ELECTION BET. I’ve put mine down: Medvedev will run, Putin will not, there may be a second Team candidate (ie one from United Russia and one from Just Russia).

PUTIN Q&A. Another session worth reading. He was in Magnitogorsk to open a new cold rolling complex but, as usual, answered all the questions thrown at him with his customary frankness and mastery of detail. As I have noticed on several occasions lately, he seems to be in a reflective mood and is ready to speak about what he believes he accomplished (stability again: “Who is going to invest in a country that is always shaking like a leaf?”). Several times lately he has been looking back in detail but forward in generalities. Is this a (tiny, I agree) indication that he is contemplating retirement?

LEGAL ACTIVITY. Quite a lot since my last Sitrep. Contractor arrested for swindling the Navy (and, by the way, a rather easily detected swindle). Four people in the North Caucasus arrested as they were preparing a bomb attack on Moscow. Yet another RosAtom executive arrested on charges of embezzlement. Another traffic cop arrested in another “blue light” affair. Three police sentenced for abuse of office. Criminal investigation into a St Petersburg shipyard. Charges laid in the Bulgaria sinking. Investigation into a “blue light” death re-opened. Extreme nationalist sentenced. Two charged in a laser blinding case (there have been a spate of these lately). A man arrested for a multiple murder. And, in the Magnitskiy case, charges have been laid and the investigation re-opened. That’s what I’ve noticed in three weeks – I wouldn’t say that nothing is being done about corruption and malfeasance.

LIBERALS. Has a “liberal” party with legs finally appeared in Russia? I refer to Right Cause (Правое дело). Founded in 2008 out of SPS and a couple of others, it has succeeded in electing some people. Most importantly it survived the preposterously complicated (and easily manipulated) registration process and thus is ready to go. The billionaire businessman Mikhail Prokhorov heads it and has said that he will devote his efforts to the future of the party. But the curse of Russian “liberals” is that they refuse to unite (that is, each is ready as long as he’s the boss) and hence there are innumerable and evanescent “taxi parties”. I believe that there is an electorate of 10% or so ready to support a viable “liberal” party and this might be the one.

POLICE REFORM. The Interior Minister says that over 90% of the police rank-and-file passed their performance review. That is not convincing – a third of the top people were let go and while I know that “a fish rots from the head” the rot doesn’t stop at the head. The job will have to be done again.

PAY PAL. It is reported that the enterprise is planning to start operations in Russia soon. I recall flying out to Vladivostok in 1995 carrying thousands of dollars in cash to pay our people out there: there was almost no other way to get money to them. This is a remarkable step and says much about Internet penetration, credit and banking institutions, changes in mentality and so forth. It also is a vote of confidence in Russia.

STUNTS. First we had “Putin’s Army” and now we have “Medvedev Girls”. A feeble example of civil society I suppose but mostly a publicity stunt as “Obama Girl” turned out to be.

GOOD NEWS FOR UKRAINE. Ukraine is thought to have significant reserves of oil and gas shale. It was announced that Royal Dutch Shell may make a significant investment in exploration. If this pans out, it will help reduce dependence on Russia.

QUADRIGA AWARD. The huffing and puffing worked and the award was rescinded. Pretty amateur performance.

US SENATE. One would think that American Senators had a pretty full schedule these days. Nonetheless they found time to pass a resolution “calling upon Russia to remove its occupying forces from Abkhazia and South Ossetia”. Perhaps a Senator should go to one of these places and ask the locals what they think about the Russian troops and why they want them to stay. Once again, no consideration of the Abkhazian or Ossetian point of view.

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)

MILITARY. There may be more to last week’s retirements of three generals. One reporter suggests that their retirement has a connection with what he says are several cases of convicted officers being promoted. He has learned that the Presidential Administration has “frozen” their resignations and will be interviewing them to ascertain why “young, promising leaders are retiring from the army”. Report in English here. On the procurement problem – and the growing conviction that a lot of Russian-made weaponry is more expensive than it should be – a Deputy Defence Minister reports that overpricing is caused by an excessive number of subcontractors which, he said, can lead to sudden and unexplained price drops when the initial bid is challenged. It rather sounds as if this is a polite way of saying that many people are “wetting their beaks”.

“AGAINST ALL”. Russian ballots used to have an entry “Against All” and “Against All” could win and occasionally did. In that case, new election with new candidates. The provision was abolished in 2006 but Sergey Mironov, the leader of Just Russia, has introduced a bill to the Duma to bring it back. An interesting provision that very few countries dare to have because it might lead to unflattering discoveries. I suspect that the real reason Mironov made the proposal was to distinguish his party from United Russia. Whether it passes or is voted down, he will achieve that aim.

STOLYPIN. I have always had the suspicion that it is Putin’s dream to be considered a second and successful Piotr Stolypin and I have noticed the occasional reference to him in his speeches over the years. He has “suggested” government officials might “like” to contribute to a statue of Stolypin to commemorate his 150th birthday. I’ll bet all the officials would “like to” and that the statue appears.

INFRASTRUCTURE. There have been a couple of plane crashes lately and the sinking of a cruise boat on the Volga. Russian infrastructure is rather old and there is some concern. But new things are appearing: roads, hospitals, trains, farm equipment and so on. While a lot of it is foreign-made, it is undeniably new. But it’s a race.

Space. With the launch of the Atlantis, the USA has finished the Space Shuttle program. This leaves the space launch field pretty much to Russia. And to make the point, a Soyuz just launched six US satellites. Not a state of affairs to have been expected in 1961.

QUADRIGA AWARD. Putin is one of the winners {“for his contribution to the stability and reliability of German-Russian relations” we are told). This has set off the usual huffing and puffing.

GEORGIA. Tbilisi has announced the arrest of three photographers on charges of spying for – of course – Russia. One of them is Saakashvili’s personal photographer. The case has been declared secret and no information is allowed out except what the regime chooses to say. Many Georgians have lost their confidence in what the government says and the Coalition for Media Advocacy has protested the secrecy of the case and the Public Defender also wants more evidence. It would appear that their “crime” was photographing the breakup of the protest on 26 May or perhaps selling photos to Russian news outlets. Anyone who believes anything official Tbilisi says is rather naïve. More scepticism about Saakashvili’s periodic discovery of plots from Dmitry Babich here. Meanwhile six opposition parties have united to form the Free Choice coalition. I find it instructive that two party leaders and the founders of one of the six held office under Saakashvili and two of the remaining three parties were former allies of his party. Saakashvili’s Western claque is oblivious to the fact that the people who know him best have, one by one, gone into opposition. (Why do I go on about Saakashvili? you may ask. It is because Georgia has been used for years as a stick with which to beat Russia. Western sources have displayed much credulity. Perhaps not so much any more though.).

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)

GRAIN EXPORTS. When I was in Russia in the early 1990s I visited several farms. In my travels I don’t recall ever seeing a field that was being used for anything except grazing for a scrawny cow or two. I spoke to Russians and Westerners, more knowledgeable than I, who had seen farms; everyone agreed that the situation was, in a word, hopeless. At that time it was said that Russia imported half its food. Something has happened. Last year, with the bad summer, Russia halted grain exports and the world price went up. Exports have just been resumed (perhaps 15 million tonnes out of a total harvest expected to be about 85) and prices went down. Somehow the desperate situation of the 1990s has turned around and Russia is an important grain exporter for the first time since when? a century ago? In the 1990s, the idea of Russia becoming an major food exporter would have been utterly unimaginable. I am not aware of any coverage of this and I would love to see some. Private farming? A restructuring of the decayed remnants of state and collective farms? New land? What? Away from the everlasting barren speculation of neo-Kremlinology there are real stories to cover.

MILITARY. In addition to the problems of modernising equipment, improving its command and control and other matters requisite to becoming modern, the Russian Armed Forces are plagued with three endemic scandals. Military procurement, by many accounts, is a feeding frenzy for corruption. Yesterday, Medvedev gave Defence Minister Serdyukov three days to report on the state of the defence procurement order for this year. Serdyukov is a money man and was brought in to get a grip on where it goes. Second is the pain (and disagreements) of reform: it is reported that “several influential members” of the high command have resigned over implementation of reforms (or maybe not). Added to this is confusion about the end point. For example, the aircraft carrier dream refuses to die: last week the head of the United Shipbuilding Corporation said Russia would get its first nuclear powered carrier by 2023; three days later Serdyukov said there were no plans to build carriers. And, completing the trio, two officers have been charged with extorting money from their subordinates. Serdyukov has just promised to create a special military police department to eradicate this sort of thing as well as bullying. Gradually the searchlight is turning to the military. In 2003 Putin said “The army in Russia, as I have said many times, should be small in size, compact but effective, ready for battle, and provided with modern equipment.” Eight years on, it is far from that goal. Indeed, I often wonder whether it is possible to reform a Soviet-pattern, mass-conscript, big-war army. Perhaps they should start all over again. Peter had to.

CORRUPTION. An investigation has uncovered 30 criminal groups engaged in car theft. The investigators said that their primary focus was catching police and they did: 160 policemen were involved in 12 of the groups.

ECONOMIC CRIMES. Medvedev has smiled upon the idea of an amnesty for economic crimes. Preparatory study is said to be underway.

MAGNITSKIY. The Investigative Committee has reported that Sergey Magnitskiy died in prison from lack of medical care; this is not news but the announcement of prosecutions to follow may be. Another inquiry suggested he may have been beaten to death. There were dismissals at the time but Medvedev’s comment that “it seems… there really was some crime committed” suggests that more serious charges may be laid eventually.

BELARUS. On Friday Lukashenka pledged to restore stability to Belarus: “In the next few months we will completely stabilise the situation… Belarus has not been forced into a corner…as some would like.” A rather stunning admission from someone whose main campaign platform since he began in 1994 would have been “peaceful Belarus”. As the economy gently moves towards the end of its economic and financial possibilities, there are now regular demonstrations and arrests.

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)

THE NEXT PHASE. Medvedev laid out to the government budget policy for the next three years. The key words are: modernise, competitive, growth, private initiative, innovation, effective, high quality, privatising, transparency, decentralisation. A working group on decentralising power has been set up. Read the speech, don’t read about it. I saw this coming four years ago (Sitrep 20061109: “Putin can name his successor and, one assumes, that if he names only one, that one will be as much in his mould as he can ensure. But that successor will have to confront the task of lifting growth to the next level, making it self-sustaining and not dependent on the world price of oil. The only way to do this is to allow it to happen: the government can encourage, it can create conditions, but it cannot do the lifting itself; only individual Russians can push economic growth to the next level. And here he will run into one of Putin’s legacies, which is Putin’s tendency, when there is a problem, to centralise control into an office next to his. But Russia is too big, too diverse and too untidy to be neatly run from the big corner office in the Kremlin. Putin’s successor will have to start to decentralise or watch Russia’s economic takeoff sag back onto the runway”). All this, Phase II of The Plan, was delayed a year or so by two unexpected events: the war in Ossetia and the international financial crisis.

DUMA BARRIER. Proportional representation is used by many countries in many variations. Russia has been through some: originally the Duma was half party list and half individual candidacies, then it became full party list. The next variation is the size of the percentage of total vote that a party has to gain to get members into parliament. The percentage varies around the world (and what is the “correct” number anyway?); originally in Russia it was 5% but was then put up to 7%. I believed that 7% was too high, especially if the aim was to force the growth of parties (as it was said to have been). Medvedev has just sent a draft law to the Duma to lower it back to 5%. While this is another loosening of things, it is worth noting that even if it had been 5% in the last election there would have been no difference: it would have had to have been 2% for the next party to get in.

POLICE REFORM. On Monday it was announced that police will be tested on lie detectors as part of the re-certifying process of transforming from “militia” to “police”. This is, of course, entirely “voluntary” – if they want to be re-hired into the police force, that is. And, not unconnected, 11 prison officials have been disciplined for violations of prisoners’ rights at one of Moscow’s nastier prisons.

FEDERATION COUNCIL. With Mironov’s translation to the Duma, the post of Speaker is open. Valentina Matviyenko, Governor (mayor) of St Petersburg, has been persuaded to run. She has to get a seat on the St Petersburg legislature first and then it seems that everything is prepared and she should be Speaker by the end of August. Which opens up the Governor’s job. More pre-election manoeuvrings?

ENERGY WARS. In a nutshell, neither Belarus nor Ukraine can afford to pay the price. The Russian electricity export agency cut off electricity to Belarus (about 12% of its total consumption) because of failure to pay a mere US$43 million. Minsk paid up today but that’s symptomatic. The gas price to Ukraine is set at 70% of the European price which, in turn, is tied to oil prices; they are rising. Currently Ukraine pays about US$300 per thousand cubic metres and that will likely go up to about US$400 by the end of the year. Kiev is trying to re-negotiate the price and Putin, on a “private” visit to Crimea, will be meeting Yanukovych, no doubt to talk about this. It is not in Moscow’s interest to bankrupt either but neither is it to carry customers who can’t pay.

USD. One of Medvedev’s advisors speculates that the Central Bank of Russia will cut the share of US dollars in its international reserves. Can’t think they’ll replace them with Euros or Yen: is this Canada’s big moment?

KARABAKH. Medvedev has hosted talks between the Armenian and Azerbaijanian Presidents on Karabakh. I am not sanguine for reasons here (probably posted tomorrow). Not least of which is that if Stepanakert is not represented, what can anyone expect? It won its war and isn’t ready to have someone else give anything away.

GEORGIA. The regime has decided that Irakli Okruashvili – formerly Saakashvili’s Defence Minister (and a rather aggressive one at that) – has formed an “illegal armed group”. Arrests have been made. Meanwhile, Shevardnadze says it would be “wise” for Tbilisi to recognise Abkhazia’s independence: “It’s clear Abkhazia can’t be a normal region of Georgia any longer”. “Not serious” says Saakashvili. Will Shevardnadze’s peaceful retirement suddenly end?

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)

MODERNISATION. On Friday Medvedev made a speech about modernisation to the St Petersburg Economic Forum. Those who believe that this program has already failed, or that the only question in Russia is the imaginary Medvedev-Putin feud/power struggle won’t be interested but it’s worth reading. Generalities for the most part, but he is the President and he was giving a strategic message. A message we are now familiar with: “Modernisation is the only way to address the many issues before us”; that progress is real but still small: “They are small fruits, but they are there.” As to state control of certain sectors: “I want to state loud and clear here that we are not building state capitalism. Yes, there was a point in our development when we increased the state’s share in the economy, but this was an unavoidable step and in many ways necessary in order to stabilise the situation after the chaos of the 1990s, and re-establish basic order. That avenue has exhausted its potential now… [he describes problems with state control: state interests always dominate, the greater possibility of corruption and poor management] … This economic model jeopardises the country’s future. It is not my choice. My choice is different. Private business and private investment should dominate in the Russian economy. The state must protect the choice and assets of those who consciously decide to risk their money and reputation. We need to give them the right to make mistakes, and opportunities for drive and development.” As to specifics he spoke of more judicial independence and, as ever, corruption. He does understand what must be done as well as how difficult it will be. But he is right – as Belarus is showing – that there is no alternative. And, I again stress that this is the “Putin program” too: there was much use of “modern” in his 2005 and 2007 Federal Assembly addresses; “it’s no longer possible to survive and be competitive without modernisation” (2010). And so on. All part of The Plan.

THE THIRD TURN. Eugene Ivanov points out a decline – but not absence – of hostile coverage about Russia in some of the Western MSM recently. Too early, of course, to draw big conclusions, but one cannot shout that the Russians are coming – the “gas weapon”, conquering Georgia, subverting Estonia etc etc – forever without some evidence that it is happening.

THE ONLY STORY. One of his aides says Medvedev will make his announcement in the autumn. I believe that there is a difference of opinion in the Duumvirate on the timing: Putin – ever cautious – wants to get the Duma elections out of the way; Medvedev wants to announce earlier. Thus “the autumn” may be the compromise. I expect Medvedev to say he will and Putin to say he won’t.

MISTRAL. The deal is done; as expected, two will be built in France and two later in Russia. The Russian side claims to have got all the technology it wanted.

PERSONNEL CHANGE. More changes in the police senior ranks. And, I have heard, more firings of senior military officers for unstated reasons.

ELECTIONS. There is a wide-spread assumption that United Russia’s domination is fraudulent (although I can’t recall anyone actually having the foolishness to claim that, otherwise, some other party would dominate). Anatoly Karlin takes the effort to move past assumptions to evidence to show that the results accord with opinion polls. But, for so much Russia coverage, it’s all “decision-based evidence making”.

CORRUPTION. Yuriy Chayka, the Prosecutor General (just re-confirmed) says that more than 40,000 corruption cases were begun in 2010: “We consider it progress”. Somewhat more than a drop in the bucket I would say.

BELARUS. The EU, which is in another anti-Belarus phase, has tightened sanctions. (For a brief moment Belarus was another victim of the Russian “energy weapon”).There have been protests, aided by social media, against the economic situation and it is said, across the country, 450 arrests. I believe that Belarus’s avoidance of economic reality is coming to an end but I expect it will be some time yet before the full consequences hit. One of the keys to how long Lukashenka can keep his Soviet-lite economy running is energy costs and here Belarus is dependent on Russia. But Moscow, years ago, made the decision to move prices for its ex-Soviet customers up to the Western Europe level, step-by-step. And, the fact is that cheap energy prices were a drag on these countries’ ability to modernise their economies. So Russia’s 15-year cheap prices were probably not doing them any favours. Both Belarus and Ukraine are experiencing this reality today.

© Patrick Armstrong, Ottawa, Canada

POLICE REFORM. According to the Minister, one third of the top police officers did not survive the screening and have been dismissed – 119 of 335. That is not a trivial percentage and to my mind shows the effort is real. The idea was that the senior officers would be vetted by the Presidential Administration and juniors by the seniors – perhaps it would have been smarter to wait until the seniors’ vetting was over before beginning the juniors. But the effort isn’t over yet.

CORRUPTION. It is almost a cliché in certain circles that Medvedev’s struggle against corruption has failed. Readers are invited, however, to consider this account of a successful effort to stop (corrupt) markups in medical equipment prices. That’s not been a failure. And, by the way, as to the other cliché that anti-corruption is Medvedev’s thing (and by implication not Putin’s), here’s Putin three years ago: asked “Which of Russia’s problems have you found the most wearying and difficult to resolve over these last eight years?”, he answered “Corruption”. Same program, different phase.

MILITARY CORRUPTION. Is a subject that is coming over the horizon. A recent assessment put the Defence Ministry at the top of the corruption list of government structures. This piece explains why and how: huge vague budget holes combined with “national security” make procurement programs into a corruption playground. So, what is to be done? Attempts for some years to get a grip on book-keeping do not seem to have worked. From time to time arrests are made but, if the problem is as widespread and systemic as it is thought to be, it will take many more arrests. I wonder if the “combing” process applied to the police will be done here.

LEGAL REFORM. Last week Medvedev submitted Criminal Code amendments to the Duma. They are aimed at moderating the process. Courts will be able to soften charges in certain cases and take mitigating circumstances into account. Sentencing will also be softened. As usual this will take time to take effect.

PRESUMPTION OF FAILURE. All the above are part of Medvedev’s attempt to reduce “legal nihilism”. In this connection I highly recommend this piece by Eugene Ivanov which persuasively argues that the campaign is having more effect than conventional wisdom thinks. I reiterate: relying on Western coverage of Russia will leave you very poorly informed indeed.

PRIVATISATIONS. It is policy to sell off some of the state assets acquired in the Putin era and both Medvedev and one of his staffers have called for speeding up the process. Apart from the fact that government control – arguably a good idea ten years ago when outright disintegration of the Russian state was a common fear – is now unnecessary, corruption is always easier when you start inside the front door of a large company.

MIRONOV. He has completed his move from the upper to the lower house, taking a seat vacated for him in the Duma last week and being elected leader of the Just Russia (Справедливая Россия) bloc this week. I can’t shake the suspicion that this is all manoeuvring to establish him as a presidential candidate running on the Just Russia ticket. From that bottomless well of talent in St Petersburg, he could be considered a member of The Team but at a bit of distance. See this for more thought on what’s going on.

LIBYA. Foreign Minister Lavrov expressed his disgust with NATO’s interpretation of the UN resolutions: it shows that “no one’s word can be taken” (another suggestion that promises made to secure Russia’s abstention have been broken). Meanwhile Medvedev’s envoy Mikhail Margelov is now in Tripoli. But, given that Medvedev has said Khadafy must go and Khadafy says he won’t, the effort may prove to be fruitless.

PEOPLE POWER. “This not a charter but a scheduled flight… kindly make sure your top official does not turn up late”. The pilot (and passengers) lost this one but will they lose the next? An inquiry has been opened.

BUDANOV. Yuriy Budanov was murdered last week in Moscow. Many suspect this is revenge for Kungayeva.

JIHADISM. I don’t cover the subject much because Gordon Hahn does it better but here’s the last two weeks. Two Muslim clerics murdered (a common jihadist tactic); a major attack stopped; and shoot outs in Chechnya and Dagestan. It continues.

MISTRAL. Moscow and Paris have signed a protocol of intent. This is not quite what we were promised by Sarkozy and Medvedev: maybe there are serious difficulties as many suspect.

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)

MISSILE DEFENCE. Here’s Russia’s position in a nutshell: “We must receive guarantees that it is not directed against us. So far no such guarantees have been given.” Simple, easy to understand and any other country would say the same. “Trust, but verify”. Do you become more secure by making your neighbours nervous?

LIBYA. It is reported that several leaders, formally or otherwise, asked Medvedev to mediate in Libya. He is willing. Moscow has maintained relations with Tripoli and more recently opened discussion with the rebels in Benghazi and is therefore in a position to be a middleman. In his press conference after the G8, Medvedev said that he had sent Mikhail Margelov to Benghazi to begin talks, that “Gaddafi’s regime has lost legitimacy and he must leave” and that Russia would not give him asylum. Readers will recall that when NATO’s operation began, I wondered if it would end (as Kosovo did) with Russia helping to get it out of a stalemate.

KHODORKOVSKIY. His lawyers say he will apply for parole. Meanwhile the European Court of Human Rights has ruled 1) that his first trial had not been politically motivated 2) his rights were violated by the treatment he received. It would have been better had this decision come out a lot earlier before it became a meme that the whole thing was political. By the way: the decision had two points to it and news outlets chose which to emphasise: rights violated, not politically motivated. The former slant seems to predominate although I would have put the second first because it contradicts the meme and is therefore less expected.

POLITKOVSKAYA. Rustam Makhmudov, her killer according to the prosecution’s theory, was arrested in Chechnya on Tuesday. The investigators thanked the authorities in Belgium, where he had been hiding, for making him leave. He has been formally charged with murder.

WTO. Sarkozy said that the G8 supported Russian entry into the WTO and saw no impediment. Well I do: Tbilisi seems to have a veto and will use it. So either its objection is dropped, ignored or it continues not to happen. Biden is reported to have told Saakashvili that Washington supports Russia’s entry. We’ll see if that hint from Saakashvili’s only remaining – and increasingly lukewarm – international supporter has any effect.

POLICE REFORM. Three traffic police officers in Samara are accused of beating a driver to death in January.

CORRUPTION. The Chief of the Main Military Medical Directorate of the Ministry of Defence has been arrested on corruption charges. Corruption is said to be a serious problem in the Ministry and Armed Forces and possibly getting worse (or, alternatively, more are being caught).

MISTRAL. Despite all the stories that the deal was falling apart, Medvedev and Sarkozy agreed that the contract (two ships built in France and then two in Russia) will be signed in 15 days. In his interview, Medvedev sidestepped the question about technology transfer so we will have to wait and see.

BELARUS. I believe that the Belarus economy – a sort of USSR-lite – is coming to the end of its possibilities. About two weeks ago the National Bank devalued the currency 36% against the US$ (4930 per dollar vs 3155 the day before) which has set off a degree of panic buying. True to form, Lukashenka has threatened to dismiss the government if it does not produce daily improvements. He has also shut down a number of Russian media outlets for printing “hysterical” pieces on the effect of the devaluation. Meanwhile Minsk is trying for a US$8 billion stabilisation loan from the IMF. Belarus under Lukashenka has been an island of torpid stability – no divisive “Orange Revolution”, wars or economic collapses when you thought everything was OK. He can indeed claim that it’s better under him in Belarus than in most of its neighbours. But it seems to be a gentle and implacable decline.

GEORGIA. The bloom continues to come off the rose: the UN, USA, OSCE and UK (plus people inside Georgia) have called for an inquiry into pretty considerable police brutality. I don’t recall such loud and immediate calls the last time. Meanwhile, as usual, “evidence” has appeared (been manufactured) to show the whole thing was hatched in Moscow. But Saakashvili is losing his audience.

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)

RULE-OF-LAW. At the St Petersburg Legal Forum Medvedev said: “Over these last years we have made progress in putting in place the foundations on which we can build a rule-of-law state in our country.” I think that’s a fair statement: he’s essentially saying that the beginning has been begun and not pretending that what’s been done is enough or that the job is finished. Police reform, legal changes, dismissals, some trials; that’s not nothing. I find that too much comment on Russia is absolutist: either a reform is 100% successful right now or it’s 100% failure. But, in the real world, it’s all incremental and one should look for small progress. It’s there.

POLICE REFORM. Medvedev has signed a decree establishing advisory panels at regional police headquarters. They are to “coordinate issues of public importance concerning the interests of peoples, federal and regional bodies of state power, local self-governments, and public associations”. That’s quite a lot he’s done in this area. Its effectiveness will be revealed in the next few years but again, it’s not nothing.

CORRUPTION. A military trial has charged a commissioning officer of selling rations and substituting dog food. The whistleblower who broke the story (YouTube again) was dismissed earlier. The base in Vladivostok was also found to have illegal immigrants doing construction work. More and more stories of wide-spread corruption in the Armed Forces are coming out. I wonder if a police-style sieving process will come there.

PEOPLE POWER. Civil society is pretty weak in Russia for obvious historical reasons but I am always watching for shoots to appear and here is a small one. A group of women have formed an organisation in Ulan-Ude to improve social problems in the region.

BLUE LIGHTS. But a bigger sign of success for a grass-roots protest is that Just Russia has proposed legislation to limit blue lights to cars that carry the President, the PM or emergency services vehicles. There are said to be about 1000 cars in Moscow with the official right to carry them and make everyone else get out of the way. (It does appear, however, that the do-it-yourself blue lights so common for plutocrats and hoods in the 1990s have been somewhat reduced). If Just Russia gets the law through – and it will be a popular one and hard for the other parties to object to – several ends will have been served. First the protesters will have been vindicated and we will have a law that truly came from the bottom up (the first ever in Russian history?). Second, Just Russia will have established a bit of space between it and United Russia which will be something for the Duma elections and a tiny step towards pluralism. If United Russia uses its majority to bury the proposal that will have an effect in the elections too. Very interesting to watch this play out.

KHODORKOVSKIY. The Moscow City Court heard the appeal and upheld the second conviction of Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev but cut their sentence by a year. They will now be out in 2016. It also closed a criminal case against them on the grounds that the term of the case had expired. So, just the tiniest mercy. Amnesty International has declared them “prisoners of conscience”.

PRIVATISATION. Putin has approved the sale of 7.58% of Sberbank’s share capital; at the end the government would own 50% plus one share. It is planned that a number of government holdings will be sold.

G8 BILATS. Medvedev and Obama said nice things about each other (and Doku Umarov was added to a US program that offers a reward for information about his whereabouts – it has taken official Washington a very long time to understand what’s going on in the North Caucasus). Sarkozy said the two had agreed that a contract for the Mistral will be signed in 15 days (2 built in France, 2 in Russia) and “we should treat Russia as a friendly state and involve it in our deliberations ​​about creating an extensive space of security and prosperity”.

GEORGIA. Protests against Saakashvili have begun again, led by Burjanadze. I notice signs in English, which weren’t common in earlier protests: clearly an appeal to the outside world. We see the usual problems of disunity: Okruashvili was supposed to return to Georgia but didn’t and the numbers are not large. Standard reactions from the regime: a film purporting to show some of the protesters planning violence (why always videos?) and Saakashvili says it’s all the hand of Moscow. The protests were broken up by riot police today with some complaints of excessive force. The protesters set up defences and fought back. The planned military parade went ahead. Will the protesters succeed this time? Probably not, but one day they will: the long-term prospects for Georgia are not encouraging; see this Chatham House paper by an experienced observer.

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)

MEDVEDEV PRESS CONFERENCE. Medvedev gave a large press conference yesterday. He said he would announce “soon” whether he will run again. The inquiry into Sergey Magnitskiy will be concluded “soon”. He several times stressed that no one should stay in power forever (in the context of saying he had replaced half the regional leaders) and that people who do so come to “a rather bad end”. Russia’s political system is still being adjusted (“a forming democracy “) and that it was possible that Federation Council members (and governors) might be directly elected (not, apparently, “soon”). He understood that “local authorities try to varnish everything” when he comes to visit, but said that he also got information from blogs etc which “cut right to the truth”. Relations with NATO were “not that bad” but he reemphasised that Moscow had to be sure that “these strike potentials will not be directed at us”. (Many of course see this and similar statements as threats; they aren’t, they’re conditional warnings: if Russia feels it is threatened – which it doesn’t today – it will take counter steps. A perfectly understandable position and one that any country would take). But, once again, sometimes the level of detail was preposterous. I have noticed this many times in his and Putin’s Q&A sessions: a version of “my roof is leaking Mr President, will you repair it?”. The third question was about parking in Moscow. Medvedev answered the question in some detail but I believe he would have been wiser to say: ask the Mayor, that’s not my job. The Boss – even if there are two of them – cannot do everything.

KHODORKOVSKIY. The relevant court has postponed the hearing of the appeal of Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev against their second sentencing until next week: the reason given that more time was needed to study “the large volume of complaints about the sentencing”. Meanwhile the defendants have asked the Russian Investigative Committee to open a criminal case against the judge who sentenced them in December. At his press conference Medvedev said that the release of the two posed no threat to society. The Khodorkovskiy case did a great deal of damage to Russia’s reputation in the outside world and I and others wondered what Medvedev would do about it. Perhaps the second verdict will be overturned and the two will be released when they finish their first terms.

NAVALNIY. More pressure on this anti-corruption campaigner – the logo on his website (showing a double-headed eagle with a saw in each claw) mocks the state symbol. This, combined with the other story, begins to look like an organised campaign to shut him down. He will have offended many powerful people.

MIRONOV. The St Petersburg Legislative Assembly recalled Sergey Mironov from the Federation Council. He is pretty calm about it and says he will continue to be active in Just Russia and he may re-appear as a Duma Deputy: several Deputies are said to be prepared to give up their seats for him. (The logic of proportional representation is that no one votes for an actual individual). This may be a manoeuvre to show that Just Russia is not just an appendage of the Kremlin. I believe it to be a possibility that one member of The Team could run on the Just Russia ticket and another on the United Russia ticket and this may be part of such a plan.

BLUE LIGHTS. Another egregious case of their misuse: the driver for Sergey Shoygu was filmed (camera phones are ubiquitous) abusing (threatened to shoot him if he didn’t get out of his way) another driver, He was alone in the car at the time. He has been fired. I’m sure this will ignite the protesters again.

MILITARY. As a further indication that Russia’s ambitious military re-building program is not going well, several military and defence industry officials were dismissed Tuesday for poor performance in implementing the arms procurement program.

FLASH MOBS. A flash mob in Moscow in honour of this. And another one on a more serious subject. A species of civil society.

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)

POPULAR FRONT. The fundamental problem with United Russia is that, being a pedestal party, its members aren’t especially interested in new ideas: they only want to stay in with the statue standing on it. Putin has complained about this before and in his latest idea to bring some life to Russia’s stodgy political system, announced on Friday at a United Russia conference the creation of a “popular front”, Set up the next day, it is supposed to harness the creativity of the population and bring forward good ideas. Blunt as ever, he gave two reasons: the Duma elections are coming (presumably this ties into his notion of something like primaries before candidates are chosen) and “Frankly speaking, United Russia, our leading political force, needs an influx of new ideas, proposals and people in these circumstances”. I’m sceptical: first, this is too top-down and second, all the kratotropes in United Russia will comb the Bosses’ speeches so that they can enthusiastically agree with whatever they propose.

HERMITAGE CAPITAL. Two stories: the official Moscow story and Browder’s. Moscow said Hermitage Capital participated in a tax fiddle, Browder was a “threat to national security” and expelled him in 2005. Some officials were dismissed, some arrests were made and the case lumbers on. Browder’s story is that Russian tax officials robbed him and set him up. Browder’s story is looking better these days: Swiss authorities have just frozen the bank accounts of the tax officials that he accused. This all ties in with the death of Sergey Magnitskiy, a lawyer for Hermitage, who was arrested when he made these accusations and died in pre-trial detention in November 2009. An investigation into his death was ordered by Medvedev and is due to report soon. But that only covers Magnitskiy’s death; a part of what appears to have been a very elaborate operation. This case will be a test of how serious the anti-corruption campaign is, especially now that the Swiss authorities have brought new evidence to light. The complicated story, from Browder’s perspective, is here and this website covers events.

NAVALNIY. In something that may be related to the Hermitage Capital case, the anti-corruption campaigner Aleksey Navalniy, who runs a Wikileaks-style website (rospil), has been himself charged with fraud. He insists it is a false charge to shut him down.

POLICE REFORM. Four more senior officers apparently did not pass through the sieve.

MARKELOV AND BABUROVA MURDER. Sentencing finally: life for Tikhonov and 18 years for Khasis. Their suicide attempts are understandable.

FOREST FIRES. Now that it is the forest and peat bog fire season again (34 in Siberia so far), Shoygu, whose Ministry is responsible for fighting them, has proposed that networks of “public patrols”, with direct links to his Ministry, be created to keep watch. In the Soviet days there was an extensive network of federal forest rangers but this service was disbanded in 2007 and the responsibility downloaded to regional governments. In hindsight, obviously a mistake and it’s evident that Shoygu is trying to bring something like that back.

KHIMKI FOREST. Even though the decision has been made to route the highway through it (with vague assurances of some sort of offset) the issue is not going away. An unauthorised protest was put down with heavy-handed police tactics on Sunday.

BORDERS. One of the more naïve charges against Russia in the 90s was that it had not settled its borders with the former SSRs – the implication being that this was an indication of its desire to “restore the empire”. Naïve because it actually takes a very long time to delineate an international border in a context in which the former inter-USSR borders didn’t matter very much and many tiny details (routes of power lines or navigable channels in rivers for example) have to be laboriously negotiated. To say nothing of the expense of constructing signage, crossing points, patrols and all the rest of the infrastructure of a meaningful border. Medvedev just submitted to the Duma the treaty on the border with Azerbaijan. And it’s clear that it is still not completely delineated: the precise starting point (where Azerbaijan, Georgia and Russia meet) and the Caspian appear still unsettled).

MISTRAL. Confirming some speculation, a Russian defence industry spokesman says that the negotiations are stuck on the issue of technology transfer.

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)