MISSILES. Washington has given up missile system deployment in the Czech Republic and in Poland. (White House Pentagon), an idea never very popular in either country. A good deal of the comment accuses Washington of abandoning eastern Europe to the “Russian menace”. This is very ironic: when Moscow complained that it saw the missiles as a possible threat, everyone pooh-poohed it and insisted that it was only about Iran. Now it turns out that many saw them precisely as a counter to Russia. (Indeed we see this logic here: we say that what we do is not a threat to Russia; but the Russians think it is; that is itself threatening; therefore we must counter this Russian threat). I am encouraged that there seems to be some opening to Russian participation in the new scheme. But, more details to follow no doubt.

MILITARY REFORM. At the Valdai meeting, one of the authors of the military reform plan (he doesn’t like the word “reform”; he prefers “revolution”) described it. “Russia is giving up the mass army prepar[ed] for a large-scale war. That old system was introduced by War Minister Dmitriy Milyutin in 1874. The purpose was to have a rather small regular army for peace time and a huge pool of reservists… And that was followed for almost 150 years”. But there is now no need for it today: “No mobilization, no large-scale war, no threats from NATO”. The aim now is about one million in the standing forces with reserves of about 100,000. However, tactical nuclear weapons will be “the replacement for those reserves, dozens and dozens of reserve divisions in case of something happening. It is not considered a real threat at the present time. But when they speak about Chinese spread or NATO spread, you cannot just dismiss it as something impossible”. Russia is adopting NATO’s strategy of the 1950s: nuclear weapons as the equaliser. But it is painful: “And it is difficult to accept with the military mind, that is why lots of officers are unhappy about what is going on. But it should have been done, in my opinion, five, 10 – maybe even better – 15 years ago. What’s being done is overdue.”

COLOURS OF RUSSIA. I recommend a look at this. “The Colours Group of Canada addresses the need to eliminate the out-dated and often negative cultural stereotypes perpetrated by global media.”

ALCOHOL. Medvedev has instructed the government to prepare a plan to regulate alcohol production and use. Here are some statistics; they don’t look especially bad to me as an average, but binge drinking (запой) is quite common and that is more dangerous than steady quiet soaking.

CORRUPTION. The Head of the Voronezh Oblast branch of Agency for Federal Property Management, Zafeddin Mikailov, was arrested on suspicion of taking a bribe.

BONY. It is reported that that the Bank of New York Mellon is very near settlement on a money laundering suit brought by Moscow. Of course, the story was reported rather differently in 1999: “USA Today reported Thursday that Russian organized crime figures laundered at least $15 billion”.

TERRORIST ATTACKS. The past week has brought at least three suicide attacks in the North Caucasus. Confirming my deduction that the area has (again) become a magnet for the international jihad, Ingush Republic President Yevkurov has said that “Out of 30 recently killed participants of illegal armed formations, 27 were foreigners”.

NAVY. The head of the Navy announced that Moscow plans to hold an international tender for the purchase of a helicopter carrier; France, Spain and the Netherlands were mentioned as bidders. With the customary opacity of the MoD, it’s not clear whether this is exclusive of the announcement that it would buy a Mistral-class amphibious assault ship from France. But it is certainly an indication of the deficiencies of Russia’s shipyards.

WHAT A DIFFERENCE A YEAR MAKES. A year ago NATO was all in a huff about Russia, yesterday the new NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, called for an “open-minded and unprecedented dialogue” with Moscow, taking into account “that Russia has legitimate security concerns”. What could have made the difference I wonder? Could reports like this, or this, or this have had an influence?

NORD STREAM. As another piece of evidence of Europe’s changing views since last year, Gazprom has announced that a French company will buy into the pipeline.

CHAVEZ VISIT. Venezuelan President Chavez visited Moscow; announced Caracas’ recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and did some arms deals involving, it is said, tanks, MLRSs and possibly SSMs. Not, I would have thought, much use to Venezuela but they will, not doubt, look impressive on parade.

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)

HISTORY (AGAIN). We are seeing a spate of tendentious pieces trying to make out that “Russia’s traumatic history is being rewritten on a massive scale to rehabilitate Stalin”, to quote a recent example of the genre. They are usually based on misreports about a textbook (actually a teachers’ guide), Contemporary History of Russia 1945-2006: Book for Teachers. There is every indication that none of the writers has actually looked at the book itself. What the book is actually trying to do is not “rehabilitate” Stalin but create the background for a classroom discussion: “For some, he is the hero and orchestrator of Victory in the Great Patriotic War; to others, he is the embodiment of evil itself.” It quotes Winston Churchill (“Stalin came to Russia with a wooden plough and left in it possession of nuclear weapons”) and Antonov-Ovseyenko (“bloody tyrant”). On the one hand; on the other. It concludes: “On the one side, he is regarded as the most successful Soviet leader… But Stalin’s rule had another side… the ruthless exploitation of the population.” But don’t take my word for it: read it yourself (Eng Russ). And, which these writers will never tell you, the Education Ministry has just decreed that sections of the GULag Archipelago will become compulsory, joining One Day in the Life…. This attempt at balance, however poorly it may be done, is better than the wholesale airbrushing that is common in other countries. The past is not just a Russian problem: these pieces never tell you about all the Lenin statues still standing in Kiev; to do so would destroy the simple story they are trying to sell you.

MEDVEDEV’S LATEST. He is setting himself up as grand strategist and chief moraliser. His latest, on the question: “Should a primitive economy based on raw materials and endemic corruption accompany us into the future?” Worth reading as a guide to what he is trying to do.

NORTH CAUCASUS. A better week for the authorities with several “militants” killed, including a major fighter who, they say, was the mastermind of the assassination attempt on Ingush Republic President Yevkurov. A Russian newspaper says that the authorities prevented two suicide terror attacks on Moscow itself this week.

GAS WARS. Tymoshenko says there are “no conflicts” between Russia and Ukraine over gas supplies or storage. Typically, Yushchenko’s side disagrees. But Yushchenko is now a very lame duck indeed.

MOLDOVA. The newly-elected speaker of the Moldovan parliament, Mihai Ghimpu, has been, in the past at least, an advocate of Moldova’s dissolving its existence and becoming part of Romania. He denies he still intends this but it is a dangerous subject to be raised at all. The Moldavian SSR was created by Stalin in two steps: first he created, out of a piece of the Ukrainian SSR, the Moldavian ASSR and then, when he acquired territory from Romania, the Moldavian SSR was created out of most of these former bits of Romania and most of the former Moldavian ASSR. And a Moldavian ethnos was invented to make all this fit with the Soviet nationality theory. It was this territory that is today’s Moldova. When the USSR broke up, many in Moldova believed that they were really Romanians and sought to merge into Romania. The inhabitants of the former Moldavian ASSR, about two-thirds of them Ukrainians or Russians, did not want to be so submerged into a foreign body and the wars broke out and, as a result, the Transdnestr Republic appeared. In short, talk of joining Romania was the casus belli. Transdnestr is recognised by no one and the issue remains unsettled – although the proposal on the table would allow a referendum in Transdnestr should Moldova decide to become part of Romania. This is therefore potentially a dangerous thing to mention. And why raise it now? Perhaps because Moldova is said to be one of the poorest countries in Europe and merger with Romania is one solution to the problem.

TURKISH CAPTAIN. Tbilisi has reconsidered; after a visit by the Turkish Foreign Minister, the 24-year sentence of the Turkish captain of the ship trading with Abkhazia has reduced and he freed.

SOUTH OSSETIA WAR. Three weeks ago Russian prosecutors said they had discovered evidence that “Ukraine’s regular Defence Ministry units and at least 200 members of the UNA-UNSO nationalist organisation” had participated in the war. There are two components to the assertion: forces that Kiev controls and forces that it does not. Ukraine President Yushchenko has strongly denied the involvement of the former. Some of the purported evidence of the latter is here but I have seen no evidence for the participation of regular forces. Although, given the large supply of weapons from Ukraine, there may have been Ukrainian troops somewhere in Georgia when the war began. But that’s not quite the same thing.

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)

HISTORY AGAIN. Tuesday was the anniversary of the German attack on Poland which is generally taken as the beginning of the Second World War and many gathered in Gdansk to commemorate it. Putin was there for Russia and preceded his visit with an article he wrote (or caused to be written) in Gazeta Wyborcza. It called for a balanced view: one that speaks of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact to be sure, but also of the Munich agreement and the generally flabby response to Hitler than many countries practised. All very historically accurate and reasonable (although he couldn’t resist the temptation to remind us that Poland grabbed a bit of Czechoslovakia after Munich). As to Western MSM coverage of this, ya pays yer money and ya takes yer chances, but I’ll bet you won’t see this quoted: “The people of Russia, whose destiny was crippled by the totalitarian regime…”. In any event, none of this is very new and Putin is quite correct: no country has much to be proud of. Here’s Putin’s speech (Eng Russ) making the same points.

MILITARY REFORM. Yesterday the top military leaders of Russia met to discuss military reform. A no doubt painful discussion. One topic would be whether to bring naval units under command of the North Caucasus Military District. It is said that one of the problems last year was the lack of unity of command.

SUICIDE ATTACKERS. Ingush Republic President Yevkurov says he has information that a group of suicide bombers has arrived in the republic. There is good evidence that suicide attackers are a world-wide resource and are moved around the various battlefields. Iraq is not the attractor it formerly was and they are being sent elsewhere (at least one in Dagestan this last week). It’s not just about Russia; pieces like this are exceptionally naïve: the war in the North Caucasus became international when Khattab arrived from Afghanistan in 1995.

GAS WARS. Putin and Tymoshenko met in Poland and agreed that Ukraine will only pay for the gas that it actually consumes. I’m not sure what this means. Gas producers prefer to produce gas evenly over the year although demand is usually higher in the winter; and so summer gas is pumped into storage facilities to be released in winter. In the Soviet days, understandably, storage facilities were built in the Ukrainian SSR and that fact has led to a lot of the problems today. Does this agreement mean that Gazprom will own the gas in the Ukrainian storage tanks and, in the winter, sell it to Ukraine and to Western Europe as needed? Anyway, the two seem to have quite a convivial and useful meeting. No doubt, Tymoshenko will be claiming, when she runs for president, that she can deal with Russia in a reasonable way.

BOTH ENDS AGAINST THE MIDDLE. Lukashenka has just said that Belarus will steer an equal course between Russia and Europe. Perhaps the Kommentariat, rather than persisting in its usual zero-sum assumptions, should look for examples of this, the sensible strategy for small powers with powerful neighbours. And one that usually pays off: the Kyrgyz Republic managed to pry money out of both Moscow and Washington while getting a better deal on Manas.

TURKEY-ARMENIA. Switzerland has mediated talks between Turkey and Armenia on mutual recognition. There was no recognition when the USSR disappeared and Turkey closed its border in the 1990s during the Karabakh wars. At least two issues have to be cleaned up: Yerevan’s demands on Ankara re massacres of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire and Ankara’s taking sides in the Karabakh issue. But both sides are hopeful and the Turkish Foreign Minister hopes that this will be an impetus to resolving the Karabakh problem.

SHIPS. Tbilisi maintains that Abkhazia is part of Georgia and that no one may trade with it. Accordingly Georgia forces have been apprehending ships suspected of trading with Abkhazia. On 16 August Georgian warships impounded the tanker Buket carrying gasoline and diesel to Abkhazia and on Monday, the Turkish captain was sentenced to 24 (24!) years in prison by a Georgian court. I suspect that Ankara will not be amused especially since the Turkish operator of the ship claims the seizure was made well outside Georgia’s territorial waters. On the 28th, claiming that 23 ships had been stopped this year, the Russian Border Service announced it would start protecting ships passing through Abkhazian territorial waters. Those who enjoy nightmarish speculations can image US warships backing up Georgian warships seizing Turkish merchant vessels with Russian warships trying to stop them.

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)

NORTH CAUCASUS. Medvedev addressed the security problem: he spoke of corruption, socio-economic factors, the training and responsibility of police. He also recommended that jury trials be dropped for organised crime issues. Medvedev’s argument is “to ensure that criminals and corruptionists cannot exert pressure on courts hearing such cases”. For a similar reason he proposed that terrorism cases (jury trials already eliminated for them) be held in different parts of the country from where the crimes were committed. The organised crime proposal has attracted some opposition: for one thing, the temptation of the police to label every crime “organised” would be overwhelming, given that jury trials result in a higher rate of acquittal.

SUICIDE BOMBERS. Suicide attacks are back in the North Caucasus: on the 17th, 21st and 25th. Now that Iraq is much calmer, it is likely that the suicide bombers are being sent to the North Caucasus, Afghanistan and elsewhere. It’s a world-wide phenomenon in which a change in one battlefield affects the others. See this.

FRENCH SHIP. Confirming a rumour, the CGS said Moscow would buy Mistral class amphibious assault ships from France. I find this interesting for several reasons. Generally Russia makes its own weaponry and boasts of doing so; but this is the second foreign buy (Israeli UAVs the first) showing that a sense of reality about its capabilities is appearing. Second, it is another indication of the knock-on effect of Saakashvili’s military adventure with further evidence that Paris is revising its view of things. Third, is this the answer to the collapse of Russia’s aircraft carrier ambitions? Fourth, this is a power-projection ship designed to put a battle group on a foreign shore. Which shore? That question will produce a good deal of bloviating. A number of navies have such ships; the US has by far the most and the largest.

HEP ACCIDENT. On the 17th an accident shut down the Sayano-Shushenskaya HEP. The investigation is not complete but the culprit would appear to be that distressingly casual Russian approach to safety (see Chernobyl and Kursk). The sale of strong alcoholic drinks has been banned in the area.

ALCOHOL. Speaking of which, Medvedev held a meeting on the problem and a researcher gave some pretty eye-popping statistics.

THINGS YOU WON’T HEAR ABOUT. The British Council’s case against tax authorities has been upheld in a Russian arbitration court and a jury found a Moscow resident guilty of murdering a Jesuit priest.

GOVERNORS. The new system for choosing governors has begun with a vacancy in Sverdlovsk Oblast. The legislature (dominated by United Russia) has passed three names to Medvedev who must pick one (or return the choice). Medvedev insists that the Presidential Administration’s involvement was purely “administrative”.

CHECHNYA. Moscow Times reports that Kavkaz-Tsentr has announced a death sentence on Akhmed Zakayev. The jihadists evidently fear that he will take up Kadyrov’s offer of amnesty.

UKRAINE-RUSSIA. A recent poll shows a strong majority of Ukrainians holding “positive feelings” towards Russia but a negligible desire to become part of it. No surprise there.

SAAKASHVILI. Readers will know that I expected Saakashvili to be long gone. Obviously, I was wrong. I underestimated the effects of his near-total control of news outlets and his periodic promises of reform. The opposition never quite united and never tried to move protests out of Tbilisi. And, I guess, Georgians were unwilling to have the third president in a row be overthrown in the streets. But Georgia is unlikely to be in NATO anytime soon, South Ossetia and Abkhazia are lost for the foreseeable future, Saakashvili’s credibility has collapsed, the economy is stagnant (and much of the previous growth was illusory), the army has evidently decided to be neutral, his government is not very popular and the number of former colleagues in opposition is quite astounding – and revealing: after all they know him well. The next event to come into play will be the EU report on the war.

GEORGIA. US trainers have arrived. The US general naively said that the training had no application to Russia; the Georgian Defence Minister (just replaced) knows better. The last round, regardless of what the Americans thought they were doing, convinced Saakashvili that Georgia had “the best equipped and most technologically advanced” army in the region and that he “had the US support to carry out the military operation”. Sometimes the tail has its reasons of which the dog knows nothing.

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)

UKRAINE. On the 11th Medvedev sent a sort of open letter to Ukrainian President Yushchenko complaining about relations and enumerating Russia’s complaints (for the majority of which Yushchenko would be most responsible). Reactions are appearing: some mocking, some thoughtful. I don’t understand the point of this. Yushchenko will not be the next President of Ukraine and whoever replaces him will have a more reasonable relationship with Russia. According to Gallup, approval of their government by Ukrainians is “the lowest in the world”. Surely the best thing for Moscow to do, if it wants a Ukrainian government interested in more than the “colour revolution package” of irritating Moscow and joining NATO, is to keep its mouth shut and wait for the Ukrainian people themselves to toss Yushchenko out. They need no encouragement from Medvedev: the “Orange Revolution” was based on false premises. As to the Ukrainian arms deliveries to Georgia (and I’d still like to know who paid for them), that’s percolating away in the background in Ukraine and needs no help from Medvedev either. It will likely re-surface with the new President in January, whether Tymoshenko or Yanukovych. So, altogether unnecessary, silly and rather whiney.

ECONOMY. Some numbers that aren’t as bad as previously. Unemployment is reported to have slightly declined (from 6.7 million to 6.3 million or 8.3% of the economically active population). GDP is reported to have grown 7.5% in the 2nd quarter over the 1st (but, year-on-year, is down 10.9%). Has it bottomed out?

THE MIGHTY RUSSIAN ARMS BUILDUP. Deputy PM Sergey Ivanov announced that the Russian Armed Forces would receive about US$15 billion nest year. To put this number in perspective, Canada’s defence budget this year was about the same. I know there is a big difference in purchasing power parity, and the Russian money will go much farther, but 15 billion is hardly an apocalyptical sum.

PIPELINES. The South Stream pipeline comes a little closer with a Turkish-Russian agreement last week. The two also agreed on construction of a Russian-built nuclear power plant, Turkey’s first.

STATE CORPORATIONS. Over the years Medvedev has mused that state ownership may have outlived its usefulness and I have been watching to see whether this would lead anywhere. He has ordered the Prosecutor General and the Director of the Presidential Control Directorate – interesting choices indeed! – to review and report on “the expediency of the future use of such business structures”.

CORRUPTION. A Moscow court has sentenced Andrey Taranov, the former head of Mandatory Health Insurance Fund, to 7 years in prison on corruption charges.

USE OF FORCE ABOARD. Medvedev has submitted to the Duma a draft law establishing authorisation to use Russian Armed Forces abroad. The reasons given are: to counter attacks on deployed troops; to counter or prevent an aggression against another country; to protect Russian citizens abroad; to combat piracy and ensure safe passage of shipping. No doubt other countries have similar legislation.

ANOTHER MURDER. The bodies of Zarema Sadulayeva (head of Let’s Save the Generation) and her husband, who were kidnapped in the 10th, were found the next day in Groznyy. Investigators wonder whether the target may have been her husband, Alik Jabrailov, who was formerly a fighter against the government. Interestingly, Akhmed Zakayev does not blame Kadyrov for the murders. A discussion of various theories here. Personally I have no clue: I can imagine jihadists and other interested parties wanting to embarrass Moscow and Kadyrev; I can imagine score-settling; I can imagine Kadyrov “cleaning house”. The murders will not be solved, although, like those in Novy Itagi in 1996, we may learn more years later. But there will always be problems with the credibility of sources.

CHECHNYA. To no one’s surprise, the authorities have announced a big increase in kidnappings and murders in Chechnya: the former are up from 4 to 23, and murders from 52 to 78. Crimes of “a terrorist nature” are down. But how can one separate jihadist activity, rebel activity, score-settling and “normal” “bizness”?

MOLDOVA. The four main opposition parties in Moldova have announced a coalition; 61 votes, of which they have 53, are required to name the next President; therefore they need support from some of the 48 Communists. If they fail, there will have to be another election.

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)

PUTIN POPULARITY. At last a reasonably intelligent piece on Putin’s popularity. But, while it makes the important point strongly, it is still has some of the clichés that clutter up Western reporting. The important point is that Putin’s popularity has held up despite the fall in oil prices. However, it is a cliché that his popularity suffered with the Kursk sinking (presumably the feeling is that Western leader would in a similar case), the piece claims a “significant drop”, but the chart shows only about one point lost and soon regained. Someone is quoted dragging out the hoariest cliché of all: Russians’ alleged “lasting desire for strongman leadership”. No, it’s much simpler than that. Compare Russia’s prospects in 1999 with today’s. Russians give Putin’s team credit for the improvement across the board: higher standard of living, greater stability and cohesion, increased position in the world and all the rest. There’s nothing mysteriously Russian about it: people like effective leaders everywhere. Another point to reflect on is that many observers assume that they can measure political freedom by the level of opposition they perceive. They see opposition in Georgia or Ukraine but little in Russia. But, as the piece shows, since 2000 about seven out of ten Russians have approved of Putin; an observer will have to look much harder there to find an opponent than in the other two countries where the government structure is much less popular. There it’s easy to find opponents of the government: in Ukraine more than nine out of ten disapprove and in Georgia eight out of ten. And, I suspect, they are much more passionate about their disapproval.

POLITKOVSKAYA TRIAL. Has re-opened after the Supreme Court declared a mistrial in the last attempt. It was adjourned today to consider defence objections. Another case of Russia being damned if it does and damned if it doesn’t. It’s condemned because the case is still not resolved; it’s not congratulated that the government’s case failed to convince a jury.

SUBMARINES. Russian submarines off the US coast “raised concerns”, “assertive stance” “echoes of the cold war era” etc etc. But, according to the Russian Navy, such patrols never stopped. So why mention them now? And in the usual context which doesn’t even wonder whether the US makes similar patrols (it does)? As Stalin used to say: “the struggle intensifies”: many people want to undermine Obama’s “reset”.

SOUTH OSSETIA WAR. Saturday will be the first anniversary of the start of the fighting and there will be, no doubt, many think pieces written. Check them, dear readers, with these points in mind: any serious discussion ought to at least mention most of them. Background should start in 1918 when the Democratic Republic of Georgia attempted to add South Ossetia by force; then carry through Stalin-Jughashvili’s decision to cut Ossetia in two and give the southern half to the Georgian SSR; it should mention Ossetian demands to retain the rights they had had in the Soviet system (as an “Autonomous Oblast”); Tbilisi’s rejection of that; then the Georgian attack in 1991. Extra bonus points if anyone mentions the “hosts and guest theory” prevalent in Georgia in the late 1980s. All this left a legacy of mistrust and constant shooting back and forth. These think pieces should get the immediate chronology right too. On 7 August, Saakashvili gave a speech announcing a ceasefire and saying “I love Ossetians as a President and as an ordinary citizen of this country”. A few hours later, Georgian forces opened fire. Expecting a quick seizure of the bridge at Didi-Gupta and believing he had support from Washington, on the 8th Saakashvili gave a “victory speech”. But Georgian forces were stopped by Ossetian militia and collapsed and ran when Russian soldiers arrived, abandoning their cities and their weapons. Since then Saakashvili has changed his story several times; in particular he is now saying that the Russians moved first. There should be some understanding that Saakashvili’s former Defence Minister has admitted that an attack on South Ossetia was always part of the plan. There should be recognition of the truth that the Ossetians are actors, not Moscow puppets and that they have shown, by plebiscites and by fighting, that they do not want to be part of Georgia (at least as it has been constituted since Gamsakhurdia). All of these points should be considered. If they are not, you are reading a whitewash. Perhaps paid for by Saakashvili.

MOLDOVA ELECTION. In parliamentary elections, the Communists won a plurality but not a controlling majority.

UKRAINE GAS. The IMF has approved the third tranche of its US$16 billion stabilisation loan to Ukraine (about US$10 billion received so far). Gazprom has been paid in full for the gas pumped into Ukraine storage facilities in July. Perhaps we will have a quiet winter for once: the winter gas is getting there; it’s paid for.

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)

RESPECT AND INFLUENCE. Two centuries ago John Jay wrote: “If they [foreign powers] see that our national government is efficient and well administered, our trade prudently regulated, our militia properly organized and disciplined, our resources and finances discreetly managed, our credit re-established, our people free, contented, and united, they will be much more disposed to cultivate our friendship than provoke our resentment.” True then and true now. A Medvedev interview touches on many of these points: “Just as our foreign policy has a direct impact on living standards here at home, so does our success at home have a direct impact on how others perceive us.” He knows Russia has some distance to go: “So long as others see Russia as a country with an unacceptably high level of corruption we will be treated accordingly.” If you want to know what the Russians think about things, read what they say; not what other people want you to think they said.

CORRUPTION. Medvedev has called on people “not to be afraid to use [the new anti corruption laws]”. In the interview cited above, he admits that so far his efforts have had “very modest results”.

MAIL. Law enforcement agencies are now empowered to inspect private mail. With a court order. Which, in the realities of Russia, is a flimsy safeguard.

NGOs. Medvedev has approved a simplification of the registration rules for Russian NGOs.

POLITKOVSKAYA. It is announced that a new murder trial is to begin 5 Aug. I think that the prosecutors got it right (and the editors of Novaya Gazeta seem to agree) but the last trial was completely bungled. As so many prosecutions have been: the best lawyers are working somewhere else; mob hits are notoriously difficult to prove thanks to cutouts, intimidated witnesses and the expendable triggermen; the police are incompetent and corrupt (one policeman acted as the spotter for the murderers it is said). Very few prosecutions do the job in modern Russia.

RELIGION. In a meeting with leaders of Russia’s four “traditional” religions (Orthodoxy, Islam, Judaism and Buddhism), Medvedev expressed support for voluntary religious instruction in schools and chaplains in the Armed Forces. It will be interesting to see how the kommentariat spins this one.

CHECHNYA. An effort is underway to bring back into the fold the last remaining independence fighters so as to gain their cooperation against the jihadists. Talks with Akhmed Zakayev in particular.

BASES. A Russian admiral says the Black Sea Fleet should have at least two main bases: one in Sevastopol and Novorossiysk. I think it should have as many bases as it wants. But they should all be in Russia.

GEORGIA. Just before Biden’s visit Saakashvili promised reforms: the opposition is scornful. What are his promises worth anyway? A few hours before Georgian forces opened fire on Tskhinvali last year, he said “I have been proposing and I am proposing Russia act as a guarantor of South Ossetian autonomy within Georgia”. The opposition has suspended its regular Tbilisi street protests but promises to keep working to get rid of Saakashvili. Not a failure: Biden seems to have taken to heart Burjanadze’s appeal to support Georgia not Saakashvili. In the Wall Street Journal interview (which has been spun, in my opinion, as far more hostile to Russia than it really was) Biden was asked about Saakashvili’s reform promises: “I’m not concerned, but I’m not taking any chances. The opposition believes the only reason he said it was because I was coming. The opposition said to me the only reason he did some of the stuff he did in terms of backing off the demonstrations was because I told him…” Saakashvili wanted weapons; he has been refused. The Daily Telegraph reports that the EU report on the war has been delayed. This leads me to suppose that it will not support Saakashvili’s various stories. Pretending that the fact that Georgian forces opened fire on Tskhinvali at midnight doesn’t matter is absurd: does anyone seriously think that Russia would have “invaded” anyway if Saakashvili had actually meant what he said? Extracting what he can from Biden’s visit, Saakashvili says “Putin’s plan to completely occupy and to destroy Georgia: has now been foiled”. Perhaps this will put an end to all the op-eds predicting that Moscow is about to do what it could have done last year but didn’t.

BIDEN IN UKRAINE. He appears to understand that the gas problem is not just Moscow: he is reported to have observed that allowing local consumers pay fractional rates for gas means that Naftohaz is always short of money to pay Gazprom.

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)

JUST WHAT RUSSIA NEEDS. Another liberal/social democrat opposition party. But it has been announced that Gorbachev’s Independent Democratic Party of Russia will hold its founding congress in early September. I would estimate that 10 to 15% to the electorate would be sympathetic to something like this (although the “pedestal parties” long since stole the economic platforms) but for some reason Russian liberals absolutely refuse to cooperate with each other and there doesn’t appear to be much sign that they ever will. Each is prepared to unite – but only under his leadership.

KARABAKH. At a side meeting of the G8, Russia, France and the USA announced they would submit a revised set of proposals to resolve the Karabakh problem to Yerevan and Baku. Like South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Chechnya and Transdnestr, this particular attempt to revise Stalin’s cartography started up in the dying days of the USSR in an. After quite serious fighting over several years, the Karabakhians secured their independence and occupied a swath of Azerbaijan territory linking themselves to Armenia. Like the other issues (except Chechnya for some reason) the “international community” generally ignores the secessionists, regarding them as the finger puppets of recognised states. External attempts to mediate the issue have foundered on the assumption that it’s only a Baku-Yerevan issue. But that is folly: the Karabakhians won their independence and they will not allow it to be traded away by somebody else. Any solution must return a substantial amount of territory to Baku and assure Stepanakert that it will not be governed from Baku and offer veterans of the fighting enough to satisfy them. Not an easy thing to achieve. Over the years, however, the rough form of a settlement has emerged: Karabakh remains nominally in Azerbaijan but in reality controls its own destiny; some access to Armenia is secured, the other land is returned to full Azerbaijan control. Naturally, there would have to be some strong peacekeeping force in place (and who would volunteer for that?). Nonetheless it is encouraging that Washington-Moscow and Paris are getting involved: the combination may be able to deliver. The preliminary meeting of the Armenian and Azerbaijanian presidents will be held in Moscow this weekend.

BLACK SEA FLEET. The Black Sea Fleet in the Soviet days was based in Crimea. When the USSR broke up, the Russia portion of the fleet negotiated a lease to stay there. The current lease expires in 2017. On Tuesday Medvedev visited Novorossiysk and announced that construction of a new base was underway and should be complete by 2020. What appeared to be a strong intimation that the fleet would finally leave Ukraine was immediately muddied when the Chief of the General Staff announced that Moscow hoped to extend the lease. Moscow should bite the bullet, finish the base and move the fleet to it as soon as possible. Perhaps Medvedev will issue a clarification.

AIRCRAFT LOSSES IN SOUTH OSSETIA. Moscow Defense Brief says that Russia actually lost 6 aircraft in the fighting (Moscow admits to 4), three of them to Russian fire because the lack of cooperation between Army and Air force “led them to conduct completely separate campaigns”. The General Staff has denied the report.

ANOTHER MURDER. Natalya Estemirova was kidnapped in Chechnya yesterday and her body was found in Ingushetia. The Interior Minister Rashid Nurgaliyev has pledged action. While it is possible that the murder will be quickly solved, it is more likely that it won’t and the usual rumours will replace fact.

GEORGIA. The opposition has announced that it will spread protests throughout Georgia. Meanwhile Burjanadze was in France presenting evidence of government repression. Saakashvili continues to tighten control with a new law on protest rallies and a stronger grip on the news media. He assured the Georgian people that the new presidential palace a-building cost a “trifle”.

BEREZOVSKIY. It is reported that Ukrainian investigators interviewed Berezovskiy about the alleged poisoning of President Yushchenko in 2004. If true, that’s a new and curious twist to this long unsolved mystery.

NABUCCO. The gas pipeline moved a step forward with Turkey, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania signing an intergovernmental agreement on the line (Caspian to Europe via Turkey). Naturally, in the zero-sum thinking that infests the subject of pipelines, some hailed it as a way to cut Russia out. But, for what it’s worth the Turkish PM invited Russia and Iran to join the project.

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)

RUSSIA-US SUMMIT. To my mind, Obama said a number of things that deserve being said, particularly: “America wants a strong, peaceful, and prosperous Russia… we also recognize the future benefit that will come from a strong and vibrant Russia.” For too long, the prevailing impression has been that Washington would prefer a weak, turbulent and poverty-stricken Russia. He also intimated that the end of the Cold War was not simply a result of US action. On the two burning concerns for Moscow, he showed openness. He hinted at the possibility of Russian involvement in missile defence and, on NATO expansion, rather than the usual wooden language, listed the things Ukraine and Georgia must do to qualify for membership (one of them, “a majority of its people must choose to”, effectively rules out Ukraine); he also stated: “NATO should be seeking collaboration with Russia, not confrontation”. The only jarring note, probably understandably, I saw was “I reiterated my firm belief that Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity must be respected”. If only it were that simple: but Tbilisi ought not to have done things in the late 1980s and 1990s that persuaded Ossetians and Abkhazians they had no future in an independent Georgia. The two roughed out a nuclear weapons agreement and US transit through Russia to Afghanistan was extended. Overall, the “reset” seems to be off to a good start. But we’ve been here before: Clinton-Yeltsin and Bush-Putin also started well. Things happen and each government has long-entrenched interests that work against these beginnings.

RUSSIA INC. The Central Bank says net capital inflow was US$7.2 billion in the second quarter (first net inflow since second quarter 2008). But net outflow in the first quarter was US$34.8 billion. Meanwhile, Russia’s total foreign debt is down US$8.4 billion to US$475.1 billion in the first half of the year. In this number the government’s debt is down US$1.8 billion to US$27.7 billion. International reserves are US$409.1 billion.

OIL AND GAS. Russia’s energy exports have suffered with the world-wide economic difficulties. We are told that the average price of Russian oil was $US105.31 per barrel in the first half of last year but only $50.82 per barrel in the first half of this year. Natural gas exports to Western countries are about half over the same periods. As for Russia’s immediate neighbours, Ukraine has bought about a third of the gas that it contracted to buy but Gazprom’s CEO says that it will be forgiven the penalties the contract requires. It has paid in full for June’s deliveries but there is concern that it’s having problems doing so (gas has to be bought to fill storage tanks so as to prepare for winter’s higher demands). The EU may lend Ukraine the money. (Parenthetically, the EU seems to now understand that the gas delivery problem is more than just Russia’s “energy weapon” as conventional wisdom had it the first time around). Putin stated that Russia will continue to sell gas to Belarus at reduced prices (Ukraine is not paying the full European rate either).

KHODORKOVSKIY. Like some others, I thought it possible that Medvedev might pardon him. He has just issued his first (I think) statement on the subject: “Concerning the possibility of a pardon for someone, Khodorkovsky or anyone else, the procedure has to be carried out in accordance with our country’s rules. In other words, a person must appeal to the President, plead guilty to having committed a crime and seek the appropriate resolution. So at this point there is nothing to discuss”.

GOVERNORS. A recent Levada poll finds majority of Russians supporting direct election for governors. Russia has run through a number of variations: from direct appointment in Yeltsin’s time, to direct elections, to nominations by the President with agreement by the legislatures. There may be more changes to come.

CAUCASIAN RUMOURS OF WARS. Another two weeks of violence in the North Caucasus. But it’s not one-sided: for example, a police convoy was ambushed in Chechnya on the 4th but the authorities ran the attackers to ground quickly with some success. Last week security forces killed an “emir” and, it is claimed, prevented an assassination attempt on Kadyrov. While there are resemblances to the situation before the first Chechen war of 1994, there are very important differences. Then the central and local governments were helpless and ineffective; today the authorities are altogether stronger and better organised. They have much more support from the populations as well: all the suffering, and the terrible result of the death or glory rhetoric so common then, has inoculated many against such romanticism. (I’ve heard that the movie Braveheart was a huge hit all over the Caucasus at the time – after a short struggle the heroic little guys win their freedom: see.)

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)

FREEDOM OF OPINION. We hear a great deal about how Russia’s media is not free, but because the discussion is usually only about the “old media” and not about the “new media”, a distorted picture is given about citizen access to information. Which is the really important thing. But the “old media” is dying everywhere for a variety of reasons. A recent poll (JRL/2009/21) gives some numbers on Russian access to the Internet: daily use is claimed by 22% of the population; naturally Moscow (49%) and St Petersburg (40%) are the highest. This site suggests Russian “Internet penetration” is about half the European average and about one-third of the North American average. But the main point is that the Internet is free – there is no government control and once you’re on it, you’re on it, whether you’re in Ottawa or Omsk. So assessments of Russians’ access to different opinions ought to take into account the fact that about a third of Russians say they use the Net at least once a week and that number is, of course, growing all the time and more wide-spread among young than old.

PR. The Presidential Administration head Sergey Naryshkin will head up a commission to improve Russia’s international image. In his copious spare time. The piling of new duties on a few key players is rather Putinesque and not particularly effective.

FOR YOUR DELECTATION. Volcano in the Kuriles from the ISS.

CAUCASIAN RUMOURS OF WARS. Another two weeks of bombs, assassinations and counter moves culminating in the attempted assassination of the President of Ingushetia. There’s no doubt in my mind that one of Putin’s biggest mistakes in the region was replacing Ruslan Aushev.

THE GREAT RUSSIAN MILITARY BUILDUP. The plan to build aircraft carriers has been dropped. Meanwhile this year the Russian Armed Forces added 10 tanks and 20 fighters to its roster. And 12 UAVs bought from Israel.

CSTO. The CSTO agreed to form a joint rapid reaction force involving troops from Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Russia, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Before we have the usual comments, there are two things to bear in mind. First, this was tried before in the 1990s and nothing much came of it and second, the threat in that part of the world is from jihadism which is supposed to be a major role for NATO.

DAIRY WARS. These appear to be over; I have no idea what was going on; here’s some speculation and summary of theories. Certainly, if Moscow was trying to bully Minsk, it doesn’t seem to have succeeded.

DEMOGRAPHICS. A reminder that not just Russia has a demographic problem: the population of Ukraine has dropped from 52 million in 1990 to 46 million. Population loss is a widespread post-communist phenomenon.

HISTORY. Latvia is reported to have suspended its commission calculating the cost of the Soviet occupation; saving money was the reason given.

MANAS. Washington and Bishkek have come to an agreement on the use of the base. Bishkek had three principal concerns: the money, the possibility of the base’s use in US operations other than Afghanistan and alleged crimes. The rent has tripled and there is about $100 million for other things; the base is now supposed to be only for “the transport of non-military goods of a commercial nature”. As to extraterritorial issues, nothing has been said. So, it appears that Bishkek has got most of what it wanted. Medvedev approves.

EU REPORT ON SOUTH OSSETIA WAR. Der Spiegel has a piece purporting to be based on leaks from the uncompleted EU report on South Ossetia war, It will not give any comfort to Tbilisi; especially to Saakashvili’s (postwar) claim that Russian forces entered South Ossetia before Georgian forces did. Meanwhile Russia’s CGS has said the number of troops in South Ossetia and Abkhazia will be reduced. Further indications of a disconnect between the EU and Washington on views of Georgia as is the PACE report below.

GEORGIA. Open violence began on the 15th in front of the Interior Ministry. The police claim they were trying to arrest some people and the protesters fought back. Perhaps, but reporters were beaten and so was an identified member of Georgia’s Public Defender’s office. Readers are invited to scroll through this site to see other actions by the authorities of intimidation, kompromat at al. My guess is that it will get more violent, not least of all because of the way the protesters feel that they are being ignored by the West. Although PACE has noticed “the growing number of attacks by unknown assailants on opposition activists and peaceful demonstrators”.

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)