As is generally known, Russia has had great difficulty adjusting to the fact that its empire, built by conquest over centuries, disappeared in 1991, depriving it of rich borderlands and nearly half its population.
Richard Pipes:”Russia’s Designs on Georgia”; 14 May 1998
The turbulent events of the past seven days are a defeat for President Boris Yeltsin, a huge setback to the cause of reform, and a warning to the West…[Zhirinovskiy] will be ideally placed in coming months to exploit popular discontent…Just over a hundred days ago, Yeltsin’s forces blew up the old Russian parliament and killed 147 people in the name of reform…The government is now dominated by men who have a strong taste for communist style state controls of the economy…the death of liberal Russia is a direct consequence of the free vote held on 12 December.
Tony Barber, “Back to the USSR”, The Independent on Sunday, 23 Jan 1994
…Caspar Weinberger issued a powerful warning that American policy makers, in their preoccupation with NATO’s expansion, may be missing the fact that Russia has a truly ominous enlargement initiative of its own – ‘dominance of the energy resources in the Caspian Sea region.’ As he observes in the attached op.ed. article which appeared on 9 May in the New York Times… ‘If Moscow succeeds, its victory could prove much more significant than the West’s success in enlarging NATO.’
This style, which has obviously been introduced to the ruling structures by representatives of law-enforcement organizations, has three features: crude simplicity of problem-solving methods, decisiveness in the implementation of these methods, and highly negative consequences of this for the country’s economy.
Vladimir Gryaznevich “It’s Not What You Do, But the Way You Do It” St. Petersburg Times, July 13, 2004
Until last fall I perceived the president as a person lacking initiative, who was either chronically late to respond to developments or preferred not to respond at all. However, after last September my (and many others’) opinion of Mr. Putin changed. The president dared a breakthrough in Russia’s relations with the rest of the world. He made a strategic choice in favor of the West. He also caught Western leaders by surprise after the September 11 terrorist attacks, when he unconditionally supported the anti-terrorist coalition, and when he called NATO Secretary General Robertson and stated directly that relations between Russia and the Alliance couldn’t have been worse and that something had to be done to improve them… And President Putin goes on breaking these stereotypes by not overreacting to the US withdrawing from the ABM Treaty, or to America’s military presence in Central Asia, or to Washington’s plans for Iraq. The nation demands that the president show some strength, but I believe he feels that any door-slamming would only result in another humiliation for Russia. What happened in September, exactly, was that Russia consciously and voluntarily undertook the role of another great power’s junior partner – an unprecedented case in world history. Thus, President Putin ended an entire era in the history of the Russian Empire’s development.
Interview with Lilia Shevtsova, Novaya Gazeta No. 15 March 4-6, 2002
Note July 2016. A favourite quotation. Of course, it wasn’t “Trotskiy’s” Red Army: the Soviet takeover of Georgia was orchestrated by the two Georgians in the Bolshevik government: Stalin-Jugashvili and Orjonikidze. And Abkhazia these days is predominantly Christian. And Georgia is still independent today. An early example of the Economist’s anti-Russia at any cost editorial policy.
An independent state of Georgia existed for 2 1/2 years, until Trotsky’s Red Army snuffed it out in 1921. Mr Yeltsin has given its successor exactly the same amount of time. More or less secretly, Russian forces have backed rebellions by Muslims in the Abkhaz region and by Georgian followers of the former president, Zviad Gamsakhurdia. In this squeeze the current president, Eduard Shevardnadze…despairingly appealed to Moscow for help, and got it on terms that in effect mortgage his country’s independence.
The Economist 13 November 1993
Nevertheless, it is clear that the storming of the White House will increase the army’s influence, particularly in foreign policy.
The Economist, 9 Oct 93
Will a neo imperialist Russia (aided and abetted by Iran) dominate the development of Eurasian oil and its exports, or will Russia be an equal and fair player in the region…the West has a paramount interest in assuring that the Caucasian and Central Asian states maintain their independence and remain open to the West. Otherwise, Moscow will capture almost monopolistic control over this vital energy resource, thus increasing Western dependence upon Russian dominated oil reserves and export routes.
Ariel Cohen, Senior Policy Analyst, The Heritage Foundation “The New ‘Great Game’: Oil Politics in the Caucasus and Central Asia”; 25 Jan 1996.
When he was elected, President Putin set out to build a strong state in Russia. This document shows what kind of state the president considers strong. Prosperous families, and society in general, don’t matter in Putin’s strong state. A strong state is one which is armed to the teeth, and fenced in by numerous self-imposed restrictions and limitations. According to the president, economic security takes precedence over all other economic ideas.
Alexander Nadzharov “Backing up? President Putin prepares a turnaround of the Russian economy. The Security Council’s plans for national economic security” Novye Izvestia August 9, 2001
Still, a big worry is that, even under Mr Primakov’s relatively sophisticated tutelage, Russia seems unable to break free of its view of the world as a sort of zero sum game in which countries become strong only by making other countries weak. In the near abroad, where it counts for something, Russia pursues that logic with hard cynicism. Presumably, it would do the same in the more distant abroad if it only had the chance. Mr Primakov is calm, he is calculating, he can be amusing. But there is something chilling in his Lubyanka tinted eyes.
The Economist 23 Nov 1996
Russia Observer 