ALARUMS PAST. In November, accepting an award, the well-known Russian media personality Leonid Parfyonov gave a speech excoriating the state of the news media in Russia: a culture in which reporters were a species of “state official” ever attentive to their “boss’s bosses”; one in which everyone understood there were stories that “that can be broadcast on television and those that cannot”. This attracted some attention together with mentions of reporters killed or harmed in Putin’s time. While there is no doubt a good deal of truth in what he said, charges of control or bias in what is and is not broadcast are not unknown elsewhere. He also intimated that Russian TV was being dumbed down. Well that’s hardly unique to Russia either. In my opinion, anybody who depends on the MSM in any country for his news is missing a lot and the New Media is winning everywhere. And in Russia, you can read criticisms similar to Parfyonov’s translated from foreign media on the Net if you want to. But the point is that, whatever mixture of truth and exaggeration there may have been in his observations, it seems that nothing has happened to him. He lives and thrives.

CORRUPTION. Two Moscow Oblast prosecutors suspected of protecting underground casinos have been put on the federal wanted list. This follows dismissals of several other senior officials on charges of having protected the illegal casinos. Three police officers were sentenced to prison terms for stealing substantial amounts of money from travellers at one of Moscow’s airports. Investigators have requested a warrant for the arrest of the former Bank of Moscow President. Medvedev has signed a law which greatly increases penalties in corruption cases. I haven’t the statistics, but it seems to me there are more and more cases involving higher-ups. Although, as I’ve said before, I don’t think the campaign will really bite until someone in an office near Medvedev’s or Putin’s is arrested.

THE HOLIDAY FORMERLY KNOWN AS MAY DAY. Since 1992 re-named Spring and Labour Day, saw lots of parades in Moscow that passed off quietly. The numbers were indicative, if not of actual support, then of organisational ability. United Russia got out 25K, KPRF 4.5K; Just Russia 3K; LDPR 0.7K and the liberal opposition 0.25K.

MISTRAL. Something has gone wrong with the negotiations. The former Russian negotiating team was dismissed – one man for “internal reasons” the other for re-appointment – and a new team is to be appointed. But the deal may fall through: Ruslan Puhkov thoroughly discusses the issue and possible obstacles to agreement here.

OPEN SKIES. A Canadian team is beginning flights over Russia. To tell the truth, I’d forgotten all about this. But, I suppose, since the demise of the CFE Treaty, it has it uses in strengthening transparency.

MARKELOV MURDER. A jury found the two defendants guilty “and not deserving leniency”. They were members of a super-nationalist group, Russkiy Obraz and Markelov seems to have been their target and Baburova just an unfortunate witness. Sentencing is expected shortly.

EMERGENCIES MINISTRY. Long-time readers will know that I admire this organisation and its leader Sergey Shoygu. It seems to be one of the most effective state structures in the country. It recently showed off some of its new kit for fighting fires. More evidence that Russia Inc’s energy money is not being wasted.

MANOEUVRINGS. Sergey Mironov, speaker of the Federation Council, may be recalled by the St Petersburg legislature. He was head of Just Russia until recently. He has been critical of St Petersburg and its Governor and there are likely enough votes there to unseat him. More grist for the speculation mill. Is this a move to make him and Just Russia more plausible as an opposition? As part of a move to run two Team candidates for president? Or St Petersburg wants its representative to say nice things and not that it’s very corrupt?

MISSILE DEFENCE. The commander of the Space Forces has outlined Moscow’s proposals for a future European missile defence network. They are the familiar ideas of sectors (with Russia’s “shield” covering Eastern Europe and the Black, Barents and Baltic Seas) and a joint data processing and command centre.

INTERNET. Medvedev met with “internet community representatives” last week to open a discussion about regulation. As a lawyer, he was most concerned about copyright. There was no hint of government control.

JIHADISM. It is reported that the leader of foreign jihadists in the North Caucasus was killed in Chechnya yesterday.

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)

COURT ACTIVITY. Lots of activity in the legal system. In old cases, the Moscow City Court announced that it would hear an appeal against the new jail term for Khodorkovsky and Lebedev on 17 May. This follows last week’s Supreme Court ruling that their pre-trial detention was not legal. Perhaps we will see a reduction in sentence or maybe even an acquittal. Valeriy Borshchev, of the presidential council on human rights, said that that body’s investigation showed that charges against Sergey Magnitskiy (who died in pre-trail detention 18 months ago) were fabricated. Meanwhile, in Switzerland, a money-laundering probe against a former Russian tax official has been opened at the request of the company with which he was associated. In on-going cases, two defendants accused of the murders of Stanislav Markelov and Anastasia Baburova in January 2009 have attempted suicide; the verdict was supposed to come out today. And in coming cases, the Russian Audit Chamber says it will sue the former Bank of Moscow president, Andrey Borodin, for US$1 billion (the sum he is supposed to have extracted from Moscow City). Medvedev’s campaign against “legal nihilism” presumably excludes pre-determined verdicts, fabricated evidence and requires punishment. We will see how these work out. Meanwhile Medvedev signed into law an extension of defence lawyers’ rights.

PAVLOVSKIY. Gleb Pavlovskiy, long time political fixer and advisor to the Kremlin, has severed (or been severed from) his connection with the Presidential Administration. He gave his reasons in an interview yesterday. He is disturbed by the fact that neither of the Duumvirate has announced his candidacy; this he says, is creating competition between their two “fan clubs”. Pavlovskiy makes no secret that he thinks Medvedev should be the “consolidated team” candidate and implies that his credibility was impaired by the opposition from Putin’s “fan club”. He, however, utterly denies a split between the two leaders: “There is no split and rumours about it are unfounded (неправомерны)”. The potential difficulty with the Duumvirate idea was never competition between the two principals but struggles between their apparats. When one of the two is up, so is his tail and vice versa. Putin, ever cautious, thinks it’s too early to announce – he wants to get the Duma elections over first – but Medvedev seems to be willing to announce earlier. Myself, I don’t see why it shouldn’t be announced earlier – it’s not as if Zhirinovskiy (running yet again – that’s every presidential election since the first twenty years ago) is likely to win otherwise. Or Zyuganov.

UNITED RUSSIA. There is a good deal of discussion going around that the pedestal party is slipping in the polls and may even lose its predominance. I’m less convinced: too much analysis seems to assume that the choice is between United Russia and the Archangel Michael’s party. Michael won’t be running but the Communists and Zhirinovskiy will and Russian electors will have the same old tired choice: more of the same or the obsolete past. Nonetheless, there is a good deal of struggling under the blanket and it is time for the Duumvirate to decide on its candidate and end the struggles between the “fan clubs”.

STATE AND ECONOMY. On Monday, addressing the boards of the Ministry of Economic Development and the Ministry of Finance, Putin said “We need to reduce the government’s unjustified presence in the economy and excessive amounts of government property creating more room for private initiative.” Is the Kommentariat going to start writing headscratchers on how Putin has now become the anti-Putin? His speech could have been given by Medvedev: reducing reliance on commodities, more innovation and modernisation. Same team, same plan, different phase.

POLICE. More senior police officers fired. No reason announced but, given their positions, peculation looks likely. And more appointments as seniors pass their tests.

LIBYA. As NATO’s operations in Libya inexorably expand, my suggestion that Russia may become the necessary intermediary comes a little closer: it is reported that Foreign Minister Lavrov was in discussion with the Libyan PM on a ceasefire. Lavrov also made it clear that Moscow will not support any new UN resolution that “stipulates further aggravation of the civil war and violence”. Putin remains scornful. Shades of NATO’s Kosovo adventure in which a limited and quick – or so it was expected – air operation went on for a couple of months with talk of introducing ground troops until Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari brought it to an end.

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)

PUTIN SPEECH. Today Putin gave his annual speech to the Duma reporting on the government’s activities and plans. He was generally upbeat about Russia’s recovery from the financial crisis. He returned to one of his key themes: “This country requires decades of steady, uninterrupted development. Without sudden radical changes in course or ill thought through experiments based so often in either unjustified economic liberalism, or, on the other hand, social demagogy. We need neither. Both will distract us from the general path of developing the country. And, of course, we should maintain civic and inter-ethnic peace, and put a stop to any attempt to cause our society to split and quarrel among itself”. To my mind stability is still the dominating theme for him (probably less so for Medvedev, given the difference in age and experience – Putin was 39 when the USSR fell apart, Medvedev 26. A significant difference I believe). He enumerated a number of targets for the future having to do with the economy. His observation (supporting his contention that Russia had done better than some others) that Portugal had asked for emergency financial assistance put me in mind of his remark a decade ago: rather than Russia struggling to catch up to Portugal, it may happen that it passes Russia, going in the other direction.

PEDESTAL PARTY. On Friday he gave another important speech to the leaders of United Russia. To my mind the most important point was his call for competition inside the monolith. What he appears to be suggesting is that UR candidates in the Duma elections (in December), rather than nominated from above, should be chosen through some sort of electoral process presumably resembling a US primary. The party leadership enthusiastically agreed with the proposal. An interesting idea: we will see how authentic it is in practice (as little as local bosses can get away with no doubt).

PARTY OF POPULAR FREEDOM. And yet another liberal party. Boris Nemtsov, Mikhail Kasyanov, Vladimir Ryzhkov and Vladimir Milov created the Party of Popular Freedom in December and it is beginning to stir. We’ve seen a lot of these come and go: usually they founder on the egos of the leader; each Russian liberal appears to believe that only he is fit to be leader of a “united” movement. Probably this attempt will fade away as so many others have but I was struck by an interview with Ryzhkov in which he sounded quite realistic (JRL/2011/65). He sees potential support in the range of 10% rather than some notion that a majority will support them. I’m also impressed that the website is in Russian – I always wondered what the target for sites like this really was. And it’s not the Kremlin that crushes these things. Ryzhkov named three problems of liberals in Russia: 1) “All previous parties were clubs comprising intellectuals, mostly from Moscow, who established these parties in accordance with their own ideas concerning what the people needed”; 2) “[The 1990s] compromised the democratic idea thoroughly… A good deal of Russians regard the words ‘democrat’ and ‘rascal’ as synonyms” and 3) “the eternal discord among democrats. Hence the lack of success.” So some difference. But the odds are poor. But one of these days Russian liberals will get together.

KHODORKOVSKIY. The Supreme Court has ruled that the detention of Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev before their second trial was not legal. There is, after all, a new law that says people charged with economic crimes should not be parked in the (often lethal) pre-trial detention prisons. We shall see what difference this will make to their situation but it is another sign that Russia is not entirely run out of one office.

JACKSON-VANIK. A lawsuit has been filed in the USA to require Obama to remove Russia from the restriction. They believe he has the necessary legal authority. US Presidents routinely promise to end it, but it never happens. Its retention is another of those things that makes suspicious Russians believe that it’s all a swindle.

CORRUPTION. There was a large anti-corruption demonstration in Moscow – several tens of thousands they say – on Sunday. It attracted Nashi and the Party of Popular Freedom as well as the newly-appeared “white aprons”. It looked rather un-spontaneous to me but may develop into something more popularly rooted.

PEOPLE POWER. An Arbitration Appeals Tribunal ruled that Rosneft must provide information on its 2009 board meetings to minority shareholder and blogger Aleksey Navalniy, who has consistently called for greater transparency in Russian business practices. Another small victory for the ordinary citizen.

 © Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)

ANOTHER MISQUOTATION IN THE ONLY STORY IN RUSSIA. RIA Novosti reports that Medvedev said that he and Putin would decide which runs for president soon. This assertion will, no doubt be endlessly repeated. But it’s not what he said. What he actually said was that he would decide fairly soon whether he would run for a second term: “I do not rule out the possibility of my running for a second term at the presidential elections. The decision will be taken very shortly”. (Eng Rus) A much better mindset than this sterile obsession with one or the other is the German concept of a Vorstand; a corporate governance team which is “expected to act collectively and collegiately”. Medvedev himself said about the two of them “We have friendly and very warm relations that have been shaping over the last two decades. It is a long time, in my life, too   you said I am not that old yet. I have known Mr Putin for almost half of my life, it is quite a lot, and we first met back in St Petersburg many-many years ago.” They’re a team. And they are in turn part of a team that has worked together quite effectively and harmoniously for some years. (I am obliged to Timothy Post for introducing me to the concept of a Vorstand.)

DEMOGRAPHICS. The situation continues to slowly improve. January’s births were down a bit from last year but deaths were down further and the net population loss was reduced from about 44,000 to about 39,000. Anatoly Karlin keeps an eye on the data and his conclusion is that, when you add in immigration, Russia’s population has stopped falling. Whether Karlin’s prediction (“I can confidently predict that the 2020 Census will show a population bigger than this year’s”) comes true or not, it’s high time to stop talking about Russia’s “demographic collapse.” The program started some years ago is clearly working. According to data from a 1987 statistics book I possess, the USSR gross death rate began to increase in the Khrushchev period and rose from 7.4 to 10.2 per thousand at the beginning of the Gorbachev period. The effects can be found throughout the post-communist world. Russia was not the worst affected and is making progress.

FSB NOT TOO HAPPY. First the Communications Minister said there were no plans to ban Skype, gmail, hotmail or the like after an FSB official had said he thought they should be. Then an “art collective” got an award for a rude graffito near the FSB headquarters in St Petersburg. Haven’t we been told endlessly that such things are not possible in Putin’s neo-KGB state?

CORRUPTION. Last week police raided the office of the Moscow Administration of the Federal Tax Service and home of its deputy head as part of investigation into the attempted theft of US$70 million by a St. Petersburg firm. A Moscow court has suspended the President of the Bank of Moscow and one of his deputies from the bank’s management for duration of a criminal probe into a large loan. The story is that money from the City’s budget made it into Baturina’s hands. It sounds more and more as if a web is being woven around Luzhkov and his wife.

FRIVOLITY. A flash mob blowing soap bubbles appeared in the Arbat on Sunday.

INCOMES. Putin and Medvedev have declared their incomes. Appropriately modest. Of course neither has had to spend much of his own money for years.

CARS. Russia’s economy is recovering – fairly successfully – after the global financial crisis with increases across the board. But, for some reason sales of cars and light commercial vehicles have really taken off: they are reported to be up 77% year-on-year in the first quarter.

GEORGIA. An Israeli armaments company is suing Tbilisi claiming non-payment for weapons sales made before Israel cut Georgia off after the Ossetia war. The company had sold UAVs and, in all likelihood, many or most have been destroyed already.

MINSK BOMB. A bomb in a Metro station in Minsk on Monday killed and wounded many. Yesterday Lukashenka claimed the crime solved and the perpetrators caught: three are said to have confessed and another two were arrested today. He intimates there is a connection with another explosion in July 2008. Seems a rather suspiciously quick solution.

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)

TWO HATS OR ONE? In 2001 Putin appointed Aleksey Miller CEO of Gazprom. Always a state controlled company, the previous CEO had run Gazprom as if he personally owned it. Putin explained Miller’s appointment: “The first task is to safeguard the state’s interests in this company, to collect everything which by rights belongs to the state, and to make the company’s activity and primarily its financial activity absolutely transparent to all shareholders, including minority shareholders”. As a further measure of control, one Dmitriy Medvedev, then Chief of the Presidential Administration, was made board chairman. This pattern was followed in many other state companies. Putin’s actions made sense to me at the time: it was important for the state to get control of what it owned; many feared Russia was collapsing and a notable characteristic of the Yeltsin period had been how poorly state interests had been “safeguarded”. But this had disadvantages: was Ivan Ivanovich a Minister or one of the chief officers of a wealthy company? He was supposed to regulate the company of which he was an officer; how did that work? Was the company a company, or a branch of the ministry? But the time for this is over: Medvedev has published a list of government officials who are to be removed from the boards of state companies: this is to be done by 1 July. More are expected. Note that transparency was the reason given for each plan: for Putin the transparency was for the government so it wouldn’t be looted; for Medvedev it is for investors. Not a dispute with Putin but the fact that different times require different ideas.

BUSINESS CLIMATE. Medvedev gave an important speech on modernisation and the business climate (“very bad, very bad”) in Magnitogorsk. As usual, corruption and bureaucracy were the chief obstacles. He laid out his demands. Work has started: Putin gave orders to cut the payroll tax from 1 Jan 2012 and to prepare a bill to require all officials and parliamentary members to declare expenses. The airport and airline sectors may be opened up. There has been some progress in one important area: see below.

SHADOW ECONOMY. The head of RosStat estimates Russia’s grey economy to amount to about 16% of GDP. This is way down from some previous estimates (45% in 1999). To put this figure into context (something almost never done in reporting about Russia) it is estimated that the grey economy in Europe ranges from 10% in the UK, 12% in Germany(!) and France, 20% in Spain and up to 40% in the eastern countries. Russia, now roughly at the European median (page 4), is hardly an outlier.

OPPOSITION. As I never tired of pointing out, the “liberal opposition”, when it paired with Limonov’s NatBols, accepted a contradiction into its core: whatever the former may have been, the latter had nothing to do with democracy or liberty. Now that Moscow City permits protests (but not Limonov’s), the contradiction has matured. All this played out on 31 March. Lyudmilla Alekseyeva’s group (she refuses to partner with Limonov now) was given a permit, three or four hundred appeared and it was all peaceful. Limonov, refused permission, held a rally anyway, a hundred or so showed up and there were arrests. Added to which, there is no point in holding protests against not being allowed to protest when you are allowed to protest. And so, the leaders announced that that would be the last “31” protest. But they say they will continue their demos. We’ll see: the protests, aided by the Western media’s resolute incuriosity about the NatBols, always seemed to be aimed at a Western audience. So who won? The protesters for carrying their point? Or the authorities for neutering them?

KHODORKOVSKIY. The judge’s aide who said in February that the verdict was fixed “from above” has resigned; her own decision she says.

LUZHKOVSHCHINA. Apparently in advance of his arrest, the President of the Bank of Moscow got out to London. The police are ready to charge him with illegally granting a US$444 million loan to Luzhkov’s wife.

ISS. With the US shuttle program ending, resupply is now up to Russia.

ELECTORAL CHANGES. Medvedev signed a law mandating greater use of party list voting in regions. He is trying, he says, to strengthen political parties. For a discussion of the party system see here (probably up tomorrow).

POLICE REFORM. As the results of the tests come in, Medvedev is making many appointments in the senior ranks of the police. Someone who follows this more closely than I should analyse them to see what changes are happening. We would want to see quite a few positional changes (>33%?) to believe that the effort is real.

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)

LIBYA. After Russia abstained on the UNSC resolution, allowing it to pass, the Foreign Ministry spokesman piously objected when the “no fly zone” enforcement began exactly as the US Defense Secretary had said it would two weeks before. Much as it may please some Russians to throw that fatuous word “disproportionate” back at the West, this is pretty hypocritical. Russia could have stopped it by veto. Meanwhile Medvedev has declared that Moscow is ready to mediate. That may happen yet: for all I know, NATO would still be fighting in Kosovo if Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari hadn’t stepped in.

SPLIT IN THE DUUMVIRATE? Is there a difference between Putin and Medvedev on Libya? Putin said that the resolution reminded him of “a medieval call to crusade”; shortly afterwards, Medvedev said that to talk of crusades was “unacceptable”. Certainly Medvedev seems more comfortable (or less uncomfortable) with the operation than Putin does (not surprisingly given the number of times Putin was burned by the West.). Although, when meeting with the US Defense Secretary, Medvedev used the words “indiscriminate use of air power”. Which it is not (but then, the Russians don’t have JDAMs. See below). When Medvedev (in Moscow) made his formal statement, was he aware that Putin (in the Udmurt Republic) had given his “personal opinion” about four hours earlier? On the other hand the word “Crusaders” is commonly used by jihadists to describe the West and Gaddafi is using it too. So, coincidence or direct rebuke? Putin (in Slovenia) has denied any split: “We have a president in Russia who directs foreign policy and there can not be a split”. Yesterday he (in Serbia) eased off a bit more. What this incident does show is that the assumption that Putin is the puppet master and Medvedev the puppet is naïve.

DEFENCE INDUSTRY. The battle continues. As Russia tries to catch up after a twenty-year pause in weapons design and production, the question arises as to whether what’s left of the old Soviet weapons industry is competitive. In a number of categories – UAVs, assault ships, light AFVs – the decision seems to be that it is not. But there are many more categories over which to argue. In a direct riposte to the Ground Forces Commander’s assertion that the T-90 MBT was inferior to, and more expensive than, the German Leopard, we have the counter: mathematical models that purport to show the reverse. (A personal aside: years ago I was in the combat simulation business and inputs and assumptions are pretty important in the models: one of the ones in this study apparently was to start the fight at 1500 metres. Which is a rather short range these days). Deputy PM Ivanov, however, has announced that Moscow will invest US$100 billion in the development of the defence industry in next decade. A lot of money and pride is at stake and the battle will intensify.

POLICE. Medvedev just dismissed another batch of high-ranking police officers; no reason was given. (Perhaps they failed their examination). As I suspected, the current situation is that all high officers have been formally suspended and are acting in their former ranks pending the performance review to be conducted by the Head of the Presidential Administration and approved by Medvedev.

CORRUPTION. Dmitriy Gayev, the former Moscow subway chief, has been charged with taking US$4 million of public funds: the story is that he illegally patented the electronic tickets that replaced the old tokens and peacefully trousered the patent payments.

ROADS. Last year a couple of guys drove from Moscow to Vladivostok recording all the way. Their films are worth a look: Russian roads are in much better shape than is commonly assumed: Russia has not been wasting its energy profits.

ARMENIA. On Thursday there was a substantial (10,000 people seems to be the consensus) anti-government protest in Yerevan. The former president, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, was one of the leaders. He has been protesting the results of the last election, claiming fraud, and claims that the present ruling group is corrupt and oppressive. Independent Armenia has not had a happy 20 years. Wars over Karabakh, the resulting blockade of the eastern rail route from the north (the western one is blocked by the Georgia-Abkhazia dispute); a small land link with Iran and a longer border with Turkey (and difficult relations there); the fear that Baku will use its oil revenues to attack. All these have made for a stagnant economy and rather hopeless forecasts. And high levels of emigration.

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)

ANNIVERSARY. Twenty years today the USSR held a referendum on whether to support the proposed New Union Treaty. The new setup would have given much more power to the republics; the word used to describe it then was “confederation”. I recall much brouhaha about how the referendum would be a bust and even some “experts” claiming that no one knew what they were voting on (despite the fact that all the iterations of the treaty – 3 as I remember – had been published in the Soviet press). In the event there was a decent turnout and a strong support for continuing in the new arrangement. This was the pre-Internet days and I have lost the detailed results but the overall results are here and more detailed here. (Both sources are disingenuous, taking their numbers not from the whole population of potential voters but from those who actually did vote; in several areas not voting was voting “no”). The three Baltic SSRs, the Moldavian, Georgian and Armenian SSRs did not hold votes, on the grounds that they had not legally been incorporated into the USSR in the first place. But the Abkhaz ASSR voted by a small margin to stay in. The Chechen-Ingush ASSR voted to get out as did the Nakhichevan ASSR (the last I suspect being part of Heydar Aliyev’s manoeuvring to get to Baku). So, some hints of the future were given. The proposed signing date was set for 20 August but the coup attempt on the 19th (not unconnected of course) intervened. In the event the leaders of the Ukrainian and Belarussian SSRs and the RSFSR (55.7% of whose registered voters had voted “yes”) simply declared the end of the USSR in December (the three Baltics had been let go in September in what turned out to be effectively the last official act of the USSR). And that was that. I still believe that the bulk of the USSR could have transformed into the New Union; if so, a lot of suffering would have been avoided. Three quotations are instructive: “The recent dramatic events [ie the coup attempt] showed that our republic is absolutely unprotected… ” (Kravchuk 1991); “if Ukraine really will not be in the Union, I cannot imagine such a Union” (Yeltsin 1991); “I believed that Ukraine is so rich that it provided for the entire [Soviet] Union” (Kuchma 1993). So Ukraine killed the New Union on the expectation that it would become immediately rich by stopping the imagined drain from the others on its “rich” economy. Ah well, divorce in haste, repent at leisure: a recent poll from Ukraine says half the population now regrets the breakup. I suspect that a lot of former Soviets do too. Indeed it would be very interesting to see polls from others of the fifteen; especially from those that were very glad to get out twenty years ago. But it’s too late, it’s gone.

EMERGENCIES MINISTRY. Speaking of 1991, that is the year that Sergey Shoygu was appointed head of the Ministry. And he still is. For twenty years he has consistently ranked very high in popularity and trust. And for good reason. I have noticed in many international disasters that the Ministry is quick to act and regularly one of the first responders. And so it has with the Japanese disaster: the first rescue teams started work in Sendai Tuesday and more are on the way together with the first load of emergency supplies. Moscow has also offered fire fighting expertise at the damaged reactors. A highly skilled and efficient organisation that does not receive the attention that it should, obsessed as the Kommentariat is with Russian failures, malfeasance and Kremlinology.

ELECTIONS. As usual United Russia dominated in Sunday’s local elections. Well, if you were a Russian, would you vote for Zhirinovskiy? the Communists? for any of the latest dozen quarrelling “liberal” parties? What do they have to offer?

WEAPONS PRODUCTION. The Russian Armed Forces are re-equipping themselves and the effort is revealing problems in what is left of the former Soviet weapons industry. I was interested to see that the Ground Forces head told the Federation Council that Russian ground weapons were below NATO and Chinese standards and over-priced as well. Here is a rather gloomy accounting of the latest armaments program about half way through its term. Not unconnected with this is the announcement that Moscow is in talks with France to buy light armoured vehicles for the border guards.

UMAROV. The UNSC has put Doku Umarov on its terrorist list. High time.

LIBYA. The Foreign Minister has just said that the Arab countries should take the lead in formulating the international response to the situation in Libya and that Moscow will base its policy on their views.

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)

US-RUSSIA. US Vice President Biden is in Moscow. He says that Russia’ accession to the WTO is a top priority, (although hinted that it depended on Russia’s human rights record) and may have made approving noises about ending the absurdly out-of-date Jackson Vanik Amendment. He reportedly told Putin that visa-free travel between Russia and the US was “a good idea”. Well, we’ll see. As to the WTO, it is quite absurd that Russia is not a member. During the time Russia has spent trying to get into it, Oman, Côte d’Ivoire, China, Cuba, Zimbabwe and others have entered. No problems with “human rights” there apparently. Russians could be forgiven for thinking that the WTO is not the economic organisation that it purports to be but really a political organisation. Members appear to have a quasi-veto and Tbilisi is quite happy to use its. A Russian official claims that Biden said that Washington had tried to talk Tbilisi out of opposing Russian membership. But I wonder how much influence Washington has on Tbilisi these days over what is the only pressure point on Moscow that Saakashvili has.

AFGHANISTAN SUPPLY. With good timing, Medvedev signed the law ratifying the agreement with Washington on military transit to Afghanistan via Russia. Another attack on a NATO fuel convoy in Pakistan a couple of weeks ago.

CORRUPTION. Two significant cases this week. Yesterday the Duma sanctioned the arrest of a Deputy from the LDPR. He is accused of significant fraud and embezzlement connected with construction in Moscow. The Duma stripped him of his immunity in November – the fourth Deputy to have lost it. Criminal proceedings were instituted in Primorskiy Kray in another embezzlement case. The suspect is the former director of a plant and the charge is that he expropriated money Japan had contributed three years ago to a program for the safe disposal of nuclear submarines.

THE THIRD TURN. Something that I’m sure would not have happened a couple of years ago is that a Russian company won the tender to operate the container terminal at the port of Tallinn Port beating out nine other bidders including an Estonian firm.

CHECHNYA. On Saturday, with Medvedev’s nomination, Ramzan Kadyrov was unanimously confirmed for another 5-year term as head of Chechnya by its parliament. Whether it likes it or not, Moscow is pretty well stuck with him. I have long been of the opinion that the people now running Chechnya, mostly people who fought Moscow in the first war, have learned that de jure independence is too costly in blood and risks the danger of a takeover of Chechnya by international jihadism. So they have decided to game Moscow with effusive protestations of loyalty and improbable voting results for the pedestal party while inching their way towards de facto independence. If this is true, there isn’t much Moscow can do about it.

LIBYA. Medvedev signed on to the UN sanctions package. It remains opposed to international intervention. There are, I believe two principal reasons for its opposition. Moscow questions the wisdom of intervention in something that grows messier by the day, especially when it is encouraged by hyperbolic reporting that may not prove correct in the end. A bit of intervention can easily become a lot of intervention. The other reason is that Moscow is highly suspicious of the “international community”, or some part of it, making decisions about what regime is acceptable and what is not. It remembers the Kosovo intervention (speaking of a “little” turning into a “lot” and hyperbolic reporting) and fears the same could be applied to it. The current Russian government prefers the international status quo.

© Patrick Armstrong, Ottawa, Canada

POLICE REFORM. The new law took effect on Tuesday (see here for a discussion of its provisions). As if in celebration, Medvedev dismissed seven high ranking police officers from around the country. And high-ranking they are indeed. No reasons were given. He had a meeting with Interior Minister Nurgaliyev and signed a number of decrees moving the effort forward. Something I have often wondered about is how one gets from here (an institution with a culture of corruption and incompetence) to there (something much better). It appears (but the wording of his instructions to Nurgaliyev is not clear and this is my best guess of what Medvedev told him) that all members of the present force (“militia”) will be, as it were, passed through a sieve and either dismissed or allowed to join the new force (“police”). Senior officers will be examined by the Head of the Presidential Administration, Sergey Naryshkin, and approved by Medvedev. So, it would appear that everyone’s job is at risk. The examinations are to be complete by 1 June which, only two months away, seems an unrealistically early date. Given the existing corruption as well as the powerful resistance all bureaucracies present to change that threatens their “corporate will”, this is a very tall order and certainly all the crooks and incompetents will not be weeded out by then. But one assumes that if someone slips through the sieve by bribing his superior or by lying and is caught, he will be subject to instant dismissal. Those who are interested in reforming intransigent and locked-in bureaucracies run mad, should watch this experiment carefully.

MISSILE DEFENCE. Foreign Minister Lavrov has called for a formal agreement that NATO and Russia will not target each other with their defence systems; he says Moscow is willing to sign. Such a formal declaration – which is supposed to be NATO’s official policy anyway – will go some of the distance to resolve differences between the two. I repeat that Moscow has no reason to trust any informal declaration from NATO.

GOVERNORS. In January Medvedev said that he had already replaced one third of the regional heads: “I think it is a normal, objective practice… And all governors should understand that they have two, three terms at the most to prove themselves… Secondly, people need to understand that they can’t be in office forever.” Two more have just gone – Kamchatka Oblast and the Karachay-Cherkess Republic. This too is part of “modernisation”.

“PUTIN’S PALACE”. So-called. A medium sized flap over this monster house (“a billion dollars”) allegedly being built for Putin. Turns out it’s a hotel and conference centre and it has just been bought by a Russian plutocrat. But, no doubt, the anti-Putinites will say this is just a cover story: for them everything visible in Russia is a manipulated illusion covering what’s really happening. Oddly enough, they alone have penetrated the deception and uncovered the Truth.

PEOPLE POWER. The Blue Buckets are back in their campaign against “blue lights”. Their latest stunt is handing out stickers for cars that read “I only give way to 01, 02, 03,” (the emergency numbers for police, fire and ambulance services). The Moscow police, as usual, don’t know how to react to these clever campaigns.

RETURN. Last week four families of Old Believers (23 people) returned to Russia from Bolivia. They are to be given land in Primorskiy Kray.

GORBACHEV. Was 80 yesterday and Medvedev awarded him the Order of St Andrew. I invite you all to consider what the world would look like today had Viktor Grishin been chose as GenSek in 1985, as he might have been. Grishin died in 1992. Incidentally, in contrast with the way Yeltsin treated Gorbachev, the Duumvirate is much more respectful.

BUSHEHR. On 26 February Iran announced that it was unloading the fuel from the reactor for “technical reasons”; on Tuesday another spokesman said fuel was not being unloaded. The same day RosAtom (which would be doing the work) said it was being unloaded because of the possibility that metal particles could get into the machinery. The Iranian nuclear program is not going well and common speculation centres on the Stuxnet virus. The story is very murky and it will likely be years – if ever – before we find out what happened but there are those who see a Russian connection.

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)

REVOLUTIONS. The Arab Revolution is making a few people (Gorbachev for one) speculate about the possibility of a similar rising in Russia. Speculation about a Russian “Arab scenario” is little more than wishful thinking from a negligible opposition that agrees on almost nothing. The “Arab revolution” is sui generis: rulers-for-life enriching their circle while impoverishing everyone else and populations in which half are under 30 or 25 with little to hope for. And some outside advice. This is not Russia: simply stated, the necessary conditions are not there. The Duumvirate remains popular and for good reason: Russians can see and touch the improvement in their situation over the past decade. If in 15-20 years the same people were on top still taking about police reform, cooruption and modernisation that would be a different story. However, some of the other post Soviet states, especially those with rulers-for-life, could develop that way. One place to keep an eye on is Georgia: if Saakashvili contrives to stay in power (as he seems to be trying) and we have another few years of stagnation and blaming everything on Russia, it could happen there – at least some of the opposition says so.

DEMOGRAPHICS. Generally speaking the government’s efforts to correct the demographic decline by working at each end of the problem – ie birth and death rates – is showing good effects. Anatoly Karlin follows developments in greater detail than I; here is his latest entry. Population decline was never an exclusive Russian problem – most of the former communist countries had similar numbers (see below for one of the contributing factors) – and Russia is starting to pull away from its neighbours. The Health Minister unveiled a new program for 2011-2015 which aims to keep the population at least at the current level.

BOOZE. Figures from the WHO claim that Russia ranks fourth highest in the world in alcohol consumption (interactive data by regions here – this site is excellent for statistics, by the way). Interestingly, nine of the top ten on the list enjoyed the blessings of communism. That is a little too coincidental.

CORRUPTION. The push against illegal gambling in Moscow continues: the police chief claims that 388 illegal casinos have been shut down in the last six weeks. And, naturally, that’s not the only involvement of the legal authorities: the Moscow Oblast prosecutor and a number of other officials have been suspended during the investigation. Bribery is suspected.

DISMISSAL. Medvedev has dismissed the FSB deputy head Vyacheslav Ushakov at the request, we are told, of the FSB head. “Shortcomings in his work and code of ethics violations” were the reasons given. I’m sure there’s more to the story but we may never hear it.

TRIALS. The Governor of Magadan was murdered in 2002 and four people have just been sentenced. Some of this rather excessive delay is due to the fact that the two principals had to first be extradited from Spain. The trial for the murders of lawyer Stanislav Markelov and reporter Anastasia Baburova has begun. I wonder if the Kommentariat will take notice of that because it goes against its meme that Putin is killing reporters and nothing is done about it.

KHODORKOVSKIY VERDICT. Veniamin Yakovlev, adviser to Medvedev for justice, says he is ashamed to hear the allegation that the verdict was dictated to the judge from on high and that the allegation must be investigated. I haven’t the faintest idea what this means: a private opinion? (does a Presidential advisor of six years standing have private opinions that he publicly expresses)? A hint that the verdict could be overturned? That a really serious investigation of the whole Khodorkovskiy case will be conducted? That a better cover-up will be contrived? His retirement speech? Stay tuned.

INVESTMENT. General Motors announced that it intends to double output at its St Petersburg plant in 2011.

GAMSAKHURDIA. A Georgian Parliamentary Commission, headed by his son Konstantin, has concluded that Zviad Gamsakhurdia could not have committed suicide in 1993 as reported (I have always called it an “assisted suicide”). Gamsakhurdia was the author of much of Georgia’s present problems and was overthrown by a coup which brought Shevardnadze in to be its “beard”.

MANAS AIRPORT. It has just been announced that a Russian-Kyrgyz JV has been created to supply jet fuel to Manas airbase. Given the scandals associated with the last supplier, its alleged connections to the Bakiyev regime and Otunbayeva’s criticisms of its present behaviour, I expect that this consortium will get the contract.

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)