RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP 17 March 2011

ANNIVERSARY. Twenty years today the USSR held a referendum on whether to support the proposed New Union Treaty. The new setup would have given much more power to the republics; the word used to describe it then was “confederation”. I recall much brouhaha about how the referendum would be a bust and even some “experts” claiming that no one knew what they were voting on (despite the fact that all the iterations of the treaty – 3 as I remember – had been published in the Soviet press). In the event there was a decent turnout and a strong support for continuing in the new arrangement. This was the pre-Internet days and I have lost the detailed results but the overall results are here and more detailed here. (Both sources are disingenuous, taking their numbers not from the whole population of potential voters but from those who actually did vote; in several areas not voting was voting “no”). The three Baltic SSRs, the Moldavian, Georgian and Armenian SSRs did not hold votes, on the grounds that they had not legally been incorporated into the USSR in the first place. But the Abkhaz ASSR voted by a small margin to stay in. The Chechen-Ingush ASSR voted to get out as did the Nakhichevan ASSR (the last I suspect being part of Heydar Aliyev’s manoeuvring to get to Baku). So, some hints of the future were given. The proposed signing date was set for 20 August but the coup attempt on the 19th (not unconnected of course) intervened. In the event the leaders of the Ukrainian and Belarussian SSRs and the RSFSR (55.7% of whose registered voters had voted “yes”) simply declared the end of the USSR in December (the three Baltics had been let go in September in what turned out to be effectively the last official act of the USSR). And that was that. I still believe that the bulk of the USSR could have transformed into the New Union; if so, a lot of suffering would have been avoided. Three quotations are instructive: “The recent dramatic events [ie the coup attempt] showed that our republic is absolutely unprotected… ” (Kravchuk 1991); “if Ukraine really will not be in the Union, I cannot imagine such a Union” (Yeltsin 1991); “I believed that Ukraine is so rich that it provided for the entire [Soviet] Union” (Kuchma 1993). So Ukraine killed the New Union on the expectation that it would become immediately rich by stopping the imagined drain from the others on its “rich” economy. Ah well, divorce in haste, repent at leisure: a recent poll from Ukraine says half the population now regrets the breakup. I suspect that a lot of former Soviets do too. Indeed it would be very interesting to see polls from others of the fifteen; especially from those that were very glad to get out twenty years ago. But it’s too late, it’s gone.

EMERGENCIES MINISTRY. Speaking of 1991, that is the year that Sergey Shoygu was appointed head of the Ministry. And he still is. For twenty years he has consistently ranked very high in popularity and trust. And for good reason. I have noticed in many international disasters that the Ministry is quick to act and regularly one of the first responders. And so it has with the Japanese disaster: the first rescue teams started work in Sendai Tuesday and more are on the way together with the first load of emergency supplies. Moscow has also offered fire fighting expertise at the damaged reactors. A highly skilled and efficient organisation that does not receive the attention that it should, obsessed as the Kommentariat is with Russian failures, malfeasance and Kremlinology.

ELECTIONS. As usual United Russia dominated in Sunday’s local elections. Well, if you were a Russian, would you vote for Zhirinovskiy? the Communists? for any of the latest dozen quarrelling “liberal” parties? What do they have to offer?

WEAPONS PRODUCTION. The Russian Armed Forces are re-equipping themselves and the effort is revealing problems in what is left of the former Soviet weapons industry. I was interested to see that the Ground Forces head told the Federation Council that Russian ground weapons were below NATO and Chinese standards and over-priced as well. Here is a rather gloomy accounting of the latest armaments program about half way through its term. Not unconnected with this is the announcement that Moscow is in talks with France to buy light armoured vehicles for the border guards.

UMAROV. The UNSC has put Doku Umarov on its terrorist list. High time.

LIBYA. The Foreign Minister has just said that the Arab countries should take the lead in formulating the international response to the situation in Libya and that Moscow will base its policy on their views.

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)

Medvedev Speech Sign of Split?

Note February 2016. These were done for the Russia Profile Weekly Experts’ Panel which I cannot find on the Net now. Many were picked up by other sources and I have given links where I can find them.

http://www.expat.ru/analitics.php?item=940

JRL/2011/ 46/12

Medvedev’s speech will be mined to serve the current ruling theme of Russian coverage: is the Duumvirate about to split? But Putin and Medvedev have been a team for some years and they claim to be carrying out the same program. Considering that Putin could be President today had he wanted to be, that he chose Medvedev and that the two claim to be in accord, more effort should be spent in seeing where they agree than looking for invented differences. Medvedev took the opportunity of the anniversary to situate the present course of reforms in Russian history and make a claim that it is a continuation of the Tsar Liberator’s policy. Far from espousing opposing views, one can find many of Medvedev’s points in Putin’s speeches.

One of Medvedev’s major themes was that neither the “fantasy about our nation’s special way” nor “the Soviet experiment” proved to be “the most viable, long-lived ideas”; rather, he claims, the “normal, humane order” of Aleksandr II was the correct course. Neither Nikolay I nor Stalin was correct. Putin described communism as “a road to a blind alley” (1999) and “Our goals are very clear. We want high living standards and a safe, free and comfortable life. We want a mature democracy and a developed civil society” (2004). Not so different.

Medvedev’s other emphasis was the importance of freedom: “The aim of modernisation and progress has always been to enhance freedom in society.” Here is Putin: “Meanwhile, it is not possible to have a strong state without respect for human rights and freedoms” and “Our essential task is to learn how to use the state levers for ensuring freedom, freedom of the individual, freedom of entrepreneurship, free development of civil society institutions.” (2000) And “our goal is for our civil society to mature, grow, gain in strength and understand its own strength. (2010)” So, again, not so different.

Other points of agreement can be found. In 2000 Putin said “Many of our failures are rooted in the fact that civil society is underdeveloped”. He praised modernisation in 2007:Our task is to diversify the economy and make it more innovative.” He too wants Russia to become more “European”: “real integration into Europe [is] our historical choice” (2003). Many more quotations that march with Medvedev’s speech could be enumerated if space limitations did not preclude them.

When Putin became President, a common descriptor of Russia was “free fall” and Putin saw “strengthening the state” as the necessary pre-condition for everything else. While this made sense then, I have believed for some time that the control must now be loosened and that is evidently Medvedev’s task. There is nothing to suggest that Putin disagrees with that and much in his speeches over the past decade to show that he agrees.

Clearly there is a difference between rhetoric and achievement: realities intervene and priorities change. But, on a rhetorical level, we can see that the important points of Medvedev’s speech are in accord with earlier statements by Putin. There is no reason to assume that the one contradicts the other.

I operate on the assumption that Putin and Medvedev have worked as a team for some years, that they are still a team and that they are following the same general plan whose outline can be seen in Putin’s essay of 1999. This is, after all, what they say they are doing. Until I see real evidence, rather than mere speculation, I will take them at their word and continue to assume that they are generally in agreement on means and ends. Same plan, new phase.

 

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP 10 March 2011

US-RUSSIA. US Vice President Biden is in Moscow. He says that Russia’ accession to the WTO is a top priority, (although hinted that it depended on Russia’s human rights record) and may have made approving noises about ending the absurdly out-of-date Jackson Vanik Amendment. He reportedly told Putin that visa-free travel between Russia and the US was “a good idea”. Well, we’ll see. As to the WTO, it is quite absurd that Russia is not a member. During the time Russia has spent trying to get into it, Oman, Côte d’Ivoire, China, Cuba, Zimbabwe and others have entered. No problems with “human rights” there apparently. Russians could be forgiven for thinking that the WTO is not the economic organisation that it purports to be but really a political organisation. Members appear to have a quasi-veto and Tbilisi is quite happy to use its. A Russian official claims that Biden said that Washington had tried to talk Tbilisi out of opposing Russian membership. But I wonder how much influence Washington has on Tbilisi these days over what is the only pressure point on Moscow that Saakashvili has.

AFGHANISTAN SUPPLY. With good timing, Medvedev signed the law ratifying the agreement with Washington on military transit to Afghanistan via Russia. Another attack on a NATO fuel convoy in Pakistan a couple of weeks ago.

CORRUPTION. Two significant cases this week. Yesterday the Duma sanctioned the arrest of a Deputy from the LDPR. He is accused of significant fraud and embezzlement connected with construction in Moscow. The Duma stripped him of his immunity in November – the fourth Deputy to have lost it. Criminal proceedings were instituted in Primorskiy Kray in another embezzlement case. The suspect is the former director of a plant and the charge is that he expropriated money Japan had contributed three years ago to a program for the safe disposal of nuclear submarines.

THE THIRD TURN. Something that I’m sure would not have happened a couple of years ago is that a Russian company won the tender to operate the container terminal at the port of Tallinn Port beating out nine other bidders including an Estonian firm.

CHECHNYA. On Saturday, with Medvedev’s nomination, Ramzan Kadyrov was unanimously confirmed for another 5-year term as head of Chechnya by its parliament. Whether it likes it or not, Moscow is pretty well stuck with him. I have long been of the opinion that the people now running Chechnya, mostly people who fought Moscow in the first war, have learned that de jure independence is too costly in blood and risks the danger of a takeover of Chechnya by international jihadism. So they have decided to game Moscow with effusive protestations of loyalty and improbable voting results for the pedestal party while inching their way towards de facto independence. If this is true, there isn’t much Moscow can do about it.

LIBYA. Medvedev signed on to the UN sanctions package. It remains opposed to international intervention. There are, I believe two principal reasons for its opposition. Moscow questions the wisdom of intervention in something that grows messier by the day, especially when it is encouraged by hyperbolic reporting that may not prove correct in the end. A bit of intervention can easily become a lot of intervention. The other reason is that Moscow is highly suspicious of the “international community”, or some part of it, making decisions about what regime is acceptable and what is not. It remembers the Kosovo intervention (speaking of a “little” turning into a “lot” and hyperbolic reporting) and fears the same could be applied to it. The current Russian government prefers the international status quo.

© Patrick Armstrong, Ottawa, Canada

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP 3 March 2011

POLICE REFORM. The new law took effect on Tuesday (see here for a discussion of its provisions). As if in celebration, Medvedev dismissed seven high ranking police officers from around the country. And high-ranking they are indeed. No reasons were given. He had a meeting with Interior Minister Nurgaliyev and signed a number of decrees moving the effort forward. Something I have often wondered about is how one gets from here (an institution with a culture of corruption and incompetence) to there (something much better). It appears (but the wording of his instructions to Nurgaliyev is not clear and this is my best guess of what Medvedev told him) that all members of the present force (“militia”) will be, as it were, passed through a sieve and either dismissed or allowed to join the new force (“police”). Senior officers will be examined by the Head of the Presidential Administration, Sergey Naryshkin, and approved by Medvedev. So, it would appear that everyone’s job is at risk. The examinations are to be complete by 1 June which, only two months away, seems an unrealistically early date. Given the existing corruption as well as the powerful resistance all bureaucracies present to change that threatens their “corporate will”, this is a very tall order and certainly all the crooks and incompetents will not be weeded out by then. But one assumes that if someone slips through the sieve by bribing his superior or by lying and is caught, he will be subject to instant dismissal. Those who are interested in reforming intransigent and locked-in bureaucracies run mad, should watch this experiment carefully.

MISSILE DEFENCE. Foreign Minister Lavrov has called for a formal agreement that NATO and Russia will not target each other with their defence systems; he says Moscow is willing to sign. Such a formal declaration – which is supposed to be NATO’s official policy anyway – will go some of the distance to resolve differences between the two. I repeat that Moscow has no reason to trust any informal declaration from NATO.

GOVERNORS. In January Medvedev said that he had already replaced one third of the regional heads: “I think it is a normal, objective practice… And all governors should understand that they have two, three terms at the most to prove themselves… Secondly, people need to understand that they can’t be in office forever.” Two more have just gone – Kamchatka Oblast and the Karachay-Cherkess Republic. This too is part of “modernisation”.

“PUTIN’S PALACE”. So-called. A medium sized flap over this monster house (“a billion dollars”) allegedly being built for Putin. Turns out it’s a hotel and conference centre and it has just been bought by a Russian plutocrat. But, no doubt, the anti-Putinites will say this is just a cover story: for them everything visible in Russia is a manipulated illusion covering what’s really happening. Oddly enough, they alone have penetrated the deception and uncovered the Truth.

PEOPLE POWER. The Blue Buckets are back in their campaign against “blue lights”. Their latest stunt is handing out stickers for cars that read “I only give way to 01, 02, 03,” (the emergency numbers for police, fire and ambulance services). The Moscow police, as usual, don’t know how to react to these clever campaigns.

RETURN. Last week four families of Old Believers (23 people) returned to Russia from Bolivia. They are to be given land in Primorskiy Kray.

GORBACHEV. Was 80 yesterday and Medvedev awarded him the Order of St Andrew. I invite you all to consider what the world would look like today had Viktor Grishin been chose as GenSek in 1985, as he might have been. Grishin died in 1992. Incidentally, in contrast with the way Yeltsin treated Gorbachev, the Duumvirate is much more respectful.

BUSHEHR. On 26 February Iran announced that it was unloading the fuel from the reactor for “technical reasons”; on Tuesday another spokesman said fuel was not being unloaded. The same day RosAtom (which would be doing the work) said it was being unloaded because of the possibility that metal particles could get into the machinery. The Iranian nuclear program is not going well and common speculation centres on the Stuxnet virus. The story is very murky and it will likely be years – if ever – before we find out what happened but there are those who see a Russian connection.

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)

Russia and US Missile Defence

Note February 2016. These were done for the Russia Profile Weekly Experts’ Panel which I cannot find on the Net now. Many were picked up by other sources and I have given links where I can find them.

http://www.russialist.org/archives/russia-missile-defense-feb-456.php

Missile defence is prudent: while there may be no realised threats at present, there may well be in a decade and, since any system will take time to emplace, starting today makes sense. Moscow knows that it could also be on the target list.

From Moscow’s perspective, involvement in a defence scheme with NATO has difficulties. The first is trust. The West likes to think that it is honourable and open but Moscow is not so convinced. NATO expansion took place despite a promise made to Gorbachev and it was soon evident that it was an expansion to include anyone but Russia. Distrust was hardened by the Kosovo war which Moscow perceived as NATO arrogating to itself the right to decide where borders should be. The “coloured revolutions” in Ukraine and Georgia (do we still count the “Tulip Revolution”?) intensified the distrust. And the West’s uncritical swallowing of Saakashvili’s story in the Ossetia war made things worse.

But events have moved on: NATO expansion appears to be over, NATO no longer boasts about successes in Kosovo, the “coloured revolutions” have failed and Saakashvili is no longer the democratic darling. (I have argued elsewhere that we are seeing a “third turn” in the West’s view of Russia; http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/2010/11/the-third-turn.html#more). But Moscow is no longer, as perhaps it was in the early 1990s, prepared to take NATO at its word.

The second problem involves the “higher nonsense” of nuclear calculations. I say “nonsense” because, even if a defence system could stop 90% of Russia’s warheads, the 10% that got through would constitute by far the greatest disaster that the USA had ever suffered. Even a “small” nuclear exchange would be an unimaginable catastrophe for each, no matter which “won”. Nonetheless, people in the nuclear business do make these calculations of first-strikes, secure second-strikes and all the rest. I suspect, however, that Moscow’s nuclear arsenal has as much to do with prestige as anything else. Many in Moscow are still frightened by the possibility that Russia could become an insignificant country helplessly watching other mightier powers make decisions. Being the second nuclear power is some assurance that it will not be ignored.

Moscow is also aware that for a significant sector of Western opinion – shrinking I believe, but still influential – Russia is the eternal enemy. For these people, President Obama’s decision to stop the plan for missile defence in Poland and the Czech Republic was a betrayal and a sell-out to Moscow (despite the fact that previously they had argued that the deployments had nothing to do with Russia). (See http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/2009/09/unguided-missiles.html#more).

For these reasons Moscow is cautious and sceptical: NATO’s assurances cannot be taken at face value; Russia’s theoretical “nuclear deterrence” could be weakened; the significant anti-Russia group (and Moscow probably takes it more seriously than it deserves) will always work to twist any intentions against Moscow’s interests.

Nonetheless, given the threat posed to NATO and Russia by what used to be called “rogue states” with small numbers of nuclear weapons and missiles, a common defence makes sense.

A compromise between the two positions is not hard to imagine: Russian and NATO sectors as separate but integrated at a central headquarters. Similar solutions have been found before – NORAD, for example – and with good will, something like that could square the circle. An effective defence could be built and Russians would be assured that it was not pointed at them.

When one considers how far this issue has evolved – all previous Russian efforts to get involved having been rejected – some optimism is warranted.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP 24 February 2011

REVOLUTIONS. The Arab Revolution is making a few people (Gorbachev for one) speculate about the possibility of a similar rising in Russia. Speculation about a Russian “Arab scenario” is little more than wishful thinking from a negligible opposition that agrees on almost nothing. The “Arab revolution” is sui generis: rulers-for-life enriching their circle while impoverishing everyone else and populations in which half are under 30 or 25 with little to hope for. And some outside advice. This is not Russia: simply stated, the necessary conditions are not there. The Duumvirate remains popular and for good reason: Russians can see and touch the improvement in their situation over the past decade. If in 15-20 years the same people were on top still taking about police reform, cooruption and modernisation that would be a different story. However, some of the other post Soviet states, especially those with rulers-for-life, could develop that way. One place to keep an eye on is Georgia: if Saakashvili contrives to stay in power (as he seems to be trying) and we have another few years of stagnation and blaming everything on Russia, it could happen there – at least some of the opposition says so.

DEMOGRAPHICS. Generally speaking the government’s efforts to correct the demographic decline by working at each end of the problem – ie birth and death rates – is showing good effects. Anatoly Karlin follows developments in greater detail than I; here is his latest entry. Population decline was never an exclusive Russian problem – most of the former communist countries had similar numbers (see below for one of the contributing factors) – and Russia is starting to pull away from its neighbours. The Health Minister unveiled a new program for 2011-2015 which aims to keep the population at least at the current level.

BOOZE. Figures from the WHO claim that Russia ranks fourth highest in the world in alcohol consumption (interactive data by regions here – this site is excellent for statistics, by the way). Interestingly, nine of the top ten on the list enjoyed the blessings of communism. That is a little too coincidental.

CORRUPTION. The push against illegal gambling in Moscow continues: the police chief claims that 388 illegal casinos have been shut down in the last six weeks. And, naturally, that’s not the only involvement of the legal authorities: the Moscow Oblast prosecutor and a number of other officials have been suspended during the investigation. Bribery is suspected.

DISMISSAL. Medvedev has dismissed the FSB deputy head Vyacheslav Ushakov at the request, we are told, of the FSB head. “Shortcomings in his work and code of ethics violations” were the reasons given. I’m sure there’s more to the story but we may never hear it.

TRIALS. The Governor of Magadan was murdered in 2002 and four people have just been sentenced. Some of this rather excessive delay is due to the fact that the two principals had to first be extradited from Spain. The trial for the murders of lawyer Stanislav Markelov and reporter Anastasia Baburova has begun. I wonder if the Kommentariat will take notice of that because it goes against its meme that Putin is killing reporters and nothing is done about it.

KHODORKOVSKIY VERDICT. Veniamin Yakovlev, adviser to Medvedev for justice, says he is ashamed to hear the allegation that the verdict was dictated to the judge from on high and that the allegation must be investigated. I haven’t the faintest idea what this means: a private opinion? (does a Presidential advisor of six years standing have private opinions that he publicly expresses)? A hint that the verdict could be overturned? That a really serious investigation of the whole Khodorkovskiy case will be conducted? That a better cover-up will be contrived? His retirement speech? Stay tuned.

INVESTMENT. General Motors announced that it intends to double output at its St Petersburg plant in 2011.

GAMSAKHURDIA. A Georgian Parliamentary Commission, headed by his son Konstantin, has concluded that Zviad Gamsakhurdia could not have committed suicide in 1993 as reported (I have always called it an “assisted suicide”). Gamsakhurdia was the author of much of Georgia’s present problems and was overthrown by a coup which brought Shevardnadze in to be its “beard”.

MANAS AIRPORT. It has just been announced that a Russian-Kyrgyz JV has been created to supply jet fuel to Manas airbase. Given the scandals associated with the last supplier, its alleged connections to the Bakiyev regime and Otunbayeva’s criticisms of its present behaviour, I expect that this consortium will get the contract.

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP 17 February 2011

KURILES. I’m mystified why this issue has suddenly boiled up. Perhaps Medvedev’s visit last November has driven the two capitals into the inevitable rhetorical exchanges. Attempts are being made to calm things down: the two foreign ministers have promised to talk calmly and the chief of Antiaircraft and Missile Troops, responding to a suggestion that S-400 SAMs be deployed there, dismissed the idea as excessive and dangerous. The principal Japanese opposition leader has criticised his government for its language. At present each claims the islands and it is not easy to see how a compromise can appear. But there is at least one international example that might serve as a model – the Åland Islands.

KHODORKOVSKIY. An aide to the judge who sentenced Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev to another prison term has said: “Higher echelons didn’t like the verdict, so it was replaced by another one”. The judge denies it, and, although the aide fully expects to be fired, the court says “it has no plans” to do so. Apart from any other considerations, there has always been a strong political content to the prosecutions because Khodorkovskiy was trying to gain control of the Duma and thence the government.

POLICE REFORM. A detailed analysis of the new law is presented here by my colleague Gordon Hahn. On paper the reform looks good and even if execution is only 50%, it will be a huge improvement.

TOURISTS. One of the more noticeable changes since 1990 is that Russian tourists are all over the place (enough, as I have observed myself, to make it worthwhile to print souvenir booklets in Russian). According to RIAN, 2009’s three favourite destinations were Turkey, Egypt and China; there were about 7 million Russian tourists.

RUSSIA-UK. Moscow-London relations have been rather bad for some time. Moscow is not amused that Berezovskiy has a safe haven there to continue his attempts to overthrow the Russian government and there have been several painful events regarding British companies. The Litvinenko affair irritates both capitals. But, very gradually, relations are improving. Foreign Minister Lavrov has been visiting and so far, the atmosphere seems to be cautiously friendlier. But there is a long way to go: perhaps a serious investigation of the Litvinenko affair would be a good place to start.

EDUCATION. It’s being reformed too. The ministry has posted the projected standards for high school education (Russian) on its website; the idea is to encourage public discussion. Subjects will be taught at “minimum” and “dedicated” levels depending on the student’s choice. Subjects will be grouped as follows: Russia and literature (including the appropriate second language: eg Tatar, Ossetian et al); foreign languages; mathematics and computer science; social sciences; natural sciences; arts or an optional subject. Four subjects will remain compulsory: Russia in the World, life safety basics, physical training and a personal research project. This is supposed to come into effect in 2020. What ought to strike an observer from the West is how solid these subjects are.

CORRUPTION. Yesterday the FSB raided a Moscow Oblast police station over alleged links to illegal gambling; two police officers having been arrested the day before. Medvedev has submitted a draft law to the Duma increasing penalties for accepting bribes and kickbacks.

LUZHKOVS. Police have raided Baturina’s company Inteco. I do believe that we will see charges laid eventually.

COSSACKS. Medvedev has proposed the creation of an All-Russian Cossack Association to unite Cossacks. “The Cossack Question” is something that never quite seems to get off the ground. They exist – or at least there are people who believe themselves to be Cossacks and organise themselves that way – and from time to time the government has muttered about Cossack self-defence organisations, Cossacks assisting the police, or Cossack units in the Army, but nothing much ever seems to happen.

DEMOS. Now there are plenty on Moscow – although none very large. Fearing another nationalist rally, police cordoned off Manezh Square last week and made some arrests. A sanctioned “anti fascist” rally organised by the Caucasus Congress passed off quietly. The sanctioned “Day of Wrath” rally attracted a few hundred but arrests were made as the Left Front movement leader Sergey Udaltsov attempted to move to the Presidential Administration building. I suppose that protests about the inability to protest will die away.

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP 10 February 2011

POLICE REFORM. The Police Reform Bill has been passed and signed into law; a simple summary of it by RIA/Novosti is here. Symbolically they will now be called “Police” rather than the revolutionary-sounding “Militia” and will get new uniforms resembling, we’re told, the Tsarist ones. Perhaps the most important part of the reform is that presently serving police will interviewed for their jobs, so to speak, and 20% will be let go. This last strikes at the heart of the problem, which is that too many serving police are corrupt and incompetent. But, as a former bureaucrat myself, I doubt that the process will thin them out much. This is undeniably another step but it takes a long time to change.

ARMS TREATIES. With the new START out of the way – Medvedev signed on the 28th and Obama on the 3rd – there is talk of new arms control discussions between Washington and Moscow. Obama said Washington intended to initiate talks on tactical nuclear weapons, of which Russia is believed to hold many more than the US. At the Munich security conference the Russian Foreign Minister called for re-animation of the CFE Treaty which Moscow finally denounced after NATO kept piling conditions on ratification. This was a particularly useful treaty: it was one of the few disarmament treaties that actually destroyed weapons and the inspection regime and data exchanges were great confidence and transparency builders. At the same conference the US Secretary of State called for cooperation on missile defence and talks at NATO began today on that subject.

THE THIRD TURN. The only mention of Russia in the new US National Military Strategy document speaks of cooperation.

KURILES. Yesterday Medvedev held a meeting with the Regional Development and Defence Ministers regarding the Kurile Islands and gave instructions to improve living conditions and defence readiness. At the same time it was announced that the first two Mistral class ships will be based in the Far East. The island chain runs from Kamchatka to Hokkaido; the issue with Japan relates to islands at the south of the chain: specifically Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and a few tiny islands (Habomais), not those north of 45º30’. But, as it happens, the troops that Russia has out there are based on the first two. This is an issue that is very neuralgic in Japan and is legally rather murky. For a long time it was a block in investments – although perhaps no more with the new Toyota agreement. Why Moscow is today talking about defence of these rather insignificant and poverty-stricken islands I do not know.

LUZHKOV’S MOSCOW. The noose does appear to be tightening, The Audit Chamber’s investigation, at the request of the new Mayor, found significant misspending on the transportation sector (especially on Moscow City’s airline – !!??). The head of the Metro resigned amid allegations of unlawful diversion of funds. Luzhkov himself is not having a lot of luck at finding a safe haven.

31. Alexeyeva’s demonstration attracted about 500 people and passed off without incident. When it finished Limonov and a few dozen tried his: they were arrested but quickly released.

KHODORKOVSKIY. Some see hints of a pardon for Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev in Medvedev’s request to the “legal expert community” to look into the case. The Moscow City Court has opened review proceedings on the second trial. But for a pardon Khodorkovskiy has to admit his guilt and this he has said he will not do.

CORRUPTION. The Public Chamber has announced that it will open a phone hotline and a website to receive citizens’ reports of official corruption; perhaps it will name corrupt officials: one author says it will be a “hall of shame”. This follows another reporting site created by the tax service last month

DOMODEDOVO BOMBING. More security chiefs have been fired; two suspects have been arrested. Doku Umarov, the leader of Caucasus Emirate, claimed credit for the bombing but the authorities doubt it, saying that it was an independent cell.

KAZAKHSTAN. Nazarbayev has modestly admitted that he’s prepared to serve for as long as the people want him. In short he will run in April and win. Perhaps he should look at the news from Tunisia and Egypt.

BELARUS. Minsk is back in the Western doghouse with the USA and the EU imposing new sanctions; on the other hand it is reported that nearly all the problems with Russia have been solved.

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP 27 January 2011

DOMODEDOVO. A suicide bomber team killed and wounded many in the arrivals area of Domodedovo Airport. Not the first time jihadists have attacked outside the security zone and we will see more. It is possible that this attack may wake up Westerners to the reality that it’s all the same thing: the NORAD commander appears to understand. On the other hand, others still blame the “Putin system”; one assumes these editorialists blamed the December Stockholm bomb on the “Reinfeldt system”. Medvedev has dismissed several officials, blaming lax security. Some of this is the ancient Russian tradition of pretending to solve the problem by firing somebody, but it also fits with Medvedev’s policy of clearing out deadwood.

START. The Duma finally ratified the agreement on Tuesday by a comfortable margin and the Federation Council did so the next day. The question of missile defence is still a potential stumbling block and Russia will denounce the Treaty if it feels US developments in this area threaten it. But that was always the reality and one hopes that a rational settlement will be found.

OPPOSITION ALLIANCE. The alliance of Limonov and his NatBols with the liberals, about which so much was written a few months ago, appears to be over. It was always unnatural: the two groups have quite different aims, no matter how much they may share a dislike of Putin. Lyudmila Alexeyeva appears to be emerging as the principal leader; she has the advantage of not being tainted by the Yeltsin years and Putin cannot say about her what he said about some of the Yeltsin-era oppositionists: “they want to come back and refill their pockets”. She has broken with Limonov who is now calling himself head of the Other Russia party but doesn’t appear to have taken over the website (registration of his party was turned down yesterday). The authorities are probably not unhappy with this development and Moscow City has (again) given permission for her group to demonstrate on the 31st but not Limonov’s. Limonov will likely show up anyway for some street theatre.

THE NEW MEDIA. Medvedev, who must be one of the most Internet-savvy leaders around, had quite a bit to say about it at Davos. It leads to the “creation of communities of people… in different countries… by a shared goal or idea, and no national government can claim to have a strong impact on such communities” (as we see in Egypt and elsewhere today). There are dangers that criminals or terrorists use it. But “this universal connectedness must become a powerful driver of economic growth”. He promised “Russia will not support initiatives that may jeopardise Internet freedom”. There is general agreement that the New Media flourishes in Russia and the government leaves it alone.

LENIN’S TOMB. I think it’s finally going to happen. The official line has always been that the body will be buried in St Petersburg when the population wants it. A Duma Deputy started the current campaign and there is a website on which people can vote; so far a solid majority wants the body moved out of Red Square. So, what will replace the Mausoleum? My bet is whatever was there before. And what about the Kremlin wall necropolis, Stalin’s ashes and all the rest of the Communist Pantheon? Surely, if Lenin goes, Stalin and the others have to too.

ANOTHER OIL ENGAGEMENT PARTY. RosNeft and ExxonMobil have made an agreement to jointly develop hydrocarbon findings in the Russian part of the Black Sea. The wedding season has come early to Russia!

MURDER. Last week another mass murder was discovered – most of a family of a local crime boss was found dead in a garage in Stavropol. Will it be discovered, in this case too, that the local authorities were providing cover for him or for his murderers?

KACZINSKI CRASH. Two defenders of the Russian findings have spoken up. David Learmount accepts them. Poland’s lead investigator agrees. As the first said of the report: “It does not make happy reading for the Polish people or their government, and indeed they are finding its truths difficult to swallow”.

FRIENDS AGAIN. It is claimed that practically all the problems between Moscow and Minsk have been resolved. Of course, now that the West has decided it doesn’t like Lukashenka (again), he doesn’t have many alternatives. There was a brief moment there when Belarus was being spun as a fellow victim of Moscow’s “gas weapon”.

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada (see http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/)

Russian Arab Spring?

Note February 2016. These were done for the Russia Profile Weekly Experts’ Panel which I cannot find on the Net now. Many were picked up by other sources and I have given links where I can find them.

http://www.russialist.org/archives/russia-government-democracy-tunisia-uprising-protests-poll-jan-277.php

The chance of a Tunisian scenario in Russia is something less than zero. The conditions simply don’t exist.

The popular revolt in Tunisia – I assume it was not a phoney revolution like the “Orange Revolution” or the “Rose revolution” or the now-forgotten “Tulip Revolution” – was a result of revulsion at years of hopelessness and stagnation.

In Russia, innumerable polls, over many years – see, for example, the Levada data at http://www.russiavotes.org/ – show that Russians appreciate the steady improvement of their own living conditions and give the government a great deal of credit for it. They show no naïve belief that everything is wonderful, but they do show a steady increase in optimism (or reduction in pessimism) for the future and improvement of present circumstances. The Duumvirate is popular – most governments would love to have a constant 60-70% support in difficult times. The Levada data is especially useful because, with ten to fifteen years of results for a given question, one can make direct comparisons and observe trends. Other polling organisations show the same trends.

In short, the Putin Team has generally provided the things that people hire governments for.

Thus, the underlying conditions that sparked the Tunisian revolt do not exist in Russia. Observers who take the effort to analyse polling data rather than lazily phone up names on the Rolodex their predecessors bequeathed them would understand this.

But, nonetheless, those who predicted the collapse of the “Putin system” with Kushchevskaya, last summer’s fires, the expected collapse of the Russian economy in the global financial crisis, riots in Vladivostok, Beslan, the “Orange Revolution”, the Kursk sinking, the debt crisis, apartment bombings, the “virtual economy” (I keep a file of this stuff), will quarry the “Tunisian parallel” for indicators. Until the next thing pops up. Same story, new indicators.

I am dumfounded by the endless speculation about how Putin and Medvedev are struggling under the blanket and that Putin will re-appear as President. If Putin had wanted a third (and fourth and fifth) term, all he had to do was arrange for one little clause in the Constitution to be changed. And no one can doubt that he could have, and many wanted him to. But he didn’t. Why would he go through this elaborate charade to get back?

Perhaps he and Medvedev are part of the same team, carrying out the same program. As they say they are.

But what do they know?