Stalin’s Cartographical Time-Bombs

On July 1, 2011February 13, 2016 By Patrick ArmstrongIn CONTRIBUTIONS TO GROUP DISCUSSIONS, HISTORY, SOUTH CAUCASUS

Note February 2016. These were done for the Russia Profile Weekly Experts’ Panel which I cannot find on the Net now. Many were picked up by other sources and I have given links where I can find them.

No reference found.

When the USSR fell apart five of Stalin’s cartographical time-bombs exploded. After the fighting, each of the five had secured its liberty: North Ossetia, Abkhazia, Karabakh, Transdnestr and Chechnya. Of these, only Chechnya has been resolved (for the time being anyway) but only after immense bloodshed and destruction. The other four maintain their independence.

International attempts to negotiate an end to these standoffs fail, over and over again, on five obstacles.

The first is the contradiction between two fundamental principles of international relations: territorial integrity and the right of self-determination. There is, however, no means of resolution when the two principles collide as they do in these four cases. As to a third principle, uti possidetis, the “international community” seems to be too squeamish to accept that the four won their independence in war and are therefore entitled to keep it.

A second difficulty is the question of who sits at the negotiating table. This issue has particularly bedevilled attempts to resolve Karabakh. Karabakh is a player, it cannot be left out of the talks. But Baku is adamant that it will negotiate only with Yerevan. That is understandable: for Baku to admit Stepanakert as a negotiator would be to concede much of what Stepanakert demands. And so discussions fail because one of the principals – the most important, for it won its war – is not party to them.

A third difficulty is the status quo. The four, whatever their long-term hopes may be, prefer the status quo of self-government to the visible alternatives. Stepanakert’s incentive to make Baku happy or Tiraspol’s to make Chisinau happy is low.

Fourth, whatever the casus belli may have been – unwillingness to join Romania in the case of Transdnestr and fear of massacres in the case of Karabakh – the four gained their independence in war and much blood was shed on both sides. They feel that they earned their independence. Several times a possible solution to the Karabakh problem has been blocked by enraged war veterans on both sides.

Finally, there is no outside power that can “deliver” any of them. While much commentary in the West seems to assume that all of these problems were fomented or caused by Moscow that is not true; they were sui generis. Neither Moscow nor any other outside power can force a solution on any one of the four.

Perhaps there were possibilities in the 1990s to peacefully resolve these problems. For example, Kiev wisely conceded autonomy to Crimea and Chisinau to the Gagauz and these potential problems were resolved in a civilised way. But, in the cases of South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Transdnestr and Karabakh these possibilities were not available. (Moscow did negotiate an autonomy agreement with the Chechen parliament but Dudayev would have none of it.) And so it was left to war to resolve the problems.

I do not hold out much possibility for any future negotiating session to overcome these obstacles. The irony is that the end-state – something resembling the arrangement of the Åland Islands for example – is visible. But it is hard to imagine, given the five obstacles, how to get there from here.

Putin’s Popular Front

On May 20, 2011February 13, 2016 By Patrick ArmstrongIn CONTRIBUTIONS TO GROUP DISCUSSIONS, POLITICS AND POWER

http://www.expat.ru/analitics.php?item=974

JRL/2011/ 91/16

Believing that Ockham’s Razor is the most powerful analytical principle ever articulated, I would try first to understand Putin’s popular front idea by assessing the reasons he gave before trying to fit it into more elaborate schema.

Putin’s two reasons were: “First, the State Duma elections will be held soon… And it is very important how the parliament will be formed. Second. Frankly speaking, United Russia, our leading political force, needs an influx of new ideas, proposals and people in these circumstances”. (Note “and people”)

The first reason ties into his speech in April: “If United Russia wants to be competitive in the political struggle with other public organisations and political parties it should create a competitive atmosphere within its own ranks” and “The six hundred candidates listed on the ballots should be up for review and discussion with all voters in the regions and municipalities, not just their respective party members”. The popular front speech is a follow-on to that speech.

The second reason – related to the first – is his concern that United Russia is stagnating. “New ideas” has been a concern of his for some time; for example, in 2008 he stated that “The goal of our party is to generate new ideas and projects and control their implementation. We need to understand public opinion and people’s needs.” He has evidently decided that United Russia, from its own resources, has not met that goal.

And it’s not surprising that United Russia is no wellspring of creativity: its membership is drawn from those who want to be close to power and profit from that closeness. They wait to be told what “new ideas” they should support; it is not in the nature of power-seekers to propose new ideas: what if the Boss doesn’t like them? But, for better or for worse, it is Russia’s “leading political force” and the Team must work with it. Therefore, Ockham’s Razor would suggest that the popular front is Putin’s latest attempt to bring a level of creativity into United Russia.

Russia’s politics are stagnating: United Russia is what it is; no “new ideas” will come from either the Communists or Zhirinovskiy; Just Russia is a fading earlier attempt by the Centre to force creative tension; the liberals refuse to unite. This political reality will endure for some time.

It does not seem very likely that Putin’s popular front will attract much creativity: now that the Boss has given them a new box to check, they will simulate creativity. Bureaucracies the world over are skilled at adjusting their behaviour to pretend to give the Boss what he wants.

Ultimately the “influx of new ideas” must come from the bottom and that brings us to the infant state of Russia’s civil society. Both Medvedev and Putin have spoken of this lack: Putin in his 2000 Federal Assembly Address: “Many of our failures are rooted in the fact that civil society is underdeveloped” and, eleven years later, Medvedev: “I think that bigger involvement on the part of civil society in discussing sensitive issues will do our country good. We have deeply rooted totalitarian traditions, and it will take time”.

It will indeed take time, and a healthy civil society will not appear by fiat from the top. Until it appears and strengthens Russia is stuck with its present political landscape.

New Party in Russia?

On April 8, 2011February 13, 2016 By Patrick ArmstrongIn CONTRIBUTIONS TO GROUP DISCUSSIONS, POLITICS AND POWER

http://www.russialist.org/archives/russia-politics-medvedev-putin-two-parties-728.php

The problem with suggesting that the Duumvirate create a new party to become a “loyal opposition” to the rather tired United Russia (Единная Россия) is that they have already tried that. Just Russia (Справедливая Россия) was created in 2006; at the time I thought that was exactly what was happening and that two candidates from the Team would be picked (Medvedev for Just Russia and Ivanov for United Russia were my guesses then). If my theory was correct, something happened to spoil the plan: it may have been that Just Russia didn’t do as well as hoped or it may have been that the Team’s deeply embedded fear of instability made it abandon the idea. But Just Russia has never really taken off.

And there’s a good reason why it hasn’t. United Russia is a “pedestal party” – it is the pedestal upon which the Boss stands. No better evidence can be found than its history. When in 1999, it was not clear who the new Boss would be, two “pedestal parties” appeared (Unity and Fatherland-All Russia). A year later they smoothly amalgamated to support Putin. If you wish to be close to power and enjoy the fruits of that closeness, why would you join the lesser “pedestal party”? And so Just Russia did not become a contender.

The second difficulty is the Establishment cannot create an opposition party by fiat; it must arise from some other source. And so we return to the problem of Russian politics. There are only three strong political entities: the pedestal party, the Communists and Zhirinovskiy’s personal vehicle. The last two are steadily slipping: they totalled (there is a degree of vote-sharing) 35% of the popular vote in 1993 but are now down to 20%; their numbers are not likely to grow. The “liberal opposition” (or whatever descriptor you prefer) fails because it will not unite. (I suspect that Western reporters talk too much to these bitter people: bitter because they are both disgusted with the status quo and frustrated by their quarrelsome futility). So, I would conclude that, until the “liberals” get their act together, Russia’s stagnant political situation will endure.

But, just because Plan A didn’t work the first time doesn’t mean it can’t be tried again. If two credible candidates were to run against each other, one backed by “Pedestal party A” and one by “Pedestal party B”, perhaps (perhaps) the foundations of a multi-party system could be laid. But there are two caveats. Putin should not be a candidate because he would probably win, presumably on the United Russia ticket, and we’d be back to where we started. The second problem is kratotropism: even if Candidate B ran a strong second to Candidate A, most power-seekers would immediately switch from B’s pedestal to A’s. Nevertheless Plan A is a possibility to watch.

That having been said, there are two steps that could open the system up a bit. The seven percent threshold in the Duma is too high and should be lowered or abolished altogether. Returning to direct election of regional heads – but only after the heads-for-life are got rid of, which is happening – would also open up the system and create the possibility of some pluralism in the regions.

But ultimately, for there to be a better choice than the pedestal or two failed, stale and shrinking groupings, the liberals have to unite. And, once united, agree that they are players inside the system, not condescending superior beings looking on from outside and sneering. Two big ifs.

Medvedev Speech Sign of Split?

On March 11, 2011February 13, 2016 By Patrick ArmstrongIn CONTRIBUTIONS TO GROUP DISCUSSIONS, POLITICS AND POWER

http://www.expat.ru/analitics.php?item=940

JRL/2011/ 46/12

Medvedev’s speech will be mined to serve the current ruling theme of Russian coverage: is the Duumvirate about to split? But Putin and Medvedev have been a team for some years and they claim to be carrying out the same program. Considering that Putin could be President today had he wanted to be, that he chose Medvedev and that the two claim to be in accord, more effort should be spent in seeing where they agree than looking for invented differences. Medvedev took the opportunity of the anniversary to situate the present course of reforms in Russian history and make a claim that it is a continuation of the Tsar Liberator’s policy. Far from espousing opposing views, one can find many of Medvedev’s points in Putin’s speeches.

One of Medvedev’s major themes was that neither the “fantasy about our nation’s special way” nor “the Soviet experiment” proved to be “the most viable, long-lived ideas”; rather, he claims, the “normal, humane order” of Aleksandr II was the correct course. Neither Nikolay I nor Stalin was correct. Putin described communism as “a road to a blind alley” (1999) and “Our goals are very clear. We want high living standards and a safe, free and comfortable life. We want a mature democracy and a developed civil society” (2004). Not so different.

Medvedev’s other emphasis was the importance of freedom: “The aim of modernisation and progress has always been to enhance freedom in society.” Here is Putin: “Meanwhile, it is not possible to have a strong state without respect for human rights and freedoms” and “Our essential task is to learn how to use the state levers for ensuring freedom, freedom of the individual, freedom of entrepreneurship, free development of civil society institutions.” (2000) And “our goal is for our civil society to mature, grow, gain in strength and understand its own strength. (2010)” So, again, not so different.

Other points of agreement can be found. In 2000 Putin said “Many of our failures are rooted in the fact that civil society is underdeveloped”. He praised modernisation in 2007: “Our task is to diversify the economy and make it more innovative.” He too wants Russia to become more “European”: “real integration into Europe [is] our historical choice” (2003). Many more quotations that march with Medvedev’s speech could be enumerated if space limitations did not preclude them.

When Putin became President, a common descriptor of Russia was “free fall” and Putin saw “strengthening the state” as the necessary pre-condition for everything else. While this made sense then, I have believed for some time that the control must now be loosened and that is evidently Medvedev’s task. There is nothing to suggest that Putin disagrees with that and much in his speeches over the past decade to show that he agrees.

Clearly there is a difference between rhetoric and achievement: realities intervene and priorities change. But, on a rhetorical level, we can see that the important points of Medvedev’s speech are in accord with earlier statements by Putin. There is no reason to assume that the one contradicts the other.

I operate on the assumption that Putin and Medvedev have worked as a team for some years, that they are still a team and that they are following the same general plan whose outline can be seen in Putin’s essay of 1999. This is, after all, what they say they are doing. Until I see real evidence, rather than mere speculation, I will take them at their word and continue to assume that they are generally in agreement on means and ends. Same plan, new phase.

Russia and US Missile Defence

On February 25, 2011February 13, 2016 By Patrick ArmstrongIn CONTRIBUTIONS TO GROUP DISCUSSIONS, WORLD POWER RELATIONSHIPS

http://www.russialist.org/archives/russia-missile-defense-feb-456.php

Missile defence is prudent: while there may be no realised threats at present, there may well be in a decade and, since any system will take time to emplace, starting today makes sense. Moscow knows that it could also be on the target list.

From Moscow’s perspective, involvement in a defence scheme with NATO has difficulties. The first is trust. The West likes to think that it is honourable and open but Moscow is not so convinced. NATO expansion took place despite a promise made to Gorbachev and it was soon evident that it was an expansion to include anyone but Russia. Distrust was hardened by the Kosovo war which Moscow perceived as NATO arrogating to itself the right to decide where borders should be. The “coloured revolutions” in Ukraine and Georgia (do we still count the “Tulip Revolution”?) intensified the distrust. And the West’s uncritical swallowing of Saakashvili’s story in the Ossetia war made things worse.

But events have moved on: NATO expansion appears to be over, NATO no longer boasts about successes in Kosovo, the “coloured revolutions” have failed and Saakashvili is no longer the democratic darling. (I have argued elsewhere that we are seeing a “third turn” in the West’s view of Russia; http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/2010/11/the-third-turn.html#more). But Moscow is no longer, as perhaps it was in the early 1990s, prepared to take NATO at its word.

The second problem involves the “higher nonsense” of nuclear calculations. I say “nonsense” because, even if a defence system could stop 90% of Russia’s warheads, the 10% that got through would constitute by far the greatest disaster that the USA had ever suffered. Even a “small” nuclear exchange would be an unimaginable catastrophe for each, no matter which “won”. Nonetheless, people in the nuclear business do make these calculations of first-strikes, secure second-strikes and all the rest. I suspect, however, that Moscow’s nuclear arsenal has as much to do with prestige as anything else. Many in Moscow are still frightened by the possibility that Russia could become an insignificant country helplessly watching other mightier powers make decisions. Being the second nuclear power is some assurance that it will not be ignored.

Moscow is also aware that for a significant sector of Western opinion – shrinking I believe, but still influential – Russia is the eternal enemy. For these people, President Obama’s decision to stop the plan for missile defence in Poland and the Czech Republic was a betrayal and a sell-out to Moscow (despite the fact that previously they had argued that the deployments had nothing to do with Russia). (See http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/2009/09/unguided-missiles.html#more).

For these reasons Moscow is cautious and sceptical: NATO’s assurances cannot be taken at face value; Russia’s theoretical “nuclear deterrence” could be weakened; the significant anti-Russia group (and Moscow probably takes it more seriously than it deserves) will always work to twist any intentions against Moscow’s interests.

Nonetheless, given the threat posed to NATO and Russia by what used to be called “rogue states” with small numbers of nuclear weapons and missiles, a common defence makes sense.

A compromise between the two positions is not hard to imagine: Russian and NATO sectors as separate but integrated at a central headquarters. Similar solutions have been found before – NORAD, for example – and with good will, something like that could square the circle. An effective defence could be built and Russians would be assured that it was not pointed at them.

When one considers how far this issue has evolved – all previous Russian efforts to get involved having been rejected – some optimism is warranted.

Russian Arab Spring?

On January 23, 2011February 13, 2016 By Patrick ArmstrongIn CONTRIBUTIONS TO GROUP DISCUSSIONS, WAR ON RUSSIA

http://www.russialist.org/archives/russia-government-democracy-tunisia-uprising-protests-poll-jan-277.php

The chance of a Tunisian scenario in Russia is something less than zero. The conditions simply don’t exist.

The popular revolt in Tunisia – I assume it was not a phoney revolution like the “Orange Revolution” or the “Rose revolution” or the now-forgotten “Tulip Revolution” – was a result of revulsion at years of hopelessness and stagnation.

In Russia, innumerable polls, over many years – see, for example, the Levada data at http://www.russiavotes.org/ – show that Russians appreciate the steady improvement of their own living conditions and give the government a great deal of credit for it. They show no naïve belief that everything is wonderful, but they do show a steady increase in optimism (or reduction in pessimism) for the future and improvement of present circumstances. The Duumvirate is popular – most governments would love to have a constant 60-70% support in difficult times. The Levada data is especially useful because, with ten to fifteen years of results for a given question, one can make direct comparisons and observe trends. Other polling organisations show the same trends.

In short, the Putin Team has generally provided the things that people hire governments for.

Thus, the underlying conditions that sparked the Tunisian revolt do not exist in Russia. Observers who take the effort to analyse polling data rather than lazily phone up names on the Rolodex their predecessors bequeathed them would understand this.

But, nonetheless, those who predicted the collapse of the “Putin system” with Kushchevskaya, last summer’s fires, the expected collapse of the Russian economy in the global financial crisis, riots in Vladivostok, Beslan, the “Orange Revolution”, the Kursk sinking, the debt crisis, apartment bombings, the “virtual economy” (I keep a file of this stuff), will quarry the “Tunisian parallel” for indicators. Until the next thing pops up. Same story, new indicators.

I am dumfounded by the endless speculation about how Putin and Medvedev are struggling under the blanket and that Putin will re-appear as President. If Putin had wanted a third (and fourth and fifth) term, all he had to do was arrange for one little clause in the Constitution to be changed. And no one can doubt that he could have, and many wanted him to. But he didn’t. Why would he go through this elaborate charade to get back?

Perhaps he and Medvedev are part of the same team, carrying out the same program. As they say they are.

But what do they know?

Russia Profile/Weekly Experts Panel: Will Russia Have Competitive Politics?

On December 3, 2010February 2, 2016 By Patrick ArmstrongIn CONTRIBUTIONS TO GROUP DISCUSSIONS, POLITICS AND POWER

http://www.russialist.org/archives/russia-competitive-politics-dec-450.php

There is little political variety in Russia today. Zhirinovskiy is content with the status quo: given the proportional voting system he can count on a comfortable living forever. The Communist Party has a certain base and it too can count on reliably winning seats. The “liberals” spend their time quarrelling, each leader discovering reasons why he cannot cooperate with anyone else and must form his own groupuscule. Anyone who thinks that this reality is the result of fiddling by the Kremlin should stock up on aluminum foil.

The dominant party in Russia today is United Russia. Since the Yeltsin days the people in power have sought to create a support party. In Yeltsin’s time, where this was done inefficiently and at the last moment, we lived through Russia’s Choice and Our Home Russia, neither of which had much longevity. In 2000, when it was uncertain who would come out on top, two pedestal parties appeared but, after Putin’s victory, they smoothly amalgamated into United Russia. Perhaps the enduring political image of these times was the Moscow election billboard showing Mayor Luzhkov and the slogan “Together with the President”. Whoever he might be. Thus, United Russia is a “pedestal party” whose purpose is to support the statue of Power. Putin described its purpose succinctly in 2008: “it is far more important that I, as Prime Minister and leader of the party, have the possibility of relying on the United Russia majority in the State Duma. This enables me to implement long-term decisions and promptly respond to problems as they arise.” But the weakness of it as a political party is that it exists to support The Team and it attracts those who want to be close to Power: it has no other raison d’être.

More recently the Kremlin created a second pedestal party – Just Russia – and, while it exists today, it is not clear that there can be two pedestal parties with different flavour.

Development of a more varied political landscape is also affected by the reality that Russian generally approve of the behaviour and policies of their leaders and because they agree with what the Statue is doing, they vote for its Pedestal.

While Medvedev is right in calling for more variety, past experience suggests that his call will not change anything. It must come from the bottom and that we have not seen so far.

There is, however, one thing that he could usefully do and that is to lower the threshold that a party must cross to get into the Duma. At present it is set at 7% which is probably too high. But, even so, on the 2007 election figures, the barrier would have had to have been set at 2% before the next party (and not an especially “liberal” one) got in. The only way that lowering the barrier would make any difference would be if the “liberals” could unite and then cooperate and share the 7-10% support that they probably have. But there are no signs of that happening. (Indeed, here is Kasparov criticising the latest attempt to form a coalition, which, of course, doesn’t include him).

Therefore, the Russian political landscape will look much the same for several more election cycles.

On the Commemoration of the Circassian Exile

On May 4, 2010February 2, 2016 By Patrick ArmstrongIn CONTRIBUTIONS TO GROUP DISCUSSIONS, HISTORY, SOUTH CAUCASUS

Note February 2016. Wrote this for a website discussing Circassia and I can’t find the original.

http://historiana.eu/case-study/the-russian-expulsion-circassian-peoples-19th-century/multiple-perspectives-commemorations-tragic-events-such-circassian-exodus

I do not think such commemorations are a good idea because the memory of yesterday’s miseries can lead to tomorrow’s.

Warfare is one of the engines of history – people live in this place and not that, speak this language and not that, have this religion and not that as the consequences of victory or defeat in war. The Circassians lost a long and brutal war and many of them went into exile as miserable refugees. But all peoples have the same past; all have been losers, all have been winners. My own ancestors, Border Reivers, were dispossessed of their lands and driven from Britain 400 years ago. It aids no one to dwell on these past miseries and injustices.

Therefore, commemorations of past tragedies can fuel present disputes that will lead to future tragedies. They should be matters of history to be dispassionately remembered and assessed. These events happened and, in most cases, had the losers been the winners, they would have done the same to their enemies.

Russia Profile Weekly Experts Panel: Eastern Europe in Danger?

On March 6, 2009February 1, 2016 By Patrick ArmstrongIn ACCUSATIONS, CONTRIBUTIONS TO GROUP DISCUSSIONS, PROPAGANDA, LIES AND NONSENSE, WAR ON RUSSIA

http://neftegaz.ru/en/press/view/5698

When NATO expansion was light-heartedly (George Kennan’s expression) begun by the Clinton administration its proponents sold the idea (I well remember earnest Americans patiently explaining this when I was a diplomat in Moscow) as a means of improving European security. And, had there been any serious intention to include Russia, perhaps it would have been. But wiser people, like Jack Matlock, foresaw that the exclusion of Russia would make things rather less stable.

And so it has proved to be. Even proponents of NATO expansion can see the connection with Tbilisi’s attack on South Ossetia last August and are fond of claiming that Russia puts up gas prices in order to weaken Ukraine (ignoring the fact that Russia has put up prices for everyone – even Armenia and Belarus which have no intention of joining NATO). NATO expansion has steadily crept east, from Poland to Latvia and now to Ukraine and Georgia (although their accession looks less likely today). Now the argument seems to be little more than because Moscow does not want these countries in NATO, they must be admitted (and, above all, we must not give Moscow a “veto”). A thin reason indeed.

NATO now has members that have re-painted their history under communist rule: gone are the home-grown communists like Wladyslaw Gomulka or Martin Latsis and in their place is a picture of Russian imperialism and native resistance. These countries are a lobby pushing NATO into a reflexive anti-Russian stance. They do not need actual evidence of Russian hostility: Russian imperialism is the very foundation stone of their new historical mythology. Perhaps the most preposterous example of this reconstruction of reality was the proposal that the still-existing museum in Gori Georgia to its favourite son, Iosef Bissarion-dze Jughashvili, be re-named the museum of the Russian occupation of Georgia. Perhaps Russia should create a museum of the Georgian occupation of Russia: given the importance to Russian history of Stalin, Beria, Orjonikidze, Golglidze and Gvishiani, this would have more historical credibility. “In 1939 the whole of the USSR could be said to be controlled by Georgians and Mingrelians” says Donald Rayfield in Stalin and his Hangmen. But these people have been painted out of the portraits – de-communisation was often more airbrushing than an honest recognition of the reality of enthusiastic native participants. And now they’re selling these paintings to NATO. As Matlock saw ten years ago: “it creates greater polarization of attitudes as the line moves east”. Kennan called it “a tragic mistake”.

The actual problems of the post-communist countries are all similar: corruption, out-dated industry, bad work habits, decaying infrastructure, crashing demographics and fragile economies. Countries that had the full 70-year dose of communism are worse off than those who received the 40-year dose to be sure, but the problems are shared. NATO is not the answer to any of them.

There is no better illustration of this truth than the parlous state of Ukraine today. The post “Orange Revolution” obsession with NATO has only exacerbated the political division in the country.

And finally, why would Russia, which is surviving the financial storm better than most – if not all – of its neighbours, want to acquire these countries anyway? Much more trouble (and expense) than they’re worth. After all, there wasn’t much stopping Russia from seizing most of Georgia last August if it had wanted to.

Russia Profile Weekly Experts Panel: For Real or for Show?

On February 17, 2009February 1, 2016 By Patrick ArmstrongIn CONTRIBUTIONS TO GROUP DISCUSSIONS, POLITICS AND POWER

http://www.russialist.org/archives/2009-37-3.php

The first thing that should be kept in mind is that in the present duumvirate, Medvedev and Putin are not rivals. They are members of the same team and have worked together for years. Thus, the most logical beginning, rather than looking for disagreements, is to attempt to see how they work in a complementary fashion.

When Putin became president all indicators in Russia were negative (as a reminder see “Russia is Finished” from the Atlantic Monthly of 2001). His early speeches show that he was seriously concerned that Russia might literally fall apart. I believe that he had four aims when he began: to reverse Russia’s economic decline; to halt fissiparous tendencies; to improve Russia’s standing in the world, to institute what he called “rule of law” but what might better be termed “rule of rules”. He can – and has – claimed real progress in the first three but has admitted to little success in the fourth. Indeed he once said that corruption had been his greatest failure. His style of governance was very centralising, not surprisingly given his fears about breakup. It can be argued that all this worked reasonably well for most of his eight years.

Medvedev became president in a less desperate time (although the unexpected international financial crisis has taken some of the shine off the economy). Although he worked with Putin in the bad years, he presumably is not so concerned with the possibility of sudden collapse. He can, therefore, be more relaxed.

Another difference is that during Putin’s time (and Yeltsin’s for that matter) prime ministers were, with the notable exception of Yevgeniy Primakov, creatures of the president. All decisions came to the president’s desk (something Putin once publically complained about) and others obeyed (or, quite often, ignored) presidential orders. Under the present duumvirate, Russia now has a prime minister of real status. This permits a different division of labour. We indeed see Putin working at the “first minister” details and Medvedev discussing the larger “presidential” policy issues. This is not the only possible division of labour but it appears to be how this one is shaping up. Indeed, for one of the few times in its history, Russia has a degree of pluralism of power. This could lead to trouble, as dual power has before, but so far the two are cooperating. The common assumption that Putin still rules Russia is too facile: there can be no question that he could have amended the constitution and been elected for a third term. The astute analyst must seek to understand why he chose the course that he did.

Medvedev has his sphere and Putin has his. It is clear that Medvedev’s sphere is “rule of law”, in the widest sense, and encouraging the modernisation of Russia (witness his recent remarks on “the information society”). It is also probable that he seeks to loosen some of the centralisation (over-centralisation to my mind) of the Putin period. This should not be seen as disagreement with Putin, neither should it be seen as tension between the two, but rather what is appropriate for Russia’s circumstances today.

Finally, one should reflect on the fact that Russia has had two presidents in a row who were greatly affected by Anatoliy Sobchak. There should be less obsession, to my mind, with Putin’s KGB background and more consideration of the “Sobchak factor”.

Russia Observer

Category: CONTRIBUTIONS TO GROUP DISCUSSIONS