PUTIN PLATFORM. An article in Izvestiya lays out the outlines of Putin’s election platform. And perhaps we have a clue as to why he thinks he must return as President. It’s one of the most concise statements of his desire for gradual reform he has ever given us. “A recurring problem in Russian history has been the elites’ desire to achieve sudden change, a revolution rather than sustained development. Meanwhile, both Russian and global experience demonstrates how harmful these sudden historical jolts can be… This is balanced by a different trend, a diametrically opposed challenge – in the form of a certain inclination to inertia, dependency, the elites’ uncompetitiveness and high levels of corruption.” Perhaps he feels that only he has the political muscle to steer between these twin shoals. He reiterated the long list of achievements since 2000 when many “foresaw one future for Russia: bankruptcy and breakup.” In short, vote for me, you know what I’m doing, you’ve seen what I’ve done. He promises more such pieces. I was also interested to see what I believe to be his first public reference to Khattab – a figure not as well known in the West as he should be.

POLLING. A VTsIOM poll shows Putin’s numbers rising since the Duma election and the rest of the field well behind. A Levada poll a few weeks earlier showed a similar rise for Putin and comparable numbers for the rest of the field. Another VTsIOM poll finds most Russians (53%) favour gradual political reforms while 39% (but note the rise from 30% in 2008) want rapid and radical reforms. All this bodes well for Putin’s winning in the first round in March.

PROTESTS. Igor Shuvalov observed that the recent protests were a sign of Russia’s irreversible political transformation and “will not be stifled”; “When per capita GDP is approaching $15,000, a country crosses a certain line, it begins to perceive itself differently, and the political system becomes more flexible”. Putin made a similar observation in Izvestiya: “Lastly, the middle classes are people who can choose politics. As a rule, their education is such that they can take a discriminating attitude to candidates rather than ‘voting with their heart’. In short, the middle classes have begun shaping their real demands in various fields.”

CORRUPTION. The former Moscow Region 1st deputy prosecutor was detained in Poland and Moscow has begun extradition procedures: he is accused of protecting an underground casino ring. A member of the Investigative Committee says the federal budget lost US$220 million last year in crimes on government purchase contracts. A former police captain has been charged with facilitating a bribe so a company could have the case against it closed. A former policeman was sentenced to 26 years for murdering an investigator looking at his rackets.

GOVERNORS. Medvedev submitted a bill to the Duma restoring direct election of regional heads. I’ve forgotten all the twists and turns but I believe it was first by presidential appointment, then direct election, then presidential appointment with two variations and now direct election again. Well, it takes time to figure it all out.

RUSSIA INC. RosStat has announced that consumer price inflation in 2011 was 6.1%; this is the lowest in the post-Soviet period. And Putin says Russia’s GDP grew 4.2% in 2011, third among the major economies (behind China at 9.5% and India at 7.8%. USA was 1.6% and Eurozone 1.5%.) (World numbers to 3Q 2011 here). More grist for Putin’s campaign mill.

THE MIGHTY RUSSIAN ARMS BUILDUP. The Defence Ministry says the Air Force will receive over 60 modernised MiG-31 (first flight by prototype 1975) by 2020.

ROCK SPIES. Well well, eventually it comes out. The British admit to spying in the “rock case” of 2006. Maybe we will eventually learn that, as Moscow said at the time, they were surreptitiously passing money to NGOs. Not quite how the story was spun when we first heard of it: Russian “paranoia” and “campaign of pressure against Russian NGOs”.

IRAN. The Foreign Minister has said that an attack on Iran by Western powers could cause an unpredictable “chain reaction”. Russia is also trying to tone down statements and actions against Syria. Despite the prattle in Western news outlets about Russian “support” for “allies”, the real truth is that Russia is cautious about changes. And indeed, foreign meddling in this part of the world often leads to unhappiness down the line.

GAS. We are informed by Ukraine’s gas company that Russian gas prices will be about US$416 per thousand cubic metres this year. This compares with the German price in December of US$435.

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)

MEDVEDEV SPEECH. He gave his annual speech to parliament last week. As is customary he started with achievements. Quite a list in fact: improvements in the economy overall, in the demographic situation, poverty reduction, military improvement. All true enough, albeit presented as positively as possible. But, in the present situation, his proposals for political reform are the most interesting. And, given the continuing existence of The Team, we may assume that these have Putin’s approval and will become law. The principal ones – and, he said, more will be coming – are the return to direct election of regional heads, the creation of a proportional voting system for districts (sounds like a return to the previous system of half individual representative and half party vote) and the reduction of the numbers of signatures required to register a party or presidential candidate. Instructions were given to the government and a bill on the last was sent to the Duma. The condition for candidates and parties to produce millions of signatures was inherently bogus and brittle. Specialists in collecting or producing the signatures appeared: the results were suspect and the authorities could always find enough fraudulent signatures to disqualify whom they wanted. So a reduction in the number required will be an improvement but better still would be to allow all registered parties to nominate a presidential candidate. Will the easier registration requirements apply in the presidential election? Not clear although one of his advisors is quoted as saying they will. If so, there could be a multitude of candidates competing for the “liberal” vote. This will have the benefit of demonstrating to Western observers infatuated with the parade of “liberals” that few of them have either support or programs.

OTHER CHANGES. Putin has ordered web cameras be established at all polling stations immediately and transparent ballot boxes will be bought and provided.

DEMONSTRATION. Another protest on Saturday; photos here, here and here. Clearly this one had a much bigger organised political party component. Two size estimates – 45K and 56K. In short, a number comparable to the Boloynaya Square protest of two weeks before. Momentum is not building: indeed Levada shows that nearly two-thirds had participated in the earlier protests. By the way, there are other opinions demonstrating these days: here is a demo on the 17th. The first photo says it all: Stalin, Putin, Aleksandr III “Yes! Single Power”.

WHO? Levada has done a survey of who was there and we can see the New Young People of whom I spoke last Sitrep (note that some questions allowed more than one answer). Men (60%), under 40 (56%), higher education (62%), self-described “liberal” or “democrat” (69%), heard of protests through the Net (89%), reasonably prosperous (68%). 20% hadn’t voted in the Duma election or had spoiled their ballot; 38% voted Yabloko, 19% Communist and 12% Just Russia. Only 37% had not protested the elections before. What were they protesting against? Falsified elections (73%) certainly but many responses show a generalised discontent with the way things are going. A solid majority want new elections, dismissal of the CEC head and punishment for fraudsters. Preferences for leaders are diffuse: about a quarter like Yabloko and Yavlinskiy but the remainder are well spread out. But there is a firm anybody-but-Putin stance. So, much as I suspected: young, educated, reasonably well-off and liberal. Putin’s children indeed but they’re tired of dad.

ELECTION FRAUD. Still nothing that I have seen convinces me of game-changing fraud. Vedomosti, which was looking at polling stations in Moscow it thought were the most fraudulent has given up and confesses it has not found big fraud (Google translation) and has, weakly, fallen back on anecdote. The Gaussian argument, popular in Russia, is fully discussed here and remains unconvincing. I reiterate: results in step with numerous opinion polls (in fact the ruling party did a bit worse than predicted) are strong prima facie evidence of reasonably accurate elections and need more than (partisan) anecdotes and credulous Western reports to contradict. Anatoly Karlin lists the various (and varied) opinions about the degree of fraud here.

KHODORKOVSKIY. Bet this doesn’t feature in Western coverage. The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights rejected re-examination of the 31 May judgement that “incontestable proof” to back allegations of political motivation behind his first trial “had not been presented”. A long-winded way of saying that it found no evidence that it was politically-motivated. But the meme has been established.

WTO. At last Russia is in. The overcoming of Tbilisi’s “veto” is further evidence of Saakashvili’s slippage.

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)

DEMONSTRATIONS. On Sunday there was a small (~500) nationalist demo, Monday saw 5-6K turn out for the authorities but the big one was Saturday’s. I am going with Alexandre Latsa’s estimates – he was there, took pictures and made a methodical estimate. He tells me he estimates about 25-30K at the maximum with many coming and going for a total over the day of maybe 50K. There were demonstrations around the country, so about 75K would be a decent estimate across Russia. Who were they? The photos show the usual oppositionists – disgruntled ex-officials, nationalists, Communists and so on – but also a lot of young middle class people who, presumably, hadn’t protested before. Latsa estimates that perhaps two-thirds were these young middle class people. For lack of a better term I will call these NYP – new young people. What generalisations can be made about them? They came to maturity in the Putin Age, have only childhood memories of the worst of the 1990s and none from the Communist period. They are, so to speak, Putin’s “children”. (Putin agrees). But children grow up and become independent. I suspect that they do not much fear change (I think many older Russians do). They are not especially representative of the population but every Russian city will have some. They are computer-savvy and linked together by the New Media: I doubt they pay much attention to TV newscasts. What were they protesting? Vote-fixing to be sure but they don’t look particularly angry in the photos. I am coming to believe that they were protesting not so much against counterfeit elections as against counterfeit politics: a protest against the Establishment; an Establishment that includes Zyuganov, Zhirinovskiy and the rest: beneficiaries of the stagnant political structure for two decades. They were saying you can’t ignore us any longer! This makes me more convinced that Putin’s decision to return was a bad one especially in the way it was done: a back-room agreement with Medvedev, announcement and servile approval from United Russia. I do not believe that the NYP have any interest in the familiar oppositionists, most of whom they would regard as tainted and – most tellingly – obsolete. I doubt that they have “leaders” (facilitators like Navalniy perhaps. By the way, there’s more to be known about him than The New Yorker tells). I believe that something new has been born but I don’t think that the NYPs or anyone else has any idea of what. I think “Putin’s Children: Flying the Nest” puts it well. It is worth noting, however, that it’s not that clear-cut – many of the people at Monday’s demo look like NYPs too.

NYP POLITICS. It seems to be agreed that the NYPs have not taken much interest in politics before. Have they started to? and if so, who will capitalise on their new interest? Not, I suspect, anyone that we have heard of. But they may continue to reject politics and make their effect felt in some other sphere. Until polling data on the phenomenon appears, no one can say. A protest has been authorised for next week and we will learn more.

ANTI-PUTIN? Is a protest against the mouldy political system – with which he has had a lot to do – a rejection of Putin the presidential candidate? At present he will be running against Zyuganov, Zhirinovskiy, Yavlinskiy – all surely more obsolete to an NYP than he is. Mironov is new to presidential elections but he’s Establishment too. Perhaps Prokhorov will be on the ballot but will NYPs rally around a plutocrat who made a fortune in the 1990s? I don’t think anyone has any idea what the NYPs will do in the presidential vote.

FRAUD. I remain unconvinced that there was game-changing fraud on the part of United Russia. Vedomosti has been doing a recount in Moscow. After examining 294 “protocols” (the document from each polling station showing its results), starting with what it expected to be the worst, it claims to have uncovered 7456 United Russia votes stolen from other parties. As 294 protocols cover 440,000 votes at about 1500 each, this is not a very high percentage. And, because its investigation is already running into diminishing returns with fewer alleged stolen votes in each new protocol examined, the total votes alleged to be stolen will not likely rise very much more. Even if we accept – and double, or triple – these numbers, the alleged theft is a fraction of one percent of Moscow’s seven million voters. The non-Gaussian argument is declared here to be bad mathematics and the author proves his point by showing similar statistical effects from the latest UK election. (I especially recommend that you read him – Google translation). As always the North Caucasus stands out but minorities are amazingly skilful at maximising their presence at the centre where the cheques are written and it is prudent for them to pretend super-loyalty; pumping 80% up to 90% or 95% is again not game-changing. Exit polls do not impress me – too easy to fake or mis-sample. And the results broadly fit previous opinion polls.

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)

ELECTION RESULTS. The almost final results give a Duma with 238 seats for United Russia (down 77); 92 Communists (up 35); 64 Just Russia (up 26) and 56 Zhirinovskiy’s party (up 16). (Interactive map by regions). United Russia will dominate, but no longer be able to bully. Which is a step in the right direction.

ELECTION FRAUD. There is a lot from the usual media outlets about widespread, even game-changing, fakery. I would suggest that those who believe this reflect on what might be termed the Prime Law of Election Fixing: Don’t fix it so that your party loses votes and seats. Especially when they have been saying that every previous Russian election was fraudulent. This should be obvious to anyone. Secondly the results accord well (as previous elections have) with opinion polling (indeed United Russia did a bit worse). This piece shows that the results are consistent with numerous polls (here’s a reasonably perceptive forecast from two months earlier and another, based on polls, from the day before). To persist in assertions of game-changing fraud in the face of these facts is just ridiculous. By the way, if you go by the English-speaking media you would think that foreign observers thought the elections were frightful: not so, here are a number of foreign observers saying that they were good enough. The OSCE report does not suggest big-scale fixing either; indeed it reads like other OSCE reports: administrative resources, lack of competition, some bad behaviour.

LOGIC. There is a simple point of logic here, I think. Opinion polls told us that United Russia was sinking and that even Putin’s ratings had declined. This is the factual basis for pieces like this one. So far so good. But to then to claim that the election was so fraudulent that – that what? the Communists actually won? United Russia gave itself 10-20-30 points? Enough to get a majority? – contradicts the very opinion polls that were the basis for the first observation. (Was there cheating? Of course there was, and not just by United Russia. There’s cheating in all elections everywhere. Enough to be a game-changer? I doubt it.)

IMPLICATIONS. Half the vote is hardly a repudiation of United Russia but such a reduction is hardly an endorsement either. For some months opinion polls have been showing a weariness with this assemblage of power-worshippers. It is a wake-up call. I would expect more “retirements” of officials: not because they failed to cook the results but because they have been repudiated by the electorate. I do not believe that it will affect the presidential vote greatly (opinion polls again: The Team’s ratings are still pretty high) but it might/might result in Putin having to go to a second round of voting. On the other hand, given that the number two candidate will probably be Zyuganov of the Communists, it might not. However tired Russians may be of Putin, they must be even more tired of Zyuganov who ran for President in 1996, 2000 and 2008. To say nothing of Yavlinskiy (1996 and 2000) and Zhirinovskiy (1991, 1996, 2000 and 2008). Of these, Putin is certainly the least stale. But I still think he should have retired. At any rate both Medvedev and Putin are taking it pretty calmly; but, given the polls, they must have seen it coming. And, once again, the “liberals”, so beloved of the West, failed. Here, as a change from “Putin stole it”, is a piece saying the Communists are back.

CHECHNYA. Chechnya, again, produced a 99%+ turnout with 99%+ voting for United Russia. I actually believe this result is correct (plus or minus). Kadyrov’s father once said Chechens had been fighting for independence for decades without success and it was time to try some other method than war. I believe Chechens still want independence but understand that it would come at a terrible cost and then be followed by invasion by jihadists. This is, after all, what happened after the first war in 1994. It is therefore necessary never to let Moscow suspect that independence is what you are after (sovereignty is an acceptable public aim) but to move gradually in that direction. In this respect it is useful to be able to cover your moves by showing outstanding “loyalty” to Moscow. Chechnya is the sort of society in which the word can be put out through the tayps and families that it is in everyone’s best interest to turn out and vote for Moscow’s party. And something similar can be seen elsewhere in the North Caucasus where United Russia always gets big numbers.

DEMONSTRATIONS. We shall see what Saturday’s demonstrations bring.

MAGNITSKIY. The case was re-opened, we are told, so that his relatives can have his name cleared.

NAVY. A task force, led by the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov, has left Severomorsk for the Atlantic and Mediterranean. Not, we were told last week, bound for Syria.

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)

DUMA ELECTION. There have been innumerable reports that Russians are sick and tired of political realities; we hear this every time an election comes up (after all, a prevailing meme is that Putin & Co only hold onto power by cheating and manipulation) and it’s forgotten until the next time. However, there does seem to be some genuine evidence that people are getting tired of United Russia. This is The Team’s dilemma: while it has successfully constructed a “pedestal party”, something that eluded Yeltsin, United Russia is still little more than a grouping of those in power and those who want to be. Many of its apparatchiks are not very popular in local areas. Nonetheless, one could hardly expect the perennial, and unchanged, opposition of the Communists and LDPR to offer much more hope. I expect that United Russia will remain the largest party but would not be surprised to see its percentage cut – no bad thing (Putin would agree: less of a rubber stamp and more of a Duma that thinks. Not, of course, that he wants any discontinuity). What I’m less confident about is what the disgruntled will do. Many I suspect will stay home but it will be interesting to see whether Just Russia, Right Cause or Yabloko profit from the mould that has grown on United Russia. For years now the Communists and LDPR have shared a (declining) sector of the vote and I don’t think that their total share will much change. We’ll find out on Sunday. As for those who are convinced Russian elections are rigged, I recommend Anatoly Karlin’s piece which shows that results accord with earlier opinion polls. (And for those who think they’re rigged, all I can say is that that would be an improbable amount of rigging.)

CFE. Washington has decided to stop passing CFE information to Russia “after repeated efforts, including high-level efforts to save the treaty”. Then the UK did the same citing Russia’s failure to fulfil its obligations. Now let me see if I’ve got this right: after long negotiation and re-negotiation of this effective arms reduction treaty, Russia ratified it in 2004. NATO, after sticking in some new conditions, and ignoring the satisfaction of one of them, did not. Russia complained for years and finally withdrew in 2007 from a treaty only it, Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan had ratified. And it’s Russia that that won’t cooperate?

WTO. At last! A Swiss-developed compromise has been accepted by Tbilisi and Moscow and it appears that Russia will be admitted next month. Bidzina Ivanishvili says Saakashvili was pressured into agreeing; I am inclined to agree with him and it’s another sign of how much standing he has lost since his adventure in South Ossetia. Obama promised Medvedev that he would start to end Jackson-Vanik (and how indeed could the two co-exist?).

RUSSIA INC. The Central Bank of Russia now estimates private capital outflow for 2011 will be US$70 billion, not US$36 billion; it was US$38.3 billion last year, down from US$56.9 billion the year before. Not a good sign at all.

SOMETHING NOT TO BE IMAGINED TEN YEARS AGO. Medvedev’s economic adviser says that Moscow is prepared to help stabilise the European economy via the IMF; the sum mentioned was up to $10B.

RUSSIAN WARSHIPS TO SYRIA. CGS General Makarov denies it. But, once again, Moscow, fearing that all change is for the worse (vide Kosovo and Libya), is trying to be the middle man.

RELIC. As a reminder that there is more to Russia than Kremlin rumourology, a relic important in Orthodoxy has attracted enormous crowds of worshippers throughout Russia.

STALIN. Given the endless and unending nonsense about Putin and Stalin, I doubt the creation of a GULag Museum in Moscow will be noticed any more than the inclusion of sections from the GULag Archipelago on school reading lists is remembered.

THE MIGHTY RUSSIAN ARMS BUILDUP. The Air Force expects about 90 new or refurbished aircraft in 2012 and the Navy 8-10 diesel submarines by 2020. Pay increases. Not much: this is the USAF’s 2012 shopping list.

TROUBLE IN PARADISE. The presidential elections in South Ossetia have gone sour; the local Supreme Court has invalidated the results; the opposition candidate insists she won. Trouble coming. Discussion here.

ANOTHER “COLOURED REVOLUTION” FAILS. The newly elected President of the Kyrgyz Republic (Otunbayeva kept her word not to run) says the Manas agreement will not be renewed. Now that Pakistan has shut down NATO supply lines into Afghanistan, I would advise NATO to start taking Moscow’s concerns seriously.

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)

DEMOGRAPHICS. The Russian demographic problem – which, incidentally, has its roots in the Soviet days and is mirrored in most FSU countries (Latvia perhaps the worst) – was the consequence of problems at each end. Low birth-rates and high infant mortality combined with too many early (and largely preventable) deaths. But, contrary to the customary poorly-sourced pieces that the Western MSM is rife with, progress is being made. Anatoly Karlin has been posting on the subject for several years and is well worth reading. His latest argues that Russia’s population has actually increased and is today higher than it was in 2009. While the natural population increase is still negative – but less and less so every year – the increase has come from immigration. Improvements have been made at both ends of the problem but Karlin provides data showing that deaths by alcohol, suicide and homicide have seen great reductions. They are still rather higher than they should be but these are factors where comparatively easy resolutions can be found. In short, it appears, barring some new disaster, that the Russian demographic crisis is on the way to being solved; that the various government programs are having their effect and that increasing prosperity will continue to raise life expectancy and reduce infant mortality. Thus Russia’s “demographic crisis” is yesterday’s news and the improvements – with more expected – serve as another of the many reasons that Russians generally approve of the Putin team. It cannot be said too often that the reasons for the Team’s popularity, trust and support in Russia is not that opinion polls are fixed, or that the mass media is as it was in the Soviet days or that Russians are naturally subservient (all assumptions of the Russophobic tendency) but because Russians can see every day the effect of a governing team that, generally speaking, does what a government is hired to do.

WTO. The long dreary saga of Russia’s attempt to join the WTO drags on. Although a member of the G8, firmly in the top 15 economies of the world and an important trader, being on the waiting list for years, promises of support from Washington and others, Russia has still not joined Zimbabwe, Papua New Guinea, Mongolia, Guinea-Bissau and 149 other countries in the group. On Friday Foreign Minister Lavrov said all the terms had been completed. All but one that is: the tradition is that all members must agree and Georgia, a member since 2000 – a gift to Shevardnadze I believe – does not. The latest from Tbilisi is that an official calls for Moscow’s agreement to “jointly monitor the Russian-Georgian border with international observers”. US Congressmen are getting into the act. Russians can be forgiven for seeing all this as another door being slammed in their faces; always a new goalpost, further down the field. We shall see – there is some indication that the EU is tired of Georgia’s intransigence.

LUZHKOV. Confirming what many suspected, the head of the Presidential Administration has said that the reason for firing Luzhkov as Mayor of Moscow was not just his “extremely inefficient city management” but also “the horrible level of corruption.” Luzhkov has threatened to sue. Medvedev has just ordered a probe into the 2003 sale of land in Moscow. The land had been set aside to house foreign embassies but was sold to a company belonging to Luzhkov’s wife.

POLITKOVSKAYA. Another former policeman has been charged with organising her murder.

GRAIN EXPORTS. Putin has said that he expects Russian grain exports to total 24 to 25 million tonnes this year. They were greatly reduced last year because of the bad summer

PATRIOTIC WAR. It’s autumn and time for 1812 war re-enactments. Getting bigger each year.

GAS WARS. Ukraine has given up the idea of contesting at the Stockholm Court of Arbitration the 2009 gas price deal negotiated by then-PM Tymoshenko. Kiev still hopes to get a lower price by negotiations and PM Azarov is optimistic. Ukraine has extensive shale gas deposits and has recently signed exploration contracts with Shell and ExxonMobil and is hopeful of freeing itself from dependency on Russian supplies.

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)