SOLZHENITSYN. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, a man of unshakeable integrity and courage, who did more to kill communism than anyone else, died on Sunday. His body lay in state at the Academy of Sciences and Putin and Gorbachev paid their respects. He was buried yesterday at the Dmitriy Donskoy Monastery in Moscow and Medvedev attended. Lately he had begun to sound rather out-of-date but I suspect his influence will endure for many years.

CORRUPTION. Medvedev signed his national anti-corruption plan and the Russian text is up on his website. A number of laws and amendments are expected to go to the Duma next month. Some features are restrictions and regulations for disposal of state assets and a provision by which companies can be responsible for the corrupt actions of employees. Speaking of which, the labour in the Augean Stables continues: so far this year, the military prosecution office says that 5 generals have been found guilty on corruption charges and the Investigative Committee states that 757 criminal cases have been opened against legal officials.

THE CADRE PROBLEM. As Stalin once said, “cadres resolve everything”. Medvedev is starting to wrestle with the question of where Russia’s civil servants come from and how they get to where they are. He has recently been musing on the subject and has suggested that some sort of “reserve” be formed of likely people. That won’t do the trick either – it’s a perennial idea in Western bureaucracies and it all goes the usual way.

KHODORKOVSKIY. The Levada Centre released an interesting poll which indicated that 55% had little sympathy for him even though only 15% believed his conviction to be lawful (85% were either doubtful of the legality or gave no opinion); 35% thought he should be paroled – his hearing is set for 21 August – while 30% did not. Apart from anything else, it shows that Russians are more capable of making up their own minds than the conventional view, which assumes an imposed official opinion, has it. (JRL/2008/142/28).

XENOPHOBIA. In most Western press coverage, Russia is treated as a sort of freak show – an endless catalogue of disasters – but, typically, coverage is often short on the facts. One of the current memes is the epidemic of attacks on foreigners. Well, according to Aleksandr Brod, director of the Moscow Human Rights Bureau, who is not likely to understate the numbers, so far this year 73 have been killed and 200 injured. While this is much more than nothing, it is hardly an “epidemic” in a country of 150 million. Neither is it a uniquely Russian phenomenon.

USA-RUSSIA. The latest US National Defense Strategy takes some shots at Russia: “Russia’s retreat from openness and democracy… leveraged the revenue from, and access to, its energy sources; asserted claims in the Arctic; and has continued to bully its neighbors… more active military stance… threatened to target countries hosting potential U.S. anti-missile bases…. retreat from democracy… intimidation of its neighbors”. Too many unexamined clichés in that catalogue, I fear.

CHECHNYA. Sulim Yamadayev has been put on the federal wanted list on charges connected with kidnapping and murder. A real attempt at justice, or the removal of a potential opponent?

OSSETIA-GEORGIA. The small-scale war has intensified with reports of car bombs, artillery shelling and sniper fire. Each side blames the other. I have always maintained that Moscow’s principal motivation in the South Caucasus is that a war there could – as it did before – spread into the North Caucasus. And, rhetorically at least, it is spreading. Kokoity threatens to declare mobilisation and call on North Caucasians for help; Abkhazia has put its forces on alert; Tskhinvali claims volunteers from North Ossetia are arriving and a Cossack hetman says he’s ready to help. The Ossetians claim to have driven a Georgian force off a hill with some killed: Tbilisi first denied and later admitted losses. The correlation of forces may be changing: Saakashvili has just made a speech on TV: he ordered a ceasefire adding “And I am offering the Russian Federation to be a guarantor of the South Ossetian autonomy within Georgia… I offer a very important role to Russia in resolving this conflict… Georgia is a natural ally for Russia… We need a real mediator.” Words not before heard: he sounds quite nervous. As he should be: Tbilisi has been consistently defeated in its wars with South Ossetia and, if Abkhazia joins in, anything could happen in that rather fragile country. Illusion meets reality.

© Patrick Armstrong, Ottawa, Canada

THE DUUMVIRATE. I regard The Economist as a generally worthless commentator on Russia, useful only because it is a reliable guide to the “mean sea level” of conventional opinion. In its 6-12 October 2007 issue, it was confident “It has always been a question of how, not if, Vladimir Putin would retain power”. Now it’s not so sure: maybe Medvedev is in charge. Its latest piece (JRL/2008/130/6) finally understands that Putin could have amended the Constitution easily and run for a third term. The point is not that The Economist has become any more thoughtful but that its change of mind is an indication that conventional opinion is coming around to the idea that maybe the whole thing wasn’t, as the October 2007 headline read, “Vladimir Putin: The never-ending presidency”. Revisiting my five hypotheses, I am coming to think that the choice is now between Numbers 4 and 5: I never thought 1 and 2 very likely and 3 is certainly dead. For what it’s worth, but presumably signalling new tactics if not a new strategy, there has been criticism of some of Putin’s legacies appearing in the Russian press.

IN A NUTSHELL. Having been away for a while, I am catching up. What occurs to me is this simple summary. Putin saw his job as stopping the rot and can justifiably regard himself as having been reasonably successful at doing so. Medvedev sees his job as “modernising” Russia; or perhaps a better term is establishing “good governance”. These are two different but related missions. Each has the persona and skills for his task and neither would be very convincing at the other. But they are on the same team trying to get to the same place.

COLOUR REVOLUTIONS. Vladislav Surkov, widely regarded as the Kremlin’s chief political theorist, has just said that the threat of a “colour revolution” being introduced into Russia is now over. (By the way, I am now much more sceptical about the, shall we say, spontaneity of the “Orange” and “Rose” “revolutions” than I was at the time – and I was sceptical then). I never thought such a thing could happen in Russia but it is clear that some in the Presidential Administration did. Another fear that probably had a bearing on Putin’s decision to stay around.

USA-RUSSIA. A VTsIOM poll on how Russians view the USA shows that the generally positive impressions of five years ago are unchanged. About 50% had positive attitudes in both periods while the negatives have actually declined from 29% from 40%. Which certainly goes against a lot of conventional wisdom (Ref).

MECHEL. Thanks to some rather Stalinesque remarks by Putin, the company’s value has taken a hit and people are starting to worry about Russia as a reliable investment area again. His complaint seems to be that the company may (or may not) have been evading taxes but it seems a stunningly inept thing to say in public. Interestingly, today Medvedev said that officials “should stop causing nightmares for business”. Stay tuned.

KHODORKOVSKIY. Applied for parole on the 16th. As usual there are two opinions, each asserted with utter conviction: 1) the request will be rejected 2) the request will be approved. We’ll soon know.

ECONOMY. Still growing but slowing: GDP is up about 6% since last June, but June’s increase in industrial production (0.9%) was the lowest since November 2002. Inflation is now predicted to be about 11% for the year. But, thanks to energy prices, Russia has more than half a trillion dollars in reserves and US$44 billion in debts.

GAS PRICES. Will be rising. Gazprom’s CEO expects a European price of at least US$500 tcm by the end of the year and has cut a deal with Turkmenistan that will greatly raise the price. Ukraine’s arrival at “world prices” may be sooner than it hopes, given that much of its gas is from Uzbekistan. Get ready for more “Russia’s energy weapon” thinkpieces.

ESTONIA. 8.2% of Estonia’s residents are denied citizenship; mostly Russophones, they have taken Russian citizenship – what would you do if you couldn’t get it from the country where you live? The government has rejected an amendment to allow their Estonian-born children to become citizens automatically. This rather obvious violation of basic rights will, no doubt, prevent Estonia’s joining the EU or NATO. Or perhaps not.

CAUCASIAN RUMOURS OF WARS. Has a low grade shooting war begun in South Ossetia? Or is it another of the periodic flare-ups? The campaign season in mountainous areas is short and starting to end. Moscow sent some fighters over the territory in an admitted show of force it hoped “dampened the zeal of hotheads in Tbilisi”.

ABKHAZIA. The German Foreign Minister has been trying to sell a settlement plan. Three stages are reported: Tbilisi will promise not to use force and refugees will return, then some reconstruction and only then a resolution of Abkhazia’s status. Too little too late, I think, but it may prove to be the basis for something in the end.

© Patrick Armstrong, Ottawa, Canada

BALANCE. A Levada poll shows a probably important change in political reality. For years opinion polls have ranked the president distinctly higher than the PM or government. This was so even in the Yeltsin era (although all at very low levels in the latter years). What this poll shows is that Putin’s presence has pulled the government rating up: in the 40s through most of his presidency, it is now in the 60s. At the same time his rating remains in the 80s and Medvedev’s is in the 70s. If this trend holds – and why shouldn’t it? – Russia’s political structure will be much better balanced than it has been. Further evidence, to my mind, of my fifth hypothesis.

CORRUPTION ET AL. Medvedev mused that some provision should be made for transferring assets held by civil servants into trusts and said a first draft of a national plan for combating corruption has appeared. A presidential aide suggested that “independent directors” might replace state officials in some state-owned companies. Of course if that turns out to be a way of letting former members of Putin’s administration keep these lucrative positions… I can understand why you would want to place government officials in these important companies (remember Gazprom under Yeltsin?) but the problem then becomes: where do their interests now lie?

MILITARY. I have been hearing rumours of something happening in the defence apparatus. What has surfaced is that the Defence Minister said the Forces would be reduced to one million by 2013: The original target had been 2016 but “We suggested doing it faster…”. Then a 1st Deputy Defence Minister made the observation that training methods were still rooted in the 1960s and 1970s despite “the experience of the two anti-terrorist campaigns in the North Caucasus and the coalition forces in Afghanistan”. Yesterday the Public Chamber published a report about corruption in the Armed Forces: “Businessmen in epaulets” was a memorable expression. Maybe the rumours of disagreements current a couple of months ago have something to them.

TEMPS ET MOEURS. “2008 Nashi Summer Camp To Focus on Business Training Program” (JRL/2008/125/7).

TAXES AND FOREIGN NGOS. Putin has cut the number of international organisations that can avoid Russian taxes from 101 to 12. This will no doubt be played as another crackdown but a little time on Google suggests that at least one of the entities (IFAW) does not appear to have a Russian branch, although it has many other national branches. Maybe it should set up a proper local Russian branch. In short, this may have more to do with Russia treating such things as other countries do rather than allowing them to browse Russia for cash.

YAVLINSKIY. At the recent Yabloko conference, Grigoriy Yavlinskiy announced he was retiring as leader: his nominee, Sergey Mitrokhin was duly elected. I can’t help thinking that his adamant refusal to ally with anyone else has produced Yabloko’s decline and helped create the reality that today’s “liberal” “opposition” (how many sneer quotes can I get away with?) is little more than a stunt for foreign TV. The head of the St Petersburg branch, who has been critical of Yavlinskiy’s leadership, welcomed the change, saying he expected Mitrokhin to work towards a unification of this potential political grouping.

KHODORKOVSKIY. I have long wondered whether Medvedev might signal a new look by letting, one way or the other, Khodorkovskiy out of jail, given that the Yukos prosecution marked such a turn in Western conventional opinion about Russia. On the one hand, Khodorkovskiy’s lawyers have said they have advised him to apply for parole; on the other, new charges against him are been mentioned. We’ll see. It’s an issue receiving some debate.

IMPERIAL FAMILY. A spokesman for the Prosecutor General’s Office has confirmed that the bodies of Crown Prince Aleksey and Grand Princess Maria have been identified. So all the remains have now been found.

DEMOGRAPHICS. The latest statistics for January-April show continued improvement at each end, although the population is still shrinking: the decline was 96,000 this year compared with 148,100 for the same period last year. Births were said to be 547,100 (488,700 last year).

BELARUS. Medvedev and Lukashenka met; the communiqué spoke of cooperation “on the principles of a market economy”. So no cheap gas. On the other hand, Venezuela will lend Belarus US$500 million to help pay the bills.

CAUCASIAN RUMOURS OF WARS. Bombs in and around Abkhazia: Sukhumi blames Tbilisi, Tbilisi blames Abkhazian criminals. Sukhumi says Tbilisi has begun UAV flights again; Tbilisi denies it. On the 1st Sukhumi sealed the border with Georgia. Javier Solana recommended direct dialogue between the two.

© Patrick Armstrong, Ottawa, Canada

A NOTE ON FILLING THE PAGE. Today is the 490th Thursday that I have done a Sitrep. I have always been able to fill a page, some days more easily than others. This is the hardest I’ve worked to do so. For some years, we have been living with the “Russian Question”. One day, it, like the “Eastern Question” or the “German Question”, will pass and there won’t be enough happening to warrant weekly Sitreps. While that day is not here, we are, perhaps, closer to the desired end when Russia ceases to be a “Question” (with, FAR less bloodshed than the other two were settled, by the way, and far less than predicted by anyone). A “normal” Russia: one with which other countries may have trade disputes or strategic disagreements but will be confident that they can be settled “inside the box”. It’s a mixture of perception and reality: the latter changing much faster than the former.

TOURISM. A result of the growing prosperity of the Putin years has been a steady increase in tourism by Russians. 15 years ago the fear was millions of refugees; ten years ago thousands of criminals; the reality has become ordinary Russians on holiday. I have noticed this for some time but last year in the Mediterranean was interested to see that there are enough of them to justify guidebooks in Russian everywhere and we often had a Russian couple beside us in a cafe. This piece discusses the phenomenon. To my mind, the relative absence of such pieces in the MSM (although see JRL/2008/116/2) is a product of the meme that Russia is locked down by Putin and his Chekist minions. But, as Stalin understood, to really lock a country down, you can’t let people out and you can’t let people in. Perception and reality again.

POLITKOVSKAYA CASE. The Investigation Committee of the Prosecutor General’s Office has announced that it has “finalised” the investigation into her murder. Murder charges have been brought against three Chechens and the police officer, earlier rumoured to have been the “spotter” for the killers, has been charged with abuse of office and extortion. The editor of the paper for which she worked, which has been doing its own investigation, questioned how “finalised” the investigation was. While it was “on the right track”, he reiterated that there were more people involved than the three shooters. As was evident the moment the prosecution’s case was outlined, the murder was not something ordered by the Kremlin, as so many in Western media outlets rushed to assume. As I thought from the beginning, it appears that she ran across some piece of information a “biznesman” didn’t want known.

KLEBNIKOV CASE. This is also the likely explanation in the murder of Paul Klebnikov some years ago – certainly it is the heart of the prosecution case. The Presidium of the Supreme Court just ruled that the decision to return the case to the Prosecutor and suspend the trial was lawful. The Prosecutor General’s Office believes that he was murdered at the order of a Chechen “biznesman” (now apparently dead himself) who didn’t like what Klebnikov said about him in a book. But the prosecutors have been unable to produce either killers or witnesses as is not unusual in mob hits.

TNK-BP. I have no idea what is going on and it appears that there is no clear opinion elsewhere either. Some see it as another Kremlin-inspired takeover while others believe it is an internal dispute.

YOU JUST CAN’T KEEP UP ANYMORE! The newspaper that published the false report that Putin was going to divorce has announced that it will resume publication; on the other hand, the eXile is stopping. While the latter’s closing will be – is being – spun as pressure from the centre, so was the former’s. Apparently the eXile was no longer making money for its backers. Newspapers are dying all over the world.

NORTH CAUCASUS. Quite a number of evidently coordinated small scale attacks across the North Caucasus on and around Russia Day. In Dagestan, a bomb in Makhachkala killed one, the authorities were after a group near the Chechnya border, and a bomb was defused near Khasavyurt. In Chechnya there was an attack on a village in the mountains and a couple of attacks elsewhere and in the Ingush Republic an attack on a police post. Nothing like the scale of a few years ago but a reminder that the jihadists are still there, as they are elsewhere around the world.

CAUCASIAN RUMOURS OF WARS. There was an explosion yesterday on the railway line in Abkhazia on which the Russian railway troops are working. Tbilisi denies any involvement. There are, however, a number of Georgian militia groups in Western Georgia that are not necessarily under Tbilisi’s control. Meanwhile accusations and claims continue from all parties.

© Patrick Armstrong, Ottawa, Canada

MEDVEDEV SPEECH. In his speech opening the St Petersburg International Economic Forum Medvedev said he wants to turn Moscow into a “powerful global financial centre”; well, to do so would require a substantial reduction of corruption, criminality and opacity. He spoke of liberalising the gas market and reducing taxes on the oil sector. He also spoke of helping to overcome the food crisis (but how? more wheat?). He took some shots at the USA’s financial policies and mused about how the UN or something could do it better. For the rest he tried to present a picture of a Russia, prosperous (1st DPM Igor Shuvalov next day said Russia would become the 6th largest economy by the end of the year) and an important and responsible participant in the world’s economy.

HUBRIS. That’s what it sounds like to me. Putin, yesterday: “Our country has asserted itself as a major economic player, it formulates principal items for global agendas. Russia is one of what one calls the chief newsmakers of the modern world.” My sarcastic response would be: only as an energy exporter; not very successfully; bad news. But seriously, while the contrast with ten years ago is striking and in Russia’s favour, it is not truly a big player, it has not had much luck with its interests (see NATO expansion, for example) and news coverage is all “energy weapon”, “journalist murders”, “aggression” and the like. I think the ruling class overestimates the strength of Russia’s position. That is a problem.

HUMAN RIGHTS. Some developments under the new regime. On the 10th Medvedev had a meeting with the Human Rights Commissioner Vladimir Lukin and that day signed two laws affecting the Commissioner’s position and the rights of prison inmates. In each case the theme seems to be to bring the Public Chamber and NGOs into the process. Lukin was quoted as cautiously approving the new laws. We shall see what difference they make. The Public Chamber is potentially an important force in Russia but it is still finding its feet.

AT LONG LAST. People who have suffered the Heisenbergian car trip to Sheremetyevo will be happy to know that a high speed rail link between the centre of town and the airport opened yesterday.

BUDGET SURPLUS. The federal budget surplus is reported to be about US$50 billion so far this year. What a change from the 1990s when enormous wage arrears were the main feature of federal finances. Now the problem is one of success: what to do with all the money without firing up inflation. Maybe it’s time to cut taxes: an increase in the threshold for the mineral extraction tax is in the works but individuals can usually spend their own money more wisely than governments can.

FRENCH CULTURE. There is an outbreak of cars being set on fire in Moscow: about 35 so far.

CHECHNYA. A Russian general has just stated that there are no plans to disband the East and West battalions in Chechnya. Which still leave a lot of questions unanswered. But, because Chechen conscripts are placed in these units Groznyy probably wants to keep them (and they are rather brutally effective).

SOCHI OLYMPICS. The decision to award the 2014 Winter Olympic Games to Sochi has repercussions. Quite apart from the (potentially eye-poppingly corrupt) process of building the millions and millions of dollars worth of facilities there, there are the Abkhazia implications. Sukhumi will want a piece of the action. The Russian companies involved will want to cut their costs by importing what they can from Abkhazia. This is likely the principal incentive to get the railway operating. An optimist would think that Tbilisi and Sukhumi will now have an opportunity to cooperate but I suspect that Sukhumi, remembering its sack in 1992 (quoting a Western scholar: “The campaign of looting, rape, torture and murder mounted by the Mkhedrioni in the region did much to poison relations between Mingrelia and the rest of Georgia… Georgian forces behaved similarly upon their entry into Abkhazia in the summer of 1992”). will not be interested. And Saakashvili’s record here and in South Ossetia does not inspire confidence. It’s probably too late. But the exigencies of the enormous construction effort in Sochi will likely make tensions worse. (Link to a rational and informed piece on Abkhazia: there’s a lot of baggage in this place and I can’t shake the fear that most Western officials haven’t a clue).

ABKHAZIA. Confirming my suspicion that Moscow’s principal motive in Abkhazia is fear of another war, Foreign Minister Lavrov said the other day that the Russian peacekeeping force had been increased not for “preparing any intervention” but “to prevent the possible use of force by our Georgian colleagues”. However, Medvedev and Saakashvili have had their first contact and maybe they can establish a better personal relationship.

 

© Patrick Armstrong, Ottawa, Canada

MEDVEDEV IN GERMANY. The conversation appears to have been mostly about gas pipelines but Medvedev expressed concern about the “increasing gap between Russia and the West” on security issues and reiterated his intentions to effect a “qualitative transformation” of Russia.

PUTIN INTERVIEW. When he was in France, Putin gave an interview (English summary, Russian) to Le Monde. As usual, it’s a straightforward unemotional statement of his views on present and past. It’s a “one stop shopping” trip for Putin’s view of things. The English summary above leaves out his remarks on Abkhazia where he, once again, attempted to educate a Western audience that the problem has deep roots that cannot be wished away.

LITVINENKO. Those who still accept the standard explanation might find this interview with Edward Jay Epstein interesting. From the start I have thought that Litvinenko was engaged in nuclear smuggling for his friends in Ichkeria and poisoned himself.

MONEY. As of 1 June the Reserve Fund had $129.32 billion and the National Welfare Fund $32.60 billion. Much of the first is supposed to be invested abroad which is a compelling indicator that Russia wants a quiet world.

MILITARY CHANGES. Yuriy Baluevskiy has resigned as CGS and will become Deputy Secretary to the Security Council (is it still a parking lot for retirees?); Nikolay Makarov will succeed him. There have long been rumours that Baluevskiy and Defence Minister Serdyukov have been at odds and perhaps they are true. Or maybe, it’s Medvedev putting new makeup on the Russian face. Or maybe he’s had enough.

ENERGY. Medvedev has issued a decree setting targets for improving Russia’s efficiency in using energy. Just as well if we are indeed facing another Maunder Minimum.

POLITKOVSKAYA. The Prosecutor General’s Office has announced that the preliminary investigation into her murder should be complete by the 20th. Although, as the editor of her paper observed, the case can hardly be called finished when neither the killer, nor the man who ordered it, is in custody.

ALTERNATE FUTURE. On Tuesday Grigoriy Romanov died, aged 85. At one point, he was regarded as a strong contender for the post of GenSek. I think we’d be looking at a rather different, and much worse, situation today if he had been.

CHECHNYA. Groznyy continues its tiptoe towards as much independence as it can get: an official has announced that Chechen conscripts into the Russian army this year will not serve outside Chechnya.

CAUCASIAN RUMOURS OF WARS. The International Crisis Group has issued a report on Abkhazia. Unusually for Western discussions of the issue, it is both balanced and informed and doesn’t take the conventional route of blaming Moscow alone: “It [Tbilisi] has quietly been making military preparations, particularly in western Georgia and Upper Kodori. A number of powerful advisers and structures around President Mikheil Saakashvili appear increasingly convinced a military operation in Abkhazia is feasible and necessary.” I remain convinced that Tbilisi would lose such a war and that Moscow will do what ever it has to to prevent it. There is, as the report admits, a considerable danger of spillover, just there was the last time Tbilisi decided to solve the problem by war.

ABKHAZIA RAILWAY. The railway from Russia, via Abkhazia, to Tbilisi has been closed (and decaying) since the Abkhazia-Georgia wars of the early 1990s. In February 2006 an agreement was made between the parties to re-open it. Last week Russia put about 400 railway troops in to rebuild tunnels, bridges and power supplies. Tbilisi has complained, insisting that it never gave permission. The timing of the Russian move has probably some connection with the decision to award the 2014 Winter Olympic Games to Sochi. There will be more activities like this in preparing the area and Sukhumi is certainly hoping to make some money out of all the visitors to a city which is only about 30kms from its border.

PEACEKEEPERS IN ABKHAZIA. The end of the Abkhazia-Georgia wars established a Russian-Georgian-Abkhazian peacekeeping force which has been there ever since (and very likely prevented another war). Ukraine’s Defence Minister has said that Kiev will sent troops if Tbilisi wants it to. We will see what this amounts to: presumably Moscow and Sukhumi would have to agree as well if Ukrainian troops are to be added to the force, but it could be a productive step as Kiev has no axes to grind there.

 

© Patrick Armstrong, Ottawa, Canada