023; three days later Serdyukov said there were no plans to build carriers. And, completing the trio, two officers have been charged with extorting money from their subordinates. Serdyukov has just promised to create a special military police department to eradicate this sort of thing as well as bullying. Gradually the searchlight is turning to the military. In 2003 Putin said “The army in Russia, as I have said many times, should be small in size, compact but effective, ready for battle, and provided with modern equipment.” Eight years on, it is far from that goal. Indeed, I often wonder whether it is possible to reform a Soviet-pattern, mass-conscript, big-war army. Perhaps they should start all over again. Peter had to.

CORRUPTION. An investigation has uncovered 30 criminal groups engaged in car theft. The investigators said that their primary focus was catching police and they did: 160 policemen were involved in 12 of the groups.

ECONOMIC CRIMES. Medvedev has smiled upon the idea of an amnesty for economic crimes. Preparatory study is said to be underway.

MAGNITSKIY. The Investigative Committee has reported that Sergey Magnitskiy died in prison from lack of medical care; this is not news but the announcement of prosecutions to follow may be. Another inquiry suggested he may have been beaten to death. There were dismissals at the time but Medvedev’s comment that “it seems… there really was some crime committed” suggests that more serious charges may be laid eventually.

BELARUS. On Friday Lukashenka pledged to restore stability to Belarus: “In the next few months we will completely stabilise the situation… Belarus has not been forced into a corner…as some would like.” A rather stunning admission from someone whose main campaign platform since he began in 1994 would have been “peaceful Belarus”. As the economy gently moves towards the end of its economic and financial possibilities, there are now regular demonstrations and arrests.

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)

Stalin’s Cartographical Time-Bombs

Note February 2016. These were done for the Russia Profile Weekly Experts’ Panel which I cannot find on the Net now. Many were picked up by other sources and I have given links where I can find them.

No reference found.

When the USSR fell apart five of Stalin’s cartographical time-bombs exploded. After the fighting, each of the five had secured its liberty: North Ossetia, Abkhazia, Karabakh, Transdnestr and Chechnya. Of these, only Chechnya has been resolved (for the time being anyway) but only after immense bloodshed and destruction. The other four maintain their independence.

International attempts to negotiate an end to these standoffs fail, over and over again, on five obstacles.

The first is the contradiction between two fundamental principles of international relations: territorial integrity and the right of self-determination. There is, however, no means of resolution when the two principles collide as they do in these four cases. As to a third principle, uti possidetis, the “international community” seems to be too squeamish to accept that the four won their independence in war and are therefore entitled to keep it.

A second difficulty is the question of who sits at the negotiating table. This issue has particularly bedevilled attempts to resolve Karabakh. Karabakh is a player, it cannot be left out of the talks. But Baku is adamant that it will negotiate only with Yerevan. That is understandable: for Baku to admit Stepanakert as a negotiator would be to concede much of what Stepanakert demands. And so discussions fail because one of the principals – the most important, for it won its war – is not party to them.

A third difficulty is the status quo. The four, whatever their long-term hopes may be, prefer the status quo of self-government to the visible alternatives. Stepanakert’s incentive to make Baku happy or Tiraspol’s to make Chisinau happy is low.

Fourth, whatever the casus belli may have been – unwillingness to join Romania in the case of Transdnestr and fear of massacres in the case of Karabakh – the four gained their independence in war and much blood was shed on both sides. They feel that they earned their independence. Several times a possible solution to the Karabakh problem has been blocked by enraged war veterans on both sides.

Finally, there is no outside power that can “deliver” any of them. While much commentary in the West seems to assume that all of these problems were fomented or caused by Moscow that is not true; they were sui generis. Neither Moscow nor any other outside power can force a solution on any one of the four.

Perhaps there were possibilities in the 1990s to peacefully resolve these problems. For example, Kiev wisely conceded autonomy to Crimea and Chisinau to the Gagauz and these potential problems were resolved in a civilised way. But, in the cases of South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Transdnestr and Karabakh these possibilities were not available. (Moscow did negotiate an autonomy agreement with the Chechen parliament but Dudayev would have none of it.) And so it was left to war to resolve the problems.

I do not hold out much possibility for any future negotiating session to overcome these obstacles. The irony is that the end-state – something resembling the arrangement of the Åland Islands for example – is visible. But it is hard to imagine, given the five obstacles, how to get there from here.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP 30 June 2011

THE NEXT PHASE. Medvedev laid out to the government budget policy for the next three years. The key words are: modernise, competitive, growth, private initiative, innovation, effective, high quality, privatising, transparency, decentralisation. A working group on decentralising power has been set up. Read the speech, don’t read about it. I saw this coming four years ago (Sitrep 20061109: “Putin can name his successor and, one assumes, that if he names only one, that one will be as much in his mould as he can ensure. But that successor will have to confront the task of lifting growth to the next level, making it self-sustaining and not dependent on the world price of oil. The only way to do this is to allow it to happen: the government can encourage, it can create conditions, but it cannot do the lifting itself; only individual Russians can push economic growth to the next level. And here he will run into one of Putin’s legacies, which is Putin’s tendency, when there is a problem, to centralise control into an office next to his. But Russia is too big, too diverse and too untidy to be neatly run from the big corner office in the Kremlin. Putin’s successor will have to start to decentralise or watch Russia’s economic takeoff sag back onto the runway”). All this, Phase II of The Plan, was delayed a year or so by two unexpected events: the war in Ossetia and the international financial crisis.

DUMA BARRIER. Proportional representation is used by many countries in many variations. Russia has been through some: originally the Duma was half party list and half individual candidacies, then it became full party list. The next variation is the size of the percentage of total vote that a party has to gain to get members into parliament. The percentage varies around the world (and what is the “correct” number anyway?); originally in Russia it was 5% but was then put up to 7%. I believed that 7% was too high, especially if the aim was to force the growth of parties (as it was said to have been). Medvedev has just sent a draft law to the Duma to lower it back to 5%. While this is another loosening of things, it is worth noting that even if it had been 5% in the last election there would have been no difference: it would have had to have been 2% for the next party to get in.

POLICE REFORM. On Monday it was announced that police will be tested on lie detectors as part of the re-certifying process of transforming from “militia” to “police”. This is, of course, entirely “voluntary” – if they want to be re-hired into the police force, that is. And, not unconnected, 11 prison officials have been disciplined for violations of prisoners’ rights at one of Moscow’s nastier prisons.

FEDERATION COUNCIL. With Mironov’s translation to the Duma, the post of Speaker is open. Valentina Matviyenko, Governor (mayor) of St Petersburg, has been persuaded to run. She has to get a seat on the St Petersburg legislature first and then it seems that everything is prepared and she should be Speaker by the end of August. Which opens up the Governor’s job. More pre-election manoeuvrings?

ENERGY WARS. In a nutshell, neither Belarus nor Ukraine can afford to pay the price. The Russian electricity export agency cut off electricity to Belarus (about 12% of its total consumption) because of failure to pay a mere US$43 million. Minsk paid up today but that’s symptomatic. The gas price to Ukraine is set at 70% of the European price which, in turn, is tied to oil prices; they are rising. Currently Ukraine pays about US$300 per thousand cubic metres and that will likely go up to about US$400 by the end of the year. Kiev is trying to re-negotiate the price and Putin, on a “private” visit to Crimea, will be meeting Yanukovych, no doubt to talk about this. It is not in Moscow’s interest to bankrupt either but neither is it to carry customers who can’t pay.

USD. One of Medvedev’s advisors speculates that the Central Bank of Russia will cut the share of US dollars in its international reserves. Can’t think they’ll replace them with Euros or Yen: is this Canada’s big moment?

KARABAKH. Medvedev has hosted talks between the Armenian and Azerbaijanian Presidents on Karabakh. I am not sanguine for reasons here (probably posted tomorrow). Not least of which is that if Stepanakert is not represented, what can anyone expect? It won its war and isn’t ready to have someone else give anything away.

GEORGIA. The regime has decided that Irakli Okruashvili – formerly Saakashvili’s Defence Minister (and a rather aggressive one at that) – has formed an “illegal armed group”. Arrests have been made. Meanwhile, Shevardnadze says it would be “wise” for Tbilisi to recognise Abkhazia’s independence: “It’s clear Abkhazia can’t be a normal region of Georgia any longer. “Not serious” says Saakashvili. Will Shevardnadze’s peaceful retirement suddenly end?

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP 23 June 2011

MODERNISATION. On Friday Medvedev made a speech about modernisation to the St Petersburg Economic Forum. Those who believe that this program has already failed, or that the only question in Russia is the imaginary Medvedev-Putin feud/power struggle won’t be interested but it’s worth reading. Generalities for the most part, but he is the President and he was giving a strategic message. A message we are now familiar with: “Modernisation is the only way to address the many issues before us”; that progress is real but still small: “They are small fruits, but they are there.” As to state control of certain sectors: “I want to state loud and clear here that we are not building state capitalism. Yes, there was a point in our development when we increased the state’s share in the economy, but this was an unavoidable step and in many ways necessary in order to stabilise the situation after the chaos of the 1990s, and re-establish basic order. That avenue has exhausted its potential now… [he describes problems with state control: state interests always dominate, the greater possibility of corruption and poor management] … This economic model jeopardises the country’s future. It is not my choice. My choice is different. Private business and private investment should dominate in the Russian economy. The state must protect the choice and assets of those who consciously decide to risk their money and reputation. We need to give them the right to make mistakes, and opportunities for drive and development.” As to specifics he spoke of more judicial independence and, as ever, corruption. He does understand what must be done as well as how difficult it will be. But he is right – as Belarus is showing – that there is no alternative. And, I again stress that this is the “Putin program” too: there was much use of “modern” in his 2005 and 2007 Federal Assembly addresses; “it’s no longer possible to survive and be competitive without modernisation” (2010). And so on. All part of The Plan.

THE THIRD TURN. Eugene Ivanov points out a declinebut not absence – of hostile coverage about Russia in some of the Western MSM recently. Too early, of course, to draw big conclusions, but one cannot shout that the Russians are coming – the “gas weapon”, conquering Georgia, subverting Estonia etc etc – forever without some evidence that it is happening.

THE ONLY STORY. One of his aides says Medvedev will make his announcement in the autumn. I believe that there is a difference of opinion in the Duumvirate on the timing: Putin – ever cautious – wants to get the Duma elections out of the way; Medvedev wants to announce earlier. Thus “the autumn” may be the compromise. I expect Medvedev to say he will and Putin to say he won’t.

MISTRAL. The deal is done; as expected, two will be built in France and two later in Russia. The Russian side claims to have got all the technology it wanted.

PERSONNEL CHANGE. More changes in the police senior ranks. And, I have heard, more firings of senior military officers for unstated reasons.

ELECTIONS. There is a wide-spread assumption that United Russia’s domination is fraudulent (although I can’t recall anyone actually having the foolishness to claim that, otherwise, some other party would dominate). Anatoly Karlin takes the effort to move past assumptions to evidence to show that the results accord with opinion polls. But, for so much Russia coverage, it’s all “decision-based evidence making”.

CORRUPTION. Yuriy Chayka, the Prosecutor General (just re-confirmed) says that more than 40,000 corruption cases were begun in 2010: “We consider it progress”. Somewhat more than a drop in the bucket I would say.

BELARUS. The EU, which is in another anti-Belarus phase, has tightened sanctions. (For a brief moment Belarus was another victim of the Russian “energy weapon”).There have been protests, aided by social media, against the economic situation and it is said, across the country, 450 arrests. I believe that Belarus’s avoidance of economic reality is coming to an end but I expect it will be some time yet before the full consequences hit. One of the keys to how long Lukashenka can keep his Soviet-lite economy running is energy costs and here Belarus is dependent on Russia. But Moscow, years ago, made the decision to move prices for its ex-Soviet customers up to the Western Europe level, step-by-step. And, the fact is that cheap energy prices were a drag on these countries’ ability to modernise their economies. So Russia’s 15-year cheap prices were probably not doing them any favours. Both Belarus and Ukraine are experiencing this reality today.

© Patrick Armstrong, Ottawa, Canada

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP 16 June 2011

POLICE REFORM. According to the Minister, one third of the top police officers did not survive the screening and have been dismissed – 119 of 335. That is not a trivial percentage and to my mind shows the effort is real. The idea was that the senior officers would be vetted by the Presidential Administration and juniors by the seniors – perhaps it would have been smarter to wait until the seniors’ vetting was over before beginning the juniors. But the effort isn’t over yet.

CORRUPTION. It is almost a cliché in certain circles that Medvedev’s struggle against corruption has failed. Readers are invited, however, to consider this account of a successful effort to stop (corrupt) markups in medical equipment prices. That’s not been a failure. And, by the way, as to the other cliché that anti-corruption is Medvedev’s thing (and by implication not Putin’s), here’s Putin three years ago: asked “Which of Russia’s problems have you found the most wearying and difficult to resolve over these last eight years?”, he answered “Corruption”. Same program, different phase.

MILITARY CORRUPTION. Is a subject that is coming over the horizon. A recent assessment put the Defence Ministry at the top of the corruption list of government structures. This piece explains why and how: huge vague budget holes combined with “national security” make procurement programs into a corruption playground. So, what is to be done? Attempts for some years to get a grip on book-keeping do not seem to have worked. From time to time arrests are made but, if the problem is as widespread and systemic as it is thought to be, it will take many more arrests. I wonder if the “combing” process applied to the police will be done here.

LEGAL REFORM. Last week Medvedev submitted Criminal Code amendments to the Duma. They are aimed at moderating the process. Courts will be able to soften charges in certain cases and take mitigating circumstances into account. Sentencing will also be softened. As usual this will take time to take effect.

PRESUMPTION OF FAILURE. All the above are part of Medvedev’s attempt to reduce “legal nihilism”. In this connection I highly recommend this piece by Eugene Ivanov which persuasively argues that the campaign is having more effect than conventional wisdom thinks. I reiterate: relying on Western coverage of Russia will leave you very poorly informed indeed.

PRIVATISATIONS. It is policy to sell off some of the state assets acquired in the Putin era and both Medvedev and one of his staffers have called for speeding up the process. Apart from the fact that government control – arguably a good idea ten years ago when outright disintegration of the Russian state was a common fear – is now unnecessary, corruption is always easier when you start inside the front door of a large company.

MIRONOV. He has completed his move from the upper to the lower house, taking a seat vacated for him in the Duma last week and being elected leader of the Just Russia (Справедливая Россия) bloc this week. I can’t shake the suspicion that this is all manoeuvring to establish him as a presidential candidate running on the Just Russia ticket. From that bottomless well of talent in St Petersburg, he could be considered a member of The Team but at a bit of distance. See this for more thought on what’s going on.

LIBYA. Foreign Minister Lavrov expressed his disgust with NATO’s interpretation of the UN resolutions: it shows that “no one’s word can be taken” (another suggestion that promises made to secure Russia’s abstention have been broken). Meanwhile Medvedev’s envoy Mikhail Margelov is now in Tripoli. But, given that Medvedev has said Khadafy must go and Khadafy says he won’t, the effort may prove to be fruitless.

PEOPLE POWER.This not a charter but a scheduled flight… kindly make sure your top official does not turn up late”. The pilot (and passengers) lost this one but will they lose the next? An inquiry has been opened.

BUDANOV. Yuriy Budanov was murdered last week in Moscow. Many suspect this is revenge for Kungayeva.

JIHADISM. I don’t cover the subject much because Gordon Hahn does it better but here’s the last two weeks. Two Muslim clerics murdered (a common jihadist tactic); a major attack stopped; and shoot outs in Chechnya and Dagestan. It continues.

MISTRAL. Moscow and Paris have signed a protocol of intent. This is not quite what we were promised by Sarkozy and Medvedev: maybe there are serious difficulties as many suspect.

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP 2 June 2011

MISSILE DEFENCE. Here’s Russia’s position in a nutshell: “We must receive guarantees that it is not directed against us. So far no such guarantees have been given.” Simple, easy to understand and any other country would say the same. “Trust, but verify”. Do you become more secure by making your neighbours nervous?

LIBYA. It is reported that several leaders, formally or otherwise, asked Medvedev to mediate in Libya. He is willing. Moscow has maintained relations with Tripoli and more recently opened discussion with the rebels in Benghazi and is therefore in a position to be a middleman. In his press conference after the G8, Medvedev said that he had sent Mikhail Margelov to Benghazi to begin talks, that “Gaddafi’s regime has lost legitimacy and he must leave” and that Russia would not give him asylum. Readers will recall that when NATO’s operation began, I wondered if it would end (as Kosovo did) with Russia helping to get it out of a stalemate.

KHODORKOVSKIY. His lawyers say he will apply for parole. Meanwhile the European Court of Human Rights has ruled 1) that his first trial had not been politically motivated 2) his rights were violated by the treatment he received. It would have been better had this decision come out a lot earlier before it became a meme that the whole thing was political. By the way: the decision had two points to it and news outlets chose which to emphasise: rights violated, not politically motivated. The former slant seems to predominate although I would have put the second first because it contradicts the meme and is therefore less expected.

POLITKOVSKAYA. Rustam Makhmudov, her killer according to the prosecution’s theory, was arrested in Chechnya on Tuesday. The investigators thanked the authorities in Belgium, where he had been hiding, for making him leave. He has been formally charged with murder.

WTO. Sarkozy said that the G8 supported Russian entry into the WTO and saw no impediment. Well I do: Tbilisi seems to have a veto and will use it. So either its objection is dropped, ignored or it continues not to happen. Biden is reported to have told Saakashvili that Washington supports Russia’s entry. We’ll see if that hint from Saakashvili’s only remaining – and increasingly lukewarm – international supporter has any effect.

POLICE REFORM. Three traffic police officers in Samara are accused of beating a driver to death in January.

CORRUPTION. The Chief of the Main Military Medical Directorate of the Ministry of Defence has been arrested on corruption charges. Corruption is said to be a serious problem in the Ministry and Armed Forces and possibly getting worse (or, alternatively, more are being caught).

MISTRAL. Despite all the stories that the deal was falling apart, Medvedev and Sarkozy agreed that the contract (two ships built in France and then two in Russia) will be signed in 15 days. In his interview, Medvedev sidestepped the question about technology transfer so we will have to wait and see.

BELARUS. I believe that the Belarus economy – a sort of USSR-lite – is coming to the end of its possibilities. About two weeks ago the National Bank devalued the currency 36% against the US$ (4930 per dollar vs 3155 the day before) which has set off a degree of panic buying. True to form, Lukashenka has threatened to dismiss the government if it does not produce daily improvements. He has also shut down a number of Russian media outlets for printing “hysterical” pieces on the effect of the devaluation. Meanwhile Minsk is trying for a US$8 billion stabilisation loan from the IMF. Belarus under Lukashenka has been an island of torpid stability – no divisive “Orange Revolution”, wars or economic collapses when you thought everything was OK. He can indeed claim that it’s better under him in Belarus than in most of its neighbours. But it seems to be a gentle and implacable decline.

GEORGIA. The bloom continues to come off the rose: the UN, USA, OSCE and UK (plus people inside Georgia) have called for an inquiry into pretty considerable police brutality. I don’t recall such loud and immediate calls the last time. Meanwhile, as usual, “evidence” has appeared (been manufactured) to show the whole thing was hatched in Moscow. But Saakashvili is losing his audience.

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP 26 May 2011

RULE-OF-LAW. At the St Petersburg Legal Forum Medvedev said: “Over these last years we have made progress in putting in place the foundations on which we can build a rule-of-law state in our country.” I think that’s a fair statement: he’s essentially saying that the beginning has been begun and not pretending that what’s been done is enough or that the job is finished. Police reform, legal changes, dismissals, some trials; that’s not nothing. I find that too much comment on Russia is absolutist: either a reform is 100% successful right now or it’s 100% failure. But, in the real world, it’s all incremental and one should look for small progress. It’s there.

POLICE REFORM. Medvedev has signed a decree establishing advisory panels at regional police headquarters. They are to “coordinate issues of public importance concerning the interests of peoples, federal and regional bodies of state power, local self-governments, and public associations”. That’s quite a lot he’s done in this area. Its effectiveness will be revealed in the next few years but again, it’s not nothing.

CORRUPTION. A military trial has charged a commissioning officer of selling rations and substituting dog food. The whistleblower who broke the story (YouTube again) was dismissed earlier. The base in Vladivostok was also found to have illegal immigrants doing construction work. More and more stories of wide-spread corruption in the Armed Forces are coming out. I wonder if a police-style sieving process will come there.

PEOPLE POWER. Civil society is pretty weak in Russia for obvious historical reasons but I am always watching for shoots to appear and here is a small one. A group of women have formed an organisation in Ulan-Ude to improve social problems in the region.

BLUE LIGHTS. But a bigger sign of success for a grass-roots protest is that Just Russia has proposed legislation to limit blue lights to cars that carry the President, the PM or emergency services vehicles. There are said to be about 1000 cars in Moscow with the official right to carry them and make everyone else get out of the way. (It does appear, however, that the do-it-yourself blue lights so common for plutocrats and hoods in the 1990s have been somewhat reduced). If Just Russia gets the law through – and it will be a popular one and hard for the other parties to object to – several ends will have been served. First the protesters will have been vindicated and we will have a law that truly came from the bottom up (the first ever in Russian history?). Second, Just Russia will have established a bit of space between it and United Russia which will be something for the Duma elections and a tiny step towards pluralism. If United Russia uses its majority to bury the proposal that will have an effect in the elections too. Very interesting to watch this play out.

KHODORKOVSKIY. The Moscow City Court heard the appeal and upheld the second conviction of Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev but cut their sentence by a year. They will now be out in 2016. It also closed a criminal case against them on the grounds that the term of the case had expired. So, just the tiniest mercy. Amnesty International has declared them “prisoners of conscience”.

PRIVATISATION. Putin has approved the sale of 7.58% of Sberbank’s share capital; at the end the government would own 50% plus one share. It is planned that a number of government holdings will be sold.

G8 BILATS. Medvedev and Obama said nice things about each other (and Doku Umarov was added to a US program that offers a reward for information about his whereabouts – it has taken official Washington a very long time to understand what’s going on in the North Caucasus). Sarkozy said the two had agreed that a contract for the Mistral will be signed in 15 days (2 built in France, 2 in Russia) and “we should treat Russia as a friendly state and involve it in our deliberations ​​about creating an extensive space of security and prosperity”.

GEORGIA. Protests against Saakashvili have begun again, led by Burjanadze. I notice signs in English, which weren’t common in earlier protests: clearly an appeal to the outside world. We see the usual problems of disunity: Okruashvili was supposed to return to Georgia but didn’t and the numbers are not large. Standard reactions from the regime: a film purporting to show some of the protesters planning violence (why always videos?) and Saakashvili says it’s all the hand of Moscow. The protests were broken up by riot police today with some complaints of excessive force. The protesters set up defences and fought back. The planned military parade went ahead. Will the protesters succeed this time? Probably not, but one day they will: the long-term prospects for Georgia are not encouraging; see this Chatham House paper by an experienced observer.

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)

Putin’s Popular Front

Note February 2016. These were done for the Russia Profile Weekly Experts’ Panel which I cannot find on the Net now. Many were picked up by other sources and I have given links where I can find them.

http://www.expat.ru/analitics.php?item=974

JRL/2011/ 91/16

Believing that Ockham’s Razor is the most powerful analytical principle ever articulated, I would try first to understand Putin’s popular front idea by assessing the reasons he gave before trying to fit it into more elaborate schema.

Putin’s two reasons were: “First, the State Duma elections will be held soon… And it is very important how the parliament will be formed. Second. Frankly speaking, United Russia, our leading political force, needs an influx of new ideas, proposals and people in these circumstances”. (Note “and people”)

The first reason ties into his speech in April: “If United Russia wants to be competitive in the political struggle with other public organisations and political parties it should create a competitive atmosphere within its own ranks” and “The six hundred candidates listed on the ballots should be up for review and discussion with all voters in the regions and municipalities, not just their respective party members”. The popular front speech is a follow-on to that speech.

The second reason – related to the first – is his concern that United Russia is stagnating. “New ideas” has been a concern of his for some time; for example, in 2008 he stated that “The goal of our party is to generate new ideas and projects and control their implementation. We need to understand public opinion and people’s needs.” He has evidently decided that United Russia, from its own resources, has not met that goal.

And it’s not surprising that United Russia is no wellspring of creativity: its membership is drawn from those who want to be close to power and profit from that closeness. They wait to be told what “new ideas” they should support; it is not in the nature of power-seekers to propose new ideas: what if the Boss doesn’t like them? But, for better or for worse, it is Russia’s “leading political force” and the Team must work with it. Therefore, Ockham’s Razor would suggest that the popular front is Putin’s latest attempt to bring a level of creativity into United Russia.

Russia’s politics are stagnating: United Russia is what it is; no “new ideas” will come from either the Communists or Zhirinovskiy; Just Russia is a fading earlier attempt by the Centre to force creative tension; the liberals refuse to unite. This political reality will endure for some time.

It does not seem very likely that Putin’s popular front will attract much creativity: now that the Boss has given them a new box to check, they will simulate creativity. Bureaucracies the world over are skilled at adjusting their behaviour to pretend to give the Boss what he wants.

Ultimately the “influx of new ideas” must come from the bottom and that brings us to the infant state of Russia’s civil society. Both Medvedev and Putin have spoken of this lack: Putin in his 2000 Federal Assembly Address: “Many of our failures are rooted in the fact that civil society is underdeveloped” and, eleven years later, Medvedev: “I think that bigger involvement on the part of civil society in discussing sensitive issues will do our country good. We have deeply rooted totalitarian traditions, and it will take time”.

It will indeed take time, and a healthy civil society will not appear by fiat from the top. Until it appears and strengthens Russia is stuck with its present political landscape.