Hybrid War for Dummies

https://gianalytics.org/986-hybrid-war-for-dummies

Hybrid war” is an expression that is much used of late. It has two opposing meanings which must carefully be distinguished.

The first is the way the term is commonly used; that use is imaginary;

the second is the way it is not used; that use is factual.

To take the first use: “hybrid war”, they tell us, is what Russia is doing and NATO has to create a response. And here’s a whole paper about it. (Although I must confess I can’t figure out whether the author thinks that asserting that Russia is cunningly practising “hybrid warfare” is true or or whether he thinks saying so is just plain nonsense.) In the paper we find this:

In sum, Russian hybrid warfare as widely understood in the West represents a method of operating that relies on proxies and surrogates to prevent attribution and intent, and to maximize confusion and uncertainty.

The author also tells us it is sometimes called the “Gerasimov doctrine” after an article written in 2013 by the Chief of the Russian General Staff.

According to Gerasimov, the lessons of the Arab Spring are that if the ‘rules of war’ have changed, the consequences have not – the results of the ‘colored revolutions’ are that a ‘thriving state can, in a matter of months and even days, be transformed into an arena of fierce armed conflict, become a victim of foreign intervention and sink into a web of chaos, humanitarian catastrophe and civil war.’

In short, the theoretical foundation of this supposedly amazing, tricky, sinister and almost invisible Russian way of waging war originates in a paper written about Western-inspired “colour revolutions”. But I’ll return to that point later.

We started to hear a lot about “hybrid war” after the referendum in Crimea. And still more after the fighting started in eastern Ukraine. And this is where we see the term used in an imaginary sense. “Russia invaded Crimea“. Well, it didn’t: it already had 20-25 thousand troops in Crimea (by treaty – the Russian Black Sea Fleet has been based at Sevastopol since before the US Constitution was drafted) and those were the troops used. What were they used for? To make sure that a referendum was peaceful. Which it was and the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants voted to re-join Russia. No evidence of invasion? all the more proof that it’s… “hybrid war“!

Then Russia “invaded” Ukraine. Again, no serious evidence was presented – I covered the laughable “evidence” that NATO was handing out at the time and there is no need to go over it again: blurry satellite photos of something or other, “social media and common sense”, reporters who saw but – !! – forgot the means to record it. But, the lack of evidence makes us all the more certain that it must have been… “hybrid war”!

Then they read comments on their flacks’ articles that show their audience doesn’t believe it any more. Trust in the MSM continues to drop. RT appears on TV screens and attracts an audience. People catching on to the lying? No way, it must be… “hybrid war”!

Disagreement… “hybrid war”! Vote against it… “hybrid war”! Doubt it… “hybrid war”! Criticise it… “hybrid war”! Question it… “hybrid war”!

So, if you want to assert something, but you don’t have any evidence, call it “hybrid war”! If somebody catches you in a whopper, it must be “hybrid war”! No US Navy base in Sevastopol, it must be “hybrid war“!

“Hybrid” is used here in the sense of “invisible”.

And you hope that no one noticed that when Moscow actually did intervene with military force – as in Syria – reporters remembered their cameras, satellite photos became so sharp you could almost read the serial numbers and there was evidence of Russian military activity all over the place. Nothing “hybrid” about that.

So, that is the term “hybrid war” in its common, but imaginary, sense.

We now turn to the rarely used, but non-imaginary sense of the term. Remember that Gerasimov wrote his piece while discussing “colour revolutions”. A colour revolution is the nickname given to a regime change operation. As, for example, the Rose Revolution in Georgia that overthrew Shevardnadze and brought in Saakashvili. Or the Orange Revolution in Ukraine that overthrew Yanukovych (the first time) and brought in Yushchenko. Or the Libyan Arab Spring that killed Qaddafia and blew up the country. Or the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan that everyone has forgotten. Or the abortive White Ribbon Revolution in Russia. Or the abortive Umbrella (a colour is a giveaway these days, but there has to be a catchy slogan) Revolution in Hong Kong. Now that’s real “hybrid war”. And, as we have seen in course of the Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine, sometimes it becomes a real shooting war, with real dead bodies and entrails. Used to be that to get rid of a ruler you didn’t like, you invaded and eventually fished him out of a hidey hole and hanged him. Now, you invest the money ($5 billion in Ukraine we are told) to organise protests against corruption and overthrow him. But, different methods in different places: sometimes the one thing, sometimes the other; but it’s all war, and it’s all “hybrid”.

It’s “hybrid” because it uses many methods to bring about the desired regime change: propaganda, manipulation, protest and, occasionally, a little judicious bombing. So how ironic – how “hybrid”, in fact – that Gerasimov’s so-called textbook of Russian “hybrid war” should actually be written about the real “hybrid war” that Washington practises. A neat illustration that the common use of the term “hybrid war” is imaginary and that the hidden use is real.

For any objective observer, the evidence of who actually practises “hybrid war” is all around. Look at what we have learned just in the last month or so. The Guardian informs us that “The British government is waging information warfare in Syria by funding media operations for some rebel fighting groups…“. In the USA “15 years ago, there were two PR people for every reporter in the country. Now there are 4.8 PR people for every reporter.” “One of President Obama’s top national security advisers led journalists to believe a misleading timeline of U.S. negotiations with Iran over a nuclear agreement and relied on inexperienced reporters to create an ‘echo chamber’…”. Even respected organisations like MSF are suspect: “It seems that current MSF actions and statements on Syria are biased and effectively serving the coalition of governments waging war on Syria in violation of international law.The US funds “White Helmets” – an allegedly independent neutral organisation in Syria – but won’t allow its leader into the USA.Millions of pounds of British humanitarian aid sent to Syria may have fallen into the hands of jihadists, it has been claimed“. “The problems of the Middle East and North Africa are being compounded by a lack of ‘Western involvement,’ former Tory Foreign Secretary William Hague has claimed.” “Referenda are becoming a huge problem for the EU. The latest result in the Netherlands on the Association Agreement with Ukraine is probably the worst possible outcome.” “Croats, Bosnians, Serbs, you have been manipulated, war was staged – Former CIA officer.” “And as life has shown during these two years, Ukraine today is not a successful project. That is, America has not coped with this task.

A recent sample; and none of it from Russia or from any Putin “hybrid war” troll. What have we learned? Let us translate:

  1. Most of what you hear about Syria actually comes from London;

  2. Most reporters these days are full time PR flacks;

  3. Your government manipulates what you think you know;

  4. NGOs – well forget the NG part, only the O part is true;

  5. Different “NG”O, same story;

  6. Either we’re not as smart as we told you we were or we always intended to give the so-called enemy all that stuff. You’ll never know;

  7. More wars and more wars after that; eventually we’ll get to the Last War of All;

  8. Democracy is for losers; which is what Dutch voters are;

  9. Manipulation, ditto;

  10. Oops! Ukraine is a disaster, but the next intervention is guaranteed to be a winner. Trust us.

Definitely warfare – if you’re in Syria, Iran, Middle East, North Africa, Netherlands, former Yugoslavia, Ukraine. Warfare and pretty “hybrid” too. “Hybrid” here means sometimes bombs, sometimes “democracy promotion”, but always lies and manipulation.

By the way, this sort of thing began some time ago – “It’s recently [ February 2011] been revealed that the U.S. government contracted HBGary Federal for the development of software which could create multiple fake social media profiles to manipulate and sway public opinion.”

Which makes it all the more “hybrid” to assert that Gerasimov dreamed it all up three years ago.

Why Does the American Establishment Hate Russia So Much?

https://gianalytics.org/869-why-does-the-american-establishment-hate-russia-so-much

JRL/2016/83/5

First of all, let me start by saying I don’t know why the American Establishment is so obsessed about Russia. I can’t think of any good reason why it should be. All Russia wants is a quiet life so that it can rebuild things – as Putin himself said, back before he was President:

The current dramatic economic and social situation in the country is the price, which we have to pay for the economy we inherited from the Soviet Union.

That was not said by someone whose principal purpose is to re-create the USSR or the Russian Empire; it’s someone who wants to re-construct the defective “economic and social situation” of his country. And that requires peace and quiet. In the real world, Russia isn’t any kind of threat whatsoever to the USA. And, one would think, when the “Terror threat looms across the world” it’s a useful and necessary ally.

I do know, and my quotations collection shows, that hostility to Russia never stopped – or even moderated – after the USSR collapsed. Even in 1990 there were people insisting that nothing was real was happening because Russia, in its very essence, was expansionist, dictatorial and hostile to “our values”. Any so-called changes were only illusions calculated to gull the simple-minded. The only possible Russia was an Enemy Russia: all Russians qua Russians – never mind the absence of the temporary Soviet carapace – imagined, thought about, dreamed of, was enmity to Us and to Our Values. Russophobes – not Russia-fearers really, but Russia-haters – had little audience as long as it seemed that Russia was sinking into insignificance. With the revival of Russia’s prospects this century the Russia-haters have come to dominate the discussion.

We hear that Russia is an “existential threat” to the USA. That charge, at least, is true: Russia’s nuclear weaponry could obliterate the USA and render it uninhabitable for decades or centuries. (At the same cost to itself, of course). But the UK, France or China could cause unacceptable damage, if not outright obliteration, too. But Washington doesn’t worry about the first two and is not obsessed about the third. And one would think that Russia’s nuclear might should have been a reason to treat it with circumspection. Apparently not.

To any objective viewer Russia is not the aggressor. Those who believe that “Putin wants a new Russian empire” should – but never do – explain why it missed the chance to put Georgia into the bag in 2008. Those who believe Russia has invaded Ukraine, never explain why why the invader still hasn’t managed to get past the Donetsk Airport. A strange reluctance to take the full mouthful: a reluctance that cries out for an explanation. But no explanation is ever presented: in their vision Russia is forever reaching but never grasping, powerful but impotent, determined but indecisive.

It’s not Russia that expanded its military alliance up to the “doorstep” of the USA. It’s not Russia that has fomented, or tried to foment, “colour revolutions” in Canada, Mexico, Bermuda, Guatemala or the USA itself. Russian military bases do not surround the USA. Its media is not full of stories about Obama’s mistresses, offshore accounts, “information war“, “hybrid war“, troll factories, thuggish propensities, hatred of homosexuals, determination to conquer neighbours, bare chested macho posing, persecution of rock groups, murder of opponents.

So, why this bizarre fixation with Russia? As I said, I don’t know: there remains something deeply irrational about it; something buried deep in the dark that can’t quite be seen.

But, forthwith, I put forth a list of possible reasons.

  1. American lefties dislike Russia because it rejected socialism; indeed the Soviet experience stands as an indictment against the whole scheme.

  2. Righties dislike Russia because, communist or not (and how many think it still is?) it’s still Russia.

  3. Americans have to have a rival, an opponent, a counter, an enemy even. It’s geopolitical chiaroscuro: the City on The Hill must shine in the Darkness.

  4. Russia is the right size of opponent. To be obsessed with Venezuela (“national security threat” though it is declared) would be unworthy for such a “great” and “winning” country. China is too big and, because it owns so much of the US economy, too dangerous, to provoke. Russia is of sufficient size to be a worthy target.

  5. Russia is a safe target (or so Obama thought a year ago). US-Russia trade is small and there is little cost to being sanctimonious against Russia: bashing Russia gives a pleasing sense of moral superiority without uncomfortable consequences.

  6. Maybe Russia is an ungrateful child? In the 1990s there was much talk about US aid and advice reforming Russia, the “end of history” and all that. Russia was, evidently, on the edge of becoming “just like us”. But it didn’t and such back-sliding cannot be forgiven.

  7. Russia is a convenient palimpsest on which to write the presumptions you brought. Martin Malia wrote a fascinating book showing how Westerners from Voltaire onwards found Russia to be the perfect exemplar of whatever it was that they wished it to be. So, in Russia you can find whatever you’re looking for: a “geostrategic foe”, for example.

  8. Given that today “human rights” have been reduced to little more than applauding sexual preferences, (Watch this Ukrainian video on why the Dutch should have voted Yes, if you think I’m overstating things) Russia is so old-fashioned that all can hate it.

  9. They’re just trapped in it – they’ve been crying wolf so long and so loudly, they can’t stop.

  10. The people who actually run the USA (the White-House-and-Congress/the-Deep-State: your choice) know that the USA is losing the industrial production capacity that made it Number One. Their solution, so the theory goes (Pepe Escobar’s Empire of Chaos theory), is that the only way to keep the USA (relatively) on the top is to depress the others. Chaos and instability on its borders will bog Russia down. Europe can be bogged down by using the Russian threat – in this respect, the sanctions against and by Russia are hurting Europe more than anyone. At the end, the USA will still be king of the hill even if the hill is smaller.

  11. For some reason – it’s observable, even if it’s not explicable – Americans personalise everything. And, out there, visible everywhere, is Vladimir Vladimirovich. On Wednesday the Panama Papers are about him, on Thursday they are by him. Putin Derangement Syndrome sells papers and animates talk shows. Just in the month of April, for example, we have been told that Putin is going out with Murdoch’s ex-wife; we have seen both versions of the Panama Papers story; told that Dutch voters were thought-controlled by him, that he has a secret army in Europe and an army of “spy dolphins“. Putin Derangement Syndrome is getting crazier and crazier.

  12. We cannot forget sheer profitability. Billions spent on an F-35 fighter, a Littoral Combat Ship, unending tank production, trillion-dollar nuclear weapons program and billions and billions more cannot be substantiated by fighting a handful of “terrorists” equipped with small arms, road-side bombs and suicide vests. Without a serious enemy, justifying big contracts, how can generals hope to get a second high-paid job in retirement? The enormous US military sector needs a capable and convincing enemy. And, other than Russia (or China – remember the pivot to Asia?), what is there?

  13. There is the argument that NATO is one of the principal ways that Washington maintains its dominance over Europe and the EU. The easiest and simplest justification for NATO is a return to its earliest purpose, as Lord Ismay wittily put it, “To keep the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down”. The director of Stratfor has opined that the “primordial interest” of the USA has been preventing any sort of condominium between Germany and Russia. The Russia-the-eternal-enemy position provides both a justification for the continuation of NATO and a prophylactic against a Berlin-Moscow axis. It ensures a Europe that cannot stand on its own.

  14. Sheer laziness. The 24/7 news cycle needs material and it’s always easiest to stick with what you have. Because Russia filled some time yesterday, it should do so again today. There’s always someone available to tell you that Putin is corrupt, or Russia is about to invade some country, or Russia is about to collapse, or Russians are hungry or some other click-bait headline. Better than celebrities and their drug or marital problems because it gives that soupçon of gravity that makes the audience feel it’s not wasting its time. The steady diet has its effect and so Russia-the-eternal-enemy comes to be casually accepted.

  15. It’s clear that Putin’s team is serious and so many Western leaders are not. Also, and this cannot be denied, the team is successful. This minor country that makes nothing, where no one wants to live and which is dying is setting the course. Meanwhile, in the West…… This must infuriate the Western Establishment and that is a motive for the unceasing attempts to demean Putin & Co. It is “magical thinking“: if they repeat the charm loudly and often, maybe Russia will go away and no Western population will have to contemplate the possibility that national governments might actually do what they are paid to do.

  16. The state of mind in the Obama Administration is not made better by million-view YouTube videos comparing his work-out style with Putin’s. Nor pages of sneering cartoons contrasting a macho image with a feeb. Nor pages of “Putin beats Obama”. It has been some time since people gushed over Obama’s “glistening pecs“. It would also go some distance to explain outbursts like “White House criticizes Vladimir Putin’s posture” or flippant – and self-deceiving – dismissals like “regional power acting out of weakness” or “Russia is the outlier“.

  17. A subset of the above is the realisation that the Putin team has out-manoeuvred Washington at every step in the past few years. Washington was not able to overthrow Assad in Syria. The US Navy will not have a base in Sevastopol. Ukraine is a failing nightmare and its chances of joining NATO are probably lower than they were ten years ago. The sanctions regime against Russia has backfired. Russia survives low oil prices. The Moscow-Beijing axis is stronger than ever. Russia is not “isolated”. The Western Alliance is surely weaker than before. And this returns us to the “magical thinking” that we see manifested in Washington’s confused and contradictory utterances.

So abusing Russia satisfies many needs for the American Establishment: a safe opponent to swagger over; a contrast that can be painted as dark as you like; an object of feel-good moral righteousness; a sullen teenager who won’t listen to Daddy; a blank slate on which to write; a pretend enemy we can make a fortune out of; a useful bogeyman to frighten allies into obedience; gossip for pseudo-intellectuals. Many things at once.

But, the cost is rising.

What has changed is the conviction that Russia is a low-cost opponent. It’s very interesting to read things like this “If Russia Started a War in the Baltics, NATO Would Lose — Quickly” and “I am very concerned about the increasing risk of loss of U.S. military technological superiority” from the US defence establishment. Perhaps it’s just an attempt to screw more money out of Congress but these are certainly not things that could have been said in 2000.

It’s amazing the effect that a few insignificant boats in the Caspian Sea had, isn’t it?

Russia the Eternal Enemy Quotations

I’ve mentioned the flexing of muscles that’s been going on in the periphery of the former Soviet Union. A particular flash point of course and the focus of such activities has been the Caspian Sea and the Caucasus and the Transcaucasus region where we have seen everything from intimidation, assassinations, covertly promoted civil wars and overt military operations. Aimed, I believe, at re-subordinating the near abroad and discouraging independent minded policies on the part of other former Warsaw Pact states.

Frank Gaffney. Transcript of Television Program, “Russia: Friend or Foe?” Dec 1995, “America’s Defense Monitor”, Center for Defense Information

Russia Prepares for a Big War: The Significance of a Tank Army

 

http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_semper_tyrannis/2016/04/russia-prepares-for-a-big-war-the-significance-of-a-tank-army.html

Picked up by

http://mikenormaneconomics.blogspot.ca/2016/04/patrick-armstrong-russia-prepares-for.html
https://www.reddit.com/r/russia/comments/4d6dxh/russia_prepares_for_a_big_war_the_significance_of/
http://warnewsupdates.blogspot.ca/2016/04/russia-gets-ready-to-fight-big-war.html
https://kassander4ppp.wordpress.com/2016/04/06/summary-events-analyses-cartoons-29/
http://russialist.org/russia-ukraine-johnsons-russia-list-table-of-contents-jrl-2016-66-tuesday-5-april-2016/
https://platosguns.com/2016/04/05/sic-semper-tyrannis-russia-prepares-for-a-big-war-the-significance-of-a-tank-army-patrick-armstrongsic-semper-tyrannis/
https://www.facebook.com/PolicyResearchandInnovation/posts/1112581058774202

People who already understand how armies are put together should skip Part 1.

Part 1. How armies are put together

One of the things that I find irritating about battles in movies is that the director seems to think that battles are about getting an inchoate mass of soldiers together, giving a rousing speech and yelling “Charge!” That is absolutely not how it works nor ever has worked. Real armies are assembled out of groupings made from smaller groupings, themselves made from still-smaller groupings and so on down to the smallest group.

The smallest group is about ten soldiers. This is the fundamental bonding size – these are your buddies, the people you will really remember, the ones you depend on and who depend on you and for whom you will fight and sacrifice. Yes, you’re fighting for Freedom or some other Large Cause, but it’s really your buddy you’re doing it for. So we start with about ten soldiers.

In the Roman Army this was the contubernium – a corporal, seven legionaries plus two servants who shared a tent and ate together. The fundamental tiny piece out of which everything else was constructed.

The next thing to know is the span of command or control. The commander of each level, is trying, in very difficult circumstances, to get his subordinates to do something they would never do in their right minds. They know perfectly well that the first guy in the house, the lead guy attacking the machinegun post, the first guy out of the trench, the first guy out of the landing craft is almost certain to be killed or injured. It is very difficult to get people to do this and long experience shows that a commander can only control three to five elements.

The next principle to remember is square or triangular. Armies are usually constructed by making the next level of organisation out of three or four of the lower level. Why? With three, you can have two engaged and one in reserve. (A great deal of the problem of a commander, once battle is joined, is knowing where and when to commit his reserves). The “square” structure allows two in contact, one in reserve and one resting, or two up, one in reserve and one manoeuvring. Five or six are too many but two are too few. This introduces the fundamental principles of “fire” (applying the destruction to the enemy) and “movement” (moving so as to apply that destruction most efficaciously). (Movie battles have lots of the first, but little of the last.)

Finally, we have the combat arms – infantry, armour (cavalry in its time) and artillery – and supporting arms. “Combat arms” because they directly apply the violence. Other specialities assist them: engineers help them move, transport moves them, medical patches them up, signals communicate, logistics supplies them and so on. No army can function without them.

In what follows I will discuss infantry organisations because they are the purest soldier – the other two combat arms are machines, whether tanks or guns, and the support arms are functions. But, the principles of infantry organisations are followed in the other components. It should be noted that different military traditions have different names for some of these things but it’s all the same principle.

Three or four “tents” (sections) make a platoon; three or four platoons a company; three or four companies a battalion. At battalion level some specialisation will appear: it may have a mortar platoon, or a machinegun platoon, there will be a simple first aid element, some light engineers, communicators, headquarters and so on. But they are all capable of being ordinary riflemen if needed. The battalion is the first construction that is capable of some sort of independent action – it has enough companies to provide fire and manoeuvre and reserves, its machinegun or mortar elements give it some support. But it is still infantry and still pretty “light”.

The next level is a brigade of three or four battalions. But there is a decision point here: do you envisage this brigade being an “independent brigade” or a sub-division of a larger formation? If the former we introduce the other arms, if the latter it remains all infantry.

An independent brigade, or brigade group, will have, in proportions depending on what you want to do, infantry, tank and artillery battalions from the “combat arms” as well as “support” elements: like combat engineers, medical and dental, post offices, laundry facilities, possibly a helicopter battalion and on and on. It is an independent military town of 4000 to 6000 people which needs almost everything a civilian town needs while also being capable of moving anywhere at a moment’s notice. This formation is intended to carry out military tasks by itself with help from the air forces.

The brigade that is intended to be a piece in the next largest structure would have three or four infantry battalions and would still be mainly riflemen with very little added from the other arms. Next level is the division made of infantry, tank and artillery brigades in the proportion thought useful. In the Second World War divisions were usually the smallest thing one would see on the battlefield that could be given an independent task.

A tank division would be constructed the same way except that the basic “tent” is the tank itself, three or four make a platoon, and then companies, battalions and brigades. Artillery would only rarely be organised into independent structures because while it has fire, it does not have much movement. The supporting arms – engineers, signals, logistics, medical and so on, because they exist for support, rarely appear as independent structures. In short “divisions” are infantry-heavy or tank-heavy (bitter experience has taught and re-taught that none of the combat arms can function alone).

Moving up, three or four divisions make a corps; two to four corps an army and a couple of armies make an army group.

So, a whole gigantic army group is assembled, step by step, out of our little “tents”.

Part 2. What’s All This Mean?

How big a war do you anticipate? A smallish one, a bigger one or a really big one? Your answer will determine the formations that you construct.

An important decision point, which reveals your answer, is whether you add in the other combat arms and specialised support elements at brigade (ie 5000 or so troops) or at division (10,000 or so)? If at brigade, you have made a decision that you expect your future wars to be rather small and that all-arms formations of 5000-or-so soldiers is as big as you need. If on the other hand, you decide to create divisions – formations about three times as large – you are showing that you are expecting a larger war. If you then start combining these divisions into corps, armies or even army groups, you are expecting a really big, all-out war against a first-class enemy. Something the size of World War II in fact. In 1945, for example, the Western Allies entered Germany with three army groups, totalling eight armies, totalling 91 divisions: about four and a half million soldiers.

It is possible to have a bit of both, but it’s only a bit. You may decide on independent brigades but also have a divisional headquarters. But, unless the brigades routinely exercise under the command of a standing divisional headquarters, and that headquarters controls assets, only the idea of divisional operations is kept alive.

In short, if you stop at independent brigades, you are telling the world that you expect, and are planning for, relatively small wars. If you go to divisions you are expecting something larger and if you construct a corps (or army in Russian terminology) you are telling the world that you are preparing for a big war.

And so, an observer who knows how armies are put together, can tell a lot about what kind of war a country expects by understanding how it has put its “tent groups” together.

Part 3. The Russian Army

The Soviet Army was organised for a huge war: it had divisions, organised into armies (corps in Western terminology) which were organised into fronts (armies in Western terminology) and further grouped into TVDs or Theatres of Military Activity (army groups in Western terminology) all backed up by a conscription and reserve system, immense stocks of weapons and gigantic pre-positioned ammunition dumps. This time, the Soviets did not intend to fight the decisive battle an hour’s drive from the Kremlin. When the USSR collapsed, so did that structure. The most ready elements were based in the Warsaw Treaty countries; Russia took responsibility for them and they were hurriedly moved back, shedding conscripts as they went. The formations which would have been filled up and then supported the ready elements were in Ukraine and Belarus and lost to Russia.

For some years the management of the Russian army did not appear to have understood that everything had changed – that the huge Soviet forces were gone and would not magically fill up with hundreds of thousands of conscripts to fill up the “empty formations”. But, they didn’t know how to make them smaller either: we were always told in talks with the Russian General Staff that the state could not afford to pay the officers the pensions and housing allowances they were entitled to. And so this once mighty army decayed.

Perhaps it was failure in the First Chechen War that finally convinced headquarters that the Russian army was not a temporarily shrunken big war army. We started being told that they were re-designing their army around independent brigades. It was clear from reading the periodic military and strategic doctrine documents that the wars that Moscow foresaw were smaller wars, on the scale of border infractions or a Chechen-sized war in which the enemy would be small agile lightly-armed groups. For such conflicts, anything larger than independent all-arms brigade-sized formations would be too large and complicated.

And, gradually, between the two Chechen wars, “divisions” (which our inspections had shown to be empty of soldiers but full of poorly-maintained equipment and under-paid dispirited officers) disappeared and were replaced by “storage bases”. We assumed these to be a way of avoiding the huge retirement bill while giving officers something useful to do. At the same time independent brigade groups began to appear, with the first ones in the south where trouble was expected. This is one of the reasons why the second Chechen war was a victory for Moscow.

At this stage, (I’m looking at the 2002 CFE data now) there were entities called “divisions” and “armies” (corps) but they were very understrength – apart from the North Caucasus, there were perhaps two divisions in the western area worthy of the name; neither of them deployed to the west. The real force was in the North Caucasus: three divisions, fully staffed and an army (corps) headquarters. But the future was there too with the first two independent brigade groups setting the pattern for the rest.

In short, by the turn of the century, in their published doctrine, in everything they told us in meetings, in deployments and in their formation structures the Russians were showing us they had no offensive designs against NATO and they expected no attacks from NATO. The south was where they saw danger.

The CFE Treaty showed us all this: the Russians were obliged to give us a list of elements showing their precise location and relationship to other structures with the number of soldiers and major weapons; we could go there and check this out at any moment. Thanks to the Treaty we always knew what they had, where they had it and how it was organised. Our inspectors found no discrepancies. But the NATO member countries never ratified the Treaty, continually adding conditions to it and, after years, Russia, which had ratified it, gave up and denounced it. And so we all lost (because it was reciprocal) a transparent confidence building mechanism based on full disclosure with the right to verify.

All this time the Russians told us that that NATO’s relentless expansion, ever closer, was a danger (опасность) although they stopped short of calling it, as they did terrorism, a threat (угроза); “dangers” you watch; “threats” you must respond to. NATO of course didn’t listen, arrogantly assuming NATO expansion was doing Russia a favour and was an entitlement of the “exceptional nation” and its allies.

It is important to keep in mind with the everlasting charges that Russia is “weaponising” this and that, threatening everyone and everything, behaving in an “19th century fashion“, invading, brutalising, and on and on, that its army structure and deployments do not support the accusations. A few independent brigades, mostly in the south, are not the way to threaten neighbours in the west. Where are the rings of bases, the foreign fleet deployments, the exercises at the borders? And, especially, where are the strike forces? Since the end of the USSR they have not existed: as they have told us, so have they acted.

They planned for small wars, but NATO kept expanding; they argued, but NATO kept expanding; they protested, but NATO kept expanding. They took no action for years.

Well, they have now: the 1st Guards Tank Army is being re-created.

This army, or corps in Western terminology, will likely have two or three tank divisions, plus a motorised rifle division or two, plus enormous artillery and engineering support, plus helicopters and all else.

The 1st Guards Tank Army will be stationed in the Western Military District to defend Russia against NATO. It is very likely that it will be the first to receive the new Armata family of AFVs and be staffed with professional soldiers and all the very latest and best of Russia’s formidable defence industry. It will not be a paper headquarters; it will be the real thing: commanded, manned, staffed, integrated, exercised and ready to go.

It should be remembered that the Soviet Armed Forces conducted what are probably the largest operations in the history of warfare. Take, for example, Operation Bagration which started shortly after the D Day invasion. Using Western terms, it involved eleven armies, in support or attacking; recall that the Western allies entered Germany with eight armies – five American, one each British, Canadian and French. Tank corps (armies in Soviet/Russian) are the hammers – either they deliver the decisive counter-attack after the defence has absorbed the attack (Stalingrad or Kursk) or they deliver the offensive strike. The decision to create a tank army (armoured corps in Western terminology) is an indication that Russia really does fear attack from the west and is preparing to defend itself against it.

In short, Russia has finally come to the conclusion that

NATO’s aggression means it has to prepare for a big war.

As a historical note, Dominic Lieven’s book shows the preparations Emperor Alexander made when he realised that, sooner or later, Napoleon was going to come for Russia. And everyone knows how that ended. As Field Marshal Montgomery, who had more experience of big war than anyone in the Pentagon or White House today, said: “Rule 1, on page 1 of the book of war, is: ‘Do not march on Moscow’.”

This is what the light-hearted decision to expand NATO, “colour revolutions”, regime changes, cookies on the Maidan and incessant anti-Russian propaganda has brought us to.

And it won’t be a war that NATO will win.

 

Russia the Eternal Enemy Quotations

The appointment of Yevgeniy Primakov as Russia’s Foreign Minister yesterday marks perhaps the most ominous transfer of power in Moscow since Yuri Andropov became General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party in 1982. This is not only because, like Andropov, Primakov has had powerful links to the KGB throughout his career. It is also due to the fact that the new Foreign Minister may be as cunning, ruthless and unwavering as the former General Secretary in his service to totalitarian imperialism. And, possibly most alarming of all, there is a strong possibility that Western governments will once again try to construe the new power in the Kremlin as a ‘man with whom we can do business’….The truth is, of course, that Yevgeny Primakov is a shrewd, archetypal Soviet thug and one of the most insidiously dangerous men on earth.

Restoration Watch #7: Primakov’s promotion marks major step on the road `back to the USSR’, the Center for Security Policy 10 Jan 96 (http://www.securitypolicy.org/papers/96D2.html)

How to Spin Russia

This news entry from the BBC is a textbook example of how to write up a Russia news story so that the right twist is given to it.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has announced the creation of a new National Guard, which he said would fight terrorism and organised crime. The force will be formed of interior ministry troops and led by Mr Putin’s former bodyguard, Viktor Zolotov, who will report directly to the president. Mr Putin’s spokesman said the force could be used to maintain public order.

OK, so far so good, this announced, these the reasons. But note the next sentence:

But Dmitry Peskov denied its creation was linked to September’s election. Some critics say Mr Putin fears unrest.”

You can just see the scene: boring announcement; reporter asks: “Are you just doing this so you can crack heads?”; “No” says Peskov.

And awaaaaaay we go! Throw in “some experts” and we have the twist.

Never mind that all opinion polls — Russian and foreign — show spectacular levels of support for the government; it’s time to stir up another non-story of election faking to maintain the anti-Russia line.

 

Only Liars Want to Silence the Other Guy: Silence the “Russian Information War”!!!!!

Back in the Cold War the Soviets spent a lot of time and effort jamming Western radio and TV broadcasts. The West never bothered trying to block Radio Moscow and the others. Why? Well, the West was confident that it was telling the truth and Moscow knew that it wasn’t. So the West was perfectly happy to let the “marketplace” decide. And, eventually, the “marketplace” did decide.

So today a couple of Brits (but hardly disinterested ones – but then isn’t everyone trying to make a few bucks out of the anti-Russia cause?) have decided that Russia is conducting an “information war” against the West. We have Legatum, funded by all the usual suspects, and now this latest of which this extract is enough to give the flavour:

Moreover, regardless of the impact of this disinformation, the fact that a disinformation campaign is being conducted by Russian government outlets remains demonstrably the case; that case is set out below. This being so, appropriate legal and diplomatic responses should be brought to bear both on the direct actors in the disinformation campaign, and on the Russian government more broadly.

Note that the authors evidently don’t trust the “marketplace” to decide this one; no, no, they call for “appropriate legal and diplomatic responses”.

I think they’re not trying hard enough. I’ll bet some of the old Soviet jamming equipment is still around somewhere and could be purchased for a very small amount of money.

There are times when freedom of speech isn’t free and the delicate ears of our people have to be protected from the foul utterances of the Kremlin.

(Just as a little trip down Memory Lane here’s the reaction of E. Eugene Pell, president of Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, to the end of Soviet jamming in 1988: ”The cessation of jamming represents a significant step on the part of the Soviet Government toward the free flow of information.” “Free flow of information”; Golly! What a concept!)

How stupid do these people think we are? A child could figure it out: only liars want to shut up the other guy.

MH17 For Dummies

According to this source, the US intelligence budget for 2014 was 67.9 billion US dollars. That’s about 130,000 kilometres of $100 bills laid end to end or about three times around the world at the equator. Which is quite a lot of money, even if a lot goes to administration, overhead and the like.

So, you’d think that if an airliner was shot down over an area that was being closely watched, all this money would have bought quite a lot of information.

And, US Secretary of State John Kerry said it did and here he is saying it: “we observed it” (1.15)

But, two years later we still await the US intelligence evidence.

Instead we have

Well common sense would suggest that, if we haven’t heard about the other stuff then

  • it isn’t there or
  • it contradicts what Washington has been saying.

QED. It’s not that complicated.

 

NATO, Alcoholism and Homer Simpson

http://russia-insider.com/en/nato-alcoholism-and-homer-simpson/ri13322

That great American philosopher Homer Simpson once observed that alcohol was the cause of, and solution to, all of life’s problems.

One might say, as Pepe Escobar has, that “NATO may indeed incarnate the ultimate geopolitical/existential paradox; an alliance that exists to manage the chaos it breeds.”

They’re both right: NATO now exists to attempt to – or more accurately, to pretend to – manage the problems it created the last go round. That is now NATO’s chief purpose. Apart, of course, from making money for weapons companies. Which it does quite satisfactorily.

NATO is a geopolitical alcoholic: last night’s binge is the need for this morning’s hair of the dog which lays the foundation for tonight’s bender. Every weekend is a lost weekend for NATO.

The first case of alcohol causing the problems it solved was NATO expansion itself. In 1998 George Kennan predicted the future: “There was no reason for this whatsoever. No one was threatening anybody else…. Of course there is going to be a bad reaction from Russia, and then [the NATO expanders] will say that we always told you that is how the Russians are — but this is just wrong.” NATO expanded; Russia reacted; Russia is a threat; NATO was right to expand.

In my diplomat days in Moscow in the early 1990s NATO expansion was just beginning: it will bring stability said wooden American diplomats when I and a colleague from another NATO country questioned its wisdom. Well, we have had at least two wars now – the Ossetia War of 2008 and the ongoing civil war in Ukraine – that have a connection to NATO expansion. But they are both used as a justification for the application of more alcohol to solve the problems of the earlier binge.

Now, apparently, Russia is about to invade the Baltics. (Of course Kennan foresaw that too: “We have signed up to protect a whole series of countries, even though we have neither the resources nor the intention to do so in any serious way.”)

NATO attacked Libya on flimsy grounds. Indeed, as the Clinton e-mails tells us, on the most meretricious grounds. But grabbing Libya’s gold is what you might call the real NATO (the distillers’ profits, so to speak) and supporting the heist by fake atrocity stories and R2P is the advertising campaign. But the NATO bender in Libya, or as we say in Canada “defence of our cherished democratic principles“, has led to another drinking problem. Quite apart from waking Moscow up to the reality of NATO.

And the other problem, requiring another lost weekend, is of course the thousands of refugees/migrants from Syria, Iraq, Kosovo, Libya and Afghanistan – all places that have received the blessings of NATO’s attention. But, never fear, NATO steps up to the bar to buy another round: “We have just agreed that NATO will provide support to assist with the refugee and migrant crisis.” When it’s not blaming Russia for it, that is.

But, says Robert Kagan, the ur-neocon and husband to the Baker of the Maidan, just one more war and all will be well. One more drink and it’s solved.

First, it would require establishing a safe zone in Syria, providing the millions of would-be refugees still in the country a place to stay and the hundreds of thousands who have fled to Europe a place to which to return. To establish such a zone, American military officials estimate, would require not only U.S. air power but ground forces numbering up to 30,000. Once the safe zone was established, many of those troops could be replaced by forces from Europe, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and other Arab states, but the initial force would have to be largely American.

NATO will be curing its hangovers with the hair of the dog for years to come.