Questions NATO Still Hasn’t Answered

A couple of years ago NATO held one of its self-congratulatory summits in Wales. I suggested some agenda subjects to discuss. Time moves on, dates change, but these subjects didn’t make it to the agenda then and won’t next month either. Instead we’ll hear how NATO’s an all-round Good Thing.

NATO Gives Away the Secret

On the NATO home page we find “Admiral Howard takes the helm at JFC Naples

In it is this

As Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa, Howard will be responsible for leading full spectrum maritime operations in concert with allied, coalition, joint, interagency and other partners to advance U.S. interests while enhancing maritime security and stability in Europe and Africa. [My emphasis]

Now I thought, in my simple-minded way, that NATO’s “essential purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of its members through political and military means” and not just to be a beard for Washington’s aims and purposes.

I guess I was wrong.

Check it out before some NATO flunkey “corrects” it.

(Thanks to Tina Jennings for catching this)

Russia the Eternal Enemy Quotations

Headline from the Daily Stupidity Mail

NATO shows Putin who’s boss: 31,000 troops, tanks and jets from 24 countries begin the largest war game exercise in eastern Europe since the Cold War in response to Russian aggression

Well, apart from the fact that 80-some-odd percent of these 31K troops are from the USA and Poland, and the others are from here and there (in short, another typical NATO – some-NATO – others-NATO – whoever-shows-up NATO, all-NATO-all-the-time, operation) we can compare this with the somewhat larger FTXs Russia does (as, for example VOSTOK-2014 155K troops) and be properly gobsmacked.
But I prefer to look at the comments on the Daily Idiocy Mail website; regarding them as giving us, as Agent K might say, a better bead on reality.
Highest rated (467 upvotes):
So we organize a huge premeditated military show of Force with thousands of troops on Russias doorstep because of what???
Second highest rated (403 upvotes):
These fools are barking up the wrong tree! They should worry about ISIS and migrants crisis NOT Vlad.
Third highest rated (371 upvotes):
So this is what NATO is doing when they are not too busy training ISIS troops in Turkey?
I say it ain’t selling, Daily Dorkface Mail. Better go back to Hot-Babe-of-the-Moment’s-Beach-Body.\
Top comment: “Hunga Munga!!!!!” (92 billion upvotes)
 That gets upvotes.

Russia Prepares for a Big War: The Significance of a Tank Army

 

http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_semper_tyrannis/2016/04/russia-prepares-for-a-big-war-the-significance-of-a-tank-army.html

Picked up by

http://mikenormaneconomics.blogspot.ca/2016/04/patrick-armstrong-russia-prepares-for.html
https://www.reddit.com/r/russia/comments/4d6dxh/russia_prepares_for_a_big_war_the_significance_of/
http://warnewsupdates.blogspot.ca/2016/04/russia-gets-ready-to-fight-big-war.html
https://kassander4ppp.wordpress.com/2016/04/06/summary-events-analyses-cartoons-29/
http://russialist.org/russia-ukraine-johnsons-russia-list-table-of-contents-jrl-2016-66-tuesday-5-april-2016/
https://platosguns.com/2016/04/05/sic-semper-tyrannis-russia-prepares-for-a-big-war-the-significance-of-a-tank-army-patrick-armstrongsic-semper-tyrannis/
https://www.facebook.com/PolicyResearchandInnovation/posts/1112581058774202

People who already understand how armies are put together should skip Part 1.

Part 1. How armies are put together

One of the things that I find irritating about battles in movies is that the director seems to think that battles are about getting an inchoate mass of soldiers together, giving a rousing speech and yelling “Charge!” That is absolutely not how it works nor ever has worked. Real armies are assembled out of groupings made from smaller groupings, themselves made from still-smaller groupings and so on down to the smallest group.

The smallest group is about ten soldiers. This is the fundamental bonding size – these are your buddies, the people you will really remember, the ones you depend on and who depend on you and for whom you will fight and sacrifice. Yes, you’re fighting for Freedom or some other Large Cause, but it’s really your buddy you’re doing it for. So we start with about ten soldiers.

In the Roman Army this was the contubernium – a corporal, seven legionaries plus two servants who shared a tent and ate together. The fundamental tiny piece out of which everything else was constructed.

The next thing to know is the span of command or control. The commander of each level, is trying, in very difficult circumstances, to get his subordinates to do something they would never do in their right minds. They know perfectly well that the first guy in the house, the lead guy attacking the machinegun post, the first guy out of the trench, the first guy out of the landing craft is almost certain to be killed or injured. It is very difficult to get people to do this and long experience shows that a commander can only control three to five elements.

The next principle to remember is square or triangular. Armies are usually constructed by making the next level of organisation out of three or four of the lower level. Why? With three, you can have two engaged and one in reserve. (A great deal of the problem of a commander, once battle is joined, is knowing where and when to commit his reserves). The “square” structure allows two in contact, one in reserve and one resting, or two up, one in reserve and one manoeuvring. Five or six are too many but two are too few. This introduces the fundamental principles of “fire” (applying the destruction to the enemy) and “movement” (moving so as to apply that destruction most efficaciously). (Movie battles have lots of the first, but little of the last.)

Finally, we have the combat arms – infantry, armour (cavalry in its time) and artillery – and supporting arms. “Combat arms” because they directly apply the violence. Other specialities assist them: engineers help them move, transport moves them, medical patches them up, signals communicate, logistics supplies them and so on. No army can function without them.

In what follows I will discuss infantry organisations because they are the purest soldier – the other two combat arms are machines, whether tanks or guns, and the support arms are functions. But, the principles of infantry organisations are followed in the other components. It should be noted that different military traditions have different names for some of these things but it’s all the same principle.

Three or four “tents” (sections) make a platoon; three or four platoons a company; three or four companies a battalion. At battalion level some specialisation will appear: it may have a mortar platoon, or a machinegun platoon, there will be a simple first aid element, some light engineers, communicators, headquarters and so on. But they are all capable of being ordinary riflemen if needed. The battalion is the first construction that is capable of some sort of independent action – it has enough companies to provide fire and manoeuvre and reserves, its machinegun or mortar elements give it some support. But it is still infantry and still pretty “light”.

The next level is a brigade of three or four battalions. But there is a decision point here: do you envisage this brigade being an “independent brigade” or a sub-division of a larger formation? If the former we introduce the other arms, if the latter it remains all infantry.

An independent brigade, or brigade group, will have, in proportions depending on what you want to do, infantry, tank and artillery battalions from the “combat arms” as well as “support” elements: like combat engineers, medical and dental, post offices, laundry facilities, possibly a helicopter battalion and on and on. It is an independent military town of 4000 to 6000 people which needs almost everything a civilian town needs while also being capable of moving anywhere at a moment’s notice. This formation is intended to carry out military tasks by itself with help from the air forces.

The brigade that is intended to be a piece in the next largest structure would have three or four infantry battalions and would still be mainly riflemen with very little added from the other arms. Next level is the division made of infantry, tank and artillery brigades in the proportion thought useful. In the Second World War divisions were usually the smallest thing one would see on the battlefield that could be given an independent task.

A tank division would be constructed the same way except that the basic “tent” is the tank itself, three or four make a platoon, and then companies, battalions and brigades. Artillery would only rarely be organised into independent structures because while it has fire, it does not have much movement. The supporting arms – engineers, signals, logistics, medical and so on, because they exist for support, rarely appear as independent structures. In short “divisions” are infantry-heavy or tank-heavy (bitter experience has taught and re-taught that none of the combat arms can function alone).

Moving up, three or four divisions make a corps; two to four corps an army and a couple of armies make an army group.

So, a whole gigantic army group is assembled, step by step, out of our little “tents”.

Part 2. What’s All This Mean?

How big a war do you anticipate? A smallish one, a bigger one or a really big one? Your answer will determine the formations that you construct.

An important decision point, which reveals your answer, is whether you add in the other combat arms and specialised support elements at brigade (ie 5000 or so troops) or at division (10,000 or so)? If at brigade, you have made a decision that you expect your future wars to be rather small and that all-arms formations of 5000-or-so soldiers is as big as you need. If on the other hand, you decide to create divisions – formations about three times as large – you are showing that you are expecting a larger war. If you then start combining these divisions into corps, armies or even army groups, you are expecting a really big, all-out war against a first-class enemy. Something the size of World War II in fact. In 1945, for example, the Western Allies entered Germany with three army groups, totalling eight armies, totalling 91 divisions: about four and a half million soldiers.

It is possible to have a bit of both, but it’s only a bit. You may decide on independent brigades but also have a divisional headquarters. But, unless the brigades routinely exercise under the command of a standing divisional headquarters, and that headquarters controls assets, only the idea of divisional operations is kept alive.

In short, if you stop at independent brigades, you are telling the world that you expect, and are planning for, relatively small wars. If you go to divisions you are expecting something larger and if you construct a corps (or army in Russian terminology) you are telling the world that you are preparing for a big war.

And so, an observer who knows how armies are put together, can tell a lot about what kind of war a country expects by understanding how it has put its “tent groups” together.

Part 3. The Russian Army

The Soviet Army was organised for a huge war: it had divisions, organised into armies (corps in Western terminology) which were organised into fronts (armies in Western terminology) and further grouped into TVDs or Theatres of Military Activity (army groups in Western terminology) all backed up by a conscription and reserve system, immense stocks of weapons and gigantic pre-positioned ammunition dumps. This time, the Soviets did not intend to fight the decisive battle an hour’s drive from the Kremlin. When the USSR collapsed, so did that structure. The most ready elements were based in the Warsaw Treaty countries; Russia took responsibility for them and they were hurriedly moved back, shedding conscripts as they went. The formations which would have been filled up and then supported the ready elements were in Ukraine and Belarus and lost to Russia.

For some years the management of the Russian army did not appear to have understood that everything had changed – that the huge Soviet forces were gone and would not magically fill up with hundreds of thousands of conscripts to fill up the “empty formations”. But, they didn’t know how to make them smaller either: we were always told in talks with the Russian General Staff that the state could not afford to pay the officers the pensions and housing allowances they were entitled to. And so this once mighty army decayed.

Perhaps it was failure in the First Chechen War that finally convinced headquarters that the Russian army was not a temporarily shrunken big war army. We started being told that they were re-designing their army around independent brigades. It was clear from reading the periodic military and strategic doctrine documents that the wars that Moscow foresaw were smaller wars, on the scale of border infractions or a Chechen-sized war in which the enemy would be small agile lightly-armed groups. For such conflicts, anything larger than independent all-arms brigade-sized formations would be too large and complicated.

And, gradually, between the two Chechen wars, “divisions” (which our inspections had shown to be empty of soldiers but full of poorly-maintained equipment and under-paid dispirited officers) disappeared and were replaced by “storage bases”. We assumed these to be a way of avoiding the huge retirement bill while giving officers something useful to do. At the same time independent brigade groups began to appear, with the first ones in the south where trouble was expected. This is one of the reasons why the second Chechen war was a victory for Moscow.

At this stage, (I’m looking at the 2002 CFE data now) there were entities called “divisions” and “armies” (corps) but they were very understrength – apart from the North Caucasus, there were perhaps two divisions in the western area worthy of the name; neither of them deployed to the west. The real force was in the North Caucasus: three divisions, fully staffed and an army (corps) headquarters. But the future was there too with the first two independent brigade groups setting the pattern for the rest.

In short, by the turn of the century, in their published doctrine, in everything they told us in meetings, in deployments and in their formation structures the Russians were showing us they had no offensive designs against NATO and they expected no attacks from NATO. The south was where they saw danger.

The CFE Treaty showed us all this: the Russians were obliged to give us a list of elements showing their precise location and relationship to other structures with the number of soldiers and major weapons; we could go there and check this out at any moment. Thanks to the Treaty we always knew what they had, where they had it and how it was organised. Our inspectors found no discrepancies. But the NATO member countries never ratified the Treaty, continually adding conditions to it and, after years, Russia, which had ratified it, gave up and denounced it. And so we all lost (because it was reciprocal) a transparent confidence building mechanism based on full disclosure with the right to verify.

All this time the Russians told us that that NATO’s relentless expansion, ever closer, was a danger (опасность) although they stopped short of calling it, as they did terrorism, a threat (угроза); “dangers” you watch; “threats” you must respond to. NATO of course didn’t listen, arrogantly assuming NATO expansion was doing Russia a favour and was an entitlement of the “exceptional nation” and its allies.

It is important to keep in mind with the everlasting charges that Russia is “weaponising” this and that, threatening everyone and everything, behaving in an “19th century fashion“, invading, brutalising, and on and on, that its army structure and deployments do not support the accusations. A few independent brigades, mostly in the south, are not the way to threaten neighbours in the west. Where are the rings of bases, the foreign fleet deployments, the exercises at the borders? And, especially, where are the strike forces? Since the end of the USSR they have not existed: as they have told us, so have they acted.

They planned for small wars, but NATO kept expanding; they argued, but NATO kept expanding; they protested, but NATO kept expanding. They took no action for years.

Well, they have now: the 1st Guards Tank Army is being re-created.

This army, or corps in Western terminology, will likely have two or three tank divisions, plus a motorised rifle division or two, plus enormous artillery and engineering support, plus helicopters and all else.

The 1st Guards Tank Army will be stationed in the Western Military District to defend Russia against NATO. It is very likely that it will be the first to receive the new Armata family of AFVs and be staffed with professional soldiers and all the very latest and best of Russia’s formidable defence industry. It will not be a paper headquarters; it will be the real thing: commanded, manned, staffed, integrated, exercised and ready to go.

It should be remembered that the Soviet Armed Forces conducted what are probably the largest operations in the history of warfare. Take, for example, Operation Bagration which started shortly after the D Day invasion. Using Western terms, it involved eleven armies, in support or attacking; recall that the Western allies entered Germany with eight armies – five American, one each British, Canadian and French. Tank corps (armies in Soviet/Russian) are the hammers – either they deliver the decisive counter-attack after the defence has absorbed the attack (Stalingrad or Kursk) or they deliver the offensive strike. The decision to create a tank army (armoured corps in Western terminology) is an indication that Russia really does fear attack from the west and is preparing to defend itself against it.

In short, Russia has finally come to the conclusion that

NATO’s aggression means it has to prepare for a big war.

As a historical note, Dominic Lieven’s book shows the preparations Emperor Alexander made when he realised that, sooner or later, Napoleon was going to come for Russia. And everyone knows how that ended. As Field Marshal Montgomery, who had more experience of big war than anyone in the Pentagon or White House today, said: “Rule 1, on page 1 of the book of war, is: ‘Do not march on Moscow’.”

This is what the light-hearted decision to expand NATO, “colour revolutions”, regime changes, cookies on the Maidan and incessant anti-Russian propaganda has brought us to.

And it won’t be a war that NATO will win.

 

NATO, Alcoholism and Homer Simpson

http://russia-insider.com/en/nato-alcoholism-and-homer-simpson/ri13322

That great American philosopher Homer Simpson once observed that alcohol was the cause of, and solution to, all of life’s problems.

One might say, as Pepe Escobar has, that “NATO may indeed incarnate the ultimate geopolitical/existential paradox; an alliance that exists to manage the chaos it breeds.”

They’re both right: NATO now exists to attempt to – or more accurately, to pretend to – manage the problems it created the last go round. That is now NATO’s chief purpose. Apart, of course, from making money for weapons companies. Which it does quite satisfactorily.

NATO is a geopolitical alcoholic: last night’s binge is the need for this morning’s hair of the dog which lays the foundation for tonight’s bender. Every weekend is a lost weekend for NATO.

The first case of alcohol causing the problems it solved was NATO expansion itself. In 1998 George Kennan predicted the future: “There was no reason for this whatsoever. No one was threatening anybody else…. Of course there is going to be a bad reaction from Russia, and then [the NATO expanders] will say that we always told you that is how the Russians are — but this is just wrong.” NATO expanded; Russia reacted; Russia is a threat; NATO was right to expand.

In my diplomat days in Moscow in the early 1990s NATO expansion was just beginning: it will bring stability said wooden American diplomats when I and a colleague from another NATO country questioned its wisdom. Well, we have had at least two wars now – the Ossetia War of 2008 and the ongoing civil war in Ukraine – that have a connection to NATO expansion. But they are both used as a justification for the application of more alcohol to solve the problems of the earlier binge.

Now, apparently, Russia is about to invade the Baltics. (Of course Kennan foresaw that too: “We have signed up to protect a whole series of countries, even though we have neither the resources nor the intention to do so in any serious way.”)

NATO attacked Libya on flimsy grounds. Indeed, as the Clinton e-mails tells us, on the most meretricious grounds. But grabbing Libya’s gold is what you might call the real NATO (the distillers’ profits, so to speak) and supporting the heist by fake atrocity stories and R2P is the advertising campaign. But the NATO bender in Libya, or as we say in Canada “defence of our cherished democratic principles“, has led to another drinking problem. Quite apart from waking Moscow up to the reality of NATO.

And the other problem, requiring another lost weekend, is of course the thousands of refugees/migrants from Syria, Iraq, Kosovo, Libya and Afghanistan – all places that have received the blessings of NATO’s attention. But, never fear, NATO steps up to the bar to buy another round: “We have just agreed that NATO will provide support to assist with the refugee and migrant crisis.” When it’s not blaming Russia for it, that is.

But, says Robert Kagan, the ur-neocon and husband to the Baker of the Maidan, just one more war and all will be well. One more drink and it’s solved.

First, it would require establishing a safe zone in Syria, providing the millions of would-be refugees still in the country a place to stay and the hundreds of thousands who have fled to Europe a place to which to return. To establish such a zone, American military officials estimate, would require not only U.S. air power but ground forces numbering up to 30,000. Once the safe zone was established, many of those troops could be replaced by forces from Europe, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and other Arab states, but the initial force would have to be largely American.

NATO will be curing its hangovers with the hair of the dog for years to come.

Last Two Decades Explained in Two Quotations

These two pieces, although relatively recent, have a certain timeless quality about them: they could have been written at any time in the past two decades and would be both predictive and explanatory. They succulently explain the thinking that has brought us to today’s war talk. In essence, they are different ways of saying that We, the West, can do things that others are not permitted to do. And, do it by God’s good Grace. To take offence at these claims of supremacy and superiority is, ipso facto, a proof of hostility.

The first is by the Cheneys and is a hymn to American exceptionalism. (Originally at the Wall Street Journal 28 August 2015 a version can be found here). It begins with the obligatory lament: “President Obama has dangerously surrendered the nation’s global leadership, but it can be ours again—if we choose his successor wisely.” (An interesting feature which we often find in these discombobulations and atrabiliousnesses is the fear that the USA, the greatest, the mightiest, the most wonderfullest, the bestest is in danger of losing it all in a trice. But how could that be possible?)

A few selections are enough:

America has guaranteed freedom, security and peace for a larger share of humanity than any other nation in all of history. There is no other like us. There never has been…. It [the position as “the world’s sole superpower”] is ours because of our ideals and our power, and the power of our ideals…. Our children need to know that they – the citizens of the exceptional country, the most powerful, good and noble country in the history of mankind. They need to know that they are – the heirs of a great past and a great debt.

A couple of peculiarities of this are worth mentioning. By word count, a third of the piece is a rant against the nuclear agreement with Iran which is, to them, as so many things are, “eerily reminiscent of the Munich Agreement”. Iran is their focus; Russia is mentioned once in passing in a generic list of threats. And Putin not at all. A distinction without a difference: an identical piece – including the obligatory “eerily reminiscent of the Munich Agreement” – could effortlessly be extruded by the two about Russia, China or, come to think of it, Venezuela.

Another point that it is worth noticing is that the “exceptionalism” of the USA was, using their examples, mostly manifested in the Second World War and the immediate aftermath. They do not glory that the US selflessly brought democracy to Vietnam or El Salvador, nor do they congratulate themselves on the order and peace brought to Iraq or Libya. Their examples are rather old.

Now there are many people out there who are perfectly prepared to admire the USA of seven decades years ago but who think that it has rather gone astray since then. (One might be tempted to suggest that if even these cheerleaders cannot come up with anything much later than the Marshall Plan as an example of America’s goodness and nobility they themselves are perilously close to the sin of doubt.)

The creed of American exceptionalism is here laid out. The USA is simply the best, the brightest, the noblest. What it wants is requisite for all to want and its actions are exemplary; secure against error: its opponents are ever evil, it is ever righteous. Deserving of supreme power, whatever it does is for the best; no criticism is possible, no criticism is to be tolerated.

A very dangerous mindset indeed.

The next piece for your consideration was uttered by the former Secretary General of NATO: “The Kremlin’s Tragic Miscalculation“. (By the way, Rasmussen is now working for Goldman Sachs; a perfect closing of the circle that should make any conspiracy theorist faint with joy.) Writing more than sorrow than in anger, he says that Russia’s “tragic miscalculation” was not understanding that NATO is its friend:

In short, thanks to the EU and NATO, the stability on its Western borders that Russia has sought for centuries has now been achieved. Russia should be celebrating – and it should be seizing the opportunity to deepen its ties with the West.

There’s no need to read any further and it’s instructive that most of the commenters on the piece see this for the nonsense it is. NATO is a military alliance, it’s not a glee club, and it accounts for over half the world’s expenditure on weaponry. Who would be dumb enough to think that a country that finds NATO moving ever closer to its doorstep (while, at the same time claiming that Russia is on its doorstep), that is continually demonised by a strident and united media would not be concerned? Silly Russians indeed!

So, Dear Readers, I submit these two short pieces for your consideration as a quick guide to the thinking that has brought us, and continues to bring us, ever closer to the Last World War.

First, the deeply embedded conviction in Washington that the USA is so wonderful, so noble, so pure of purpose and clean of intention that it cannot do wrong. And second that NATO is a peace alliance dedicated to bringing peace and prosperity (rather than, as Kosovo, Iraq, Libya, Ukraine et al show, the reverse).

And finally, there is the unstated, but nevertheless attendant, assumption that the Russians (and Chinese) aren’t smart enough to understand that the consequences of these two beliefs are 1) that their interests are not worthy of consideration and 2) that war is peace.

Making Russia into an Enemy

Note February 2016. I wrote this in June 2012 as a suggestion to a website on what to do to counter the endless anti-Russia propaganda. In many ways, it summarises the theme of everything I have written since the early 1990s: the end of the Cold War gave us an opportunity to integrate Russia and the other USSR successor states into the winners’ circle. We failed to do that and, thereby, have set up the conditions for what we see today. And, there was no reason to do it. Moscow is now trying to counter the propaganda as I wished it would then; with some success, given the hysteria in the West about its loss of narrative control.

My concern is that, as a result of a mixture of reflexive hostility, sloth, lazy re-typing of memes and the campaigns of vengeful people we, the “West”, are gradually turning Russia into an enemy. And there is absolutely no reason for this: Russia needs a quiet life so that it can repair the ravages of 70 years of communism. In short, this behaviour is weakening our security: Russia is not and never will be a negligible power; we gain nothing and lose much by making it into an enemy.

In 1814, after 20 years of war, the settlement was made by the 5 “Great Powers” – Britain, Russia, Austria, Prussia and… France. France was included because it was understood that Revolutionary and Napoleonic France was not the only possible France; that France was not about to disappear from the map; that it was better to bring it into the winners’ circle than freeze it out. In 1945 the Western Allies incorporated the losers (Germany west and Japan – and Italy, which had switched sides just in time) into the winners’ circle. We do not seriously worry about a 4th Reich or 2nd East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere today.

But the 1919 settlement punished Germany and tried to keep it down forever. The combination of harsh restrictions and feeble enforcement contributed to a second worse war.

The lesson of these two successful post-war settlements and the disastrous failure of the third seems obvious: incorporate the losers into the winners.

When the Cold War ended, the “West” did not follow either the 1814 or the 1945 examples. The “original sin” was the expansion of NATO in a manner that made it obvious that anyone could join. Except Russia. A door was slammed in Russia’s face. At the time George Kennan, the famous Mr X of 1946, warned us of the consequences of this “light-hearted” decision. We see the fruits today. My fear is now, and has been from the start, that we are repeating the disaster of 1919 and not the wisdom of 1814 or 1945.

I am afraid that I have no bright ideas about overcoming the biased, incompetent, hostile and often knowingly false coverage of Russia in the Western MSM. On the bright side, the Old Media is dying and had already lost much of its power to define what constitutes “The News”. But the New Media is still weak and, in any case, will never have the near-monopoly of “News” that the Old Media had.

So, given the terrible state of coverage of Russia in the West, we have to ask the traditional questions: Кто виноват? and Что делать?

Who’s guilty? Well there are those for whom Russia is and always will be the Eternal Enemy. And there are those who have a personal interest in denigrating Russia. There’s nothing that we can do to change their minds: we cannot reason them out of ideas they were not reasoned into. These people will die off eventually. As to the others, the imitators, the lazy, perhaps we can.

What to do? All I can suggest is to keep chewing away at the memes – but it always takes more effort to defeat a meme than it does to re-type it. It’s like Hercules and the Hydra: as soon as you destroy one, another two are created.

One suggestion is to create a website – a sort of reference library – with pieces that counter some of the memes. (Although many of them cannot be countered by mere facts). I expect no great effect from this but it would at least make our jobs easier if we had a single source to point to.

Finally: I do wish Moscow would put more effort into countering this. I sometimes think that Russians are too proud to engage in PR. But they should.

Why Should Moscow Trust Anything NATO Says?

http://russia-insider.com/en/2015/01/11/2328

NATO is always asking Russia to accept its word.

Concerned about missile defence establishments next door? Pshah! they’re there to deal with a “rogue state’s” as-yet-non-existent missiles, nothing to do with you. No you can’t come and look at them.

NATO walks out of the CFE Treaty, which Russia ratified but no one in NATO did; sure but Russia didn’t satisfy the extra conditions NATO tacked on to it.

NATO expansion right up to Russia’s door? Why, NATO is a force for stability – remember Tbilisi’s attack on South Ossetia in 2008? That kind of stability. Or, more recently, the stability, peace and prosperity that floods Ukraine.

NATO flights and exercises all around you? Nonsense, they’re peaceful and stabilising; it’s Russia aircraft that are the real destabilisers.

Are NATO members bombing people all over the place? Yes, but it’s for their own good.

Why don’t the Russian leaders just take NATO’s word for it? After all, NATO says it’s a trustworthy organisation and NATO is proud to tell Russia, and the rest of the world, “Our Alliance remains an essential source of stability in this unpredictable world”. So, how have we got into the position that Moscow does not accept NATO’s word of honour? The answer is very simple: experience has taught Russia that NATO’s word of honour isn’t worth anything: “empty words” indeed. Here are two examples of the evanescent character of NATO’s promises.

Moscow was promised in the Gorbachev years that NATO would not expand. How do I know that the promise was given? After all, nothing was written down. I know this because the US Ambassador of the period has said that the promise was made; I have been personally told by another NATO Ambassador of the period that the promise was made and “After speaking with many of those involved and examining previously classified British and German documents in detail, SPIEGEL has concluded that there was no doubt that the West did everything it could to give the Soviets the impression that NATO membership was out of the question for countries like Poland, Hungary or Czechoslovakia”. Here’s more evidence, from the magazine Foreign Affairs: “In the end, the United States overturned the system it promised to bring about.” So, never mind what sophists say about there being no piece of paper saying “We promise, signed, NATO”, Moscow was assured. And the promise was soon broken and broken again and broken again. At present NATO has 28 members: 12 of them – 40% – are former Warsaw Pact, Soviet allies or parts of the USSR itself. When NATO breaks a promise, it really breaks it.

And, one cynically has to ask, would it have made any difference if Gorbachev had got it in writing? NATO is perfectly capable of breaking, or severely stretching, a written agreement too. See below.

Let us move to a more recent test of NATO’s trustworthiness. A UNSC resolution authorised NATO states and others to create a no-fly zone over Libya for humanitarian reasons. In fairly short order this mutated into sustained destruction of Kaddafi’s forces and installations; then weapons were supplied to the rebels (so much for 13. “strict implementation of the arms embargo”) and special forces gave them training and directed the air attacks. In short, NATO aircraft swiftly became the rebels’ air force retaining only the hollowest pretence of the impartiality the Resolution implied. “We came. We saw. He died” as Hillary Clinton put it. Providing the rebel forces with an air force, weapons and special forces is very far from the UN Resolution that Moscow thought it was abstaining on. What was NATO’s word of honour worth in this case? And that ignores the consequences of the intervention. Not even the New York Times can pretend it’s anything other than a disaster (the days when NATO’s intervention was a “model intervention” are long gone. But thanks to the Internet’s memory, not forgotten).

So, given the Libya precedent and NATO Expansion, Moscow can be forgiven for thinking that, not only is NATO’s promise worth nothing, but, rather than bringing the stability it boasts about, it only destroys and moves on like some science fiction monster that lives to kill and kills to live.

Russia has no reason whatsoever to trust NATO’s mere assertion of intention. Here, from a Russian perception, are more examples of the worthlessness of NATO’s promises. But, really, the two examples of NATO Expansion and Libya, so important and so patent, are more than enough to show that NATO’s solemn declarations are subject to re-interpretation without warning. “Fool me once, shame on you; fool me twice, shame on me,” NATO has fooled them more than once.

As George Kennan said, in 1998 of NATO Expansion: “I think it is the beginning of a new cold war… I think the Russians will gradually react quite adversely and it will affect their policies. I think it is a tragic mistake. There was no reason for this whatsoever. No one was threatening anybody else.” Not for the first time, “Mr X” got it right.

NATO is Meeting Today in Wales. Here’s My Suggestion for an Agenda

http://russia-insider.com/en/2014/11/04/02-12-45pm/nato_meeting_today_wales_heres_my_suggestion_agenda

But you know perfectly well that we will hear that NATO is wonderful, Ukraine is wonderful, Russia is bad and so is ISIS. NATO must get stronger.

What we should hear is that NATO has screwed up everything it’s touched since about 1990 and should, for the security of its members, let alone the rest of the world, pack up and go home.

NATO’S Word of Honour and Arms Races

http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/2011/12/natos-word-of-honour-and-arms-races.html

http://www.america-russia.net/eng/geopolitics/293578777

http://www.america-russia.net/geopolitics/293578777 (Russian)

http://radioalisa.hopto.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=9672:q-q———-&catid=76:hot-topic&Itemid=205

http://www.inosmi.ru/politic/20111205/179323560.html?id=

http://www.bsr-russia.com/en/defence/item/2010-nato-and-its-unfulfilled-promises.html

Some attention has been paid to an address to the Russian people on 23 November in which President Medvedev set out Russia’s possible reaction should its concerns about the European Missile Defence system not be accommodated. For once, the Western media reported it reasonably accurately with most news outlets echoing the BBC’s heading: “Medvedev sees arms race if missile shield not agreed”. A conditional statement: if this, then that.

Here is what Medvedev said.

Our only goal was to preserve the basic principle that Europe does not need new dividing lines, but rather, a common security perimeter with Russia’s equal and legally enshrined participation.” He reiterated Russia’s desire to build a “genuine strategic partnership” with NATO. But, he said: “Rather than showing themselves [NATO members] willing to hear and understand our concerns over the European missile defence system at this stage, they simply repeat that these plans are not directed against Russia and that there is no point for us to be concerned… But our requests that they set this out on paper in the form of clear legal obligations are firmly rejected… but our colleagues should understand that these obligations must have substance and not be just empty words”.

Shortly after, he told the Armed Forces leadership “However, it is not enough to issue oral statements.” And he reiterated the conditionality of Moscow’s responses “If our signal is not heard, then, as I said on November 23, we will deploy other defence means, including the adoption of tough countermeasures and deployment of the main attack force.”

Medvedev’s statement is obviously conditional: if NATO continues to ignore Russia’s concerns, Russia will feel that it must take steps to counter what it perceives as a threat. Russia is not “starting a new arms race”; it is saying that NATO is. Medvedev is saying if you continue to ignore our concerns, then we will have to respond.

But, as Medvedev says, NATO insists that these defence provisions are not aimed at Russia. So why doesn’t he just accept NATO’s word? After all, the stated reason for European missile defence is, and always has been, the need for defence against potential “rogue states” with nuclear weapons and delivery systems. And the fact that no “rogue state” yet has such things does not counter the prudent reality that it is better to have a defence in place than find out too late that you should have had. So, how have we got into the position that Medvedev does not accept NATO’s word of honour?

The answer is very simple: experience has taught Russia that NATO’s word of honour isn’t worth anything: “empty words” indeed. Here are two examples of the evanescent character of NATO’s promises.

Moscow was promised in the Gorbachev years that NATO would not expand. How do I know that the promise was given? After all, nothing was written down. I know this because the US Ambassador of the period has said that the promise was made; I have been personally told by another NATO Ambassador of the period that the promise was made and “After speaking with many of those involved and examining previously classified British and German documents in detail, SPIEGEL has concluded that there was no doubt that the West did everything it could to give the Soviets the impression that NATO membership was out of the question for countries like Poland, Hungary or Czechoslovakia”. And how long did that promise last?

Let us move to a more recent test of NATO’s trustworthiness. A UNSC resolution authorised NATO states and others to create a no-fly zone over Libya for humanitarian reasons: “to take all necessary measures to protect civilians under threat of attack in the country, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory” Within fairly short order this mutated into sustained destruction of Kaddafi’s forces and installations; then weapons were supplied to the rebels (so much for 13. “strict implementation of the arms embargo”) and special forces gave them training and directed the air attacks. In short, NATO aircraft swiftly became the rebels’ air force retaining only the hollowest pretence of the impartiality the Resolution implied. “We came. We saw. He died”. Regardless of whether NATO’s, probably decisive, assistance in overthrowing Kaddafi will be regarded as a Good Thing in the future, providing the rebel forces with an air force, weapons and special forces is very far from the UN Resolution that Moscow thought it was abstaining on. What was NATO’s word of honour worth in this case?

Russia has no reason whatsoever to trust NATO’s mere assertion of intention. Here, from a Russian perception, are more examples of the worthlessness of NATO’s promises. But, really, the two examples of NATO Expansion and Libya, so important and so patent, are more than enough to show that NATO’s solemn declarations – how shall I put it – are subject to re-interpretation. I’m sure that Russians have an equivalent of the saying “fool me once, shame on you; fool me twice, shame on me,” NATO has fooled them more than once.

If NATO really means what it says that the European missile defence scheme is not directed at Russia, why can’t it formally say so with a public, binding, signed statement to that effect? As long as it doesn’t, Moscow can be forgiven for thinking that it’s just another in a series of NATO promises that will be casually discarded at some later date.

As George Kennan said, in 1998 of NATO Expansion: “I think it is the beginning of a new cold war… I think the Russians will gradually react quite adversely and it will affect their policies. I think it is a tragic mistake. There was no reason for this whatsoever. No one was threatening anybody else.” Not for the first time, “Mr X” got it right.