Pussy Riot conducts a typing school

http://us-russia.org/80-pussy-riot-conducts-a-typing-school.html

JRL/2011/ 151/18

PUSSY RIOT CONDUCTS A TYPING SCHOOL

As we all know, a group calling itself Pussy Riot staged a stunt in Moscow’s Christ the Saviour Cathedral in February. Three members were arrested and have been sentenced to two years in jail. Which, less time served in “preventative detention” which counts twice, amounts to 14 months in prison. With the possibility of parole.

I’m not here going to talk about what they said and did in the church or any of the stunts that they pulled before or during the trial that probably extended the process. I’m not even sure of my own opinion about what should have happened to them. My concern here is the suspicious unanimity of coverage in the Western media.

We hear much about how they are mothers, as if there were some hitherto unknown legal principle that mothers get a free pass. [Note Eugene Ivanov has corrected me: there is a provision on Russian law for clemency towards pregnant women and mothers of small children which was not applied in this case. But, even so, I do not recall and Western outlet pointing this fact out.] We are told their ages and they are described as a “punk band” or sometimes as a “feminist punk band”. They are protesters against Putin. And, of course, it is taken for granted that Putin is really the law and judge in the case. Der Spiegel has all the memes. Masha Lipman misses out telling us that some are mothers. A particularly vapid piece in the New York Times about their style misses the mother part too. But a piece in Huffington Post gets them all in. An especially absurd piece in the Globe and Mail hits all the notes – and more: “Like the Pussy Riot heroines, whose names should be written with markers across all of our bodies, if only to remember an era in which we, too, were not afraid.” The Guardian gets them all in. As does the Bellona NGO. Something not mentioned in all the stuff about Putin and the Russian Church being in cahoots is that both the Chief Mufti and the Chief Rabbi also supported Putin).

There is a great deal of information about Pussy Riot to be found on the vibrant Russian blogosphere but, it seems, few Western media outlets bothered to look. Here for example (Warning VERY NSFW) are photos of another of their performances, albeit under another name, (sex in a museum in 2008). Further information here. No music then. And no charges or arrests either. Or another performance involving chickens and a grocery store in 2010 (again under a previous name – go to 2:29). Again neither music nor arrests. So “punk band” is hardly a complete description. The reader is also invited to compare the actual film of the cathedral event with the edited version. Quite a difference; that alone ought to set reporters to wondering if they were being manipulated. In short, there was some background that could have been examined but wasn’t: all we heard was young, mothers, punk music band and political. And this was all spun into a story that Putin was cracking down on political dissent. But they, and their source group, Voyna, had been political before and the authorities ignored them. Perhaps they wanted more attention. But, in the Cathedral church of Moscow – with all its history – their latest stunt did result in an arrest.

Russia, like other countries, has laws about public order even if the Russians (and, as we will see, the Ukrainians) quaintly call it “hooliganism”. Here is New York City’s and the UK’s for example. Poland has a law against blasphemy and an individual has been fined for something she said in an interview (but not in a church). But the standard story did not mention this and often barely hinted that the charges were not that the young mothers were protesting Putin (something rather common and even placid these days) but committing a public order disturbance and insulting religion. Furthermore, numerous Western countries have “hate crime” legislation and people are punished – even jailed – for that. But all we heard was young, mothers, punk music band and political. The most hyperbolic (and idiotic) headline was surely “Pussy Riot trial ‘worse than Soviet era’”. No, actually, it wasn’t: lack of vegan food is not quite the same as the “conveyer” or “beat, beat and beat again”. The Guardian headline creators might want to read their Solzhenitsyn again – a required text in Russian schools, by the way.

In short, Western consumers of its media outlets were treated to a very partial story indeed and to one version. Little effort was made to research any background. It was typing not reporting.

So who wrote the script that so many media outlets faithfully re-typed? Alexander Goldfarb perhaps: we are told that he “set up Pussy Riot’s legal fund in the United States”. He turns out to be the Executive Director of the International Foundation for Civil Liberties which was set up by Boris Berezovskiy. Given that Berezovskiy has more than once said that his aim in life is to bring Putin down by whatever methods, why would any supposedly impartial reporter re-type his press releases? Goldfarb was also a key player in that other media re-typing exercise, the death of Litvinenko, and was the source of much of that story. Some say there are other manipulators: the US State Department or its innumerable funded groups. (NOTE: The reader is reminded that, when all the normal sources of “news” are re-typing the same press release, reality must be sought elsewhere at the margins. Click through the references in these last two and decide for yourself how plausible their arguments are.)

Last Friday a crucifix erected near the former headquarters of the Soviet political police in Kiev in commemoration of Ukrainians who died in the communist years was cut down by one of the members of FEMEN (also Dear Reader, thanks to laws in many Western countries, the URL is also NSFW). She was young, possibly a mother, not apparently a punk band member (but a self-confessed feminist) and there was a political motive. The Ukrainian authorities are preparing a charge of hooliganism against her too. Will this also become a huge story? Perhaps it will, given that Berezovskiy doesn’t like President Yanukovych. And, dare I suggest it, now that Ukraine does not have a government that wants to get in to NATO. Stay tuned.

 

Pussy Riot Conducts a Typing School

http://us-russia.org/80-pussy-riot-conducts-a-typing-school.html

JRL/2011/ 151/18

As we all know, a group calling itself Pussy Riot staged a stunt in Moscow’s Christ the Saviour Cathedral in February. Three members were arrested and have been sentenced to two years in jail. Which, less time served in “preventative detention” which counts twice, amounts to 14 months in prison. With the possibility of parole.

I’m not here going to talk about what they said and did in the church or any of the stunts that they pulled before or during the trial that probably extended the process. I’m not even sure of my own opinion about what should have happened to them. My concern here is the suspicious unanimity of coverage in the Western media.

We hear much about how they are mothers, as if there were some hitherto unknown legal principle that mothers get a free pass. [Note Eugene Ivanov has corrected me: there is a provision on Russian law for clemency towards pregnant women and mothers of small children which was not applied in this case. But, even so, I do not recall and Western outlet pointing this fact out.] We are told their ages and they are described as a “punk band” or sometimes as a “feminist punk band”. They are protesters against Putin. And, of course, it is taken for granted that Putin is really the law and judge in the case. Der Spiegel has all the memes. Masha Lipman misses out telling us that some are mothers. A particularly vapid piece in the New York Times about their style misses the mother part too. But a piece in Huffington Post gets them all in. An especially absurd piece in the Globe and Mail hits all the notes – and more: “Like the Pussy Riot heroines, whose names should be written with markers across all of our bodies, if only to remember an era in which we, too, were not afraid.” The Guardian gets them all in. As does the Bellona NGO. Something not mentioned in all the stuff about Putin and the Russian Church being in cahoots is that both the Chief Mufti and the Chief Rabbi also supported Putin).

There is a great deal of information about Pussy Riot to be found on the vibrant Russian blogosphere but, it seems, few Western media outlets bothered to look. Here for example (Warning VERY NSFW) are photos of another of their performances, albeit under another name, (sex in a museum in 2008). Further information here. No music then. And no charges or arrests either. Or another performance involving chickens and a grocery store in 2010 (again under a previous name – go to 2:29). Again neither music nor arrests. So “punk band” is hardly a complete description. The reader is also invited to compare the actual film of the cathedral event with the edited version. Quite a difference; that alone ought to set reporters to wondering if they were being manipulated. In short, there was some background that could have been examined but wasn’t: all we heard was young, mothers, punk music band and political. And this was all spun into a story that Putin was cracking down on political dissent. But they, and their source group, Voyna, had been political before and the authorities ignored them. Perhaps they wanted more attention. But, in the Cathedral church of Moscow – with all its history – their latest stunt did result in an arrest.

Russia, like other countries, has laws about public order even if the Russians (and, as we will see, the Ukrainians) quaintly call it “hooliganism”. Here is New York City’s and the UK’s for example. Poland has a law against blasphemy and an individual has been fined for something she said in an interview (but not in a church). But the standard story did not mention this and often barely hinted that the charges were not that the young mothers were protesting Putin (something rather common and even placid these days) but committing a public order disturbance and insulting religion. Furthermore, numerous Western countries have “hate crime” legislation and people are punished – even jailed – for that. But all we heard was young, mothers, punk music band and political. The most hyperbolic (and idiotic) headline was surely “Pussy Riot trial ‘worse than Soviet era’”. No, actually, it wasn’t: lack of vegan food is not quite the same as the “conveyer” or “beat, beat and beat again”. The Guardian headline creators might want to read their Solzhenitsyn again – a required text in Russian schools, by the way.

In short, Western consumers of its media outlets were treated to a very partial story indeed and to one version. Little effort was made to research any background. It was typing not reporting.

So who wrote the script that so many media outlets faithfully re-typed? Alexander Goldfarb perhaps: we are told that he “set up Pussy Riot’s legal fund in the United States”. He turns out to be the Executive Director of the International Foundation for Civil Liberties which was set up by Boris Berezovskiy. Given that Berezovskiy has more than once said that his aim in life is to bring Putin down by whatever methods, why would any supposedly impartial reporter re-type his press releases? Goldfarb was also a key player in that other media re-typing exercise, the death of Litvinenko, and was the source of much of that story. Some say there are other manipulators: the US State Department or its innumerable funded groups. (NOTE: The reader is reminded that, when all the normal sources of “news” are re-typing the same press release, reality must be sought elsewhere at the margins. Click through the references in these last two and decide for yourself how plausible their arguments are.)

Last Friday a crucifix erected near the former headquarters of the Soviet political police in Kiev in commemoration of Ukrainians who died in the communist years was cut down by one of the members of FEMEN (also Dear Reader, thanks to laws in many Western countries, the URL is also NSFW). She was young, possibly a mother, not apparently a punk band member (but a self-confessed feminist) and there was a political motive. The Ukrainian authorities are preparing a charge of hooliganism against her too. Will this also become a huge story? Perhaps it will, given that Berezovskiy doesn’t like President Yanukovych. And, dare I suggest it, now that Ukraine does not have a government that wants to get in to NATO. Stay tuned.

Syria, Russia, Hysteria

Note January 2016: I would no longer say that the war in Syria was sui generis. I think it’s clear that, whatever combustible material may have been lying around, Washington had a lot of involvement in starting the fire.

http://www.america-russia.net/eng/face/313347041

http://www.america-russia.net/face/313347041

http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/2012/07/syria-russia-hysteria.html

JRL/2011/ 135/35

http://americanpoliticalblogs.com/2012/07/flash-points/

The revolt in Syria, now in its eighteenth month, was not caused by Washington or by Moscow. It is sui generis: specifically it is the consequence of circumstances peculiar to Syria; in general, it is another of the several revolts in the “Arab World”.

But some of the commentary in Western circles – especially, but not exclusively, in the USA – is making it sound like a Manichean battlefield of a new Cold War. Perhaps the epitome of this view is John Bolton’s assertion that “Assad remains in power because of Russia and Iran, with China supporting him in the background.” This is nonsense: Assad remains in power because people in Syria are prepared to fight for him. Naturally, the longer the fight goes on, the more outsiders are attracted: recently the government of Iraq claimed that jihadist fighters were leaving there for Syria and it is quite believable that Teheran is involved as well. But this has nothing to do with Moscow or Beijing. Bolton, perhaps to be given an important position should Romney be elected, goes on to advise what should be done; true to his assumption that Moscow is Assad’s prop, he calls for missile defence installations in Poland and the Czech Republic, withdrawal from START etc etc (No suggestions of how to pressure China. Interestingly.) As to Syria itself, he suggests Washington should “find Syrian rebel leaders who are truly secular and who oppose radical Islam”. Given that “war is deceit”, he may be disappointed in his search. But in truth, Bolton’s piece, like many others from the US right, is not really about Syria or Russia, it is an attack on President Obama: “Obama is not up to the job in Syria.” Indeed, many of the pieces that argue that Moscow is to blame are actually attacks on Obama’s alleged weakness or incapacity. “The Security Council’s moral authority is nil with Russia and China in permanent seats” is followed by “shame on Obama”. This throwaway line “Russia’s belligerent support of a murderous Syrian dictator” is from a excoriation of Obama’s activities, root and branch. Russia is just another boot to throw at him. Not everyone in the US conservative camp is so enthusiastic: this speaks of “strategy creep”, this of the unintended consequences of the Libya intervention, this of past failures and confusions. But many of the strongest calls for intervention, and the strongest kicks at Moscow, come from this side of the argument.

But others, more in the “humanitarian intervention” camp, also see the route to Damascus as running through Moscow: “Many major players in the Syrian crisis consider the peace plan that reached its deadline Thursday as the final speed bump in figuring out how to get Russia to accept enough pressure on President Bashar al-Assad to stop the violence”. The Canadian Foreign Minister believes “Russia is enabling this regime to soldier on”. French President Hollande implies Russia is “protecting” Assad. US Secretary of State Clinton says Russia’s “policy is going to help contribute to a civil war”. We are solemnly informed that “Russia has put itself on the wrong side of the argument.” Accusations come and go: Russia is supplying Syria with attack helicopters one moment; the next they are already in Syrian stocks. Russian warships sail for Syria, but arrive somewhere else. Massacres change their stories. All this assumes, against any reasonable or factual probability, that Moscow controls or has a decisive influence on Assad’s actions. But Assad is fighting for his very existence. He already has all the weapons he needs. And many Syrians, who fear a jihadist-dominated result (something the Boltons and “humanitarians” seem quite unconcerned about) support him too.

Moscow’s alleged support of Assad’s regime is said to hinge on two vital interests: its “naval base” at Tartus and its desire to preserve arms sales to Syria. But, generally, these motives are asserted without much effort spent looking at either one.

Let us consider the first. While Tartus (or Tartous) is Syria’s largest commercial port, by world standards it is rather small. According to the World Port Source, in 2008 it handled 12.9 million tons of cargo, mostly imports, and occupies a mere 300 hectares. By contrast, Rotterdam, Europe’s largest, and number 4 in the world, handled more than 400 million tons in 2008 and is over 10,000 hectares in area. The Russians have a lease on a corner of this small port and examination on Google Earth does not show anything very military. According to a Russian military thinktank, its normal staff is a few dozen and it is little more than a place where Russian warships, after their long trip from the Baltic or Barents Seas, can obtain fresh food, water and fuel. Moscow has invested little in improving it. While there is no doubt some symbolic value to it, as a “naval base” it is rather insignificant. Paul Saunders has an informed discussion of it here.

As to weapons, we hear much, but few commentators attempt the few moments’ research to find out what. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and its Arms Transfers Database tracks arms transfers and is regarded to be as accurate as open sources get. If we go to its Trade Register page, we can find its record of transfers from Russia to Syria 1990-2011. In these two decades, Russia has supplied Syria with anti-tank, anti-aircraft and anti-ship missiles; engines for tanks provided by Czechoslovakia and the USSR; 24 MiG 29 air superiority fighters and 2 MiG 31 interceptors were sold – some sources suggest that they were taken out of Russian Air Force stocks so how operable they are is a moot point. More recently 36 Yak 130 trainer/light ground attack aircraft were ordered but have not been delivered. The large majority of weapons in the Syrian arsenal are Soviet-supplied and therefore upwards of three decades old. Given the reports of army units changing sides, many of these weapons will be in rebels’ hands by now. In any case these weapons are not very useful in the kind of war going on in Syria. The missiles are best used against their appropriate targets, the twenty-year-old tank engines power thirty-year-old tanks. The aircraft – if they can still fly – could conceivably be converted to ground-attack roles. But, given that by all accounts the fighting is mostly individuals and small arms, these weapons are hardly key for Assad’s survival. The most useful would have been the Yak 130s but they have not been delivered and apparently won’t be. So the arms market motive is rather overblown – it’s not a very large contributor to Russia’s arms sales and the weapons themselves are hardly the essential thing that is keeping Assad in power (the reader is invited to compare sales with India to see what a truly significant Russian market looks like). I reiterate, pace Bolton and the rest of them, Assad is kept in power – so far – by the fact that people are ready to fight on his behalf. Russia’s so-called support (and China’s) have little influence on this reality. A UN resolution (unless it licences NATO intervention; or, vide Libya, is interpreted as doing so) will not change anything. Assad and his opponents are playing for greater stakes than “world opinion”; they know what happened to Saddam Hussein and to Kaddafi.

Russia’s official position, courtesy of Foreign Minister Lavrov, is here. It is much based on principle. All governments like to claim that their actions are firmly based on principle. But these principles are friable: Washington, for example, was very firm on the principle of inviolability of borders in the Georgian case in 2008 but not so much in Yugoslavia in 1999; Moscow firmly held the opposite position each time. Moscow was very supportive of the human rights of Ossetians but not so much about those of Kosovars; Washington, again, the opposite. Each was adept at manufacturing reasons why inviolable principles in the one case did not apply in the other. Interest trumps principle.

But Lavrov’s piece above has much on caution. And that is very much a Russian interest. Caution is often missing from the “humanitarian interventionists”. The blunt question that must be asked of those who cheered on, and participated in, NATO’s Libyan intervention is this: are the Libyans, and their neighbours, better off today? And, are they likely to be? Western media had nonstop coverage of Kaddafi’s overthrow but there has been rather less reporting on the consequences: gunmen, chaos, jihadists, spillover into Chad and Mali (not that the author of the last can resist a little Putin-bashing when it comes to Syria). But “we came, we saw, he died” and we move on to the next “success”. Moscow is fundamentally a cautious power today, committed to the status quo. If the UN can be by-passed, Russia as a P5 member loses status and influence. If a government in Country A can be overthrown, could Russia’s government be next? And what happens after the government is overthrown: who has to deal with the consequences? A rational discussion of Moscow’s motives may be found here. Some principle but mostly self-interest and a strong mistrust of the West’s motives predominate.

As to “humanitarian interventions”, Moscow is sceptical. They have seen the breathless coverage in Western circles of atrocities fade away afterwards: where are the mass graves and rape camps we heard so much of in Kosovo? Was Kaddafi really “bombing his own people”? (A note on sources, Dear Reader. Because Western media outlets move ever forward, ever forgetting, these uncomfortable reconsiderations only appear in fringe sources or – like this, or this – in the deep back pages; the front page is always reserved for the latest excitement). And, given that so many “humanitarian interventions” are lightly entered into and the downstream effects ignored, what is the result for stability – something Moscow prizes? Syria’s borders are rather artificial (another map drawn on the floor of Wilson’s study at Versailles), the Assads have kept order (brutally): who will replace them? The Boltons (“Syrian rebel leaders who are truly secular”) and the “humanitarians” (“Stop the killing”) either think they know or don’t care. But consequences happen and Malians suffer the results. And (frightening thought!) each “humanitarian intervention” obligates another. After their terrible history, one can understand that Russians would value stability and the status quo. What the Russians see, covered by the shabby mantle of “humanitarianism”, are overthrows of previously recognised governments justified by propaganda campaigns lightly based on reality with a flippant disregard of the consequences. At the end, no one is much better off and unpleasant realities are ignored. And then another campaign starts.

But I may be taking this all too seriously. Maybe something else is going on. Apart from the opportunity to bash Obama, there may be another motive for painting Russia as the obstacle. Previous “humanitarian interventions” proved to be rather more difficult than expected. The Somalia intervention convinced Osama bin Laden that “You have been disgraced by Allah and you withdrew; the extent of your impotence and weaknesses became very clear”. NATO’s intervention in Kosovo lasted for nearly eighty days and at the end ground intervention was being contemplated. NATO’s actions in Libya lasted for even longer – over 200 days – and at the end involved much more effort than merely a “no-fly zone”. Syria would clearly be a tougher nut to crack. Perhaps Washington and NATO have no stomach for another “humanitarian intervention” and find it convenient to blame inaction on Russia. It’s an excuse.

Reply to Ronald Asmus’s Claim Russia Attacked First

Note Feb 2016: Can’t remember exactly what Asmus said but his general line was that Russia was the aggressor. Of course, as I show here and elsewhere, Saakashvili changed his story and the “Russians already in the Roki Tunnel” version only appeared when he had a defeat to explain away.

http://www.russialist.org/archives/2009-60-1.php

Response to Ronald Asmus JRL/2009/59/04

Will this canard never die?

Below is what Civil Georgia reported in 8 August in its entirety (my emphasis)

http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=18955&search=control%20ossetia

“President Saakashvili said he had announced a general mobilization of reserve troops amid “large-scale military aggression” by Russia.

In a live televised address on August 8, Saakashvili said Georgian government troops had gone “on the offensive” after South Ossetian militias responded to his peace initiative on August 7 by shelling Georgian villages.

As a result, he said, Georgian forces now controlled “most of South Ossetia.”

He said the breakaway region’s districts of Znauri, Tsinagari, as well as the villages of Dmenisi, Gromi, and Khetagurovo, were “already liberated” by Georgian forces.

“A large part of Tskhinvali is now liberated and fighting is ongoing in the center of Tskhinvali,” he added.

He also said that Georgia had come under aerial attack from Russian warplanes on August 8, which was an obvious sign of “large-scale military aggression” against Georgia.

The Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs said that three SU-24 Fencer attack aircraft had breeched Georgian airspace on August 8, and one of them had dropped two bombs close to a police station in Kareli, slightly injuring several people.

“Immediately stop the bombing of Georgian towns,” Saakashvili told Russia. “Georgia did not start this confrontation and Georgia will not give up its territories; Georgia will not say no to its freedom… We have already mobilized tens of thousands of reserve troops. Mobilization is ongoing.”

“Hundreds of thousands of Georgians should stand together and save Georgia,” he added.

Note there is no mention of Russian forces in the Roki Tunnel: he gives quite different excuses.

Saakashvili’s story has changed: see my piece (with Georgian sources) on JRL/2009/ (http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/2008-170-21.cfm) documenting the change. The “Russians are already in the Roki Tunnel” excuse – of which Saakashvili put forth two variations) only appeared after the operation went so badly wrong.

And BTW – here’s the Civil Georgia report of the Kurashvili statement from 8 Aug (http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=18941&search=)

A senior official from the Georgian Ministry of Defense said Georgia had “decided to restore constitutional order in the entire region” of South Ossetia. Mamuka Kurashvili, an MoD official in charge of overseeing peacekeeping operations, told journalists late on August 7 that the South Ossetian side had rejected Tbilisi’s earlier decision to unilaterally cease fire and had resumed shelling of Georgian villages in the conflict zone.

Kitsmarishvili Testimony

JRL/2009/54/41

In response to David J. Smith’s piece “Russia Was First” (JRL/2009/53/34) allow me to just add a few things that may have escaped his attention.

This from the testimony of Erosi Kitsmarishvili, Georgia’s former ambassador to Russia and a one-time close ally of President Saakashvili. Reference at http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=20026. The whole thing, covering relations with Moscow related by someone who was intimately involved, is worth reading.

“But an incident took place between Okruashvili and Kokoity [Kitsmarishvili did not specify] and escalation started to raise in the region; a special operation was then carried out in South Ossetia, which was led by Okruashvili; on that day Okruashvili announced [on August 19, 2004] that [the Georgian troops] killed eight Cossacks fighting on the South Ossetian side. But eventually it turned out that only one person was killed.”

“During that meeting, President Saakashvili asked the question whether to launch a military assault on Tskhinvali or not? Vano Merabishvili, Irakli Chubinishvili and Zurab Adeishvili were against of launch of this operation; then we asked Gogi Tavtukhashvili whether there were enough capabilities to secure control over the region in a next few days in case of the military operation; Tavtukhashvili failed to give us a positive answer on that question; We were very close to taking a decision in favor of the operation, because Okruashvili, who was in favor of the military operation, was at that time very close associate to President Saakashvili;”

“In the second half of April, 2008, I have learnt from the President’s inner circle that they have received a green light from the western partner to carry out a military operation; When asked to specify “the western partner” Kitsmarishvili said: after a meeting with the U.S. President George W. Bush [the meeting between Bush and Saakashvili took place in Washington on March 19], our leadership was saying that they had the U.S. support to carry out the military operation; In order to double-check this information, I have met with John Tefft, the U.S. ambassador in Tbilisi and asked him whether it was true or not; he categorically denied that;”

The military operation should have been undertaken in direction of Abkhazia; military instructors from Israel were brought here in order to prepare that military operation; Kezerashvili also said at that meeting that the operation should have started in early May, or at least before the snow melted on the mountain passes; This decision was not materialized;”

In short, according to one of the insiders, an attack by Tbilisi was always in the cards. And, as Mr Smith appears to have forgotten, but Mr Kitsmarishvili has not, there actually was an attack in August 2004 (which resulted in another defeat for Tbilisi).

Moscow’s taking preparations is hardly proof of aggressive intent.

Russia Profile Weekly Experts Panel: Eastern Europe in Danger?

http://neftegaz.ru/en/press/view/5698

When NATO expansion was light-heartedly (George Kennan’s expression) begun by the Clinton administration its proponents sold the idea (I well remember earnest Americans patiently explaining this when I was a diplomat in Moscow) as a means of improving European security. And, had there been any serious intention to include Russia, perhaps it would have been. But wiser people, like Jack Matlock, foresaw that the exclusion of Russia would make things rather less stable.

And so it has proved to be. Even proponents of NATO expansion can see the connection with Tbilisi’s attack on South Ossetia last August and are fond of claiming that Russia puts up gas prices in order to weaken Ukraine (ignoring the fact that Russia has put up prices for everyone – even Armenia and Belarus which have no intention of joining NATO). NATO expansion has steadily crept east, from Poland to Latvia and now to Ukraine and Georgia (although their accession looks less likely today). Now the argument seems to be little more than because Moscow does not want these countries in NATO, they must be admitted (and, above all, we must not give Moscow a “veto”). A thin reason indeed.

NATO now has members that have re-painted their history under communist rule: gone are the home-grown communists like Wladyslaw Gomulka or Martin Latsis and in their place is a picture of Russian imperialism and native resistance. These countries are a lobby pushing NATO into a reflexive anti-Russian stance. They do not need actual evidence of Russian hostility: Russian imperialism is the very foundation stone of their new historical mythology. Perhaps the most preposterous example of this reconstruction of reality was the proposal that the still-existing museum in Gori Georgia to its favourite son, Iosef Bissarion-dze Jughashvili, be re-named the museum of the Russian occupation of Georgia. Perhaps Russia should create a museum of the Georgian occupation of Russia: given the importance to Russian history of Stalin, Beria, Orjonikidze, Golglidze and Gvishiani, this would have more historical credibility. “In 1939 the whole of the USSR could be said to be controlled by Georgians and Mingrelians” says Donald Rayfield in Stalin and his Hangmen. But these people have been painted out of the portraits – de-communisation was often more airbrushing than an honest recognition of the reality of enthusiastic native participants. And now they’re selling these paintings to NATO. As Matlock saw ten years ago: “it creates greater polarization of attitudes as the line moves east”. Kennan called it “a tragic mistake”.

The actual problems of the post-communist countries are all similar: corruption, out-dated industry, bad work habits, decaying infrastructure, crashing demographics and fragile economies. Countries that had the full 70-year dose of communism are worse off than those who received the 40-year dose to be sure, but the problems are shared. NATO is not the answer to any of them.

There is no better illustration of this truth than the parlous state of Ukraine today. The post “Orange Revolution” obsession with NATO has only exacerbated the political division in the country.

And finally, why would Russia, which is surviving the financial storm better than most – if not all – of its neighbours, want to acquire these countries anyway? Much more trouble (and expense) than they’re worth. After all, there wasn’t much stopping Russia from seizing most of Georgia last August if it had wanted to.

Debunking the Latest Rumour: Manas Airbase

Note Feb 2016: I think this was a contribution to a section in ROPV that never quite took off.

http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/2009/02/debunking-the-latest-rumor.html#more

Manas Airbase.

ISSUE. In 2001 the USA leased part of the Manas airfield in the Kyrgyz Republic to support US and Allied operations in Afghanistan. This month, President Bakiyev announced that he would seek to close the base. The Kyrgyz Republic Parliament will discuss the issue on 19 February.

INTERPRETATION: Many in the West saw Bakiyev as a puppet and the whole thing orchestrated in Moscow so as to embarrass President Obama. “Bakiyev Pleases Moscow” (Jamestown Foundation) “Under Vladimir Putin, Russia has been trying to reclaim the influence it once had in the former Central Asian Soviet republics, so Russian pressure on Kyrgyzstan is not unexpected.” (BBC) “”I think that the principal motivation is to reassert Russian influence and get visible U.S. presence out of former Soviet republics,” said retired Adm. William J. Fallon” (Huffington Post) “Russia Offers Kind Words, but Its Fist Is Clenched” (NYT). Most of these accounts mention Bakiyev’s objections but seem to regard them as just a cover for Russian machinations

COMMENT. But Bakiyev has long been tired with the relationship with Washington. “The president said he had repeatedly suggested that the US side should review the airbase agreement and raise the leasing fee for the airbase, but the suggestion was ignored. He added that the base closure was also caused by violations of law by US military personnel, including the killing of a Kyrgyz national by a US soldier in December 2006.

But there are other reasons why the issue has become a significant irritant.

  • The possibility that US forces might use the base to attack Iran or gather intelligence on China: support of the effort in Afghanistan is one thing, being draw into these issues is quite another.
  • The lack of the “trickle-down” benefits that, perhaps naively, were expected.
  • Concerns over the initial, possibly corrupt, agreement with the former President of the Kyrgyz Republic.
  • Growing scepticism about the effectiveness and length of the Afghanistan operation.
  • But, probably most important, the conviction that Washington regards the Kyrgyz Republic as a third-rate country to be taken for granted and fobbed off with indifference, patronising promises and extra-territorial arrogance. Media treatments that assume Bakiyev is Moscow’s puppet will not help this impression.

CONCLUSION: To regard Bakiyev’s decision (which may yet be reversed) as something dreamed up in Moscow is to grossly oversimplify the issue and make the common error of assuming that Moscow is the only actor.

FURTHER READING: John CK Daly: “The Manas Disillusionment”.

Early Thoughts on Litvinenko Case

The initial story, which developed over a few weeks, was that Alexander Litvinenko, a former “spy” and opponent of Putin, met in a London sushi bar on 1 Nov 2006 with an Italian professor, Mario Scaramella, who had urgent information for him about the murder of the Russian reporter Anna Politkovskaya. Litvinenko returned home, became sick, was taken to hospital and died three weeks later from radiation poisoning. His last words were to accuse Putin of having had him killed. This story was widely disseminated in suspiciously similar wording. It, together with the murder of a Russian reporter Anna Politkovskaya in Moscow, has become woven into a story that Russian President Putin routinely has his opponents murdered. Some were more sceptical, but the January piece in the New Yorker magazine reiterates the thesis that Putin’s enemies tend to die suddenly. (Summaries of some of the UK and US reactions).

Russians are strongly irritated at the way the immediate consensus that Russia is run by a sort of Murder Inc has been accepted so uncritically. The more suspicious believe that the story is a consciously manufactured plot to defame Putin and Russia.

From the first reports, there were reasons to be sceptical of the initial story. 1) all the sources, Litvinenko himself, (and Tim Bell, a major British PR and advertising executive, who handled the publicity) were people who worked for Boris Berezovskiy (see below); 2) Litvinenko was known to be a very unreliable source; 3) Even if Putin were in the habit of murdering his opponents, there were many more profitable targets in London alone; 4) the death bed accusation appears to exist only in English, which Litvinenko’s widow said he “couldn’t really speak”, and was given out by Alexander Goldfarb, another Berezovskiy employee.

In 1997, while working in the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), in a section providing protection services, Litvinenko met Berezovskiy; shortly after, he was fired from the FSB (after dramatically stating that his superiors had ordered him to murder Berezovskiy) and began working for him openly. He moved to the UK and eventually became a British citizen. He had made a career of dramatic accusations – murder plots against Berezovskiy; Putin was responsible for the apartment building explosions in Russia in 1999; Italian politician Romano Prodi is a Soviet agent; al Qaeda is a KGB plot; Putin is a pedophile. He was never able to produce any convincing proof of these accusations and few paid much attention to him. There is also a claim that he was short of money and trying to blackmail people.

No single point of the original story has stood up in subsequent revelations

  • Improbability – If Putin were in the habit of murdering his opposition, in London alone, there are three people who would be much higher on his list. Oleg Gordievskiy (one of the highest-ranking KGB officers ever to defect), Berezovskiy himself and Akhmed Zakayev (an apologist for the jihadists in Chechnya). And would he choose such a complicated means and assign the job to people inept enough to poison themselves?
  • Mario Scaramella, the man with whom he met in the sushi bar in the original story. 1) denied his information was connected with Politkovskaya’s death); 2) none of the universities he claims to be associated with have heard of him; 3) is today under arrest in Italy accused of giving false evidence on a case involving arms smuggling.
  • Polonium-210. Traces of polonium-210 were found all over London: in numerous hotels and offices and in Litvinenko’s home. Further traces were found corresponding to the movements of Dmitriy Kovtun (see below). In this connection, Berezovskiy’s statement in 2005 that the jihadists in Chechnya were close to building a nuclear weapon may be relevant (polonium can be used as a trigger). There is some evidence that Litvinenko was exposed to polonium-210 more than once. The material is, in fact, not that hard to obtain.
  • Islamic Jihadist connections. Litvinenko 1) converted to Islam shortly before his death; 2) the rebel forces in Chechnya awarded him their “highest decoration” – what had he done for them and where were his loyalties?
  • Boris Berezovskiy. Berezovskiy made a great deal of money in the Yeltsin years (when he was known as the “godfather of the Kremlin”) and was driven out of Russia by Putin because he violated Putin’s declaration that the shady billionaires from the Yeltsin period could keep their money so long as they stayed out of politics. Berezovskiy was granted asylum in the UK and has said that he is trying to overthrow Putin. Litvinenko was employed by Berezovskiy when he left the FSB; it appears that Berezovskiy kept him on a retainer but had recently cut it leaving him eager for money. Alexander Goldfarb, the source for much of the original story, who has been naively described as Litvinenko’s friend, is Berezovskiy’s “right hand”.
  • Lugovoy and Kovtun. Andrey Lugovoy is another former FSB officer who quit to work for Berezovskiy; apparently he had known Litvinenko for some years. Dmitriy Kovtun is an associate of his. They were some of the people with whom Litvinenko met on the fatal day and traces of polonium-210 have been found on aircraft and in Germany associated with Kovtun’s movements. Both were reportedly made sick, but have recovered.
  • Coverage. The media likes simple stories and that is what it was given in the beginning: brave opponent of Putin’s dictatorship murdered. As the story grew, with new characters, multiple appearances of polonium-210, Chechen connections, Scaramella’s arrest, it has become so complicated that media attention has wandered. But the simple story has lingered, and many people are not aware of the details that cast doubt on it.
  • The three most significant new facts are: 1) the jihadist connection; 2) the widespread traces of radiation; 3) several cases of sickness of the principals (especially the case of Scaramella who met Litvinenko before Litvinenko met Lugovoy and Kovtun). What this evidence fits best is a story of nuclear smuggling in which the principals managed to contaminate themselves and spread radiation traces wherever they went. Clearly, the mystery remains, but all new evidence makes the simple original hypothesis that Putin murdered an enemy less probable.

Note: Feb 2016. In February 2009 I added this introduction

The death of Alexander Litvinenko, a former low-level KGB agent and employee of Boris Berezovsky, created scandalous world press. Western media were quick to intimate that President Putin had orchestrated the death, quoting, among other things, a deathbed letter written in English despite the fact that Litvinenko’s English was poor. More astute commentators observed Litivinenko’s connections with jihadists in Chechnya and the fact that Polonium, the radioactive material that killed him, can be used in making nuclear weapons; this theory is strengthened by Litvinenko’s deathbed conversion to Islam. Others concentrate on the fact that every story – and many appeared to be later discarded – came from one of Berezovsky’s employees: the original statement that he was sick with thallium poisoning, the Scaramella connection and the famous deathbed accusation. Berezovsky has publicly stated that he would do anything to bring down Putin; if Litvinenko was trying to smuggle the material to his friends in Chechnya, then Berezovskiy successfully spun the story so as to do great damage to Putin. The murder remains unsolved, but Russian state involvement seems the least likely explanation today.

And this final point:

  • Last year, an American reporter, Edward Jay Epstein, actually visited Moscow to look at the evidence the British police had given the Russians to support their accusation of Lugovoy and came away very unconvinced: “After considering all the evidence, my hypothesis is that Litvinenko came in contact with a Polonium-210 smuggling operation and was, either wittingly or unwittingly, exposed to it.” His account summarises the case very well.