Category: POLITICS AND POWER

My Presidential Election Bet

On By Patrick ArmstrongIn POLITICS AND POWER

Note February 2016. Of course, I was wrong and Putin did run again. I believe, as I argue here, that NATO’s duplicity over Libya convinced him (correctly as it turned out) that bad times were coming and only he could helm the ship.

http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/2011/08/my-presidential-election-bet.html

Reprinted

http://vivreenrussie.1fr1.net/t4769-my-presidential-election-bet-by-patrick-armstrong

 

It sometimes seems that the only story in Russia today is who will run for President and the Kommentariat is parsing every word uttered by Putin or Medvedev in its search for clues. Neither has yet said anything definite (and no more would either: the fear is that the Russian bureaucracy – ever alert to power shifts – would stop working altogether). Readers are reminded that we heard similar speculation before: Gorbachev would not step down; Yeltsin would not (could not some said) step down; Putin would change the Constitution and stay on. In some cases, there are Russia watchers who have stoutly maintained all these positions.

I was amused by a recent – and rather lengthy – think piece which concluded that the possibilities were that Medvedev, Putin or someone else would be the next President. I believe that people who watch Russia should do better than that; and I am putting my bets down:

1. Medvedev will run for President and Putin will not.

2. There may be another candidate from the Team who runs.

Medvedev will run for President and Putin will not.

I believe that the decision was made some years ago that Putin would not serve more than two terms and that he would hand off to a trusted member of the Team which been running Russia since 2000. What Putin did, by stepping down as President and re-appearing as Prime Minister, was something not before seen: for probably the first time in Russian history there are two power centres which are cooperating. Many people simply cannot grasp the concept and insisted for some years that Medvedev was just a place-holder; now, curiously, the conventional view is becoming that Medvedev is somehow opposed to Putin and that Putin will take back the reins.

I maintain that there has been a Plan since 2000; that that Plan can be seen in the speeches of the two and especially in Putin’s Russia at the Turn of the Millennium. Or to take a more recent example, here is Putin reflecting on what has been accomplished and what remains to be done. I do not apologise for the length of the quotation; in my opinion too few actually read what the man says. He remembers what he faced in 2000:

The scale of the tasks was directly proportionate to the problems Russia was facing at the beginning of the 21st century. We entered the new century after a default that spurred inflation growth and led to bankruptcies and unemployment. At least one-third of [the] population fell below the poverty line. The system of state governance was experiencing serious problems. The authorities were ineffective, and the country looked like a group of principalities, each with its own laws and rules. At that time, a genuine civil war was under way in the North Caucasus, unleashed by terrorists who were supported by forces that sought to weaken Russia. The situation called for decisive action. I am referring above all to the restoration of constitutional order, social guarantees, and the strengthening of state institutions. We have done all of that. We have literally brought the country together, restored its legal space and created a balanced system of state governance… Most importantly, we have ensured stability.

In short, three problems: economic failure, an ineffective state and lawlessness. He did not mention the fourth: a Russia that was considered to be a declining power, on its way to negligibility. But, “Most importantly, we have ensured stability”. That sums up what Putin thinks he did as President.

The interviewer than asks him whether, “after solving high-priority problems in the past decade, we now need qualitative changes and some kind of a breakthrough in all spheres of the country’s life?” Putin answers:

I get asked this question a lot. And I’ll give the same answer by quoting Alexander Solzhenitsyn who once said that ‘preserving the people’ was Russia’s national idea. This phrase captures the main goal of modern Russia and all the ongoing transformation of its economy, social sphere, and its public and political life. At the same time, I consider consistent development to be the key to realising this national idea. We should take pride in Russia’s thousand-year history, natural resources and cultural heritage. But we must move forward, no matter what. We must maintain competitive positions in all spheres, including technology, human capital, industrial production and the arts. Society, the government and the business community must work as a team. This is the only way to attain the qualitative breakthrough you mentioned.

Qualitative change is, of course, one of Medvedev’s continually-repeated themes. I fail to see any serious disagreement between the two here. Putin “restored stability” during his two presidential terms and now is the time for a “qualitative breakthrough”. Phase I then Phase II of the long job of rebuilding Russia after what Putin once called the “blind alley” of communism.

Making the “qualitative breakthrough” will, of course be more difficult; although there were many who thought that stability could not be restored – a favourite example is a piece that appeared in 2001, the title says it all, “Russia is Finished”. It will also take much longer, and, in some respects, will never be completed because the target of “modernity” is continually moving.

Therefore, the Plan has moved into another phase and that is the job of Medvedev, whom Putin picked and nurtured (and they were both grown in Anatoliy Sobchak’s nursery). I see no serious evidence that Putin is dissatisfied with his choice. Compare and contrast lists like this do not convince me that there is a strategic difference between the two.

And there is a little clue: in another interview, Putin dropped a pretty significant hint when he said he was “fed up with foreign policy”. Foreign policy is a rather large part of the President’s job.

Therefore, I expect that The Plan will be adhered to and Medvedev will run for a second term and Putin will not.

There may be another candidate from the Team running

In 2006 the political party Just Russia (Справедливая Россия) was created. It was clear that there was a good deal of involvement by the Kremlin in its creation. This was puzzling because United Russia (Единная Россия) is the “Kremlin party”; why would the Kremlin want to create a second establishment party with a slightly different flavour?

The Russian political scene is rather barren. The only detectable raison d’être of the majority party is the division of the spoils of power. The Communists and Zhirinovskiy’s personality party have little to offer the majority. Russian liberals are quarrelsome and play more to outside opinion than to Russian interests. Perhaps the hope was that Just Russia would attract membership away from the Communist and liberal electorates but, if so, there is little evidence that it has. Although the party has secured seats in the Duma and in regional legislatures, it is very much a second fiddle to the all-dominating United Russia.

At the time – just before the 2008 presidential election – it seemed possible to me that the reason for Just Russia’s creation could be that two Team candidates would run, one for United Russia and one for Just Russia. In this event, the election would be more competitive than yet another run of the Team candidate against Zhirinovskiy and Zyuganov – a very tired contest indeed and one we have seen in almost every presidential election since 1991. Secondly, the contest would establish Just Russia as a viable party and Russia would have a species of political pluralism.

But, if this were the plan, it did not happen and Russia had another election in which the Team candidate, supported by the machinery of United Russia, faced off against Zhirinovskiy and Zyuganov. And, of course, Medvedev won as he would have, with or without the power of incumbency.

There are signs that the Team is not very enthusiastic about United Russia; as Putin said recently “Frankly speaking, United Russia, our leading political force, needs an influx of new ideas, proposals and people in these circumstances”. Medvedev has more than once called for more political competition. But, as long as United Russia is the dominant party for lack of competition, why would it ever want to be creative? All it has to do is agree and anticipate.

So, in a way, the Team is a victim of its success. In contrast to the Yeltsin period in which “pedestal parties” (eg Russia’s Choice, Our Home Russia) were cobbled together at the last moment and performed poorly, United Russia has been more carefully constructed. So the Team has a reliable base of support; but that base so dominates political discourse in Russia that the creativity necessary for Phase II (“qualitative change”) is stifled. Hectoring United Russia to be creative won’t change the reality that it is an association of apparatchiks and would-be apparatchiks.

Could my imagined 2008 scenario play out in next year’s presidential election? I believe that it is possible. I did not see much evidence of it – although the move of Sergey Mironov from the Federation Council to the Duma is interesting, as are his attempts to distinguish Just Russia from United Russia. If Just Russia were to run a credible Team candidate, it would offer a route out of the political stagnation that Medvedev and Putin complain about.

So I believe that the possibility of two Team candidates, one of them Medvedev and the other not Putin, each supported by one of these parties is something to watch for.

Other points

Putin’s future. I have no opinion on whether Putin will stay on as Prime Minister in the next presidential term. However, I believe that he has come to the end of his possibilities. He was the right man for Phase I (reversing the decline) but not so good for Phase II (qualitative change). And, as far as Russian’s image in other countries is concerned, as long as he stays in power, there will more years of speculation that “the ex-KGB officer” is really running the show. More of this would hinder the development of Phase II which requires a peaceful environment and outside investment.

When to make the declaration, I see a disagreement between Medvedev and Putin on the timing. Putin, ever cautious, has said he would prefer to get the Duma elections over with first; Medvedev keeps saying he will announce “soon”. What they both fear is the kratotropism of Russian officials. Should Medvedev declare, there will be a tendency to regard Putin as yesterday’s man and he will lose traction. Even more so, should Putin declare, then Medvedev would immediately become “nobody’s man”. On the other hand, it can be argued that the growing speculation frenzy can itself paralyze action. Thus the timing requires nice judgement and it is understandable that there could be different ideas about when to do it.

Election turnout. Russian electoral turnout, at least in presidential elections, is on the high side by world standards in the mid- to high-60s. US presidential turnouts have been gently drifting down to the low 50s; Canadian federal elections are also drifting down to the mid- to low-60s; British general election turnouts are similar and French presidential turnouts, while higher than the others, also show a downturn. Two common – and opposed – explanations are given for low turnouts: either disgust with what is on offer or acceptance of the probable outcome. Opinion polls, over many years and with many different polling organisations, suggest that Russians are generally content with their leaders. Thus it seems likely that the Russian turnout (somewhat inflated by improbable results, especially in Chechnya) will be at least in the 60s.

Putin’s Popular Front

On By Patrick ArmstrongIn CONTRIBUTIONS TO GROUP DISCUSSIONS, POLITICS AND POWER

Note February 2016. These were done for the Russia Profile Weekly Experts’ Panel which I cannot find on the Net now. Many were picked up by other sources and I have given links where I can find them.

http://www.expat.ru/analitics.php?item=974

JRL/2011/ 91/16

Believing that Ockham’s Razor is the most powerful analytical principle ever articulated, I would try first to understand Putin’s popular front idea by assessing the reasons he gave before trying to fit it into more elaborate schema.

Putin’s two reasons were: “First, the State Duma elections will be held soon… And it is very important how the parliament will be formed. Second. Frankly speaking, United Russia, our leading political force, needs an influx of new ideas, proposals and people in these circumstances”. (Note “and people”)

The first reason ties into his speech in April: “If United Russia wants to be competitive in the political struggle with other public organisations and political parties it should create a competitive atmosphere within its own ranks” and “The six hundred candidates listed on the ballots should be up for review and discussion with all voters in the regions and municipalities, not just their respective party members”. The popular front speech is a follow-on to that speech.

The second reason – related to the first – is his concern that United Russia is stagnating. “New ideas” has been a concern of his for some time; for example, in 2008 he stated that “The goal of our party is to generate new ideas and projects and control their implementation. We need to understand public opinion and people’s needs.” He has evidently decided that United Russia, from its own resources, has not met that goal.

And it’s not surprising that United Russia is no wellspring of creativity: its membership is drawn from those who want to be close to power and profit from that closeness. They wait to be told what “new ideas” they should support; it is not in the nature of power-seekers to propose new ideas: what if the Boss doesn’t like them? But, for better or for worse, it is Russia’s “leading political force” and the Team must work with it. Therefore, Ockham’s Razor would suggest that the popular front is Putin’s latest attempt to bring a level of creativity into United Russia.

Russia’s politics are stagnating: United Russia is what it is; no “new ideas” will come from either the Communists or Zhirinovskiy; Just Russia is a fading earlier attempt by the Centre to force creative tension; the liberals refuse to unite. This political reality will endure for some time.

It does not seem very likely that Putin’s popular front will attract much creativity: now that the Boss has given them a new box to check, they will simulate creativity. Bureaucracies the world over are skilled at adjusting their behaviour to pretend to give the Boss what he wants.

Ultimately the “influx of new ideas” must come from the bottom and that brings us to the infant state of Russia’s civil society. Both Medvedev and Putin have spoken of this lack: Putin in his 2000 Federal Assembly Address: “Many of our failures are rooted in the fact that civil society is underdeveloped” and, eleven years later, Medvedev: “I think that bigger involvement on the part of civil society in discussing sensitive issues will do our country good. We have deeply rooted totalitarian traditions, and it will take time”.

It will indeed take time, and a healthy civil society will not appear by fiat from the top. Until it appears and strengthens Russia is stuck with its present political landscape.

New Party in Russia?

On By Patrick ArmstrongIn CONTRIBUTIONS TO GROUP DISCUSSIONS, POLITICS AND POWER

Note February 2016. These were done for the Russia Profile Weekly Experts’ Panel which I cannot find on the Net now. Many were picked up by other sources and I have given links where I can find them.

http://www.russialist.org/archives/russia-politics-medvedev-putin-two-parties-728.php

The problem with suggesting that the Duumvirate create a new party to become a “loyal opposition” to the rather tired United Russia (Единная Россия) is that they have already tried that. Just Russia (Справедливая Россия) was created in 2006; at the time I thought that was exactly what was happening and that two candidates from the Team would be picked (Medvedev for Just Russia and Ivanov for United Russia were my guesses then). If my theory was correct, something happened to spoil the plan: it may have been that Just Russia didn’t do as well as hoped or it may have been that the Team’s deeply embedded fear of instability made it abandon the idea. But Just Russia has never really taken off.

And there’s a good reason why it hasn’t. United Russia is a “pedestal party” – it is the pedestal upon which the Boss stands. No better evidence can be found than its history. When in 1999, it was not clear who the new Boss would be, two “pedestal parties” appeared (Unity and Fatherland-All Russia). A year later they smoothly amalgamated to support Putin. If you wish to be close to power and enjoy the fruits of that closeness, why would you join the lesser “pedestal party”? And so Just Russia did not become a contender.

The second difficulty is the Establishment cannot create an opposition party by fiat; it must arise from some other source. And so we return to the problem of Russian politics. There are only three strong political entities: the pedestal party, the Communists and Zhirinovskiy’s personal vehicle. The last two are steadily slipping: they totalled (there is a degree of vote-sharing) 35% of the popular vote in 1993 but are now down to 20%; their numbers are not likely to grow. The “liberal opposition” (or whatever descriptor you prefer) fails because it will not unite. (I suspect that Western reporters talk too much to these bitter people: bitter because they are both disgusted with the status quo and frustrated by their quarrelsome futility). So, I would conclude that, until the “liberals” get their act together, Russia’s stagnant political situation will endure.

But, just because Plan A didn’t work the first time doesn’t mean it can’t be tried again. If two credible candidates were to run against each other, one backed by “Pedestal party A” and one by “Pedestal party B”, perhaps (perhaps) the foundations of a multi-party system could be laid. But there are two caveats. Putin should not be a candidate because he would probably win, presumably on the United Russia ticket, and we’d be back to where we started. The second problem is kratotropism: even if Candidate B ran a strong second to Candidate A, most power-seekers would immediately switch from B’s pedestal to A’s. Nevertheless Plan A is a possibility to watch.

That having been said, there are two steps that could open the system up a bit. The seven percent threshold in the Duma is too high and should be lowered or abolished altogether. Returning to direct election of regional heads – but only after the heads-for-life are got rid of, which is happening – would also open up the system and create the possibility of some pluralism in the regions.

But ultimately, for there to be a better choice than the pedestal or two failed, stale and shrinking groupings, the liberals have to unite. And, once united, agree that they are players inside the system, not condescending superior beings looking on from outside and sneering. Two big ifs.

Libya Crusade Flap

On By Patrick ArmstrongIn POLITICS AND POWER, PROPAGANDA, LIES AND NONSENSE

Note February 2016: A flap at the time. See, for example: “Medvedev rejects Putin ‘crusade’ remark over Libya“. In retrospect Putin was right:

What troubles me is not the fact of military intervention itself — I am concerned by the ease with which decisions to use force are taken in international affairs. “This is becoming a persistent tendency in U.S. policy,” Putin said. During the Clinton era they bombed Belgrade, Bush sent forces into Afghanistan, then under an invented, false pretext they sent forces into Iraq, liquidated the entire Iraqi leadership — even children in Saddam Hussein’s family died. Now it is Libya’s turn, under the pretext of protecting the peaceful population.” Putin said. “But in bomb strikes it is precisely the civilian population that gets killed. Where is the logic and the conscience?”

I now believe that the Libya attack was an important reason why Putin felt that he had to become President again.

The first thing that we have to ask ourselves was whether Medvedev’s comment about the inadmissibility of using the word “crusade” was actually aimed at Putin. When Medvedev (in Moscow) made his formal statement, was he aware that Putin (in the Udmurt Republic) had given his “personal opinion” four hours earlier? We don’t know. What many commentators don’t seem to realise is that the word “Crusaders” is commonly used by jihadists to describe the West and Gaddafi is now using it too. So was it a coincidence or was it a direct rebuke?

In any case Putin (in Slovenia) has denied any split saying: “We have a president in Russia who directs foreign policy and there can not be a split”. And (in Serbia) he said it again.

What this episode shows is that Putin and Medvedev have a difference of opinion on the Libya affair. Putin, probably remembering all the times he has been burned by the West, is sceptical; Medvedev is more accepting.

The second thing that it shows is that the naïve assumption that Medvedev is Putin’s puppet is – well – naïve.

Nevertheless, this incident has set off the usual speculation that the two are in some sort of struggle for the next election. Putin could have easily changed the article in the Constitution and could have been re-elected President. Why would he go through the elaborate rigmarole of putting up a puppet so he could get back into the presidency when he could, so easily, never have left office? Anyone who so speculates should be obliged, by law, to explain, before he opines on why Putin wants to be President again, why he is not today.

I maintain that Putin and Medvedev are a team, they are united on the big plan of Russia’s development, and are not likely to be diverted from this purpose by anything as trivial (in the Russian context) as actions in Libya.

Eventually there will be a serious point of disagreement, but this is not it.)

 

The first thing that we have to ask ourselves was whether Medvedev’s comment about the inadmissibility of using the word “crusade” was actually aimed at Putin. When Medvedev (in Moscow) made his formal statement, was he aware that Putin (in the Udmurt Republic) had given his “personal opinion” four hours earlier? We don’t know. What many commentators don’t seem to realise is that the word “Crusaders” is commonly used by jihadists to describe the West and Gaddafi is now using it too. So was it a coincidence or was it a direct rebuke?

In any case Putin (in Slovenia) has denied any split saying: “We have a president in Russia who directs foreign policy and there can not be a split”. And (in Serbia) he said it again.

What this episode shows is that Putin and Medvedev have a difference of opinion on the Libya affair. Putin, probably remembering all the times he has been burned by the West, is sceptical; Medvedev is more accepting.

The second thing that it shows is that the naïve assumption that Medvedev is Putin’s puppet is – well – naïve.

Nevertheless, this incident has set off the usual speculation that the two are in some sort of struggle for the next election. Putin could have easily changed the article in the Constitution and could have been re-elected President. Why would he go through the elaborate rigmarole of putting up a puppet so he could get back into the presidency when he could, so easily, never have left office? Anyone who so speculates should be obliged, by law, to explain, before he opines on why Putin wants to be President again, why he is not today.

I maintain that Putin and Medvedev are a team, they are united on the big plan of Russia’s development, and are not likely to be diverted from this purpose by anything as trivial (in the Russian context) as actions in Libya.

Eventually there will be a serious point of disagreement, but this is not it.

Medvedev Speech Sign of Split?

On By Patrick ArmstrongIn CONTRIBUTIONS TO GROUP DISCUSSIONS, POLITICS AND POWER

Note February 2016. These were done for the Russia Profile Weekly Experts’ Panel which I cannot find on the Net now. Many were picked up by other sources and I have given links where I can find them.

http://www.expat.ru/analitics.php?item=940

JRL/2011/ 46/12

Medvedev’s speech will be mined to serve the current ruling theme of Russian coverage: is the Duumvirate about to split? But Putin and Medvedev have been a team for some years and they claim to be carrying out the same program. Considering that Putin could be President today had he wanted to be, that he chose Medvedev and that the two claim to be in accord, more effort should be spent in seeing where they agree than looking for invented differences. Medvedev took the opportunity of the anniversary to situate the present course of reforms in Russian history and make a claim that it is a continuation of the Tsar Liberator’s policy. Far from espousing opposing views, one can find many of Medvedev’s points in Putin’s speeches.

One of Medvedev’s major themes was that neither the “fantasy about our nation’s special way” nor “the Soviet experiment” proved to be “the most viable, long-lived ideas”; rather, he claims, the “normal, humane order” of Aleksandr II was the correct course. Neither Nikolay I nor Stalin was correct. Putin described communism as “a road to a blind alley” (1999) and “Our goals are very clear. We want high living standards and a safe, free and comfortable life. We want a mature democracy and a developed civil society” (2004). Not so different.

Medvedev’s other emphasis was the importance of freedom: “The aim of modernisation and progress has always been to enhance freedom in society.” Here is Putin: “Meanwhile, it is not possible to have a strong state without respect for human rights and freedoms” and “Our essential task is to learn how to use the state levers for ensuring freedom, freedom of the individual, freedom of entrepreneurship, free development of civil society institutions.” (2000) And “our goal is for our civil society to mature, grow, gain in strength and understand its own strength. (2010)” So, again, not so different.

Other points of agreement can be found. In 2000 Putin said “Many of our failures are rooted in the fact that civil society is underdeveloped”. He praised modernisation in 2007: “Our task is to diversify the economy and make it more innovative.” He too wants Russia to become more “European”: “real integration into Europe [is] our historical choice” (2003). Many more quotations that march with Medvedev’s speech could be enumerated if space limitations did not preclude them.

When Putin became President, a common descriptor of Russia was “free fall” and Putin saw “strengthening the state” as the necessary pre-condition for everything else. While this made sense then, I have believed for some time that the control must now be loosened and that is evidently Medvedev’s task. There is nothing to suggest that Putin disagrees with that and much in his speeches over the past decade to show that he agrees.

Clearly there is a difference between rhetoric and achievement: realities intervene and priorities change. But, on a rhetorical level, we can see that the important points of Medvedev’s speech are in accord with earlier statements by Putin. There is no reason to assume that the one contradicts the other.

I operate on the assumption that Putin and Medvedev have worked as a team for some years, that they are still a team and that they are following the same general plan whose outline can be seen in Putin’s essay of 1999. This is, after all, what they say they are doing. Until I see real evidence, rather than mere speculation, I will take them at their word and continue to assume that they are generally in agreement on means and ends. Same plan, new phase.

 

Russia Profile/Weekly Experts Panel: Will Russia Have Competitive Politics?

On By Patrick ArmstrongIn CONTRIBUTIONS TO GROUP DISCUSSIONS, POLITICS AND POWER

http://www.russialist.org/archives/russia-competitive-politics-dec-450.php

There is little political variety in Russia today. Zhirinovskiy is content with the status quo: given the proportional voting system he can count on a comfortable living forever. The Communist Party has a certain base and it too can count on reliably winning seats. The “liberals” spend their time quarrelling, each leader discovering reasons why he cannot cooperate with anyone else and must form his own groupuscule. Anyone who thinks that this reality is the result of fiddling by the Kremlin should stock up on aluminum foil.

The dominant party in Russia today is United Russia. Since the Yeltsin days the people in power have sought to create a support party. In Yeltsin’s time, where this was done inefficiently and at the last moment, we lived through Russia’s Choice and Our Home Russia, neither of which had much longevity. In 2000, when it was uncertain who would come out on top, two pedestal parties appeared but, after Putin’s victory, they smoothly amalgamated into United Russia. Perhaps the enduring political image of these times was the Moscow election billboard showing Mayor Luzhkov and the slogan “Together with the President”. Whoever he might be. Thus, United Russia is a “pedestal party” whose purpose is to support the statue of Power. Putin described its purpose succinctly in 2008: “it is far more important that I, as Prime Minister and leader of the party, have the possibility of relying on the United Russia majority in the State Duma. This enables me to implement long-term decisions and promptly respond to problems as they arise.” But the weakness of it as a political party is that it exists to support The Team and it attracts those who want to be close to Power: it has no other raison d’être.

More recently the Kremlin created a second pedestal party – Just Russia – and, while it exists today, it is not clear that there can be two pedestal parties with different flavour.

Development of a more varied political landscape is also affected by the reality that Russian generally approve of the behaviour and policies of their leaders and because they agree with what the Statue is doing, they vote for its Pedestal.

While Medvedev is right in calling for more variety, past experience suggests that his call will not change anything. It must come from the bottom and that we have not seen so far.

There is, however, one thing that he could usefully do and that is to lower the threshold that a party must cross to get into the Duma. At present it is set at 7% which is probably too high. But, even so, on the 2007 election figures, the barrier would have had to have been set at 2% before the next party (and not an especially “liberal” one) got in. The only way that lowering the barrier would make any difference would be if the “liberals” could unite and then cooperate and share the 7-10% support that they probably have. But there are no signs of that happening. (Indeed, here is Kasparov criticising the latest attempt to form a coalition, which, of course, doesn’t include him).

Therefore, the Russian political landscape will look much the same for several more election cycles.

Putin’s Problems

On By Patrick ArmstrongIn POLITICS AND POWER, PUTIN DERANGEMENT SYNDROME

Note February 2016: I wrote this as a reply to a comment on something I’d written. My recollection now is that it was something along the lines that Putin  is only interested in power.

Your remark deserves a much longer answer (and you’ve made me think I should write something). In essence you’re suggesting that Putin talks a better game than he plays. There is, I think, some truth in this but I believe that there is a good explanation. And the point is to try and explain things, not to judge them.

Go back to the situation of Russia when Putin was handed the keys. We all know about the economic/social picture – pretty desperate, even hopeless – but consider the security situation.

Khattab and his jihadists had attacked Dagestan and Russia itself – something had to be done about that (and with Armed Forces that had shown themselves to be pretty ineffective). Billionaires who had stolen their money thought they owned the place and were buying politicians. Corruption was wall-to-wall and floor-to-ceiling especially in the regional governments. Regional govts were doing whatever they wanted. The central govt had no money. NATO was expanding happily away and had just arrogated to itself the right to decide who has a country and who doesn’t. I believe that Putin actually thought (lots of references in his speeches to this) that Russia was in danger of disappearing – breaking up in a catastrophic collapse. Scary times if you’re a patriotic Russian.

So his problem is how to get there from here. His answer was to centralise things and take it slowly. Not an unreasonable plan, especially given what had happened in the 1990s. He had no tail, was generally unknown in Moscow and was dropped right into it. So he centralised control where he thought it could be trusted (witness all the jobs he dumped on Ivanov) and controlled and moved slowly and carefully (see his replacement of Defence Minister – forgotten his name just now – and the head of Gazprom as an illustration of his management style). Gradually he replaced people (pretty successfully as it turned out) and got things back on an even keel.

Then enter the “coloured revolutions” which, as time goes on, look to be more and more faked by outside interference. He and his circle seemed to have feared that a similar CR was being prepared for Russia and he tightened some more. His suspicions and fears are not lessened by still more NATOX, absurd and hostile reporting in the West and so forth. Still scary times.

If you’ve been reading my stuff, you will know that for 3-4 years I have been saying that he tightened too much and his successor would have to loosen things. I believe Putin’s over-centralisation, however much sense it may have seemed to make ten years ago (not an immense period of time BTW in what is necessarily a long-term plan) is now getting in the way of modernisation. And I believe we are seeing — I believe we are seeing — an easing of this today – but it’s the same plan with the same team carrying it out. (Don’t forget that the schedule was derailed at least a year by two events: the international financial crisis and the Ossetia war).

I cannot emphasis too much that people should read his Russia at the turn of the Millennium. It’s all laid out there: 4 tasks 1) turn the economy around 2) reverse the fissiparous tendencies 3) improve Russia’s standing in the world 4) institute a rule of law (or at least a rule of rules).

He did pretty well on the first 3 but the 4th still eludes him (as he admitted in a speech a while ago).

BTW his remark that only democracy is intransient is, IMO, extremely profound.

Another BTW: for the first time in Russian history since Peter there are two cooperating centres of power in Russia. That’s a rather interesting thing. Very few commentators have worked that one out.

As to political competition it’s true there isn’t much. Do you recall the story that he begged Yavlinskiy to cooperate with the other liberals so that they could get into the Duma? You can’t make bricks without straw and the political landscape is pretty barren. As to civil society, it is slowly appearing but it’s slow. But he’s doing something here too, that hasn’t been noticed: see Charles Heberle’s account http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/2010/05/transforming-subjects-into-citizens-an-experiment-in-russia.html#more

Finally, here’s a little thought experiment. Let’s pretend that all the Moscow-based Western reporters had gone to St Petersburg to find out about this mysterious guy who had suddenly appeared at the top of the tree. And had found that he was the trusted deputy of Mayor Sobchak, one of the poster boys for the “new democratic Russia” and that Western businessmen had dealt with him many times and had high respect for him. Don’t you think that would have given a very different colour to the reporting over the next decade?

But, as I said, your question deserves a longer response, with support (too much written on Russia is simple assertion – that’s why I put in hyperlinks. I don’t make stuff up).

Russia Profile Weekly Experts Panel: For Real or for Show?

On By Patrick ArmstrongIn CONTRIBUTIONS TO GROUP DISCUSSIONS, POLITICS AND POWER

http://www.russialist.org/archives/2009-37-3.php

The first thing that should be kept in mind is that in the present duumvirate, Medvedev and Putin are not rivals. They are members of the same team and have worked together for years. Thus, the most logical beginning, rather than looking for disagreements, is to attempt to see how they work in a complementary fashion.

When Putin became president all indicators in Russia were negative (as a reminder see “Russia is Finished” from the Atlantic Monthly of 2001). His early speeches show that he was seriously concerned that Russia might literally fall apart. I believe that he had four aims when he began: to reverse Russia’s economic decline; to halt fissiparous tendencies; to improve Russia’s standing in the world, to institute what he called “rule of law” but what might better be termed “rule of rules”. He can – and has – claimed real progress in the first three but has admitted to little success in the fourth. Indeed he once said that corruption had been his greatest failure. His style of governance was very centralising, not surprisingly given his fears about breakup. It can be argued that all this worked reasonably well for most of his eight years.

Medvedev became president in a less desperate time (although the unexpected international financial crisis has taken some of the shine off the economy). Although he worked with Putin in the bad years, he presumably is not so concerned with the possibility of sudden collapse. He can, therefore, be more relaxed.

Another difference is that during Putin’s time (and Yeltsin’s for that matter) prime ministers were, with the notable exception of Yevgeniy Primakov, creatures of the president. All decisions came to the president’s desk (something Putin once publically complained about) and others obeyed (or, quite often, ignored) presidential orders. Under the present duumvirate, Russia now has a prime minister of real status. This permits a different division of labour. We indeed see Putin working at the “first minister” details and Medvedev discussing the larger “presidential” policy issues. This is not the only possible division of labour but it appears to be how this one is shaping up. Indeed, for one of the few times in its history, Russia has a degree of pluralism of power. This could lead to trouble, as dual power has before, but so far the two are cooperating. The common assumption that Putin still rules Russia is too facile: there can be no question that he could have amended the constitution and been elected for a third term. The astute analyst must seek to understand why he chose the course that he did.

Medvedev has his sphere and Putin has his. It is clear that Medvedev’s sphere is “rule of law”, in the widest sense, and encouraging the modernisation of Russia (witness his recent remarks on “the information society”). It is also probable that he seeks to loosen some of the centralisation (over-centralisation to my mind) of the Putin period. This should not be seen as disagreement with Putin, neither should it be seen as tension between the two, but rather what is appropriate for Russia’s circumstances today.

Finally, one should reflect on the fact that Russia has had two presidents in a row who were greatly affected by Anatoliy Sobchak. There should be less obsession, to my mind, with Putin’s KGB background and more consideration of the “Sobchak factor”.

Five Hypotheses About the Future of Power in Russia

On By Patrick ArmstrongIn POLITICS AND POWER

Note: Originally in the now-defunct Russia Blog. Didn’t get this one right either because Putin did come back and, maybe, never really went away. I advance my explanation for why he came back here, in 2015. https://patrickarmstrong.ca/2015/10/05/i-wasnt-really-wrong-when-i-said-putin-would-retire-heres-my-rationalisation/

JRL/2008/ 53/ #15
March 10, 2008
Five Hypotheses About the Future of Power in Russia
By Patrick Armstrong

A consensus appears to be developing that Putin has contrived a means of staying in power indefinitely. The idea is that, one way or the other, Medvedev will be a dummy President and Putin, as Prime Minister will retain the real power. However, the accounts that argue this point – for example Christopher Walker at RFE – fail to consider one salient fact.

And that is that, had he wanted, Putin could easily have been elected President for a third term on Sunday. No one can doubt that one or two years ago Putin and his machine could have secured the necessary majorities to have removed Article 81. 3 of the Russian Constitution (“One and the same person cannot hold the office of President of the Russian Federation for more than two consecutive terms”). This is, after all, what the leaders Walker cites have done. It would have been by far the easiest way for Putin to stay in power: the Presidential machinery of power that Putin spent so much time building up would remain without change and with the same man in the chair.

But he didn’t. Therefore, any argument that Putin is staying in power has to explain why he didn’t take the easy route to that power.

Nonetheless, we did not know what will happen. I propose that there are five possible hypotheses for the future power structure of Russia.

We cannot yet rule out the possibility, despite the facts above, that Putin has contrived a means of keeping power. Two possible hypotheses flow from that:

1. Putin pretends to be Prime Minister and Medvedev pretends to be President, but Putin keeps the real power and makes the real decisions. This seems to be the consensus of commentator opinion.

2. Medvedev resigns after a suitable period and Putin becomes Acting President and is elected for a third, non consecutive, term.

The objections to either of these possibilities remain: if Putin had wanted to stay as the supreme power, amending the Constitution would have been much easier than this contrived and complicated process. Therefore these two hypotheses appear to be less likely than others.

Two more hypotheses are possible on the assumption that Putin’s concern was to ensure that the transition period be as smooth as possible. Indeed, his recent speeches, both in the Duma and Presidential elections, as well as Medvedev’s, have had one theme: “Do not fear, nothing will change, the same team and the same policy will continue”. Under this assumption, therefore, Putin’s saying that he will continue as Prime Minister, has the object of telling everyone, both inside and outside the Kremlin, that nothing will change. Supporting this possibility are all the rumours about power struggles inside Putin’s team over the past six months.

Two hypotheses come from this assumption:

3. He will not serve as Prime Minister.

4. He will serve as Prime Minister, but only for a few months in order to ensure that the transition has been completely uneventful.

A fifth hypothesis is that Putin wishes to break the one-man power system of Russia. Both he and Yeltsin were virtually the only actors and Russia has a long tradition of being a one-man system. One can see this phenomenon in Putin’s press conferences when Ivan Ivanovich from Bezbogorod phones to complain that his roof is leaking and that Father Putin should repair it. An exaggeration, to be sure, but many of the questions are appeals to the supreme power on details that, in a normal state, would be below his level of responsibility. Under this assumption, we have a fifth hypothesis.

5. Putin is attempting to break one man rule by establishing the Prime Minister as a powerful figure and creating a separation of powers between President and government and a certain creative tension.

In this connection, his and Medvedev’s speeches have concentrated lately on the next phase of the plan: what might be called intensive development. Under this hypothesis, Putin would be a powerful Prime Minister concentrating on the improvements that must be made in health, education, infrastructure, high technology and the other deficiencies if Russia is really to become a truly modern and prosperous country. As part of a team, of course – and this was the other great theme of recent speeches: there is a team running Russia, and that team will stay in place. This hypothesis, of course, has dangers in that Russia’s experience with dual power has not been a happy one and raises the possibility of real differences between the President and the Prime Minister or their apparatuses that could paralyse the country.

So, I can see five hypotheses in three groupings: that Putin is contriving a way to stay in power (but why then did he not do it the easy way?); that Putin is motivated by fears for the smoothness of the transition and finally that he is trying to use his prestige to establish the post of Prime Minister and government as real players in the Russian power system and not as mere puppets of the Presidential Administration.

At the moment there is insufficient data to decide for one of these and, as Sherlock Holmes remarked: “The temptation to form premature theories upon insufficient data is the bane of our profession”.